11-05-2023, 08:15 AM
Goose dateline='[url=tel:1699046019' Wrote: 1699046019[/url]']
Ukraine is in an unfortunate strategic situation. Russia has invaded Ukrainian territory, and due to the lack of adequate forces Ukraine had to sit by while Russia built both "major" concrete fortifications and less impressive field fortifications throughout southern Ukraine. Some of these fortifications were protected by vast minefields of an extent comparable to the largest such minefields in WW I and WW II. These fortifications are arrayed in depth, meaning breaking through a "front line" doesn't result in an unimpeded trip to the Sea of Azov. It is however true that the strength of these fortifications varies. Some of them have no minefields, some of them are easily outflanked, and some of them are apparently "optionally manned". Russia has the option of sitting in these fortifications and "playing defense". Ukraine is not a viable state unless it can take back the south. To do that, step 1 is to break the "land bridge". Therefore, Ukraine must attack and breach these fortifications someplace. The most direct route to accomplishing this is to take Melitopl'. Russia knew this and fortified accordingly.
Ukraine is making progress towards this goal, but it is slow. At first glance, one might say that it might just take another 6 months, but the General appears to believe that adequate progress will be impossible. It certainly will be costly, given that virtually every attack has to be a "frontal" one. Ukraine suffers from the WW I problem that their attacks cannot penetrate beyond the range of their artillery and that they must remove minefields in the full view of Russian drones. The also need artillery and artillery shells in large quantities, which are probably not available.
An "antidote" to this situation is, as in WW II, air power. No new technological breakthrough required. Air power can function in several ways. One, it can be used to simply "pulverize" any given fortification. Two, it can be used to suppress fire directed against attacking Ukrainians and/or mine clearance teams. Three, it can be used to attack Russian logistics that supplies these fortifications. Logistics are inherently "mobile" and somewhat thin-skinned. Air power can destroy such targets. This would render the Russian fortifications impotent when they run out of bullets, food, and fuel.
Ukraine doesn't have that air power. They are getting maybe 50 F-16s. They will have pilots who can fly the jet but have no combat experience in 5 months or so (according to US sources). Can this group operate over the Russian fortifications in the South? Can this group attack the Russian logistics enough to degrade the Russian's ability to defend? We better hope so, or if that isn't probable, we need another plan.
The USAF possesses 5 generation aircraft. It also possesses AWACS and significant numbers of EW aircraft. They can also borrow Growlers from the Navy. We also have a much larger highly trained air force. The US would use their 5th gen aircraft to execute the DEAD plan, creating an environment where our 4th gen aircraft can operate successfully. To do that, attacks may be required into Russia proper. Ukraine will have no 5th gen aircraft. Can they successfully execute a DEAD plan, or even a SEAD plan with 4th gen aircraft? If for some reason the USAF had to accomplish that, they could IMO. It would however be costly in pilots, aircraft, and HARMs. (That is a big reason why we invested in stealth.) It would also be an ongoing effort and it would need airborne EW support. I can see why the General is concerned.
So, is this a "stalemate"? No, because Ukraine is still slowly moving towards Melitopl'. This is "plan A". It may be the General's concern that this can't continue is misplaced. Ukraine has done lots of things we never thought they could. If that momentum ceases, it will be up to the "new" F-16s to do the job. That is "plan B". If that doesn't work, it appears the General is hoping for a "breakthrough" technological solution. One such solution would be the arrival of 5,000 ATACMS unitary warhead missiles in Ukraine. That could really "work over" Russian logistics (and the fortifications themselves for that matter). Since we only have about 400 of them, that could take a while :-). Lets hope "plan A" works.
We may not have 5000 ATACMS to give. But we almost certainly do have 5,000 JDAM-ERs to give. After the initial fanfare, we have heard very little about JDAMs in the war except about their Russian equivalents. Reportedly this is due to widespread GPS jamming. I hope that changing the launch platform to one it was intended for, or software changes could help counteract this.
