[81alum]

Once again, I find myself wanting to consult Goose's expert advice on a NYT article:

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/16/world...mines.html

According to the article, Ukraine was not sufficiently prepared for the variety, quantity, or depth of Russian land mines, and the mines have (almost by themselves) bogged down the "counteroffensive."  Having enormous quantities of land mines is certainly unrelated to the morale or quality of Russian troops, so it would hardly seem to matter that Ukrainian forces have high morale and Russian forces have low morale--in this respect.

US armored vehicles (like the Bradley) save lives but don't really help with a breakthrough.  They get immobilized by anti-tank mines.  Certainly better to be in one than not, since it saves your legs.  But it doesn't exactly create a mobile battlefield.

All in all, it seems pretty pessimistic.  The  Russians can make up with mines  what they lack with everything else.  Or so the article implies.  Thoughts?

[81alum]

Once again, I find myself wanting to consult Goose's expert advice on a NYT article:

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/16/world...mines.html

According to the article, Ukraine was not sufficiently prepared for the variety, quantity, or depth of Russian land mines, and the mines have (almost by themselves) bogged down the "counteroffensive."  Having enormous quantities of land mines is certainly unrelated to the morale or quality of Russian troops, so it would hardly seem to matter that Ukrainian forces have high morale and Russian forces have low morale--in this respect.

US armored vehicles (like the Bradley) save lives but don't really help with a breakthrough.  They get immobilized by anti-tank mines.  Certainly better to be in one than not, since it saves your legs.  But it doesn't exactly create a mobile battlefield.

All in all, it seems pretty pessimistic.  The  Russians can make up with mines  what they lack with everything else.  Or so the article implies.  Thoughts?