[bl82]

Has anyone sent Shaw this handy guide?

While I have no particular complaint with the recommendations of that chart overall, it somehow bothers me that people create these charts then describe them with statements like "the math says you should go for it on fourth down here".
The math presented says that under certain sets of assumptions one should go for it on fourth down with a certain confidence level.
That set of assumptions may or may not be true for analyzing averages across entire leagues and game situations, but by definition not so for a particular team for a particular situation.
It is a useful exercise to understand what these models say under various assumptions, but the chart-for-all is not necessarily the best approach.

Note none of this is a comment on what Stanford should do differently on fourth downs. I don't think these mathematical/statistical limitations have anything to do with Shaw's approach to fourth down situations, and it seems fairly clear to me Stanford would do better with more attempts to complete first downs.

I think the issue is that Shaw is probably aware of the general math, but he overvalues his gut based on the game flow. We know as much from his own comments. His gut is conservative and calibrated to our ~2012 era teams that could actually stop people after a punt.

I am a staunch Shawpologist and think he's fantastic - I have even defended other forms of turtling. But there's a point at which the game situation doesn't matter and the math is so overwhelming that it indicates a clear decision.  If it is 4th and less than 5 from the opponent's 37 yard-line, it ought to be a no-brainer.  

By the way, the other less obvious observation from the chart is that field goals are overvalued - in general, you should consider going for it on 4th and less than 3 even if you're inside the 30. According to the chart, it's even true from the 10 or 20 yard-line.  Of course, this depends on the quality of your kicker, but again, at some point the general math should win.  

Ideally, each team should have it's own real-time, automated chart up in the booth, based on offensive and defensive yards-per-play by both teams for the current game and the season.  I know nothing about football coaching, but that would be my inclination.  Someone might say, sure, but do you have a great play for 4th-and-4, and have they been stopping that kind of play today?  You can always question the math with "feel" or a couple counter-examples from the current game, but there ought to be a limit.

Excellent comments across the board. I also think Shaw has lost track of what the expected points per possession is in CFB and how that number has increased over the years. Similarly, expected points per opponent possession vs. a team like Oregon is something I don’t think Shaw has internalized. You can almost never punt to the Ducks if they are going to average 3-4 points per possession unless you have very long odds to make a first down. And with that type of explosive offense, their starting field position is not as big if a deal as Shaw might think. Even with great punters (perhaps because of), Shaw overvalues field position.

On offense, if you are predisposed to punt and not go for it on fourth down, this affects play calling on third down and even second down. Ironically, sometimes a more conservative play call on third down makes sense if you are prepared to go for it on fourth down. A check down pass may have very little chance of making a first down, but not only does it inceprease the odds of a fourth down conversion, it might also remove the temptation to try to thread something through tight coverage down the field. To have more realistic fourth down opportunities you need to look at third down not just as a binary first-or-punt down, but a chance to drastically reduce the distance on make a first down on fourth and whatever.

There is also the issue of total possessions and if Shaw wants to play ball control, win the time of possession battle and use up as much of the time as possible, he is actually reducing the odds of winning against an inferior team, not to mention making a comeback against any team.

[bl82]

Has anyone sent Shaw this handy guide?

While I have no particular complaint with the recommendations of that chart overall, it somehow bothers me that people create these charts then describe them with statements like "the math says you should go for it on fourth down here".
The math presented says that under certain sets of assumptions one should go for it on fourth down with a certain confidence level.
That set of assumptions may or may not be true for analyzing averages across entire leagues and game situations, but by definition not so for a particular team for a particular situation.
It is a useful exercise to understand what these models say under various assumptions, but the chart-for-all is not necessarily the best approach.

Note none of this is a comment on what Stanford should do differently on fourth downs. I don't think these mathematical/statistical limitations have anything to do with Shaw's approach to fourth down situations, and it seems fairly clear to me Stanford would do better with more attempts to complete first downs.

I think the issue is that Shaw is probably aware of the general math, but he overvalues his gut based on the game flow. We know as much from his own comments. His gut is conservative and calibrated to our ~2012 era teams that could actually stop people after a punt.

I am a staunch Shawpologist and think he's fantastic - I have even defended other forms of turtling. But there's a point at which the game situation doesn't matter and the math is so overwhelming that it indicates a clear decision.  If it is 4th and less than 5 from the opponent's 37 yard-line, it ought to be a no-brainer.  

By the way, the other less obvious observation from the chart is that field goals are overvalued - in general, you should consider going for it on 4th and less than 3 even if you're inside the 30. According to the chart, it's even true from the 10 or 20 yard-line.  Of course, this depends on the quality of your kicker, but again, at some point the general math should win.  

Ideally, each team should have it's own real-time, automated chart up in the booth, based on offensive and defensive yards-per-play by both teams for the current game and the season.  I know nothing about football coaching, but that would be my inclination.  Someone might say, sure, but do you have a great play for 4th-and-4, and have they been stopping that kind of play today?  You can always question the math with "feel" or a couple counter-examples from the current game, but there ought to be a limit.

Excellent comments across the board. I also think Shaw has lost track of what the expected points per possession is in CFB and how that number has increased over the years. Similarly, expected points per opponent possession vs. a team like Oregon is something I don’t think Shaw has internalized. You can almost never punt to the Ducks if they are going to average 3-4 points per possession unless you have very long odds to make a first down. And with that type of explosive offense, their starting field position is not as big if a deal as Shaw might think. Even with great punters (perhaps because of), Shaw overvalues field position.

On offense, if you are predisposed to punt and not go for it on fourth down, this affects play calling on third down and even second down. Ironically, sometimes a more conservative play call on third down makes sense if you are prepared to go for it on fourth down. A check down pass may have very little chance of making a first down, but not only does it inceprease the odds of a fourth down conversion, it might also remove the temptation to try to thread something through tight coverage down the field. To have more realistic fourth down opportunities you need to look at third down not just as a binary first-or-punt down, but a chance to drastically reduce the distance on make a first down on fourth and whatever.

There is also the issue of total possessions and if Shaw wants to play ball control, win the time of possession battle and use up as much of the time as possible, he is actually reducing the odds of winning against an inferior team, not to mention making a comeback against any team.