[Goose]

If the Russians have really lost 40,000 to 60,000 dead and over 2000 vehicles, plus at least that many more wounded, you are talking about 10 or 12 divisions worth of men and equipment?  Is that really possible?

The US apparently agrees with an estimate of 80,000 Russian casualties, of which 40,000 were KIA. It is a difficult number to get your head around, I agree. Even if it is "wrong" (which to some extent is certainly is), the number of Russian casualties is "brobdingnagian". The equipment losses are independently counted by some observers from various photint sources (e.g. Oryx). They are pretty solid. So, given the evidence we have, I guess it is "real". How Putin is keeping 40,000 deaths quiet is a mystery, but we really have little insight into rural Russia where most of the losses are.

Normally I would think you would want to run your new recruits through 90 days of training and integrate them into established units with combat hardened NCOs and Officers.  That doesn't sound like they are doing. Seems like a recipe for disaster.  How do you see Russia trying to regain some control over the battle space?

Russian training, even back in the "best" Soviet times, was substandard. In all cases the "destination" units were expected to make a significant contribution to recruit training. Except for the navy (to some extent) Russia has never had an NCO cadre that could contribute much to recruit training or offer field leadership. Raw discipline yes, but beyond that, not much. Interestingly for a country that created "the new Soviet man", Russian officers maintained the old Imperial disdain for the troops. Even junior lieutenants consider themselves "above it all". This is still the case. This approach could kind of work when their was a professional officer class and a political state that at least in theory inspired loyalty. Truly "universal" military training for two years at least produced an obedient soldier who could do simple tasks and created a "we are all in this together" mentality. If he lived long enough, he could become very good.

In the existing kleptocracy with one year of training for some and no "moral" justification doesn't work. The contract soldiers tend to be people who can't get a better job. Nobody believes and everybody just wants to survive and steal a washing machine if possible. It is a recipe for disaster. Russia's "successes" in Syria and elsewhere revolve around having the "locals" do the actual fighting and the Wagner group stepping in where a little "extra" is needed. Thus the heavy use of LDR and DPR troops despite the fact they are not reliable.

The fear I have is that somewhere in this mess their does exist the remnants of a professional officer class that will be allowed to whip a few divisions into shape and reach the old Soviet standard. Those guys would be a real problem for Ukraine. Unless Russia can do that, their only hope is that the west becomes tired of this war or Ukraine collapses economically. Neither of these two outcomes are impossible, but that is no way to run a war.

The Ukrainians seem to be very well led, and up to using the latest technical gadgets and almost certainly getting vast amounts of current intel from various western electronic sources.  I see the Ukraine's biggest danger is getting over confident and biting off more they can chew somewhere and taking some losses they can't afford.

I agree. I would add the danger that if the war slows down and the Ukrainian population starts to take stock of their losses, both in blood and treasure, they will become discouraged. It is going to be a hard winter in Ukraine. Their economy is a shambles. In many of the recaptured areas there won't be utilities. Its lots easier enduring these things when you think you are "winning", but when nothing is happening it is lots more difficult.

Winter is a big question. Will both sides sit down and train and re-equip their units or will one side or the other go on the offense once the ground freezes over.

I think Ukraine is going to try real hard to maintain an active operational pace because the leadership is concerned about the effects cited above and also because Ukraine right now has the advantage. If Ukraine can force Russia to maintain a high defensive tempo, that will prevent Russia from regrouping. I think that is the plan.

I also see lots of pictures of small Ukrainian groups, armed with something other than the standard weapons you see, but some with a surppressed weapon and often at least one guy with an obvious sniper rifle. I assume these guys are part of some special ops unit that are probably running missions behind the front lines.  Any insight into how they are using those kinds of troops, they clearly have them?

Can't help you much there. They certainly have "special ops" but I think they have even more "irregular forces" that operate behind Russian lines as guerrillas. They are only loosely controlled but can do bigger things than the "special ops" guys can. I think lots of the explosions and assassinations are the work of these guerrillas.

[Goose]

If the Russians have really lost 40,000 to 60,000 dead and over 2000 vehicles, plus at least that many more wounded, you are talking about 10 or 12 divisions worth of men and equipment?  Is that really possible?

The US apparently agrees with an estimate of 80,000 Russian casualties, of which 40,000 were KIA. It is a difficult number to get your head around, I agree. Even if it is "wrong" (which to some extent is certainly is), the number of Russian casualties is "brobdingnagian". The equipment losses are independently counted by some observers from various photint sources (e.g. Oryx). They are pretty solid. So, given the evidence we have, I guess it is "real". How Putin is keeping 40,000 deaths quiet is a mystery, but we really have little insight into rural Russia where most of the losses are.

Normally I would think you would want to run your new recruits through 90 days of training and integrate them into established units with combat hardened NCOs and Officers.  That doesn't sound like they are doing. Seems like a recipe for disaster.  How do you see Russia trying to regain some control over the battle space?

Russian training, even back in the "best" Soviet times, was substandard. In all cases the "destination" units were expected to make a significant contribution to recruit training. Except for the navy (to some extent) Russia has never had an NCO cadre that could contribute much to recruit training or offer field leadership. Raw discipline yes, but beyond that, not much. Interestingly for a country that created "the new Soviet man", Russian officers maintained the old Imperial disdain for the troops. Even junior lieutenants consider themselves "above it all". This is still the case. This approach could kind of work when their was a professional officer class and a political state that at least in theory inspired loyalty. Truly "universal" military training for two years at least produced an obedient soldier who could do simple tasks and created a "we are all in this together" mentality. If he lived long enough, he could become very good.

In the existing kleptocracy with one year of training for some and no "moral" justification doesn't work. The contract soldiers tend to be people who can't get a better job. Nobody believes and everybody just wants to survive and steal a washing machine if possible. It is a recipe for disaster. Russia's "successes" in Syria and elsewhere revolve around having the "locals" do the actual fighting and the Wagner group stepping in where a little "extra" is needed. Thus the heavy use of LDR and DPR troops despite the fact they are not reliable.

The fear I have is that somewhere in this mess their does exist the remnants of a professional officer class that will be allowed to whip a few divisions into shape and reach the old Soviet standard. Those guys would be a real problem for Ukraine. Unless Russia can do that, their only hope is that the west becomes tired of this war or Ukraine collapses economically. Neither of these two outcomes are impossible, but that is no way to run a war.

The Ukrainians seem to be very well led, and up to using the latest technical gadgets and almost certainly getting vast amounts of current intel from various western electronic sources.  I see the Ukraine's biggest danger is getting over confident and biting off more they can chew somewhere and taking some losses they can't afford.

I agree. I would add the danger that if the war slows down and the Ukrainian population starts to take stock of their losses, both in blood and treasure, they will become discouraged. It is going to be a hard winter in Ukraine. Their economy is a shambles. In many of the recaptured areas there won't be utilities. Its lots easier enduring these things when you think you are "winning", but when nothing is happening it is lots more difficult.

Winter is a big question. Will both sides sit down and train and re-equip their units or will one side or the other go on the offense once the ground freezes over.

I think Ukraine is going to try real hard to maintain an active operational pace because the leadership is concerned about the effects cited above and also because Ukraine right now has the advantage. If Ukraine can force Russia to maintain a high defensive tempo, that will prevent Russia from regrouping. I think that is the plan.

I also see lots of pictures of small Ukrainian groups, armed with something other than the standard weapons you see, but some with a surppressed weapon and often at least one guy with an obvious sniper rifle. I assume these guys are part of some special ops unit that are probably running missions behind the front lines.  Any insight into how they are using those kinds of troops, they clearly have them?

Can't help you much there. They certainly have "special ops" but I think they have even more "irregular forces" that operate behind Russian lines as guerrillas. They are only loosely controlled but can do bigger things than the "special ops" guys can. I think lots of the explosions and assassinations are the work of these guerrillas.