The reality of war is there is lots of uncertainty about most things. That is one of the things that makes it so dangerous. IMO it is far from certain that Russia cannot win this war militarily. They may have finally found a military commander who can make their horrible organization work, and they now have a centralized military command in Ukraine (which they previously did not). It may also be that Putin is now more or less staying out of the strategic decisions, at least for now. Russia conducted a retreat from contact from Kherson masterfully. Granted, Ukraine made it easy for them, but the Russian army of Feb 24th couldn't have done that. Keep in mind this retreat also involved many of the despised untrained conscripts that Russia rushed across the river. That should give everyone pause. Russia has also begun a major shakeup in the leadership and "middle management" of their logistics operations. While such changes often introduce as much chaos as they do improvement, the problem is being addressed, and if history is any guide, given enough tries, Russia will get it more or less "right".
Russia has absorbed horrific casualties that would have pretty much knocked an equivalent NATO formation out of the war. Yet they are still there and still defending. Most "experts" agree that Russia has established a line in Ukraine that is defensible with the level of forces they have. It is not impenetrable and there is no guarantee they can hold it through the winter, but is at least possible. Russia is also madly building fixed fortifications along the line of contact and to the rear of that line. Undoubtedly many of the strong points in the rear are designed to be HIMARS proof. This would allow Russia to one again supply it's artillery in a manner Ukraine definitely will not like.
OTOH, the west and Ukraine at least appear to believe they are better prepared for winter warfare than the Russians are. A fixed line of defense based on engineered fortifications should be an anachronism in the 21st century. In WW I, the vast, vast majority of shells fired didn't hit anything important. In theory, Ukraine now possesses precision fire capability and drones to locate the targets. While Russian forward magazines may be HIMARS proof, the truck plying the roads to supply them are not. The tank was invented to defeat field fortifications. Even without all these advantages, the German infiltration tactics showed how fixed field fortifications could be defeated. Of course, the entire theory behind NATO's offensive structure is to avoid banging away all along the line. NATO intends to find a way around the stronger points, focus on the critical centers of gravity in the Russian position, concentrate overwhelming force rapidly at those points, cut through these points and wreck havoc in the enemies rear areas. Ukraine has yet to show they can do that, although they keep making noises that that is their intent. They had a golden opportunity in Kherson and didn't execute. There probably are good reasons for that, but it does raise questions about what their capabilities are now and will be in three or four months.
What happens during the next few months is IMO critical for the course of the war. The war probably won't end in this time (though it could, war is uncertain), but if Russia holds their defensive line pretty much intact it will be very bad news for Ukraine. It will at least give the illusion that Russia can hold the areas they have taken indefinitely, which will make lots of "the world" simply accept that as a given. Obviously, Ukraine can't do that as their country really needs lots of that 20% back, even assuming Russia could be trusted to leave the rest of Ukraine alone. It wouldn't mean Ukraine is defeated. They could deliver a powerful blow when spring comes and push the Russians out. However, it would not look probable if there is a three month stalemate. Obviously, any pause in the tempo of operations gives Russia a chance to fix some of their glaring problems. This is yet another reason Ukraine needs to end the winter net positive. They need to prove to themselves and the world that Russia isn't going to win by waiting them out.
Obviously there are many unanswered questions that will really make a difference in both the short and long term. Is Russia almost out of PGMs? We keep hearing they are, but the missiles keep coming. How much infrastructure damage can Ukraine absorb and still continue to fight? Is Russia almost out of modern, reasonably accurate artillery ammunition? How much are they able to make? How much 155mm can/will NATO supply to Ukraine? Will Ukraine get more HIMARS? Does Ukraine really have two tank brigades that are presently uncommitted? What can/will Iran supply to Russia that will help enough to matter? Can Russia mobilize more troops in the short term? Is the training in NATO countries of Ukrainian troops going to deliver a striking force that can execute NATO tactics? What is the actual fighting ability of Russian troops in Ukraine right now, considering the losses and leadership issues? These are some of the "military" questions that will control what happens on the ground.
Politically, there are even more questions, and these factors can win or lose the war for either side very quickly. Obviously, Putin's ability to remain in power is one question. At what point does the Russian political structure (whatever that is) decide this war was a mistake and remove him? OF did touch on a critical point. What actually defeated the Germans in WW I wasn't military but economic. They were starving to death because the blockade of Germany made it impossible for them to import what they needed to survive and export what they needed to sustain their economy. They simply couldn't fight any more. While there are lots of sanctions in place that make it difficult for Russia to trade internationally, they are still doing it and bringing in lots of cash in the process. What, if anything, will be done to stop this? There is no sign Russia is going to be driven out of this war by economic forces. Ukraine OTOH may be, depending on how much aid they can get from the west. Will that happen?
IMO the "west", particularly the US, has not done themselves any favors here. It should have been made clear to Russia when they started attacking Ukrainian infrastructure that for every missile they fired into a power plant, one of their oil tankers would be seized. There has to be a cost to Russia or they can just pound Ukraine into the dust and walk in afterwards. This is IMO obvious. It may take years, but they can do it if 1) they are foolish enough to think it is worth it and 2) there are no economic costs they can't control. While nobody wants a wider war, we can't allow Russia to define the parameters in a way Ukraine simply can't win. We needed to make it clear to Putin et al that there was no way we were going to let them set the ROE to their overwhelming advantage. There is also the question of how long "the west" will support Ukraine militarily if the way ahead appears to be the eventual destruction of Ukraine. Hard to argue it is a good idea if it can't succeed.
Russia has absorbed horrific casualties that would have pretty much knocked an equivalent NATO formation out of the war. Yet they are still there and still defending. Most "experts" agree that Russia has established a line in Ukraine that is defensible with the level of forces they have. It is not impenetrable and there is no guarantee they can hold it through the winter, but is at least possible. Russia is also madly building fixed fortifications along the line of contact and to the rear of that line. Undoubtedly many of the strong points in the rear are designed to be HIMARS proof. This would allow Russia to one again supply it's artillery in a manner Ukraine definitely will not like.
OTOH, the west and Ukraine at least appear to believe they are better prepared for winter warfare than the Russians are. A fixed line of defense based on engineered fortifications should be an anachronism in the 21st century. In WW I, the vast, vast majority of shells fired didn't hit anything important. In theory, Ukraine now possesses precision fire capability and drones to locate the targets. While Russian forward magazines may be HIMARS proof, the truck plying the roads to supply them are not. The tank was invented to defeat field fortifications. Even without all these advantages, the German infiltration tactics showed how fixed field fortifications could be defeated. Of course, the entire theory behind NATO's offensive structure is to avoid banging away all along the line. NATO intends to find a way around the stronger points, focus on the critical centers of gravity in the Russian position, concentrate overwhelming force rapidly at those points, cut through these points and wreck havoc in the enemies rear areas. Ukraine has yet to show they can do that, although they keep making noises that that is their intent. They had a golden opportunity in Kherson and didn't execute. There probably are good reasons for that, but it does raise questions about what their capabilities are now and will be in three or four months.
What happens during the next few months is IMO critical for the course of the war. The war probably won't end in this time (though it could, war is uncertain), but if Russia holds their defensive line pretty much intact it will be very bad news for Ukraine. It will at least give the illusion that Russia can hold the areas they have taken indefinitely, which will make lots of "the world" simply accept that as a given. Obviously, Ukraine can't do that as their country really needs lots of that 20% back, even assuming Russia could be trusted to leave the rest of Ukraine alone. It wouldn't mean Ukraine is defeated. They could deliver a powerful blow when spring comes and push the Russians out. However, it would not look probable if there is a three month stalemate. Obviously, any pause in the tempo of operations gives Russia a chance to fix some of their glaring problems. This is yet another reason Ukraine needs to end the winter net positive. They need to prove to themselves and the world that Russia isn't going to win by waiting them out.
Obviously there are many unanswered questions that will really make a difference in both the short and long term. Is Russia almost out of PGMs? We keep hearing they are, but the missiles keep coming. How much infrastructure damage can Ukraine absorb and still continue to fight? Is Russia almost out of modern, reasonably accurate artillery ammunition? How much are they able to make? How much 155mm can/will NATO supply to Ukraine? Will Ukraine get more HIMARS? Does Ukraine really have two tank brigades that are presently uncommitted? What can/will Iran supply to Russia that will help enough to matter? Can Russia mobilize more troops in the short term? Is the training in NATO countries of Ukrainian troops going to deliver a striking force that can execute NATO tactics? What is the actual fighting ability of Russian troops in Ukraine right now, considering the losses and leadership issues? These are some of the "military" questions that will control what happens on the ground.
Politically, there are even more questions, and these factors can win or lose the war for either side very quickly. Obviously, Putin's ability to remain in power is one question. At what point does the Russian political structure (whatever that is) decide this war was a mistake and remove him? OF did touch on a critical point. What actually defeated the Germans in WW I wasn't military but economic. They were starving to death because the blockade of Germany made it impossible for them to import what they needed to survive and export what they needed to sustain their economy. They simply couldn't fight any more. While there are lots of sanctions in place that make it difficult for Russia to trade internationally, they are still doing it and bringing in lots of cash in the process. What, if anything, will be done to stop this? There is no sign Russia is going to be driven out of this war by economic forces. Ukraine OTOH may be, depending on how much aid they can get from the west. Will that happen?
IMO the "west", particularly the US, has not done themselves any favors here. It should have been made clear to Russia when they started attacking Ukrainian infrastructure that for every missile they fired into a power plant, one of their oil tankers would be seized. There has to be a cost to Russia or they can just pound Ukraine into the dust and walk in afterwards. This is IMO obvious. It may take years, but they can do it if 1) they are foolish enough to think it is worth it and 2) there are no economic costs they can't control. While nobody wants a wider war, we can't allow Russia to define the parameters in a way Ukraine simply can't win. We needed to make it clear to Putin et al that there was no way we were going to let them set the ROE to their overwhelming advantage. There is also the question of how long "the west" will support Ukraine militarily if the way ahead appears to be the eventual destruction of Ukraine. Hard to argue it is a good idea if it can't succeed.