[GK3]

Russia probably has hit their peak of artillery shelling in June, but seem unable to sustain it. This is probably related to Ukrainian strikes on ammo dumps and Russian supplies dwindling, along with barrel wear.

Ukraine's strikes on ammo dumps and distribution points have undoubtedly destroyed lots of ordinance. Even more importantly it has forced the Russians to move their dumps significantly further from the FEBA. This requires more transport, which Russia was already short on. They need more trucks and drivers. Since they load and unload all the ammo manually, they need more people to do this as well. They can't fire any faster than supplies can be delivered and now that is much slower.

The Ukraine has also shown some significant improvement in counter battery fire. More and more reports of Russian artillery destroyed. That is undoubtedly partly due to more HIMARS that outranges the Russian tube artillery and can do the dirty work, but it it also an acquired skill. More important than the destroyed artillery, this capability forces the Russians to at least consider "shoot and scoot" rather than sitting in one place for days pounding away. This also reduces the rate of fire because towed artillery (which Russia has lots of) can't fire while moving and even self propelled guns fire much slower while moving (if they can do so at all). This movement also makes supply more difficult as the supply trucks have to find the guns. If the movement wasn't planned and pre-briefed that can be difficult and time consuming. Another factor slowing down rate of fire.

UPDATE: Just saw this. Take it with a grain of salt, but sounds good!
https://www.yahoo.com/news/counter-batte...23597.html

Casualties also cannot be ignored. During the Luhansk battles, Ukraine lost a lot of troops, but so did Russia. Many Russian batteries may be down to a couple of guns because there are too few cannon cockers. Any replacements Russia can dredge up at this point are undoubtedly even more poorly trained and motivated than the guys they replace. This leads to lower rates of fire and mistakes.

Replacing gun barrels isn't a simple task. The prime movers and SP gun engines require maintenance as well. Due to the extremely high operational tempo during the Luhansk operations this maintenance has undoubtedly been deferred. At some point you just have to do it. However, Russia lacks the skilled troops to do these tasks swiftly and reliably. That alone will force a reduction in tempo. On top of that, the Russian army is just plain tired. They have been operating at maximum tempo for months in the face of casualties. I don't hear about units being pulled out of the line to go on "R & R". Troops can only do that for so long, and if morale is poor to begin with it just gets worse. This also will hinder massive shelling.

Russian industry needs to produce shells, charges, and replace or refurbish their artillery and they seem unable to do so.

Really good thread on this below from Jack Watling of RUSI

https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/...WknEjD2iew

I am glad Mr Watling adds the caveat about not over reacting in the other way. While the west may lack insight into the rate Russia can produce shells, we do have a pretty good idea about what they started with. Even if they made essentially nothing at all they could fire at their previous rate until some time in early 2023, and this is without tapping into Soviet era material. Running low on shells at the supply end isn't the reason they are slowing down. The above reasons plus shipping bottlenecks from remote storage may be the issues, but they have the shells. Next May, maybe not.  Unwise to assume that next week they can't significantly up their game, but the reasons you cited plus a few more it looks difficult.

The fact Russia is buying shells from N. Korea says essentially nothing about their current ammunition situation. If the N. Korean ammunition is any good, it has the big advantage that it is already built. While I am sure Russia is trying to increase their ammunition output, if they have the opportunity to buy another years worth to not do so would be insane. If they later don't need so much, they can just reduce domestic production for a year. It is doubly good because it helps an ally that needs it. I also expect Russia will pay with Sakhalin POL which right now are hard to sell. I am sure N. Korea won't mind if it arrives in Russian bottoms.

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Man, how do they plan to get those munitions from NK to Western Russia?  By rail all the way, ship then rail, or ship all the way to the Black Sea?
Lots of bad things could happen to munition shipments when they get close to the Ukraine.  I don't how air shipments make any sense.

Via ship to Vlad, then rail. Lots of material moves that way every day. This will not be viewed as a big challenge for Russia. What Ukraine can do about it remains to be seen. In the next few months, probably doesn't matter.

Yes, that would be pretty much the standard way to get stuff from Eastern Russia to Western.  My concern would be how much stuff can they move and how fast will it get there.  That is a several day trip at best.  Then they have to unload it and move it closer to the FEBA.  I would assume that munition trains will stop some distance East of the FEBA and then be shipped in smaller amounts by train and truck.  I think the Ukraine will have a pretty good idea of when shipments are coming and will make a concerted effort to interdict them.  The big question is can they?  How much do they have currently in stock and available in the area of current operations.  If it is a lot, then the transit time is not that big a deal, if they are truly short of ammo, then that is something else.

[GK3]

Russia probably has hit their peak of artillery shelling in June, but seem unable to sustain it. This is probably related to Ukrainian strikes on ammo dumps and Russian supplies dwindling, along with barrel wear.

Ukraine's strikes on ammo dumps and distribution points have undoubtedly destroyed lots of ordinance. Even more importantly it has forced the Russians to move their dumps significantly further from the FEBA. This requires more transport, which Russia was already short on. They need more trucks and drivers. Since they load and unload all the ammo manually, they need more people to do this as well. They can't fire any faster than supplies can be delivered and now that is much slower.

The Ukraine has also shown some significant improvement in counter battery fire. More and more reports of Russian artillery destroyed. That is undoubtedly partly due to more HIMARS that outranges the Russian tube artillery and can do the dirty work, but it it also an acquired skill. More important than the destroyed artillery, this capability forces the Russians to at least consider "shoot and scoot" rather than sitting in one place for days pounding away. This also reduces the rate of fire because towed artillery (which Russia has lots of) can't fire while moving and even self propelled guns fire much slower while moving (if they can do so at all). This movement also makes supply more difficult as the supply trucks have to find the guns. If the movement wasn't planned and pre-briefed that can be difficult and time consuming. Another factor slowing down rate of fire.

UPDATE: Just saw this. Take it with a grain of salt, but sounds good!
https://www.yahoo.com/news/counter-batte...23597.html

Casualties also cannot be ignored. During the Luhansk battles, Ukraine lost a lot of troops, but so did Russia. Many Russian batteries may be down to a couple of guns because there are too few cannon cockers. Any replacements Russia can dredge up at this point are undoubtedly even more poorly trained and motivated than the guys they replace. This leads to lower rates of fire and mistakes.

Replacing gun barrels isn't a simple task. The prime movers and SP gun engines require maintenance as well. Due to the extremely high operational tempo during the Luhansk operations this maintenance has undoubtedly been deferred. At some point you just have to do it. However, Russia lacks the skilled troops to do these tasks swiftly and reliably. That alone will force a reduction in tempo. On top of that, the Russian army is just plain tired. They have been operating at maximum tempo for months in the face of casualties. I don't hear about units being pulled out of the line to go on "R & R". Troops can only do that for so long, and if morale is poor to begin with it just gets worse. This also will hinder massive shelling.

Russian industry needs to produce shells, charges, and replace or refurbish their artillery and they seem unable to do so.

Really good thread on this below from Jack Watling of RUSI

https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/...WknEjD2iew

I am glad Mr Watling adds the caveat about not over reacting in the other way. While the west may lack insight into the rate Russia can produce shells, we do have a pretty good idea about what they started with. Even if they made essentially nothing at all they could fire at their previous rate until some time in early 2023, and this is without tapping into Soviet era material. Running low on shells at the supply end isn't the reason they are slowing down. The above reasons plus shipping bottlenecks from remote storage may be the issues, but they have the shells. Next May, maybe not.  Unwise to assume that next week they can't significantly up their game, but the reasons you cited plus a few more it looks difficult.

The fact Russia is buying shells from N. Korea says essentially nothing about their current ammunition situation. If the N. Korean ammunition is any good, it has the big advantage that it is already built. While I am sure Russia is trying to increase their ammunition output, if they have the opportunity to buy another years worth to not do so would be insane. If they later don't need so much, they can just reduce domestic production for a year. It is doubly good because it helps an ally that needs it. I also expect Russia will pay with Sakhalin POL which right now are hard to sell. I am sure N. Korea won't mind if it arrives in Russian bottoms.

---

Man, how do they plan to get those munitions from NK to Western Russia?  By rail all the way, ship then rail, or ship all the way to the Black Sea?
Lots of bad things could happen to munition shipments when they get close to the Ukraine.  I don't how air shipments make any sense.

Via ship to Vlad, then rail. Lots of material moves that way every day. This will not be viewed as a big challenge for Russia. What Ukraine can do about it remains to be seen. In the next few months, probably doesn't matter.

Yes, that would be pretty much the standard way to get stuff from Eastern Russia to Western.  My concern would be how much stuff can they move and how fast will it get there.  That is a several day trip at best.  Then they have to unload it and move it closer to the FEBA.  I would assume that munition trains will stop some distance East of the FEBA and then be shipped in smaller amounts by train and truck.  I think the Ukraine will have a pretty good idea of when shipments are coming and will make a concerted effort to interdict them.  The big question is can they?  How much do they have currently in stock and available in the area of current operations.  If it is a lot, then the transit time is not that big a deal, if they are truly short of ammo, then that is something else.