12-09-2023, 09:34 AM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-army-unvei...00024.html
"Interesting" article. Here is a quote from Doug Bush, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.
The delay in this program was substantially due to 1) the Army not really knowing what it wanted, 2) constraints on the launch platform and the (ostensible) purpose of the missile, and 3) the changing treaty restrictions on "short range" ballistic missiles. The program started under the assumption the missile must have a range of at most 500 km, which was the treaty limit. Those "in the know" suspected that limit would go away, and steered the program towards a missile with greater range. That of course made it more difficult to build, and still left us with a missile that doesn't (yet) go further. The requirement to use the existing launcher established a very restrictive limit on the size of the missile. It can't be longer or larger in diameter than the existing ATACMS. The added requirement of launching "more than just one missile" from a pod was certainly "nice to have", but this constraint even further restricted the size of the missile.
The main problem however was that the Army was constrained by Air Force vs Army politics to build a "sniper" weapon, one that could take out a single target on short notice with great precision. This missile is great for hitting a "high value target of opportunity" like a terrorist leader on the move or a meeting of senior leadership. However, it is pretty much useless against a large scale target, e.g. a major bridge. The warhead is too small. What a lot of the army actually wanted was a US version of an Iskander, which goes "500 kM" (actually much more, but for political purposes and to "preserve the treaty, we didn't call Russia on it). It carries a warhead of up to 700kg. This missile can really blow up things. The additional problem is that it could carry a nuclear warhead (as the Iskander can). This was considered too destabilizing for the Army to possess, and besides, blowing up bridges is an Air Force job anyway. This "tension" led to slow rolling the program, hoping that somehow the Army could get a missile with a big enough warhead to be "general purpose" tactically useful. That didn't happen.
The Ukrainians are pushing the narrative that since we now have PrSM, we can give them lots of ATACMS. I support giving Ukraine "lots" of ATACMS, but the new PrSM cannot do what the "old" cluster-munition based ATACMS (591 kg warhead) can or even the unitary warhead ATACMS (214 kg warhead) can. This also means the PrSM cannot do the original ATACMS mission and is NOT a replacement. If we have to go to war with a "peer" competitor, I dearly hope there are enough of the "old" missiles around to fill the gap. Maybe we can borrow some from the Ukrainians :-).
"Interesting" article. Here is a quote from Doug Bush, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.
Quote:He added that the rapid development and deployment of this capability serve as a "shining example" of the U.S. Army's aggressive use of new procurement authorities granted by the U.S. Congress to swiftly acquire enhanced equipment for American soldiers.Orwellian beyond words!!! The PrSM program languished for years as the "long range precision fires" requirement, issued in 2016. Taking 7 YEARS to develop an upgrade to an existing system isn't "swift" in any world I live in. On top of that, this missile isn't even the one the Army intends to use. They were testing "upgrades" to the seeker (of this as of then not yet deployed missile) in 2020. These "upgrades" aren't scheduled for deployment until 2025! Before anybody gets too excited about the range "in excess of 500 kM", consider the weight of the warhead is 91 kg. It better be a "precision" strike (on something not too sturdy) with such a small warhead.
The delay in this program was substantially due to 1) the Army not really knowing what it wanted, 2) constraints on the launch platform and the (ostensible) purpose of the missile, and 3) the changing treaty restrictions on "short range" ballistic missiles. The program started under the assumption the missile must have a range of at most 500 km, which was the treaty limit. Those "in the know" suspected that limit would go away, and steered the program towards a missile with greater range. That of course made it more difficult to build, and still left us with a missile that doesn't (yet) go further. The requirement to use the existing launcher established a very restrictive limit on the size of the missile. It can't be longer or larger in diameter than the existing ATACMS. The added requirement of launching "more than just one missile" from a pod was certainly "nice to have", but this constraint even further restricted the size of the missile.
The main problem however was that the Army was constrained by Air Force vs Army politics to build a "sniper" weapon, one that could take out a single target on short notice with great precision. This missile is great for hitting a "high value target of opportunity" like a terrorist leader on the move or a meeting of senior leadership. However, it is pretty much useless against a large scale target, e.g. a major bridge. The warhead is too small. What a lot of the army actually wanted was a US version of an Iskander, which goes "500 kM" (actually much more, but for political purposes and to "preserve the treaty, we didn't call Russia on it). It carries a warhead of up to 700kg. This missile can really blow up things. The additional problem is that it could carry a nuclear warhead (as the Iskander can). This was considered too destabilizing for the Army to possess, and besides, blowing up bridges is an Air Force job anyway. This "tension" led to slow rolling the program, hoping that somehow the Army could get a missile with a big enough warhead to be "general purpose" tactically useful. That didn't happen.
The Ukrainians are pushing the narrative that since we now have PrSM, we can give them lots of ATACMS. I support giving Ukraine "lots" of ATACMS, but the new PrSM cannot do what the "old" cluster-munition based ATACMS (591 kg warhead) can or even the unitary warhead ATACMS (214 kg warhead) can. This also means the PrSM cannot do the original ATACMS mission and is NOT a replacement. If we have to go to war with a "peer" competitor, I dearly hope there are enough of the "old" missiles around to fill the gap. Maybe we can borrow some from the Ukrainians :-).