[Goose]

  For instance, if all the High School teachers were trained and ready to step into the job, they could have been deployed in March.

Hey, no! In our public high school district, teachers were responsible for planning and managing their classes via Zoom, Google Meet, with some shared time, some prep time, assignments, and grading time. They weren't just on vacation. The kids and their parents needed them.

Good point.  Not having kids in school, I forgot that teachers weren't really not working when the schools closed.

But the main point is to find some class of workers that are not in critical jobs and add a new task to their jobs.  Let's see,  park rangers, librarians, ...

No matter who they are, if it is not the "primary" occupation of the trackers/tracers, some other functions will suffer. That is why the "main", everyday response has to be based on people who do the job full time. The "repurposed" employees can be used to get the situation under control when there is a big outbreak, but they can't be relied upon to handle the initial outbreak or the long haul containment at lower case loads. At the beginning of the outbreak, these repurposed people will be in their "day jobs" and unavailable. We need enough "standing" capability to credibly contain "small" outbreaks and/or detect that the outbreak is getting away from them. If it does get away from them, all hands on deck until the outbreak is reduced to the point the "standing" force can do the job. How big that standing force can/should be is a subject of discussion, but IMHO it is clear that at all levels it was entirely too small. The surge force needs to be much larger but can only be expected to be available for +/- a month or so. The amount of time even the National Guard can spend on state business is limited by how long the state can/will tolerate them not doing their "day jobs". Surge capability (a month or so) is necessary and possible, but maintaining it for a long periods (3-6 months) is very difficult.

[Goose]

  For instance, if all the High School teachers were trained and ready to step into the job, they could have been deployed in March.

Hey, no! In our public high school district, teachers were responsible for planning and managing their classes via Zoom, Google Meet, with some shared time, some prep time, assignments, and grading time. They weren't just on vacation. The kids and their parents needed them.

Good point.  Not having kids in school, I forgot that teachers weren't really not working when the schools closed.

But the main point is to find some class of workers that are not in critical jobs and add a new task to their jobs.  Let's see,  park rangers, librarians, ...

No matter who they are, if it is not the "primary" occupation of the trackers/tracers, some other functions will suffer. That is why the "main", everyday response has to be based on people who do the job full time. The "repurposed" employees can be used to get the situation under control when there is a big outbreak, but they can't be relied upon to handle the initial outbreak or the long haul containment at lower case loads. At the beginning of the outbreak, these repurposed people will be in their "day jobs" and unavailable. We need enough "standing" capability to credibly contain "small" outbreaks and/or detect that the outbreak is getting away from them. If it does get away from them, all hands on deck until the outbreak is reduced to the point the "standing" force can do the job. How big that standing force can/should be is a subject of discussion, but IMHO it is clear that at all levels it was entirely too small. The surge force needs to be much larger but can only be expected to be available for +/- a month or so. The amount of time even the National Guard can spend on state business is limited by how long the state can/will tolerate them not doing their "day jobs". Surge capability (a month or so) is necessary and possible, but maintaining it for a long periods (3-6 months) is very difficult.