[Goose]

https://twitter.com/warinthefuture/statu...LV7S1IvaYQ

I thought that was a well-written and well-considered assessment of the situation in the Donbas.

BC

I agree it is a pretty good assessment, which may be expected he also notes the similarities to WW I in the current situation :-). Another article with some good information IMHO is https://www.npr.org/2022/05/27/110183714...ned-donbas. Unfortunately the situation that has played out is pretty much what I said back on May 11/12. The Ukrainian forces have been unable to defeat/suppress the Russian artillery and as a result have been driven back significantly in the Donbas. Unfortunately, Russian artillery remains a serious threat along the entire line of contact, as the The New Voice of the Ukraine reports daily highlight. The Russians are banging away everywhere, even when their primary focus is the Donbas. This forces Ukraine to maintain tubes and troops in currently more "quiet" sectors, such as the Karkhiv front, where Ukraine has pushed the Russians back.

Obviously I don't have the detailed information to explain "why" the Russian artillery is being successful, but I think there are several reasons. First, they heavily outnumber the Ukrainian guns. For example, Ukraine had at the start of the war 130 2A65 Msta-B towed howitzers. Russia had 370. One can research and parse these and other weapons, but it is probable Russia had at least  5:1 or so advantage in the combat zone. Worse still for Ukraine, they don't manufacture ammunition for Soviet era guns. As reported in https://www.yahoo.com/news/western-weapo...00333.html in the last months the West has provided more ammunition for the guns that we have supplied than there is Soviet-era ammunition available. This helps explain why the "new" guns have not had as much effect as we hoped because the "old" guns are restricted by their ammunition supply and will become basically useless when this ammunition is gone. Poland can manufacture it but in limited quantity because they are phasing out the Soviet era weapons. When Ukraine says they are becoming NATO standard, they really mean it!

This is where the WW I similarity becomes evident. Then, as now, both sides didn't expect a prolonged, slow struggle with continually heavy artillery engagements. Both France and the UK had to put in place crash programs to manufacture more ammunition and at times shells were carefully rationed. Ukraine has that problem with it's Soviet era weapons and it probably can't be solved. For the NATO standard weapons, they have to rely on "us" to give them enough shells. It seems clear we have not. If we had, the Ukrainian infantry wouldn't be complaining like Landsers that they do not have any artillery support. There should always be "outgoing". There needs to be H & I fire. NATO also never planned for a slow motion war. The US doesn't heavily rely on artillery, so we don't make or stockpile a lot of shells . We rely on our Air Force. I certainly hope that the administration is preparing to contract for adequate ammunition. We may have adequate stocks for a while, but we certainly haven't been overly generous with them. While in no way is this war exactly WW I redux, consider that at Verdun the Germans fired one million shells in a DAY.

The second problem is that Russia has weapons available in quantity that out-range the Ukrainian systems. The IskanderM is an example. That has been a continuing problem. The good news is that FINALLY the US is going to supply MLRS systems. While we are not supplying the longer range ATACMS missiles (yet), it is a big step up for Ukraine. They have been asking for months. The question is, how many systems and how many rockets? Ten or twenty MLRS won't help much. We have also supplied Paladins in unspecified numbers. It was clear from the first that the M777s, while useful, were not enough. There was a range gap and a quantity gap. The Paladins mobility and protection allow them to operate nearer the FEBA which increases their effectiveness relative to the M777. Our military is capable of analyzing what can be accomplished with various weapons options. I hope we are supplying the quantities that are needed, not the quantities that are convenient.

I also must say once again that we should determine what our political limits are and go right up to them right now, not wait until Ukraine has shown it can't win without the "next big thing". I can't imagine why giving them ATACMS is politically more risky than what we are doing, yet we are not doing so. Ukraine right now has very limited "deep strike" capabilities. We should force the Russians to worry about such strikes just as the Ukrainians currently must. We know the Russian's have logistics issues. They have been moving slowly mostly because they need to bring forward their supply dumps (for all the artillery shells they use among other things). If their supply dumps suddenly need to be much further from the front, then what?

[Goose]

https://twitter.com/warinthefuture/statu...LV7S1IvaYQ

I thought that was a well-written and well-considered assessment of the situation in the Donbas.

BC

I agree it is a pretty good assessment, which may be expected he also notes the similarities to WW I in the current situation :-). Another article with some good information IMHO is https://www.npr.org/2022/05/27/110183714...ned-donbas. Unfortunately the situation that has played out is pretty much what I said back on May 11/12. The Ukrainian forces have been unable to defeat/suppress the Russian artillery and as a result have been driven back significantly in the Donbas. Unfortunately, Russian artillery remains a serious threat along the entire line of contact, as the The New Voice of the Ukraine reports daily highlight. The Russians are banging away everywhere, even when their primary focus is the Donbas. This forces Ukraine to maintain tubes and troops in currently more "quiet" sectors, such as the Karkhiv front, where Ukraine has pushed the Russians back.

Obviously I don't have the detailed information to explain "why" the Russian artillery is being successful, but I think there are several reasons. First, they heavily outnumber the Ukrainian guns. For example, Ukraine had at the start of the war 130 2A65 Msta-B towed howitzers. Russia had 370. One can research and parse these and other weapons, but it is probable Russia had at least  5:1 or so advantage in the combat zone. Worse still for Ukraine, they don't manufacture ammunition for Soviet era guns. As reported in https://www.yahoo.com/news/western-weapo...00333.html in the last months the West has provided more ammunition for the guns that we have supplied than there is Soviet-era ammunition available. This helps explain why the "new" guns have not had as much effect as we hoped because the "old" guns are restricted by their ammunition supply and will become basically useless when this ammunition is gone. Poland can manufacture it but in limited quantity because they are phasing out the Soviet era weapons. When Ukraine says they are becoming NATO standard, they really mean it!

This is where the WW I similarity becomes evident. Then, as now, both sides didn't expect a prolonged, slow struggle with continually heavy artillery engagements. Both France and the UK had to put in place crash programs to manufacture more ammunition and at times shells were carefully rationed. Ukraine has that problem with it's Soviet era weapons and it probably can't be solved. For the NATO standard weapons, they have to rely on "us" to give them enough shells. It seems clear we have not. If we had, the Ukrainian infantry wouldn't be complaining like Landsers that they do not have any artillery support. There should always be "outgoing". There needs to be H & I fire. NATO also never planned for a slow motion war. The US doesn't heavily rely on artillery, so we don't make or stockpile a lot of shells . We rely on our Air Force. I certainly hope that the administration is preparing to contract for adequate ammunition. We may have adequate stocks for a while, but we certainly haven't been overly generous with them. While in no way is this war exactly WW I redux, consider that at Verdun the Germans fired one million shells in a DAY.

The second problem is that Russia has weapons available in quantity that out-range the Ukrainian systems. The IskanderM is an example. That has been a continuing problem. The good news is that FINALLY the US is going to supply MLRS systems. While we are not supplying the longer range ATACMS missiles (yet), it is a big step up for Ukraine. They have been asking for months. The question is, how many systems and how many rockets? Ten or twenty MLRS won't help much. We have also supplied Paladins in unspecified numbers. It was clear from the first that the M777s, while useful, were not enough. There was a range gap and a quantity gap. The Paladins mobility and protection allow them to operate nearer the FEBA which increases their effectiveness relative to the M777. Our military is capable of analyzing what can be accomplished with various weapons options. I hope we are supplying the quantities that are needed, not the quantities that are convenient.

I also must say once again that we should determine what our political limits are and go right up to them right now, not wait until Ukraine has shown it can't win without the "next big thing". I can't imagine why giving them ATACMS is politically more risky than what we are doing, yet we are not doing so. Ukraine right now has very limited "deep strike" capabilities. We should force the Russians to worry about such strikes just as the Ukrainians currently must. We know the Russian's have logistics issues. They have been moving slowly mostly because they need to bring forward their supply dumps (for all the artillery shells they use among other things). If their supply dumps suddenly need to be much further from the front, then what?