[Goose]

The Ukrainian air defences progressively recovered
as jammed and damaged radar systems were reset and assets were rapidly repositioned during
the second and third days. After that, the Air Force and air defence infrastructures worked
in tandem. Deconfliction between aircraft and GBAD was coordinated by time until 3 March,
after which deconfliction began to be coordinated by space because of friendly fire incidents.15
In other words, SAM systems and combat aircraft sorties began to be deconflicted by being
allocated separate operational areas.

If this is accurate (and it probably is), the Ukrainians are not using IFF. As I have suggested from the beginning, this fact really cuts down the ability of an air force to operate. Deconfilicting aircraft and missiles can be done by geography, but it is a big tactical disadvantage to operate this way. Worse still, you can't deconflict fighters from other fighters that way. Given that both sides use the same aircraft types, even visual identification isn't a good discriminant. I surmise Russia is fighting the same constraints, as the Ukrainians have the same IFF systems. Answering an interrogation and squawking would be saying "kill me". No wonder air operations are limited.

For Goose re A50 Mainstay

On the Donbas front and in the south, a similar task was performed by A-50M/U Mainstay
AWACS aircraft which flew an average of two–three sorties per day, providing higher-resolution early warning and vector information on low-flying Ukrainian aircraft in those sectors.39
However, the effectiveness of A-50M as a force multiplier has been limited throughout the war by two factors. First, Ukrainian forces have found A-50 to be fairly easy to degrade via
electronic attack, and report consistent success in doing so.40 Second, because the Russian air operation is subordinated to the Ground Forces, surveillance information is not typically
relayed directly between A-50M and fighters on CAP or to long-range GBAD units such as S-400 batteries. Instead, information is normally relayed via the military district command post or a
combined arms army command post, then either directly or via an Il-20M relay aircraft to the GBAD units and fighter patrols.41 This significantly slows the rate of data transfer and limits the
VKS’s ability to use A-50M/U to directly guide weapon engagements by GBAD assets or fighters.

The A-50 radar isn't that easy to defeat by EA when properly operated, especially by Soviet origin EA. However, it is very much a "manual" system. It, like many Soviet systems, requires good operators. If Ukraine is having good luck with EA it must be significantly due to the Russian operators lack of training. This is very believable, because training is expensive. Another factor is that Russia has been engaged in a very long program of upgrading their A-50s. This program, like many Russian programs, has great press releases and very few upgraded aircraft delivered. It also means the operators may not be using the system they trained on or the latest and greatest. Not to say the radar "jam proof", but a good operator can "work through" lots of EA. Obviously, one also wonders why "home on jam" attacks haven't made it difficult for the Ukrainians to maintain reliable EA.

The Russian decision cycle requiring the A-50 data to pass through a bureaucratic interface to the IAD system is very Russian. For BC, this is why using overhead data to find HIMARS just won't work. It takes too long. The A-50 itself has the organic capability to directly control what used to be a Russian "section" of 12 aircraft. (a section is not a squadron, just to be clear) It can control them directly. The Russians did that in Syria and routinely practice doing it. It is however true that the A-50 can "see" a much bigger area than one section can cover. The aircraft has a data link that can update the IAD in real time. In theory, the updates should go directly to all the section controllers on the ground. This apparently isn't happening, and the section controller in the Mainstay also isn't operating. Many reasons why this isn't happening are plausible, from administrative constraints to not having the data link resources. Not how it was designed to work. However, controlling a single section from the air is entirely feasible, so why they aren't doing it is anybody's guess.

The interface between the Mainstay and the missile elements of the IAD has always been a bit of a bureaucratic question mark. The S-400s aren't air force. Supposedly, a Mainstay can actually designate and fire an S-400 via it's data link. AFAIK, nobody has ever seen this happen, but the Russians have claimed that ability exists. The Army would have to permit the Mainstay to do this, and that may be a bridge too far. Since the rest of the IAD isn't functioning as "designed" on Mainstay data, even less probable the army part would.

The thing I think we should all be concerned about is that to the extent these problems are administrative, the Russians can figure that out and remove them. For sure, using a Mainstay to control a small number of fighters is possible. Doing so could make things quite difficult for the Ukrainian forces in that area and cause significant losses in Ukrainian aircraft.

[Goose]

The Ukrainian air defences progressively recovered
as jammed and damaged radar systems were reset and assets were rapidly repositioned during
the second and third days. After that, the Air Force and air defence infrastructures worked
in tandem. Deconfliction between aircraft and GBAD was coordinated by time until 3 March,
after which deconfliction began to be coordinated by space because of friendly fire incidents.15
In other words, SAM systems and combat aircraft sorties began to be deconflicted by being
allocated separate operational areas.

If this is accurate (and it probably is), the Ukrainians are not using IFF. As I have suggested from the beginning, this fact really cuts down the ability of an air force to operate. Deconfilicting aircraft and missiles can be done by geography, but it is a big tactical disadvantage to operate this way. Worse still, you can't deconflict fighters from other fighters that way. Given that both sides use the same aircraft types, even visual identification isn't a good discriminant. I surmise Russia is fighting the same constraints, as the Ukrainians have the same IFF systems. Answering an interrogation and squawking would be saying "kill me". No wonder air operations are limited.

For Goose re A50 Mainstay

On the Donbas front and in the south, a similar task was performed by A-50M/U Mainstay
AWACS aircraft which flew an average of two–three sorties per day, providing higher-resolution early warning and vector information on low-flying Ukrainian aircraft in those sectors.39
However, the effectiveness of A-50M as a force multiplier has been limited throughout the war by two factors. First, Ukrainian forces have found A-50 to be fairly easy to degrade via
electronic attack, and report consistent success in doing so.40 Second, because the Russian air operation is subordinated to the Ground Forces, surveillance information is not typically
relayed directly between A-50M and fighters on CAP or to long-range GBAD units such as S-400 batteries. Instead, information is normally relayed via the military district command post or a
combined arms army command post, then either directly or via an Il-20M relay aircraft to the GBAD units and fighter patrols.41 This significantly slows the rate of data transfer and limits the
VKS’s ability to use A-50M/U to directly guide weapon engagements by GBAD assets or fighters.

The A-50 radar isn't that easy to defeat by EA when properly operated, especially by Soviet origin EA. However, it is very much a "manual" system. It, like many Soviet systems, requires good operators. If Ukraine is having good luck with EA it must be significantly due to the Russian operators lack of training. This is very believable, because training is expensive. Another factor is that Russia has been engaged in a very long program of upgrading their A-50s. This program, like many Russian programs, has great press releases and very few upgraded aircraft delivered. It also means the operators may not be using the system they trained on or the latest and greatest. Not to say the radar "jam proof", but a good operator can "work through" lots of EA. Obviously, one also wonders why "home on jam" attacks haven't made it difficult for the Ukrainians to maintain reliable EA.

The Russian decision cycle requiring the A-50 data to pass through a bureaucratic interface to the IAD system is very Russian. For BC, this is why using overhead data to find HIMARS just won't work. It takes too long. The A-50 itself has the organic capability to directly control what used to be a Russian "section" of 12 aircraft. (a section is not a squadron, just to be clear) It can control them directly. The Russians did that in Syria and routinely practice doing it. It is however true that the A-50 can "see" a much bigger area than one section can cover. The aircraft has a data link that can update the IAD in real time. In theory, the updates should go directly to all the section controllers on the ground. This apparently isn't happening, and the section controller in the Mainstay also isn't operating. Many reasons why this isn't happening are plausible, from administrative constraints to not having the data link resources. Not how it was designed to work. However, controlling a single section from the air is entirely feasible, so why they aren't doing it is anybody's guess.

The interface between the Mainstay and the missile elements of the IAD has always been a bit of a bureaucratic question mark. The S-400s aren't air force. Supposedly, a Mainstay can actually designate and fire an S-400 via it's data link. AFAIK, nobody has ever seen this happen, but the Russians have claimed that ability exists. The Army would have to permit the Mainstay to do this, and that may be a bridge too far. Since the rest of the IAD isn't functioning as "designed" on Mainstay data, even less probable the army part would.

The thing I think we should all be concerned about is that to the extent these problems are administrative, the Russians can figure that out and remove them. For sure, using a Mainstay to control a small number of fighters is possible. Doing so could make things quite difficult for the Ukrainian forces in that area and cause significant losses in Ukrainian aircraft.