[Goose]

One thing I think that remains very important is can the Ukraine prevent Russia from gaining clear air superiority.  Today's weapons can be so accurate and inflict so much damage it is important we keep them supplied with whatever they need to prevent Russian air superiotity.

It is unclear why Russia doesn't have that already. There are two contributing factors IMHO. One is, it appears they have no doctrine on how to destroy the opposition's air defenses. While the S-300 long-range systems are very mobile, they aren't operational while moving. Ukraine isn't moving them every hour. The acquisition radars are easily geolocated by ESM (if Ukraine is even using them). The S-300 target illuminators are also detectable. Russia has anti-radiation missiles that can hit those targets. It may be Russia doesn't have enough such missiles, in which case they would have to fall back to geolocation and precision strike weapons. The Russians have, on paper, the ability to do this. It takes a while, maybe a few months, to attrit the enemy air defense that way to a point of ineffectiveness, but it can be done. They have had a few months and didn't do it. It is nothing Ukraine has done, except probably moving S-300 batteries as much as possible and not using target illuminators except when necessary. It is also possible Russia has so few cruise missiles capable of precision strike that they won't use them for SEAD. If so, they are in a world of hurt. However, they can always revert to Iron Hand methods. They will lose pilots that way, but it does work if you have the will. Maybe they don't. Eliminating or greatly attenuating the Ukraine's high altitude air defense should have been possible for Russia, one way or another. They haven't done it. If they had, Russian air could drop even dumb bombs with relative impunity. Hasn't happened. To be clear, this isn't a US level SEAD/DEAD effort, but only a reasonable facsimile against an enemy that isn't attacking your airfields or mounting a SEAD mission against you. Very, very doable.

The second problem is that Russia may feel that their air force can't inflict enough damage on the Ukranian military from high altitude bombing to make it worth their effort. They may just suck at that due to not training for that mission. They also may be so low on precision weapons that that they are not an option, and they may not have any viable stand-in weapons to use anyway. Obtaining low altitude air supremacy/superiority on today's battlefield is impossible due to MANPADS. TORs and Pantsirs are also problems. You can suppress but not eliminate radar guided low altitude weapons, but the IR ones or the optically guided ones are hard to get rid of. The US has adopted a "just don't go there" approach, but possibly Russia cannot. Russia also appears unwilling to engage Ukrainian fighter aircraft. Why is unclear.

So, it isn't so much what NATO has done. It is more what Russia didn't/isn't doing IMHO.

As an aside, todays communications systems, GPS, and satellites are so much different than yesteryear I have a hard imagining how nice would have been to have had them back in the day.  The PRC 6 and PRC 25 left a lot to be desired, plus using morse code for commo into denied areas is something else again. Plus I had some guys who would have given anything to avoid carrying the PRC 25.

The SINCGARS effort surely has been a boon to secure radio communications. I guess the replacement for that system is coming "soon" although interoperability is a big consideration. Back in the 80s anything that hopped at faster than 100 hops per second was a big ITAR no-no. Today, 1000 hops per second is considered "slow" hopping. Even back then, such signals could be DFed if you had the right equipment. The Russian versions seem to not be working or so bound up in security red tape that they have to rely on Cell phones in many cases. Russia is also actively jamming GPS wherever they can/need to. They are good at this, but possibly asset limited. There was a good video of a jamming site being destroyed. These jammers are very vulnerable because in order to work they obviously must transmit. Hazardous to their health.

[Goose]

One thing I think that remains very important is can the Ukraine prevent Russia from gaining clear air superiority.  Today's weapons can be so accurate and inflict so much damage it is important we keep them supplied with whatever they need to prevent Russian air superiotity.

It is unclear why Russia doesn't have that already. There are two contributing factors IMHO. One is, it appears they have no doctrine on how to destroy the opposition's air defenses. While the S-300 long-range systems are very mobile, they aren't operational while moving. Ukraine isn't moving them every hour. The acquisition radars are easily geolocated by ESM (if Ukraine is even using them). The S-300 target illuminators are also detectable. Russia has anti-radiation missiles that can hit those targets. It may be Russia doesn't have enough such missiles, in which case they would have to fall back to geolocation and precision strike weapons. The Russians have, on paper, the ability to do this. It takes a while, maybe a few months, to attrit the enemy air defense that way to a point of ineffectiveness, but it can be done. They have had a few months and didn't do it. It is nothing Ukraine has done, except probably moving S-300 batteries as much as possible and not using target illuminators except when necessary. It is also possible Russia has so few cruise missiles capable of precision strike that they won't use them for SEAD. If so, they are in a world of hurt. However, they can always revert to Iron Hand methods. They will lose pilots that way, but it does work if you have the will. Maybe they don't. Eliminating or greatly attenuating the Ukraine's high altitude air defense should have been possible for Russia, one way or another. They haven't done it. If they had, Russian air could drop even dumb bombs with relative impunity. Hasn't happened. To be clear, this isn't a US level SEAD/DEAD effort, but only a reasonable facsimile against an enemy that isn't attacking your airfields or mounting a SEAD mission against you. Very, very doable.

The second problem is that Russia may feel that their air force can't inflict enough damage on the Ukranian military from high altitude bombing to make it worth their effort. They may just suck at that due to not training for that mission. They also may be so low on precision weapons that that they are not an option, and they may not have any viable stand-in weapons to use anyway. Obtaining low altitude air supremacy/superiority on today's battlefield is impossible due to MANPADS. TORs and Pantsirs are also problems. You can suppress but not eliminate radar guided low altitude weapons, but the IR ones or the optically guided ones are hard to get rid of. The US has adopted a "just don't go there" approach, but possibly Russia cannot. Russia also appears unwilling to engage Ukrainian fighter aircraft. Why is unclear.

So, it isn't so much what NATO has done. It is more what Russia didn't/isn't doing IMHO.

As an aside, todays communications systems, GPS, and satellites are so much different than yesteryear I have a hard imagining how nice would have been to have had them back in the day.  The PRC 6 and PRC 25 left a lot to be desired, plus using morse code for commo into denied areas is something else again. Plus I had some guys who would have given anything to avoid carrying the PRC 25.

The SINCGARS effort surely has been a boon to secure radio communications. I guess the replacement for that system is coming "soon" although interoperability is a big consideration. Back in the 80s anything that hopped at faster than 100 hops per second was a big ITAR no-no. Today, 1000 hops per second is considered "slow" hopping. Even back then, such signals could be DFed if you had the right equipment. The Russian versions seem to not be working or so bound up in security red tape that they have to rely on Cell phones in many cases. Russia is also actively jamming GPS wherever they can/need to. They are good at this, but possibly asset limited. There was a good video of a jamming site being destroyed. These jammers are very vulnerable because in order to work they obviously must transmit. Hazardous to their health.