[BostonCard]

Similar to Article V, the idea that an attack on Russian territory will provoke a nuclear response is a threat, not a rule, and it is only as real as it is credible.  I hope we never find out, of course, but a Russia that attacks a NATO country should not expect military targets such as air defenses, that support the attack to be “off limits”, and were it to happen there will be much discussion about whether the tactical benefits are worth the risks of nuclear annihilation (bearing in mind that it would be impossible to eliminate risk, but that even a small risk may not be worth it).  My guess is that NATO’s chance to save the Baltics will rely on establishing air superiority (if not supremacy) and command of the seas to negate Russia’s advantage on land, and that thus some attacks on Russian soil will be an inevitable consequence.

BC

[BostonCard]

Similar to Article V, the idea that an attack on Russian territory will provoke a nuclear response is a threat, not a rule, and it is only as real as it is credible.  I hope we never find out, of course, but a Russia that attacks a NATO country should not expect military targets such as air defenses, that support the attack to be “off limits”, and were it to happen there will be much discussion about whether the tactical benefits are worth the risks of nuclear annihilation (bearing in mind that it would be impossible to eliminate risk, but that even a small risk may not be worth it).  My guess is that NATO’s chance to save the Baltics will rely on establishing air superiority (if not supremacy) and command of the seas to negate Russia’s advantage on land, and that thus some attacks on Russian soil will be an inevitable consequence.

BC