https://www.yahoo.com/news/crimea-shapin...00203.html
IMO this article is a good summary of the current "state of play". I admit I am showing confirmation bias about Crimea :-). It is going to be very interesting to see what Russia comes up with for a "spring offensive". If it is a "robust" effort that is fairly well led, Ukraine can lose this war because they still lack (apparently) mobile forces that can be used to "stop the bleeding". If they had such a force, I would have expected it to have been used to blunt the offensive around Bakhmut. It wouldn't be a "head on" confrontation but rather an attempt to outflank the Russian effort and make them change front. Force Russia to fight "somewhere else". Then pull back the mobile force after it has allowed the defense around Bakhmut to recover. The mobile force can be replaced with a defensive force if that appears feasible, or just let Russia have the area back. The mission goal to take the pressure off Bakhmut will have been accomplished. The offensive around Kreminna could have done this but it is moving way too slowly to do so.
Fortunately Russia has yet to execute a rapid offensive that is well led and well resourced in this war. This has allowed a Ukraine who can't move real fast either block the offensives that could isolate their forces and lead to a strategic defeat from which they can't recover. The cost to both sides has been immense. OTOH, if Ukraine can hold in the Donbas and in June or thereabouts execute a successful offensive that threatens to isolate Crimea (or actually does do so), Russia will be in deep, deep trouble. That seems to be the plan, but Ukraine has to 1) hold on until the attempt in the South is ready, and 2) execute it with speed and violence. Neither is obviously a simple task.
Russia OTOH can continue to just pound away, but they must contain any attempt by Ukraine to cut off Crimea. They are doing that by creating a defense in depth with significant fortification and troop resources. However, it is a big area to defend. Fixed defenses against a mobile enemy can have serious problems if that enemy can sustain itself while flanking/bypassing strongpoints. The ability of the Russian air force to prevent a Ukrainian breakthrough could be the key in Crimea. I am sure lots of "war games" are and have been going on inside NATO to try and figure this one out.
IMO this article is a good summary of the current "state of play". I admit I am showing confirmation bias about Crimea :-). It is going to be very interesting to see what Russia comes up with for a "spring offensive". If it is a "robust" effort that is fairly well led, Ukraine can lose this war because they still lack (apparently) mobile forces that can be used to "stop the bleeding". If they had such a force, I would have expected it to have been used to blunt the offensive around Bakhmut. It wouldn't be a "head on" confrontation but rather an attempt to outflank the Russian effort and make them change front. Force Russia to fight "somewhere else". Then pull back the mobile force after it has allowed the defense around Bakhmut to recover. The mobile force can be replaced with a defensive force if that appears feasible, or just let Russia have the area back. The mission goal to take the pressure off Bakhmut will have been accomplished. The offensive around Kreminna could have done this but it is moving way too slowly to do so.
Fortunately Russia has yet to execute a rapid offensive that is well led and well resourced in this war. This has allowed a Ukraine who can't move real fast either block the offensives that could isolate their forces and lead to a strategic defeat from which they can't recover. The cost to both sides has been immense. OTOH, if Ukraine can hold in the Donbas and in June or thereabouts execute a successful offensive that threatens to isolate Crimea (or actually does do so), Russia will be in deep, deep trouble. That seems to be the plan, but Ukraine has to 1) hold on until the attempt in the South is ready, and 2) execute it with speed and violence. Neither is obviously a simple task.
Russia OTOH can continue to just pound away, but they must contain any attempt by Ukraine to cut off Crimea. They are doing that by creating a defense in depth with significant fortification and troop resources. However, it is a big area to defend. Fixed defenses against a mobile enemy can have serious problems if that enemy can sustain itself while flanking/bypassing strongpoints. The ability of the Russian air force to prevent a Ukrainian breakthrough could be the key in Crimea. I am sure lots of "war games" are and have been going on inside NATO to try and figure this one out.