[Goose]

We know the Russian ORBAT decently well. Click through the link below for a good article as well. Of course we don't know the actual condition of many of these units. 

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status...03911?s=20

It is a pretty good start, but unfortunately things are less certain than it appears. When a reference is made in the (really interesting) later slides to a "Motor Rifle Regiment", what is that exactly? The Russians have abandoned their BTG structure, but the latent effects include the fact that what used to be a "standard" TO for a given kind of unit varies widely. During the Soviet era, we knew what a Motor Rifle Regiment was supposed to include, how many men, how many BMPs etc. The units differed in their military potential based on their state of training and manning, but even that was systematized into A, B, and C units. You could do "apples to apples" evaluations. Today, it is unknown what any given regiment is supposed to have. On top of that, units have been "reconstituted" with replacement units that are of a different organization and state of training. So, even if ostensibly "fully manned" (whatever that is), they may not be able to fight together because of different training. This is in addition to any additional degradation due to less than optimal conditions inside what they do have. So, it is real hard to know what any given unit can actually do. OTOH, there are all sorts of additional units cited in the tweet that aren't part of the official formations but are present. Normally, I would expect to see "+" or "++" or (reinforced) on many of the tactical symbols reflecting what was going on with these "plus-up" units, but we don't see that. I assume that means nobody knows :-).

Ukrainian less certain and can shift more quickly due to interior lines. We know at least one of the nine new brigades is operating in Velyka Novosilka axis and one on Mala Tokmachka axis. Haven't seen them really near Bakhmut or Luhansk.

Likely some explanation for relative success for Ukraine on Velyka Novosilka axis is less concentration of Russian forces and being right where the Russian Center and South army groupings responsibilities meet up. The operation where we saw all the destroyed Leopards and Bradleys near Mala Tokmachka involved (per Russian reports) 5 different Russian units including GRU Spetznaz, whereas only two Russian regular units seemed to be in the area of all the villages near Velyka Novosilka that Ukraine reclaimed (the above link lists 4 units but I think there was only 2 initially in area).

Like others I think Ukraine is still in a mostly shaping phase. Lots of FPV drone videos and artillery strikes on Russian artillery, mine laying vehicles, ammo resupply trucks. They have been assaulting Russian positions but not with very large groupings, trying to get Russian reinforcements moving so they can get a sense of Russian defensive plans and find weaker spots for coming larger assaults. 

This was a clear eyed article on the challenge for Ukraine.
https://cepa.org/article/twitter-bubbles...offensive/

In other words, Ukraine is trying what no single NATO country has done since the alliance was created in 1949: to conduct large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against a near-peer or peer adversary. It is no exaggeration to say that, at present, no NATO country, with the exception — perhaps — of the US, possesses sufficient capabilities and resources to conduct an operation like this. To put this in perspective, the only time some NATO members fought a large-scale land campaign against a conventional – albeit much weaker – adversary during Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, they enjoyed total air supremacy.

It is a good article, and your previous comments are pretty much spot on IMO. I would only add two things. First, the relatively small size of the Ukrainian groupings is IMO mostly due to a reluctance to give the Russians a lucrative air target. The Ukrainians have the resources to do more, and it is usually a bad idea to use less than overwhelming force if you have that force available. The problem for Ukraine is that if they concentrate to do that, the Russians may inflict major casualties from the air. Keeping the density down mitigates that problem. Second, the US isn't ever intending to execute a combined arms attack where we don't have air superiority and probably supremacy. It is always going to be too costly for the public, if not the troops. Yet, Ukraine is expected to go ahead and execute such an operation anyway. I think the Ukrainians have finally figured out what that means and don't like it one bit :-). They are hoping for a soft spot or that Russian air will under perform. It isn't a welcoming picture I think.

Ukraine has substantial advantages in morale and force quality. I think the supply situation for Russian frontline troops will become increasingly an issue and Ukraine will eventually make some big gains.

We hope so. One question is "Will Ivan fight?" and Ukraine hopes the answer is no. Running out of food, water, and/or ammunition can make one much less belligerent.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-attac...36584.html

This is an example of something that needs to get fixed. These helicopters are difficult targets for SAMs because they stay relatively low and can drop below the radar horizon much more easily that a fixed wing aircraft. One vulnerability they do have is that many of their missiles are laser designated and the helicopter has to remain exposed to illuminate the target. Unfortunately, Ukraine has essentially zero SAM capability that can accompany advancing troops. The US doesn't either, but we have an air force. These helicopters are supposedly based in Berdyansk. That is within Storm Shadow range, but maybe the Russians spread them out so much that you can only kill one or two at a time.

[Goose]

We know the Russian ORBAT decently well. Click through the link below for a good article as well. Of course we don't know the actual condition of many of these units. 

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status...03911?s=20

It is a pretty good start, but unfortunately things are less certain than it appears. When a reference is made in the (really interesting) later slides to a "Motor Rifle Regiment", what is that exactly? The Russians have abandoned their BTG structure, but the latent effects include the fact that what used to be a "standard" TO for a given kind of unit varies widely. During the Soviet era, we knew what a Motor Rifle Regiment was supposed to include, how many men, how many BMPs etc. The units differed in their military potential based on their state of training and manning, but even that was systematized into A, B, and C units. You could do "apples to apples" evaluations. Today, it is unknown what any given regiment is supposed to have. On top of that, units have been "reconstituted" with replacement units that are of a different organization and state of training. So, even if ostensibly "fully manned" (whatever that is), they may not be able to fight together because of different training. This is in addition to any additional degradation due to less than optimal conditions inside what they do have. So, it is real hard to know what any given unit can actually do. OTOH, there are all sorts of additional units cited in the tweet that aren't part of the official formations but are present. Normally, I would expect to see "+" or "++" or (reinforced) on many of the tactical symbols reflecting what was going on with these "plus-up" units, but we don't see that. I assume that means nobody knows :-).

Ukrainian less certain and can shift more quickly due to interior lines. We know at least one of the nine new brigades is operating in Velyka Novosilka axis and one on Mala Tokmachka axis. Haven't seen them really near Bakhmut or Luhansk.

Likely some explanation for relative success for Ukraine on Velyka Novosilka axis is less concentration of Russian forces and being right where the Russian Center and South army groupings responsibilities meet up. The operation where we saw all the destroyed Leopards and Bradleys near Mala Tokmachka involved (per Russian reports) 5 different Russian units including GRU Spetznaz, whereas only two Russian regular units seemed to be in the area of all the villages near Velyka Novosilka that Ukraine reclaimed (the above link lists 4 units but I think there was only 2 initially in area).

Like others I think Ukraine is still in a mostly shaping phase. Lots of FPV drone videos and artillery strikes on Russian artillery, mine laying vehicles, ammo resupply trucks. They have been assaulting Russian positions but not with very large groupings, trying to get Russian reinforcements moving so they can get a sense of Russian defensive plans and find weaker spots for coming larger assaults. 

This was a clear eyed article on the challenge for Ukraine.
https://cepa.org/article/twitter-bubbles...offensive/

In other words, Ukraine is trying what no single NATO country has done since the alliance was created in 1949: to conduct large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against a near-peer or peer adversary. It is no exaggeration to say that, at present, no NATO country, with the exception — perhaps — of the US, possesses sufficient capabilities and resources to conduct an operation like this. To put this in perspective, the only time some NATO members fought a large-scale land campaign against a conventional – albeit much weaker – adversary during Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, they enjoyed total air supremacy.

It is a good article, and your previous comments are pretty much spot on IMO. I would only add two things. First, the relatively small size of the Ukrainian groupings is IMO mostly due to a reluctance to give the Russians a lucrative air target. The Ukrainians have the resources to do more, and it is usually a bad idea to use less than overwhelming force if you have that force available. The problem for Ukraine is that if they concentrate to do that, the Russians may inflict major casualties from the air. Keeping the density down mitigates that problem. Second, the US isn't ever intending to execute a combined arms attack where we don't have air superiority and probably supremacy. It is always going to be too costly for the public, if not the troops. Yet, Ukraine is expected to go ahead and execute such an operation anyway. I think the Ukrainians have finally figured out what that means and don't like it one bit :-). They are hoping for a soft spot or that Russian air will under perform. It isn't a welcoming picture I think.

Ukraine has substantial advantages in morale and force quality. I think the supply situation for Russian frontline troops will become increasingly an issue and Ukraine will eventually make some big gains.

We hope so. One question is "Will Ivan fight?" and Ukraine hopes the answer is no. Running out of food, water, and/or ammunition can make one much less belligerent.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-attac...36584.html

This is an example of something that needs to get fixed. These helicopters are difficult targets for SAMs because they stay relatively low and can drop below the radar horizon much more easily that a fixed wing aircraft. One vulnerability they do have is that many of their missiles are laser designated and the helicopter has to remain exposed to illuminate the target. Unfortunately, Ukraine has essentially zero SAM capability that can accompany advancing troops. The US doesn't either, but we have an air force. These helicopters are supposedly based in Berdyansk. That is within Storm Shadow range, but maybe the Russians spread them out so much that you can only kill one or two at a time.