[dabigv13]

On topic of Russian long range targeting of Ukrainian high value assets

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1589576964968689664?s=20&t=ueJnhx9CGBLBc7GFWF8PIQ[/tweet]

The report linked at top of the Twitter thread is excellent, like other RUSI reports which have been some of the most informative sources during the war.

The VKS had deployed
a fast-jet force of around 350 modern combat aircraft for operations in Ukraine; so the lack
of a publicly visible air campaign came as a major surprise to most analysts.9 The tentative
conclusions reached by this author in March about the lack of VKS capacity to mount complex,
large-scale operations still hold today, but early analysis was wrong about the lack of significant
Russian air activity in the early days of the war.10 This chapter explains how, in fact, the VKS
mounted significant strike and offensive counter-air operations during this period, and the
Ukrainian Air Force engaged in numerous air-to-air clashes to oppose it.11

During the first week of the invasion, Russian electronic warfare using jamming equipment and
E-96M aerial decoys were highly effective in disrupting Ukrainian GBAD.12 S-300 and SA-11 ‘Buk’
radar-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were particularly badly affected in the north of
the country, especially to the north of Kyiv along the Hostomel/Irpin and Chernihiv axes.13 Cruise
and ballistic missile strikes had also damaged or destroyed multiple long-range early warning
radars throughout the country, and destroyed various Ukrainian SAM sites in Kherson and
Zaporizhzhia oblasts in the south. The physical destruction, along with the electronic disruption
and suppression of SAM systems in the north and northeast, left the Mikoyan Mig-29 and Sukhoi
Su-27 fighters of the Ukrainian Air Force with the task of providing air defence over most of the
country for the first few days of the war.14 The Ukrainian air defences progressively recovered
as jammed and damaged radar systems were reset and assets were rapidly repositioned during
the second and third days. After that, the Air Force and air defence infrastructures worked
in tandem. Deconfliction between aircraft and GBAD was coordinated by time until 3 March,
after which deconfliction began to be coordinated by space because of friendly fire incidents.15
In other words, SAM systems and combat aircraft sorties began to be deconflicted by being
allocated separate operational areas.

For Goose re A50 Mainstay

On the Donbas front and in the south, a similar task was performed by A-50M/U Mainstay
AWACS aircraft which flew an average of two–three sorties per day, providing higher-resolution early warning and vector information on low-flying Ukrainian aircraft in those sectors.39
However, the effectiveness of A-50M as a force multiplier has been limited throughout the
war by two factors. First, Ukrainian forces have found A-50 to be fairly easy to degrade via
electronic attack, and report consistent success in doing so.40 Second, because the Russian
air operation is subordinated to the Ground Forces, surveillance information is not typically
relayed directly between A-50M and fighters on CAP or to long-range GBAD units such as S-400
batteries. Instead, information is normally relayed via the military district command post or a
combined arms army command post, then either directly or via an Il-20M relay aircraft to the
GBAD units and fighter patrols.41 This significantly slows the rate of data transfer and limits the
VKS’s ability to use A-50M/U to directly guide weapon engagements by GBAD assets or fighters.

[dabigv13]

On topic of Russian long range targeting of Ukrainian high value assets

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1589576964968689664?s=20&t=ueJnhx9CGBLBc7GFWF8PIQ[/tweet]

The report linked at top of the Twitter thread is excellent, like other RUSI reports which have been some of the most informative sources during the war.

The VKS had deployed
a fast-jet force of around 350 modern combat aircraft for operations in Ukraine; so the lack
of a publicly visible air campaign came as a major surprise to most analysts.9 The tentative
conclusions reached by this author in March about the lack of VKS capacity to mount complex,
large-scale operations still hold today, but early analysis was wrong about the lack of significant
Russian air activity in the early days of the war.10 This chapter explains how, in fact, the VKS
mounted significant strike and offensive counter-air operations during this period, and the
Ukrainian Air Force engaged in numerous air-to-air clashes to oppose it.11

During the first week of the invasion, Russian electronic warfare using jamming equipment and
E-96M aerial decoys were highly effective in disrupting Ukrainian GBAD.12 S-300 and SA-11 ‘Buk’
radar-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were particularly badly affected in the north of
the country, especially to the north of Kyiv along the Hostomel/Irpin and Chernihiv axes.13 Cruise
and ballistic missile strikes had also damaged or destroyed multiple long-range early warning
radars throughout the country, and destroyed various Ukrainian SAM sites in Kherson and
Zaporizhzhia oblasts in the south. The physical destruction, along with the electronic disruption
and suppression of SAM systems in the north and northeast, left the Mikoyan Mig-29 and Sukhoi
Su-27 fighters of the Ukrainian Air Force with the task of providing air defence over most of the
country for the first few days of the war.14 The Ukrainian air defences progressively recovered
as jammed and damaged radar systems were reset and assets were rapidly repositioned during
the second and third days. After that, the Air Force and air defence infrastructures worked
in tandem. Deconfliction between aircraft and GBAD was coordinated by time until 3 March,
after which deconfliction began to be coordinated by space because of friendly fire incidents.15
In other words, SAM systems and combat aircraft sorties began to be deconflicted by being
allocated separate operational areas.

For Goose re A50 Mainstay

On the Donbas front and in the south, a similar task was performed by A-50M/U Mainstay
AWACS aircraft which flew an average of two–three sorties per day, providing higher-resolution early warning and vector information on low-flying Ukrainian aircraft in those sectors.39
However, the effectiveness of A-50M as a force multiplier has been limited throughout the
war by two factors. First, Ukrainian forces have found A-50 to be fairly easy to degrade via
electronic attack, and report consistent success in doing so.40 Second, because the Russian
air operation is subordinated to the Ground Forces, surveillance information is not typically
relayed directly between A-50M and fighters on CAP or to long-range GBAD units such as S-400
batteries. Instead, information is normally relayed via the military district command post or a
combined arms army command post, then either directly or via an Il-20M relay aircraft to the
GBAD units and fighter patrols.41 This significantly slows the rate of data transfer and limits the
VKS’s ability to use A-50M/U to directly guide weapon engagements by GBAD assets or fighters.