(09-10-2022, 04:09 AM)BostonCard Wrote: Already this is looking like a complete collapse of the Russian front. It suggests that the Russian line was a mile wide (well, several hundred miles wide) and about an inch deep. It’s hard to believe, but then again, if reports of 50,000 Russian casualties are correct, then, maybe. ~50,000 dead (if the data from the Russian treasury is accurate) implies at least 150,000 wounded (would be more than that but for Russian disregard for the lives of their own soldiers and crappy military evacuation). Their initial invading force was ~100,000 with maybe 50,000 in reserve plus you figure a bunch of LNR and DNR conscripts, plus the newly recruited and poorly trained “volunteers” so no way of knowing its total force but it is perhaps consistent with reports that Russian BTG’s were operating at <50%. Military doctrine states that this is well beyond the threshold where fighting force struggles with cohesion.
I don’t want to get ahead of myself here. The success of the Ukrainian advance has exceeded even the most optimistic projections, but it is a long way from over. Russian forces will regroup, and as Ukraine pushes towards the East, Russian supply lines are less stretched, Russian forces are more entrenched, the local population is more pro-Russian, and it will become tougher. That being said, I have consistently underestimated the Ukrainians and overestimated the Russians (because the Russian army really can’t be *that* bad, right?). I keep thinking they will get their act together. But until they do, it is great to see what the Ukrainians have done.
BC
Here’s the full translation of that Russian telegram:
https://twitter.com/intelarrow/status/15...WY7_3qV-aw
And from the translation, if true, it appears that Ukrainians are at the doorstep of the city of Donetsk, which they lost back in 2014.
BC
IMHO great post BC. Lots of things are in motion and there is still plenty of "fog" going on. Izyum has been taken (we think) but there is disagreement about whether the Russians surrendered there, abandoned their heavy equipment there and fled, or retreated (to where?) in good order. There are reports of POWs in the thousands, which, if true, really says the Russian army is routed and falling apart (as opposed to just too thin on the ground).
The reference to counter-battery in your previous post was a bit pro-forma, but there are lots of other ones out there. It appears that Ukraine has developed a significant capability there. It is a learned skill and as I have said before requires coordination between different forces over a potentially wide area. It takes practice to get good at it. Ukraine has had plenty of practice.
The important point is that Ukraine retains (yes, the dreaded "r word") Kupiansk and Kivsharivka. All this success flows from there. The reinforcements destined for that area were apparently cut up on the roads before they reached their destination. This is a key skill for Ukraine to demonstrate. Moving formations are much easier targets than dug in defenses (duh). Russia is going to need to move forces around to stop the bleeding. If Ukraine can significantly damage those moving forces the offensive can continue until it hits another major line of defense (if there is one).
The Russian troops to the south in Kharkiv Oblast knew that if one or both of Kupiansk and Kivsharivka were lost, there was no road or rail transport available to supply them or extract them. They were halfway out the back door before Ukraine knocked on the front. It is probable that much of Ukraine's success further south in Luhansk is simply due to panic. Those troops aren't cut off, but they fear they might be. It isn't probable that all, or even most, of the Ukrainian troops that are now advancing in the south are equipped and trained to the standard the ones that started this offensive were. It doesn't matter as long as the Russians keep running. However, it will matter if/when they don't. We can only hope the Ukraine has kept track of which are their "A" units and which are their "C" units.
We don't know yet how big a dent was made in Russian forces, but at the very least it is "significant". Supposedly Russia moved lots of troops to Kherson Oblast during the early summer. Do they try to move them back? It would seem Ukraine intends to continue their offensive in Kherson. If Russia starts to run there it could end the war. It could end because Putin falls or it could end because Crimea gets overrun. As we are seeing, if the Ukrainian offensive hits air things can deteriorate real fast. OTOH lots of troops were moved to Kherson. Many bloggers are giving Ukraine credit for luring Russia to place those troops across the river where they are now isolated. I don't quite think that's accurate. I think Russia put a lot of those troops on the Crimea side of the river in Kherson Oblast to prevent what we are seeing in Kharkiv Oblast. Whether they can/will do so is something I dearly want us to find out.
One area we don't hear much about is the "land bridge" between Donbas and Crimea. Right now, it isn't so useful to Kherson city but it still allows moving forces relatively quickly by road between Russia/Donbas and Kherson/Crimea. I have no idea what the feasibility of this might be, but the depth of that "land bridge" isn't large. If Ukraine could cut that route (either by physically occupying a position astride the road or by bringing the road into observed fire range) that would send a brobdingnagian shock wave throughout Crimea and Kherson Oblast. The Kerch bridge would be the only reliable way out. I suspect lots of people would decide now was a good time to visit relatives in (fill in the blank Russian city).