[Goose]

Everyone gets wrapped up in Presidential elections, but the real elections are for houses of legislatures. I don't know the political system in Ukraine, but Zelensky will sail to re-election if there is one and he runs. The question is will his party win its representative elections? 

In any case, I'm seeing Ukraine is really taking a serious foothold on the bank of the Dnipro river, and starting to spread the front line out quite a bit. It appears Ukraine is well aware of Russia's proclivity to attack from flanks. What better way to avoid flank attacks than by not allowing any flanks. 

So rather than concentrating forces in one place to get a breakthrough, and then be left vulnerable from the sides of the re-gained territory, UAF seem more inclined to slowly advance on a much wider front line. The territorial gain in terms of area may be the same as a concentrated breakthrough, but it would be spread over a much wider front line. I don't know what the UAF tactics are in terms of what the size of their fighting groups are and how they are equipped, as they move forward, but I do believe Ukraine is going to start moving a lot more personnel and equipment into Zaporizhia as they gain more ground on that side of the Dnipro.

It would appear Russia can't reinforce Zaporizhia much more. They are trying like hell to save Tokmak and committing and losing an absurd number of resources to Avdivka. They simply aren't going to be able to sustain things on three very active fronts. And they face worn out troops trying to survive the Winter against fresher Ukraine forces with better morale.

You love to see it:
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23451

Lets not get carried away. In Kherson Oblast the Russians from day 1 decided not to defend the riverbank. Much of that was attributed to their blowing the dam, but in fact it was also a strategic decision. They wanted to keep their troops outside the artillery footprint of Ukrainian batteries on the other side of the river as much as possible. Ukraine has taken advantage of this to infiltrate commandos into South Kherson, which is indeed a "good thing". They now have established a small group on the left bank of the river. Whether Ukraine intends to keep them there is an open question. It is quite possible Ukraine did this to "force" Russia (due to political considerations, not tactical ones) to actually send troops forward to engage the Ukrainians. These troops will be in the artillery footprint and will suffer heavy casualties.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine have committed "reserves" in South Kherson. It is a relatively "quiet" sector, infantry wise. Neither side likes fighting there because it is all open ground. There is no cover. It is much worse in that regard than even Zaporizhia. However, if Russia doesn't adequately respond and seal off the bridgehead, Ukraine MAY elect to commit more forces to an attack there. Going into winter isn't the ideal time to do that, but if Russia isn't up to the task, take advantage.

This is just another example of the strategic approach both Ukraine and Russia use. Attack everywhere, find a weak spot and reinforce success. Ukraine does have uncommitted reserves, but they have always been loath to go "all in" on anything. It is highly unlikely South Kherson will be heavily reinforced by Ukraine unless Russia simply locally collapses. One thing to consider is that if Ukraine has success in Zaporizhia, Russia would have a much greater supply problem in Crimea. Pulling out of South Kherson may be necessary because they can't supply the troops there. It becomes a large salient that can't be supplied that is also surrounded on two sides by Ukraine and the third side by the sea. It would therefore make sense to pull out, but Russia (Putin) is unlikely to see it that way. Ukraine may very well consider the evacuation of South Kherson as probable and question wasting lives  hurrying it along. That is exactly what they did in the Kherson city area, no reason to expect different now.

[Goose]

Everyone gets wrapped up in Presidential elections, but the real elections are for houses of legislatures. I don't know the political system in Ukraine, but Zelensky will sail to re-election if there is one and he runs. The question is will his party win its representative elections? 

In any case, I'm seeing Ukraine is really taking a serious foothold on the bank of the Dnipro river, and starting to spread the front line out quite a bit. It appears Ukraine is well aware of Russia's proclivity to attack from flanks. What better way to avoid flank attacks than by not allowing any flanks. 

So rather than concentrating forces in one place to get a breakthrough, and then be left vulnerable from the sides of the re-gained territory, UAF seem more inclined to slowly advance on a much wider front line. The territorial gain in terms of area may be the same as a concentrated breakthrough, but it would be spread over a much wider front line. I don't know what the UAF tactics are in terms of what the size of their fighting groups are and how they are equipped, as they move forward, but I do believe Ukraine is going to start moving a lot more personnel and equipment into Zaporizhia as they gain more ground on that side of the Dnipro.

It would appear Russia can't reinforce Zaporizhia much more. They are trying like hell to save Tokmak and committing and losing an absurd number of resources to Avdivka. They simply aren't going to be able to sustain things on three very active fronts. And they face worn out troops trying to survive the Winter against fresher Ukraine forces with better morale.

You love to see it:
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23451

Lets not get carried away. In Kherson Oblast the Russians from day 1 decided not to defend the riverbank. Much of that was attributed to their blowing the dam, but in fact it was also a strategic decision. They wanted to keep their troops outside the artillery footprint of Ukrainian batteries on the other side of the river as much as possible. Ukraine has taken advantage of this to infiltrate commandos into South Kherson, which is indeed a "good thing". They now have established a small group on the left bank of the river. Whether Ukraine intends to keep them there is an open question. It is quite possible Ukraine did this to "force" Russia (due to political considerations, not tactical ones) to actually send troops forward to engage the Ukrainians. These troops will be in the artillery footprint and will suffer heavy casualties.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine have committed "reserves" in South Kherson. It is a relatively "quiet" sector, infantry wise. Neither side likes fighting there because it is all open ground. There is no cover. It is much worse in that regard than even Zaporizhia. However, if Russia doesn't adequately respond and seal off the bridgehead, Ukraine MAY elect to commit more forces to an attack there. Going into winter isn't the ideal time to do that, but if Russia isn't up to the task, take advantage.

This is just another example of the strategic approach both Ukraine and Russia use. Attack everywhere, find a weak spot and reinforce success. Ukraine does have uncommitted reserves, but they have always been loath to go "all in" on anything. It is highly unlikely South Kherson will be heavily reinforced by Ukraine unless Russia simply locally collapses. One thing to consider is that if Ukraine has success in Zaporizhia, Russia would have a much greater supply problem in Crimea. Pulling out of South Kherson may be necessary because they can't supply the troops there. It becomes a large salient that can't be supplied that is also surrounded on two sides by Ukraine and the third side by the sea. It would therefore make sense to pull out, but Russia (Putin) is unlikely to see it that way. Ukraine may very well consider the evacuation of South Kherson as probable and question wasting lives  hurrying it along. That is exactly what they did in the Kherson city area, no reason to expect different now.