[Goose]

Very interesting article from Jack Watling of RUSI about the Ukrainian offensive and its objectives and role in the greater conflict.



https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ome-stages

If the Ukrainians can expend a limited amount of their combat power to pen the Russians into the city, they can reverse the challenges they faced in Severodonetsk and create a killing area for a large portion of Russia’s best assault troops – primarily airborne forces – who will be fixed defending a politically critical position even as it becomes militarily untenable. In this scenario, the Russian leadership must either contend with the progressive degradation of their assault troops at a time when they are desperately short of motivated infantry, or make a ‘goodwill gesture’ and withdraw – in the process suffering a heavy symbolic defeat, as Kherson is one of only two cities that were occupied largely intact during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The problem with this analysis is that the Russians were perfectly able and willing to level Severodonetsk to destroy the Ukrainians defending it, along with any Ukrainian civilians remaining there. Ukraine probably doesn't have either the desire or the artillery to do the same in Kherson. The only way to "destroy" any Russians inside the city would be to cut off their supplies (which one can do by controlling the GLOCs by artillery fire) and wait them out. Of course, this will also involve cutting off food supplies to the civilians inside the city. Hopefully everybody who can will leave before it comes to that. The other bad news for cutting the GLOCs by fire is that when the river freezes you don't need the bridges. It isn't "convenient" but it will be entirely possible to supply the city at a "basic" level that way. Russia has done it before, several times. For that reason the next few months are critical to getting the Russians out of Kherson. A mild/late winter would be a big help here.

The only sure way to drive the Russians out of Kherson is to occupy a bridgehead on the other side of the river and/or achieve local air superiority. The latter is improbable. The former is possible and has the additional advantage of creating a threat of further advances. Failing that, the reality is that the Russians will only leave Kherson city by their own choice, either due to a collapse in morale leading to a disorganized run or because the high command decides it isn't worth the attrition that holding it will cause. Ukraine doesn't want a Stalingrad. The question is whether Russia is willing to risk one. Right now it appears they expect to hold on, but who knows? https://english.nv.ua/amp/russia-will-no...66944.html

The author presents a need for Ukraine to show to the "West" that they are making progress and casting that as a motivating factor for "early" offensives. While there is IMHO some truth to this, I think a much, much greater factor is for the government of the Ukraine to show their own people and military that there is hope. Ukraine is a democracy and unlike Russia they can't fight if the people don't want to do so. Very few people in Ukraine want to "give up", but over time that will change as hardships mount and it appears defeat is inevitable. Ukraine needs some "good news" much more than the West does I suspect. As we know, there are many undercurrents in Ukrainian politics. So far, the war has overcome most of them. As winter sets in, that will be less so. A few victories can be a great motivator to hold everybody together.

[Goose]

Very interesting article from Jack Watling of RUSI about the Ukrainian offensive and its objectives and role in the greater conflict.



https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ome-stages

If the Ukrainians can expend a limited amount of their combat power to pen the Russians into the city, they can reverse the challenges they faced in Severodonetsk and create a killing area for a large portion of Russia’s best assault troops – primarily airborne forces – who will be fixed defending a politically critical position even as it becomes militarily untenable. In this scenario, the Russian leadership must either contend with the progressive degradation of their assault troops at a time when they are desperately short of motivated infantry, or make a ‘goodwill gesture’ and withdraw – in the process suffering a heavy symbolic defeat, as Kherson is one of only two cities that were occupied largely intact during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The problem with this analysis is that the Russians were perfectly able and willing to level Severodonetsk to destroy the Ukrainians defending it, along with any Ukrainian civilians remaining there. Ukraine probably doesn't have either the desire or the artillery to do the same in Kherson. The only way to "destroy" any Russians inside the city would be to cut off their supplies (which one can do by controlling the GLOCs by artillery fire) and wait them out. Of course, this will also involve cutting off food supplies to the civilians inside the city. Hopefully everybody who can will leave before it comes to that. The other bad news for cutting the GLOCs by fire is that when the river freezes you don't need the bridges. It isn't "convenient" but it will be entirely possible to supply the city at a "basic" level that way. Russia has done it before, several times. For that reason the next few months are critical to getting the Russians out of Kherson. A mild/late winter would be a big help here.

The only sure way to drive the Russians out of Kherson is to occupy a bridgehead on the other side of the river and/or achieve local air superiority. The latter is improbable. The former is possible and has the additional advantage of creating a threat of further advances. Failing that, the reality is that the Russians will only leave Kherson city by their own choice, either due to a collapse in morale leading to a disorganized run or because the high command decides it isn't worth the attrition that holding it will cause. Ukraine doesn't want a Stalingrad. The question is whether Russia is willing to risk one. Right now it appears they expect to hold on, but who knows? https://english.nv.ua/amp/russia-will-no...66944.html

The author presents a need for Ukraine to show to the "West" that they are making progress and casting that as a motivating factor for "early" offensives. While there is IMHO some truth to this, I think a much, much greater factor is for the government of the Ukraine to show their own people and military that there is hope. Ukraine is a democracy and unlike Russia they can't fight if the people don't want to do so. Very few people in Ukraine want to "give up", but over time that will change as hardships mount and it appears defeat is inevitable. Ukraine needs some "good news" much more than the West does I suspect. As we know, there are many undercurrents in Ukrainian politics. So far, the war has overcome most of them. As winter sets in, that will be less so. A few victories can be a great motivator to hold everybody together.