[Goose]

Almost all militaries are paying attention. The problem is what conclusions should be drawn from what they see. The war in Ukraine has many very unique characteristics that may or may not be applicable to wars "in general". The world's militaries have a long history of preparing to re-fight the last war. When the next war comes, it is then substantially different from the war they prepared to fight. There is also a very long history of journalists writing articles about the impact of "new weapons" or "new tactics" that turn out to be totally misguided a month or so later.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using drones in many cases because they have no alternative weapons system they can deploy. In very few cases is the drone the "best" choice, but is the one they can build in quantity. Ukraine can certainly impose a "cost" on Russia to defend itself against these drone attacks. The idea that such defense is "impossible" is refuted by Ukraine's own efforts against the Shaheds. Russia can pretty easily defend the 5 "critical" ports, but they have to actually do it. That imposes a cost, and such defense is never perfect. That said, Ukraine hasn't built a "war winner".

True enough, the drones are not war winners but Russia has I think limited resources and it can order up all kinds of stuff, but how much of what they want can they buy or build?

Russia unfortunately already has LOTS of what is needed to defend against "medium sized" drones in the class of Shahed-xxx. Ukraine has been using old, obsolete Gepard AAA systems against drones of this class. Russia built 6,500 ZSU-23-4s (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZSU-23-4_Shilka) which are similar in capability. They have plenty sitting around. Their radar ("Gun Dish" https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/1...88.en.html) is "good enough" for this task. Russia would need to get them out of long-term storage, fix them up well enough to work, and surround the critical infrastructure at the ports with them. Russia can do this. It is not a "high-tech, high cost" activity. It is mostly a manpower intensive job and I imagine lots of soldiers would volunteer for this duty. Beats the trenches in Ukraine. One does need lots of them because of their short effective range, but like the Gepard they work great against targets that have no SEAD capability. Zoo-23s were used by the North Vietnamese. They were a significant problem until the Shrike came along. After that, not so much. FWIW Ukraine uses ZSU-23-4Ms themselves.

The more holes Ukraine punches in Putin's balloon will only make life harder for him. He might find himself too close to an upper story  window. The more hits on Mother Russia will on one hand gain him some support, but on the other hand he will lose some.  At what, 71? his remaining time in the saddle is limited.

I totally agree that the more Ukraine can demonstrate the capability to "hurt" Russia, even minimally, the more problems the regime must confront. It is also correct that some of this damage actually will require a response. It does raise questions of confidence to go along with any real damage it causes. However, I would caution that it also angers the public against the Ukrainians. While eventually the public may begin to question why Putin put them in such a difficult position, that only comes "later" and only if the problems are serious enough to "matter". The anger comes immediately and will be fanned by the Russian government for their own ends. It is a very non-linear process and it will significantly strengthen Putin in the near term. He may even be able to get away with a "mobilization" in response to the "threat". It is still important for Ukraine to do these things, but it is equally important to understand the probable results. I expect Ukraine does already know this.

As far as Putin leaving power, the tendency has been to assume that is a near-term probability. IMO that isn't a "good" assumption. While Putin is 71, Biden is 81. Trump is 77. Of course, any of us could die tomorrow, but I am pretty sure Putin fully expects to be around in 10 years. He will act accordingly. If it means a long war, so be it.

[Goose]

Almost all militaries are paying attention. The problem is what conclusions should be drawn from what they see. The war in Ukraine has many very unique characteristics that may or may not be applicable to wars "in general". The world's militaries have a long history of preparing to re-fight the last war. When the next war comes, it is then substantially different from the war they prepared to fight. There is also a very long history of journalists writing articles about the impact of "new weapons" or "new tactics" that turn out to be totally misguided a month or so later.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using drones in many cases because they have no alternative weapons system they can deploy. In very few cases is the drone the "best" choice, but is the one they can build in quantity. Ukraine can certainly impose a "cost" on Russia to defend itself against these drone attacks. The idea that such defense is "impossible" is refuted by Ukraine's own efforts against the Shaheds. Russia can pretty easily defend the 5 "critical" ports, but they have to actually do it. That imposes a cost, and such defense is never perfect. That said, Ukraine hasn't built a "war winner".

True enough, the drones are not war winners but Russia has I think limited resources and it can order up all kinds of stuff, but how much of what they want can they buy or build?

Russia unfortunately already has LOTS of what is needed to defend against "medium sized" drones in the class of Shahed-xxx. Ukraine has been using old, obsolete Gepard AAA systems against drones of this class. Russia built 6,500 ZSU-23-4s (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZSU-23-4_Shilka) which are similar in capability. They have plenty sitting around. Their radar ("Gun Dish" https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/1...88.en.html) is "good enough" for this task. Russia would need to get them out of long-term storage, fix them up well enough to work, and surround the critical infrastructure at the ports with them. Russia can do this. It is not a "high-tech, high cost" activity. It is mostly a manpower intensive job and I imagine lots of soldiers would volunteer for this duty. Beats the trenches in Ukraine. One does need lots of them because of their short effective range, but like the Gepard they work great against targets that have no SEAD capability. Zoo-23s were used by the North Vietnamese. They were a significant problem until the Shrike came along. After that, not so much. FWIW Ukraine uses ZSU-23-4Ms themselves.

The more holes Ukraine punches in Putin's balloon will only make life harder for him. He might find himself too close to an upper story  window. The more hits on Mother Russia will on one hand gain him some support, but on the other hand he will lose some.  At what, 71? his remaining time in the saddle is limited.

I totally agree that the more Ukraine can demonstrate the capability to "hurt" Russia, even minimally, the more problems the regime must confront. It is also correct that some of this damage actually will require a response. It does raise questions of confidence to go along with any real damage it causes. However, I would caution that it also angers the public against the Ukrainians. While eventually the public may begin to question why Putin put them in such a difficult position, that only comes "later" and only if the problems are serious enough to "matter". The anger comes immediately and will be fanned by the Russian government for their own ends. It is a very non-linear process and it will significantly strengthen Putin in the near term. He may even be able to get away with a "mobilization" in response to the "threat". It is still important for Ukraine to do these things, but it is equally important to understand the probable results. I expect Ukraine does already know this.

As far as Putin leaving power, the tendency has been to assume that is a near-term probability. IMO that isn't a "good" assumption. While Putin is 71, Biden is 81. Trump is 77. Of course, any of us could die tomorrow, but I am pretty sure Putin fully expects to be around in 10 years. He will act accordingly. If it means a long war, so be it.