[81alum]

I do wonder how military historians many years from now will analyze the first year of this war--no doubt it will depend on the outcome.  But so far it doesn't feel as if there is a single military mind giving the Russians a cohesive strategy; instead, t feels like a strategy driven by bureaucracy and standard operating procedures.  Hopefully that won't change, but so far it isn't up to 1914 standards even, with what may be even worse results.

I think you maybe should rethink your comparison. In 1914 Russia invaded East Prussia on17th August and made some progress. By 30 August  Russia had suffered 92,000 captured, 78,000 killed or wounded (out of 230,000) at Tannenberg. The Russian Second Army was completely encircled and destroyed. The Germans followed that up with the first battle of the Masurian Lakes where the Russians suffered another 70,000 killed and wounded, 30,000–45,000 prisoners (out of 554,000). The Russian First Army was only partially encircled, but it was wrecked. At that point Russia had been driven out of East Prussia.



Even if one accepts the current Ukrainian estimates of over 200,000 Russian casualties, the Russians indeed suffered more in 1914 (including prisoners), and that was in a month, not almost a year. Russia also holds quite a bit of captured territory in Ukraine, while in 1914 Russia was completely driven from East Prussia. I would say the Russian performance in 1914 was far worse. It is also interesting to note that in Ukraine the number of captured is not talked about much. While it isn't zero, it undoubtedly isn't nearly as large percentage-wise as in 1914. This indicates that the current Russian army at least has avoided strategic errors that force them to surrender largely intact forces. The Germans were also undoubtedly capable of superior maneuver warfare than the Ukrainians have demonstrated, which isn't "apples to apples".

 

For what it's worth, the Russian army was following a plan that was developed by a single individual (in as much as a single person can ever direct 800,000 men), Yakov Zhilinsky. The plan was not a good one, but it also shouldn't have been as much of a disaster as it was. The Russian communications were non-existent, and the ones they had actually were probably of more use to the Germans than the Russians. The Russian generals were totally unable to direct the battles and had no situational awareness. Their troops were also hopelessly untrained. There are some obvious similarities to the present case.



There is no known single formula of organization that ensures competent military planning. The trend has been away from single individuals and toward a "general staff" (or JCS) organization. It has been amply demonstrated that both types of organizations can produce shockingly bad plans (at least in retrospect). The perception is that the general staff tends to produce "safer" plans that may lack panache and also often aren't "optimal". These plans generally seem to not contain "gross" errors, while individuals often did make plans that did. In all cases the plans are greatly influenced by what the planners think they "know" about the opponent and what they "know" about their nation's war aims and the abilities of their own forces. It almost all cases, bad plans are the product of bad initial assumptions. Bad outcomes are sometimes the result of bad plans, but at least equally often an adequate plan poorly executed. It is also true the enemy gets a vote, and even a perfect plan can be upset by the enemy. What one does then is critical, and both in 1914 and 2022 Russia failed that test.

Touche.  When I said 1914 I was thinking of the Schlieffen Plan by Germany to invade France and completely neglected to think about the other front--which of course would logically have been the implied analogy given that it was Russia.  So of course you are correct if thinking of the east.



What I was trying to say is that in 1914 the Germans did reasonably well with the Schileffen Plan until Allied resistence coalesced, but even then Germany held onto most of its territorial gains.  Both in 1914 and in 2022 the attacker failed to deliver the knockout blow that they expected and hoped for.  In both 1914 and 2022 the war of movement rapidly dissipated into static lines.  However, in Ukraine 2022 the attacker got rolled back and defeated in several key battles for strategically important positions: Kiev, Kharkiv, Kherson.  I guess the battle of the Marne was somewhat analogous to the Ukrainian defeat of the forces advancing on Kiev in that it assured at least a stalemate for the foreseeable future.  But if I had to say whether Germany in 1914 accomplished more of its aims than Russia in 2022, I would say both flopped, but 1914 Germany was better off 2022 Russia.  And 1914 Germany did not exactly have great prospects--it took years, but there eventually was a coup and defeat and a revolution and a transition to democracy.  (Short lived though it was.)


I don't think any of us know how the current war will turn out, but I am inclined to think that Russia's failure to knock out Ukraine rapidly at the start of the war will wind up, sooner or later, leading to the same effect that Germany's failure to knock out France led to.  By this logic the outcome was determined early on, but it may take years for both sides to realize it.

[81alum]

I do wonder how military historians many years from now will analyze the first year of this war--no doubt it will depend on the outcome.  But so far it doesn't feel as if there is a single military mind giving the Russians a cohesive strategy; instead, t feels like a strategy driven by bureaucracy and standard operating procedures.  Hopefully that won't change, but so far it isn't up to 1914 standards even, with what may be even worse results.

I think you maybe should rethink your comparison. In 1914 Russia invaded East Prussia on17th August and made some progress. By 30 August  Russia had suffered 92,000 captured, 78,000 killed or wounded (out of 230,000) at Tannenberg. The Russian Second Army was completely encircled and destroyed. The Germans followed that up with the first battle of the Masurian Lakes where the Russians suffered another 70,000 killed and wounded, 30,000–45,000 prisoners (out of 554,000). The Russian First Army was only partially encircled, but it was wrecked. At that point Russia had been driven out of East Prussia.



Even if one accepts the current Ukrainian estimates of over 200,000 Russian casualties, the Russians indeed suffered more in 1914 (including prisoners), and that was in a month, not almost a year. Russia also holds quite a bit of captured territory in Ukraine, while in 1914 Russia was completely driven from East Prussia. I would say the Russian performance in 1914 was far worse. It is also interesting to note that in Ukraine the number of captured is not talked about much. While it isn't zero, it undoubtedly isn't nearly as large percentage-wise as in 1914. This indicates that the current Russian army at least has avoided strategic errors that force them to surrender largely intact forces. The Germans were also undoubtedly capable of superior maneuver warfare than the Ukrainians have demonstrated, which isn't "apples to apples".

 

For what it's worth, the Russian army was following a plan that was developed by a single individual (in as much as a single person can ever direct 800,000 men), Yakov Zhilinsky. The plan was not a good one, but it also shouldn't have been as much of a disaster as it was. The Russian communications were non-existent, and the ones they had actually were probably of more use to the Germans than the Russians. The Russian generals were totally unable to direct the battles and had no situational awareness. Their troops were also hopelessly untrained. There are some obvious similarities to the present case.



There is no known single formula of organization that ensures competent military planning. The trend has been away from single individuals and toward a "general staff" (or JCS) organization. It has been amply demonstrated that both types of organizations can produce shockingly bad plans (at least in retrospect). The perception is that the general staff tends to produce "safer" plans that may lack panache and also often aren't "optimal". These plans generally seem to not contain "gross" errors, while individuals often did make plans that did. In all cases the plans are greatly influenced by what the planners think they "know" about the opponent and what they "know" about their nation's war aims and the abilities of their own forces. It almost all cases, bad plans are the product of bad initial assumptions. Bad outcomes are sometimes the result of bad plans, but at least equally often an adequate plan poorly executed. It is also true the enemy gets a vote, and even a perfect plan can be upset by the enemy. What one does then is critical, and both in 1914 and 2022 Russia failed that test.

Touche.  When I said 1914 I was thinking of the Schlieffen Plan by Germany to invade France and completely neglected to think about the other front--which of course would logically have been the implied analogy given that it was Russia.  So of course you are correct if thinking of the east.



What I was trying to say is that in 1914 the Germans did reasonably well with the Schileffen Plan until Allied resistence coalesced, but even then Germany held onto most of its territorial gains.  Both in 1914 and in 2022 the attacker failed to deliver the knockout blow that they expected and hoped for.  In both 1914 and 2022 the war of movement rapidly dissipated into static lines.  However, in Ukraine 2022 the attacker got rolled back and defeated in several key battles for strategically important positions: Kiev, Kharkiv, Kherson.  I guess the battle of the Marne was somewhat analogous to the Ukrainian defeat of the forces advancing on Kiev in that it assured at least a stalemate for the foreseeable future.  But if I had to say whether Germany in 1914 accomplished more of its aims than Russia in 2022, I would say both flopped, but 1914 Germany was better off 2022 Russia.  And 1914 Germany did not exactly have great prospects--it took years, but there eventually was a coup and defeat and a revolution and a transition to democracy.  (Short lived though it was.)


I don't think any of us know how the current war will turn out, but I am inclined to think that Russia's failure to knock out Ukraine rapidly at the start of the war will wind up, sooner or later, leading to the same effect that Germany's failure to knock out France led to.  By this logic the outcome was determined early on, but it may take years for both sides to realize it.