[Goose]

I hope, given the long time for which a retreat from Kherson has been a possibility, Ukraine has their fire control on the retreat/crossings mapped out. I also have to hope that in the era of drones and satellites, Russia would not be able to hide a false retreat/fake out.

I am sure Ukraine has mapped out their fire control. I am also sure that they know that they have to be within about 15-18 km of the target to use their 155 mm howitzers to reliably attack it. They are not yet close enough to do that. They also know that these guns need to move frequently or they will be goners. Right now, they have to use HIMARS and while HIMARS can provide devastating barrages they can only do it for a short time. They then must move and reload. That is not good enough to interdict a retreating force. They will suffer significant losses, but they will get out. If the Ukrainians can get into gun range, they can make the retreat almost impossible. They need to do that.

It isn't "normal" for a military organization to publicly announce a retreat, for many reasons. The Russians on the west bank have been dead men walking for months. It appears probable Russian will keep them there until Ukraine basically drives them out. They will not go totally of their own accord. If that were the intention, it would have already happened.

I wouldn't want to be the Russian commanders organizing this withdrawal. The goals of withdrawal are 1) extract as many men and as much material from the area to be abandoned as possible, 2) position your evacuated forces to defend the next line of defense, and 3) inflict as much damage as possible on the force that is pressing your defeat. In order to accomplish # 2, it is generally considered necessary to break contact with your opponent, i.e. to create enough distance between your forces and the enemy forces to allow you to organize the next line of defense. If you fail to do that, there is no reason your opponent can't just keep pushing you along (until he stretches his supply line too far). It is easier if you are going to pass through a force that can help you hold the enemy off, but you still have to do it. In order to accomplish # 1, you have to get your forces moving before the enemy can put a blocking force on your rear. If your enemy is aware of your intentions, he will move heaven and earth to do that. If he beats you to it, you can't retreat unless it becomes a "break out" operation, which is an order of magnitude harder.

Doing these things is difficult with a well trained and well motivated force. Doing it with a poorly trained and low morale force is even harder. The key will be how hard the Russians are pressed. If the Ukraine can get a blocking force in place, they can do catastrophic damage. If Ukraine can't quite manage that but can keep in contact with the retreating Russians and drive them, they can still do great damage and even more important cross the river before Russia can organize to stop them. This is actually pretty critical, and why Remagen is so well remembered and important. The allies kept driving the retreating Germans. Patton also did the same in the south, jumped  the river right on the heels of the Germans and secured several bridgeheads. Nobody wants to be faced with an opposed river crossing in the spring. Grabbing it now will save lots of lives, and conversely.

If Ukraine is "only" able to shell the Russians with HIMARS as they retreat, Russia will take that and be thankful. They are going to take a beating, but not one that destroys their combat capability in the Kherson Oblast. Two months ago, that level of destruction looked probable. Let's hope we see exactly that.

[Goose]

I hope, given the long time for which a retreat from Kherson has been a possibility, Ukraine has their fire control on the retreat/crossings mapped out. I also have to hope that in the era of drones and satellites, Russia would not be able to hide a false retreat/fake out.

I am sure Ukraine has mapped out their fire control. I am also sure that they know that they have to be within about 15-18 km of the target to use their 155 mm howitzers to reliably attack it. They are not yet close enough to do that. They also know that these guns need to move frequently or they will be goners. Right now, they have to use HIMARS and while HIMARS can provide devastating barrages they can only do it for a short time. They then must move and reload. That is not good enough to interdict a retreating force. They will suffer significant losses, but they will get out. If the Ukrainians can get into gun range, they can make the retreat almost impossible. They need to do that.

It isn't "normal" for a military organization to publicly announce a retreat, for many reasons. The Russians on the west bank have been dead men walking for months. It appears probable Russian will keep them there until Ukraine basically drives them out. They will not go totally of their own accord. If that were the intention, it would have already happened.

I wouldn't want to be the Russian commanders organizing this withdrawal. The goals of withdrawal are 1) extract as many men and as much material from the area to be abandoned as possible, 2) position your evacuated forces to defend the next line of defense, and 3) inflict as much damage as possible on the force that is pressing your defeat. In order to accomplish # 2, it is generally considered necessary to break contact with your opponent, i.e. to create enough distance between your forces and the enemy forces to allow you to organize the next line of defense. If you fail to do that, there is no reason your opponent can't just keep pushing you along (until he stretches his supply line too far). It is easier if you are going to pass through a force that can help you hold the enemy off, but you still have to do it. In order to accomplish # 1, you have to get your forces moving before the enemy can put a blocking force on your rear. If your enemy is aware of your intentions, he will move heaven and earth to do that. If he beats you to it, you can't retreat unless it becomes a "break out" operation, which is an order of magnitude harder.

Doing these things is difficult with a well trained and well motivated force. Doing it with a poorly trained and low morale force is even harder. The key will be how hard the Russians are pressed. If the Ukraine can get a blocking force in place, they can do catastrophic damage. If Ukraine can't quite manage that but can keep in contact with the retreating Russians and drive them, they can still do great damage and even more important cross the river before Russia can organize to stop them. This is actually pretty critical, and why Remagen is so well remembered and important. The allies kept driving the retreating Germans. Patton also did the same in the south, jumped  the river right on the heels of the Germans and secured several bridgeheads. Nobody wants to be faced with an opposed river crossing in the spring. Grabbing it now will save lots of lives, and conversely.

If Ukraine is "only" able to shell the Russians with HIMARS as they retreat, Russia will take that and be thankful. They are going to take a beating, but not one that destroys their combat capability in the Kherson Oblast. Two months ago, that level of destruction looked probable. Let's hope we see exactly that.