[Goose]

Well I don't know that it's likely, but I think it's a lot more likely that Ukraine retakes those areas than Russia takes and holds Kiev.

Russia is suffering more KIA in a couple weeks in Ukraine than the average monthly KIA for US during WW2, and the losses thus far have been disproportionately to their best soldiers and equipment.

True, because they are driving against a prepared and motivated defense. They are also not operating as combined arms units and are disorganized. Most of that stops if they stop attacking.

If we take 7000 as KIA, likely there are ~25k Russian soldiers dead or wounded by now. At this rate their entire invasion force will be dead or wounded in 3 to 4 months.

I am not sure I credit the 7K for exactly this reason. It seems far too high for the amount of actual combat going on. However, if it is true that the Ukrainians actually killed the commander of 150 Motor Rifle Division, that division should be really chewed up for that to happen. It should be combat ineffective. Yet we don't see it being pulled off the line. Lots of "does not compute" in the fog of war, so I think we just don't know.

We don't know Ukrainian losses but they are probably much less than Russia given their advantage as defenders. And their army and territorial defense forces are far more numerous than the Russian invasion force.

The Russian invasion force is about the same size as the entire Ukrainian military was at the start of the war. The Ukrainian army was about 125,000 men. There were officially 900,000 reservists available, but obviously many more people have made themselves available. If one accepts the idea that a 3:1 advantage of attackers over defenders is desired, overall Russia is in trouble. However, the Ukrainian reserves are not well trained (at least yet) and are immobile. If Russia was well led, their better mobility should have led to at least a 3:1 numerical superiority in chosen places where they would easily win. Hasn't happened. OTOH, if Russia stops attacking and remains on the defensive, they are just fine at 1:1.

I think a Russian military collapse is more likely than not at this point. And they certainly have not secured the areas their troops "occupy" from this offensive so I think their hold is very tenuous on those areas. Plenty of videos of supply trucks being ambushed near Russian border well behind the ostensible front lines, and the local populace hates them. This is not 2014.

Not sure a collapse is probable, but staying in place will not be a bed of roses, for sure. Creating a greater security zone around their existing troops will not be easy. It is possible if they adjust their lines to exclude areas where they are at a disadvantage, but will they do that? How much pressure and for how long can Ukraine engage them? Russian casualties will drop greatly as they go defensive, while Ukraine's  will increase as they attack fixed, dug in positions defended by surveyed in artillery support. That won't be fun either. What is the balance?
Ukraine has one big advantage ATM. Their armory contains whatever they can persuade the US and NATO to give them. They aren't going to run out of ordinance. They may not get exactly what they want, but they will get something/enough. Russia OTOH could run out of things that they can't build fast enough to supply their troops. Sanctions mean they can't get some raw materials. In the long haul, that could become the deciding issue. Lots of dead people on both sides before that happens I fear.

[Goose]

Well I don't know that it's likely, but I think it's a lot more likely that Ukraine retakes those areas than Russia takes and holds Kiev.

Russia is suffering more KIA in a couple weeks in Ukraine than the average monthly KIA for US during WW2, and the losses thus far have been disproportionately to their best soldiers and equipment.

True, because they are driving against a prepared and motivated defense. They are also not operating as combined arms units and are disorganized. Most of that stops if they stop attacking.

If we take 7000 as KIA, likely there are ~25k Russian soldiers dead or wounded by now. At this rate their entire invasion force will be dead or wounded in 3 to 4 months.

I am not sure I credit the 7K for exactly this reason. It seems far too high for the amount of actual combat going on. However, if it is true that the Ukrainians actually killed the commander of 150 Motor Rifle Division, that division should be really chewed up for that to happen. It should be combat ineffective. Yet we don't see it being pulled off the line. Lots of "does not compute" in the fog of war, so I think we just don't know.

We don't know Ukrainian losses but they are probably much less than Russia given their advantage as defenders. And their army and territorial defense forces are far more numerous than the Russian invasion force.

The Russian invasion force is about the same size as the entire Ukrainian military was at the start of the war. The Ukrainian army was about 125,000 men. There were officially 900,000 reservists available, but obviously many more people have made themselves available. If one accepts the idea that a 3:1 advantage of attackers over defenders is desired, overall Russia is in trouble. However, the Ukrainian reserves are not well trained (at least yet) and are immobile. If Russia was well led, their better mobility should have led to at least a 3:1 numerical superiority in chosen places where they would easily win. Hasn't happened. OTOH, if Russia stops attacking and remains on the defensive, they are just fine at 1:1.

I think a Russian military collapse is more likely than not at this point. And they certainly have not secured the areas their troops "occupy" from this offensive so I think their hold is very tenuous on those areas. Plenty of videos of supply trucks being ambushed near Russian border well behind the ostensible front lines, and the local populace hates them. This is not 2014.

Not sure a collapse is probable, but staying in place will not be a bed of roses, for sure. Creating a greater security zone around their existing troops will not be easy. It is possible if they adjust their lines to exclude areas where they are at a disadvantage, but will they do that? How much pressure and for how long can Ukraine engage them? Russian casualties will drop greatly as they go defensive, while Ukraine's  will increase as they attack fixed, dug in positions defended by surveyed in artillery support. That won't be fun either. What is the balance?
Ukraine has one big advantage ATM. Their armory contains whatever they can persuade the US and NATO to give them. They aren't going to run out of ordinance. They may not get exactly what they want, but they will get something/enough. Russia OTOH could run out of things that they can't build fast enough to supply their troops. Sanctions mean they can't get some raw materials. In the long haul, that could become the deciding issue. Lots of dead people on both sides before that happens I fear.