[GK3]

It's possible that I was viewing a liability as an asset.  Finland clearly sees its border with Russia as a liability.  I don't know how NATO should view it.  Is it an obligation to defend a long border?  Or a long border along which NATO can position troops and military equipment to deter an attack by Russia (even including potential attacks in other locations)?

It is an interesting question. Finland vs Russia one on one it is for sure a liability to Finland because there is no way they can garrison the entire border while Russia can. That said, historically the important fighting in Finland vs Russia is always near the Baltic sea, because that is what Russia wants. The northern part is sparsely populated and cold. The necessity to protect their left flank has always been the problem for Finland. Russia can (at least threaten) to go around them to the north and come down on them from there. NATO can provide more troops to compensate for Finland's small population. However, those are troops that NATO wants to use in the far north to threaten/capture the bases of the Northern Fleet. The USMC doesn't spend all that time in Norway because they like to ski. Having Sweden and Finland in the mix helps because they can add to the force. It hurts because that long border being penetrated also threatens Sweden as it does Finland, as well as the right flank of any NATO attack following the northern coast.

No attack across this long border in the "middle" areas would be logistically easy for either NATO or Russia. During the cold war it was pretty much assumed Russia could do whatever it wanted in Finland because southern Finland was basically indefensible. The Finns, despite their great history of fighting Russia, basically agreed, from hard experience. That is one reason they stayed out of NATO because they didn't want to be in a war they couldn't win. They hoped their military was strong enough that they could maintain some independence from Russia and reach an accommodation if push came to shove. This is one reason that their joining NATO is such a "big deal", because it says that calculus no longer applies. Sweden OTOH believed they could make it so costly for Russia to invade them that "it just wouldn't be worth it". They had no illusions about winning if Russia really wanted to take them over, but believed that they could, like the Swiss, make it so costly that it wouldn't be practical. That is why they have a very strong navy. Getting to the populated part of Sweden through the middle of Finland is difficult. Keeping Russian forces out from the south is a naval problem. It appears that Russia's irrational actions in Ukraine has convinced the Swedes that the "too costly" calculation no longer applies.

Both Sweden and Finland (as does the rest of NATO) suffered from the civilian population regarding the end of the cold war as liberating them from any military danger. This resulted in budget restrictions and a lack of interest in the military. This effect has eventually forced both Nordic countries to realize their "risk force" strategies were no longer credible, if they ever were. All in all, the border is probably a net negative for NATO, (IMO) but not as big of one as it appears at first glance.

I wasn't focusing on the military assets that Sweden or Finland can contribute in a war because those seemed small compared with the military assets of the US, UK, Germany, France, Poland, etc.  Maybe I underestimated that value.

I am biased, admittedly, but the armed forces of Sweden are very professional and very motivated. They are "better", pound for pound, than most of the other NATO forces. Their problem has always been lack of mass, and that problem is only getting worse. Germany, a country of 84 million, has 6 U-212A class submarines. There was a period between 2017 and 2018 that NONE of these were operational. Three were in the yards and three were broken, waiting to go into the yards. Sweden, a country of 10 million, has 3 A-19 (Gotland) and 2 A-17S (Södermanland). They would have at least one more of a new class, except their experiences in San Diego led them to stop construction on what they were building and make substantial changes. These are "serious" folks. They can do Russia some real damage in the Baltic. Russia constantly probes their defenses. Having them in NATO is a plus. The problem is, there are not nearly enough of them (and Kockums is still a bit of a problem).

Additional info on the "state of play" in Germany. The Bundeswehr deserves better (IMO). God forbid they have to fight anybody in the near future. https://www.yahoo.com/news/germany-buy-a...39237.html

Actions like this does not give one much confidence they are improving.

At this point I am not sure whether Russia could mount any significant offensive operations against Finland or anyone else.  I am quite sure they are not where they expected to be at this time.  I think Putin believed his forces would seize the capital of Ukraine and the country would collapse and he would then be on the borders of Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland and he would be there without expending much in the way of manpower, and military equipment.  The Ukraine has ground up a significant amount of his more or less ready men and equipment.  I simply don't think he has enough other forces capable of launching an attack on Finland or anywhere else with any chance of winning.  By this I mean non-nuclear forces.  
Poland and the Baltic States might have enough forces to put some serious pressure on St. Petersburg.  
The challenge as I see it is for the West to keep Ukraine in the game.  Like it or not, the Ukraine is being used to grind up a significant amount of Russia's most ready units and tons of their equipment.  They can't make tanks as fast as they are losing them and they can't replace experienced infantry anywhere near as fast as they are losing them.
How long can Putin remain in power if the stalemate grinds on?  How long can Ukraine hold on without more significant outside help?  At this point can the West afford to let Ukraine lose?  Poland's dislike of Russia is very strong.  If Ukraine seemed on the verge of losing, seeing Poland getting involved would not surprise me.  I am not sure any country hates Russia more than Poland.

[GK3]

It's possible that I was viewing a liability as an asset.  Finland clearly sees its border with Russia as a liability.  I don't know how NATO should view it.  Is it an obligation to defend a long border?  Or a long border along which NATO can position troops and military equipment to deter an attack by Russia (even including potential attacks in other locations)?

It is an interesting question. Finland vs Russia one on one it is for sure a liability to Finland because there is no way they can garrison the entire border while Russia can. That said, historically the important fighting in Finland vs Russia is always near the Baltic sea, because that is what Russia wants. The northern part is sparsely populated and cold. The necessity to protect their left flank has always been the problem for Finland. Russia can (at least threaten) to go around them to the north and come down on them from there. NATO can provide more troops to compensate for Finland's small population. However, those are troops that NATO wants to use in the far north to threaten/capture the bases of the Northern Fleet. The USMC doesn't spend all that time in Norway because they like to ski. Having Sweden and Finland in the mix helps because they can add to the force. It hurts because that long border being penetrated also threatens Sweden as it does Finland, as well as the right flank of any NATO attack following the northern coast.

No attack across this long border in the "middle" areas would be logistically easy for either NATO or Russia. During the cold war it was pretty much assumed Russia could do whatever it wanted in Finland because southern Finland was basically indefensible. The Finns, despite their great history of fighting Russia, basically agreed, from hard experience. That is one reason they stayed out of NATO because they didn't want to be in a war they couldn't win. They hoped their military was strong enough that they could maintain some independence from Russia and reach an accommodation if push came to shove. This is one reason that their joining NATO is such a "big deal", because it says that calculus no longer applies. Sweden OTOH believed they could make it so costly for Russia to invade them that "it just wouldn't be worth it". They had no illusions about winning if Russia really wanted to take them over, but believed that they could, like the Swiss, make it so costly that it wouldn't be practical. That is why they have a very strong navy. Getting to the populated part of Sweden through the middle of Finland is difficult. Keeping Russian forces out from the south is a naval problem. It appears that Russia's irrational actions in Ukraine has convinced the Swedes that the "too costly" calculation no longer applies.

Both Sweden and Finland (as does the rest of NATO) suffered from the civilian population regarding the end of the cold war as liberating them from any military danger. This resulted in budget restrictions and a lack of interest in the military. This effect has eventually forced both Nordic countries to realize their "risk force" strategies were no longer credible, if they ever were. All in all, the border is probably a net negative for NATO, (IMO) but not as big of one as it appears at first glance.

I wasn't focusing on the military assets that Sweden or Finland can contribute in a war because those seemed small compared with the military assets of the US, UK, Germany, France, Poland, etc.  Maybe I underestimated that value.

I am biased, admittedly, but the armed forces of Sweden are very professional and very motivated. They are "better", pound for pound, than most of the other NATO forces. Their problem has always been lack of mass, and that problem is only getting worse. Germany, a country of 84 million, has 6 U-212A class submarines. There was a period between 2017 and 2018 that NONE of these were operational. Three were in the yards and three were broken, waiting to go into the yards. Sweden, a country of 10 million, has 3 A-19 (Gotland) and 2 A-17S (Södermanland). They would have at least one more of a new class, except their experiences in San Diego led them to stop construction on what they were building and make substantial changes. These are "serious" folks. They can do Russia some real damage in the Baltic. Russia constantly probes their defenses. Having them in NATO is a plus. The problem is, there are not nearly enough of them (and Kockums is still a bit of a problem).

Additional info on the "state of play" in Germany. The Bundeswehr deserves better (IMO). God forbid they have to fight anybody in the near future. https://www.yahoo.com/news/germany-buy-a...39237.html

Actions like this does not give one much confidence they are improving.

At this point I am not sure whether Russia could mount any significant offensive operations against Finland or anyone else.  I am quite sure they are not where they expected to be at this time.  I think Putin believed his forces would seize the capital of Ukraine and the country would collapse and he would then be on the borders of Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland and he would be there without expending much in the way of manpower, and military equipment.  The Ukraine has ground up a significant amount of his more or less ready men and equipment.  I simply don't think he has enough other forces capable of launching an attack on Finland or anywhere else with any chance of winning.  By this I mean non-nuclear forces.  
Poland and the Baltic States might have enough forces to put some serious pressure on St. Petersburg.  
The challenge as I see it is for the West to keep Ukraine in the game.  Like it or not, the Ukraine is being used to grind up a significant amount of Russia's most ready units and tons of their equipment.  They can't make tanks as fast as they are losing them and they can't replace experienced infantry anywhere near as fast as they are losing them.
How long can Putin remain in power if the stalemate grinds on?  How long can Ukraine hold on without more significant outside help?  At this point can the West afford to let Ukraine lose?  Poland's dislike of Russia is very strong.  If Ukraine seemed on the verge of losing, seeing Poland getting involved would not surprise me.  I am not sure any country hates Russia more than Poland.