[Goose]

The RUSI report is very good and detailed. Worth reading in full.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...al-victory

Agree. Makes a lot of the same points my earlier one did. I wonder if there is some cross-polarization there.

There is one point in both articles where I am pretty sure they are either wrong or conflating two things. The Russians are using communications jammers to prevent the Ukrainians from talking to each other. They are also using jamming GPS and GLONASS(!) in Ukraine. Both articles suggest anti-radiation missiles as a solution. While that could be done, communications jammers are usually easy to geolocate via conventional ESM techniques. They are inherently high duty cycle and high power devices. I would be real surprised if the US didn't have the location of every significant Russian jammer mapped down to the meter. Both the USAF and the Army have aircraft that do this mission very well. The "classic" example is https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/...nsor-grcs/. If you know where the jammer is, a HIMARS can take it out.

Anti-radiation missiles are much more commonly used against radar's that do not operate continuously and are easily moved around. Such radars are also usually defending assets that are located far from the front lines and the anti-radiation missiles are part of an attack well behind the lines. If you look at the Wikipedia page, while they say such missiles can be used against communications jammers, all they talk about are radar targets. This is not to say that Ukraine doesn't need such missiles, but rather that the aren't required (or useful, because they are optimized to attack radars) against communication jammers.

[Goose]

The RUSI report is very good and detailed. Worth reading in full.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...al-victory

Agree. Makes a lot of the same points my earlier one did. I wonder if there is some cross-polarization there.

There is one point in both articles where I am pretty sure they are either wrong or conflating two things. The Russians are using communications jammers to prevent the Ukrainians from talking to each other. They are also using jamming GPS and GLONASS(!) in Ukraine. Both articles suggest anti-radiation missiles as a solution. While that could be done, communications jammers are usually easy to geolocate via conventional ESM techniques. They are inherently high duty cycle and high power devices. I would be real surprised if the US didn't have the location of every significant Russian jammer mapped down to the meter. Both the USAF and the Army have aircraft that do this mission very well. The "classic" example is https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/...nsor-grcs/. If you know where the jammer is, a HIMARS can take it out.

Anti-radiation missiles are much more commonly used against radar's that do not operate continuously and are easily moved around. Such radars are also usually defending assets that are located far from the front lines and the anti-radiation missiles are part of an attack well behind the lines. If you look at the Wikipedia page, while they say such missiles can be used against communications jammers, all they talk about are radar targets. This is not to say that Ukraine doesn't need such missiles, but rather that the aren't required (or useful, because they are optimized to attack radars) against communication jammers.