[Goose]

Normally I probably would not post this link, because there is nothing particularly unexpected about retired former generals making a statement aimed at saving a cancelled program. However the number of signatories and the rationales presented in this link are IMO out of the ordinary: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/retire...ore-f-35s/ The quotes that got my attention are as follows:

“The E-2 is unable to meet the combatant command requirements for theater-wide airborne command and control. That is not the mission for which it is designed,” the wrote. “Additionally, the E-7 can perform missions different from traditional AWACS roles that will be critical to the China contingency.”

The three mission specialists on an E-2D can in no way do what the 9-10 mission specialists on the E-7 are expected to do. The actual "control" part of AWACS in a carrier battle group is done on the CV or sometimes on a CG. The E-2 is designed as an AEW aircraft. Its ability to do the "C" part is very limited.

“We have high confidence the U.S. Space Force will develop and deploy a space-based air battle management system,” the wrote. “However, the scientific and engineering hurdles to accomplish this goal are daunting and the timeline to success is unclear. Since having a robust tracking and battle management system is fundamental to projecting airpower and winning conflicts, prudence demands we acquire sufficient numbers of E-7s to prevail whenever the next conflict unfolds.”

IMO the "high confidence" is truly tongue-in-cheek/politically correct. Physics will not be denied. The two killer problems are 1) persistence and 2) path loss.
 
LEO satellites like Starlink orbit the earth about once every 90 minutes. In order to maintain a data connection a whole slew of satellites are required. The radar satellites would be orders of magnitude more complex than a Starlink satellite. The costs of a single such network would be astronomical :-). The cost of several would be worse. 
 
Starlink satellites orbit the earth at a nominal height of 342 miles. Thus the "closest" airborne targets would be about 342 miles away. The reflected signal strength  for the satellite will be 66 dB weaker than the return from the same object to an E-7 at 40,000 ft. That is a factor of over 4 million. That is power you can never get back. You can compensate by transmitting 4 million times the power from the satellite, but generating that power in outer space may not be so easy. For may years there have been radar satellites scanning the ocean to find military ships. AFAIK they have never attempted to track aircraft. Their success in even finding aircraft carriers is somewhat spotty.

[Goose]

Normally I probably would not post this link, because there is nothing particularly unexpected about retired former generals making a statement aimed at saving a cancelled program. However the number of signatories and the rationales presented in this link are IMO out of the ordinary: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/retire...ore-f-35s/ The quotes that got my attention are as follows:

“The E-2 is unable to meet the combatant command requirements for theater-wide airborne command and control. That is not the mission for which it is designed,” the wrote. “Additionally, the E-7 can perform missions different from traditional AWACS roles that will be critical to the China contingency.”

The three mission specialists on an E-2D can in no way do what the 9-10 mission specialists on the E-7 are expected to do. The actual "control" part of AWACS in a carrier battle group is done on the CV or sometimes on a CG. The E-2 is designed as an AEW aircraft. Its ability to do the "C" part is very limited.

“We have high confidence the U.S. Space Force will develop and deploy a space-based air battle management system,” the wrote. “However, the scientific and engineering hurdles to accomplish this goal are daunting and the timeline to success is unclear. Since having a robust tracking and battle management system is fundamental to projecting airpower and winning conflicts, prudence demands we acquire sufficient numbers of E-7s to prevail whenever the next conflict unfolds.”

IMO the "high confidence" is truly tongue-in-cheek/politically correct. Physics will not be denied. The two killer problems are 1) persistence and 2) path loss.
 
LEO satellites like Starlink orbit the earth about once every 90 minutes. In order to maintain a data connection a whole slew of satellites are required. The radar satellites would be orders of magnitude more complex than a Starlink satellite. The costs of a single such network would be astronomical :-). The cost of several would be worse. 
 
Starlink satellites orbit the earth at a nominal height of 342 miles. Thus the "closest" airborne targets would be about 342 miles away. The reflected signal strength  for the satellite will be 66 dB weaker than the return from the same object to an E-7 at 40,000 ft. That is a factor of over 4 million. That is power you can never get back. You can compensate by transmitting 4 million times the power from the satellite, but generating that power in outer space may not be so easy. For may years there have been radar satellites scanning the ocean to find military ships. AFAIK they have never attempted to track aircraft. Their success in even finding aircraft carriers is somewhat spotty.

[BigJohn043]

A bit off topic, but I must admit I am very surprised to not hear some serious grousing about the Iran-Israel "12 day war" outcome. Obviously there is still no solid information on the damage to the Iranian nuclear program. That said, it appears Iran is still dead-set on continuing Uranium enrichment. We do see things like this:https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/07/07/donald-trump-us-officials-will-meet-with-iranians-after-bombing/84499425007/. However, there is no indication Iran actually intends to back away from their position on enrichment. We also see this: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-...ay-sources
 
It may be the public in Israel and the US is in a "wait and see" mode, but frankly I expected the Israeli public to want answers by now on the way ahead. So far it appears that for all the hoopla Iran is still going to behave as it always had. That should IMO call into question to what degree the Israeli military operation succeeded in its goals. It also raises questions about Israeli preparedness for Iranian tactical ballistic missile attacks. IOW, did Israeli quit fighting because it had to, not because it wanted to?

If Iran was willing to trade away its nuclear enrichment program, the first thing they would do is claim they are still going down that road.  Otherwise, they have nothing to trade...

[BigJohn043]

A bit off topic, but I must admit I am very surprised to not hear some serious grousing about the Iran-Israel "12 day war" outcome. Obviously there is still no solid information on the damage to the Iranian nuclear program. That said, it appears Iran is still dead-set on continuing Uranium enrichment. We do see things like this:https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/07/07/donald-trump-us-officials-will-meet-with-iranians-after-bombing/84499425007/. However, there is no indication Iran actually intends to back away from their position on enrichment. We also see this: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-...ay-sources
 
It may be the public in Israel and the US is in a "wait and see" mode, but frankly I expected the Israeli public to want answers by now on the way ahead. So far it appears that for all the hoopla Iran is still going to behave as it always had. That should IMO call into question to what degree the Israeli military operation succeeded in its goals. It also raises questions about Israeli preparedness for Iranian tactical ballistic missile attacks. IOW, did Israeli quit fighting because it had to, not because it wanted to?

If Iran was willing to trade away its nuclear enrichment program, the first thing they would do is claim they are still going down that road.  Otherwise, they have nothing to trade...

[Goose]

If Iran was willing to trade away its nuclear enrichment program, the first thing they would do is claim they are still going down that road.  Otherwise, they have nothing to trade...

True. Let's hope that is the case and this is posturing. Of course, it could also be true that they are saying exactly what they mean.

[Goose]

If Iran was willing to trade away its nuclear enrichment program, the first thing they would do is claim they are still going down that road.  Otherwise, they have nothing to trade...

True. Let's hope that is the case and this is posturing. Of course, it could also be true that they are saying exactly what they mean.

[gocard14]

Russia couldn't fight NATO, particularly after (a) losing so much in Ukraine and (b) telegraphing how they fight. They would have 1,000:1 loss ratios. They'd have to resort to nukes or biological weapons.

Russia indeed couldn't fight NATO. But they could fight Latvia. You might say "Wait, that would be fighting NATO". However Putin may believe 1) He can take over Latvia before NATO can even get organized, let alone starts fighting, and/or 2) NATO isn't going to risk a general war over Latvia. It is unfortunately not at all unlikely that Putin is right about one or both of these opinions. Worse still, if he is wrong about either of them a NATO vs. Russia war will be in progress. Then the NCB warfare possibilities become "real", especially if Russia starts losing. Remember, Hitler believed Poland would be a re-run of Austria and Czechoslovakia. He didn't expect either Britain or France to actually fight. Substitute the other Baltic state names for Latvia as you think appropriate :-).

You are correct that we do not do well at small wars mostly because over time the number of body bags coming home reaches a critical political level.

True, and a NATO/US vs. Russia conflict could never remain a "small" war. The currently losing side will always attempt to change the calculus by striking what it believes is a "weak point" of the other, thus expanding the war rapidly.

It seems to me that if the West can continue to help Ukraine out where it really needs help, not including boots on the ground, they can continue to bleed the Russian forces and its economy.  They once gave up in Afghanistan mostly because the losses became too large. But the Russian electorate today is not the electorate of then.  It think that Putin has a grabbed a tiger by the tail that he had no intention of grabbing. Now if he lets go of the tiger's tail it may eat him or he may fall out of a window.  A big question is how long will the "Siloviki" continue their support?

I totally agree the West should continue to help Ukraine resist the Russian invasion, short of actually entering the war. Russia would regard planes in the air the same as boots on the ground. Given the current state of play there is really no other viable choice than to continue supplying military material to Ukraine.

The West too has a tiger by the tail, although the current administration attempts to ignore that fact. When the previous administration started massively assisting Ukraine in this war it in large measure tied the credibility and influence of the US and NATO to success in Ukraine. Unfortunately that administration appears to have had no plan to deliver that success. Right now, the Ukrainian government can realistically look forward to an endless war or a temporary peace that leaves their nation as a shadow of its former self with no viable path to security and economic growth. Optimistically they can hope that with Western help they can hang on until Russia has to / chooses to give up. When will that be? I don't think anybody has even a good guess.
 
Putin has his tiger. He isn't going to quit unless forced by economic collapse/political upheaval. Ukraine cannot force either of those outcomes. They can only hold on and hope. How long they can do that is also unknown. The US possibly could by tightening down the economic pressure even tighter. It appears we will not do that.

Regarding cost of our toys, we have probably way over paid for those toys.

Absolutely, although "it is much more complicated than that". This is such a massive subject it would be inappropriate to even attempt to discuss it in a Ukraine thread.

I can't see Russia attacking NATO while still bogged down in Ukraine, but if they do, I still think high volume use of cheap small drones can to a certain extent compensate for lack of manpower.  I also assume that a high volume drone attack could saturate air defense systems, but maybe this is wishful thinking on my part.

I think a drone swarm can saturate an Russian IADS system. Ukraine has demonstrated this. However, why would we bother with such an approach when our DEAD plan will render that system nonexistent?

I realize this type of warfare is not what we train for and not what we buy for, but it still exists.

Indeed it does. It is however a form of warfare we absolutely must train AGAINST, because we may well face opponents who adopt it. NATO and the US do not use a Russian style IADS, so our vulnerabilities are different. We have always used and intend to use AWACs type aircraft to manage the air battle, from the Willie Victors to the E-3s. There are very good reasons for that choice. Unfortunately the administration has canceled the E-7. It is unclear how we will proceed now, as the lack of a fully capable AWACS undermines our entire air war philosophy.

Most of all I think as a country, we need a Plan, something well thought out and considering all the myriad of possibilities in today's world.

This! 1000 Amens. Unfortunately to have such a plan that is any good we have to have the right people in the leadership positions at the Pentagon and in the myriad supporting positions that make such plans and subsequently execute them. We don't have that, and arguably haven't had that for a very long time. While Goldwater-Nichols may have solved some problems, it created many others, both directly and indirectly. This is a big part of the problem, but isn't close to the whole problem. Again, a massive issue.

You mention that NATO would have little time to organize, but that seems unlikely given modern satellite imaging. We know that Russia was building up forces on the border of Ukraine for months, just few actually believed they would pull the trigger on the invasions. We would undoubtedly see a similar buildup prior to invasions of a NATO country. 

Now I'm sure explanations would be given to cover the buildup (exercises, etc), but if NATO leadership is on point I suspect that forces could be organized or forward deployed, both to have reactive capability and as a deterrent.

Incidentally, This would be magnified 10x if China ever elected to invade Taiwan. The logistics prep of a massive amphibious invasion would be impossible to hide.

[gocard14]

Russia couldn't fight NATO, particularly after (a) losing so much in Ukraine and (b) telegraphing how they fight. They would have 1,000:1 loss ratios. They'd have to resort to nukes or biological weapons.

Russia indeed couldn't fight NATO. But they could fight Latvia. You might say "Wait, that would be fighting NATO". However Putin may believe 1) He can take over Latvia before NATO can even get organized, let alone starts fighting, and/or 2) NATO isn't going to risk a general war over Latvia. It is unfortunately not at all unlikely that Putin is right about one or both of these opinions. Worse still, if he is wrong about either of them a NATO vs. Russia war will be in progress. Then the NCB warfare possibilities become "real", especially if Russia starts losing. Remember, Hitler believed Poland would be a re-run of Austria and Czechoslovakia. He didn't expect either Britain or France to actually fight. Substitute the other Baltic state names for Latvia as you think appropriate :-).

You are correct that we do not do well at small wars mostly because over time the number of body bags coming home reaches a critical political level.

True, and a NATO/US vs. Russia conflict could never remain a "small" war. The currently losing side will always attempt to change the calculus by striking what it believes is a "weak point" of the other, thus expanding the war rapidly.

It seems to me that if the West can continue to help Ukraine out where it really needs help, not including boots on the ground, they can continue to bleed the Russian forces and its economy.  They once gave up in Afghanistan mostly because the losses became too large. But the Russian electorate today is not the electorate of then.  It think that Putin has a grabbed a tiger by the tail that he had no intention of grabbing. Now if he lets go of the tiger's tail it may eat him or he may fall out of a window.  A big question is how long will the "Siloviki" continue their support?

I totally agree the West should continue to help Ukraine resist the Russian invasion, short of actually entering the war. Russia would regard planes in the air the same as boots on the ground. Given the current state of play there is really no other viable choice than to continue supplying military material to Ukraine.

The West too has a tiger by the tail, although the current administration attempts to ignore that fact. When the previous administration started massively assisting Ukraine in this war it in large measure tied the credibility and influence of the US and NATO to success in Ukraine. Unfortunately that administration appears to have had no plan to deliver that success. Right now, the Ukrainian government can realistically look forward to an endless war or a temporary peace that leaves their nation as a shadow of its former self with no viable path to security and economic growth. Optimistically they can hope that with Western help they can hang on until Russia has to / chooses to give up. When will that be? I don't think anybody has even a good guess.
 
Putin has his tiger. He isn't going to quit unless forced by economic collapse/political upheaval. Ukraine cannot force either of those outcomes. They can only hold on and hope. How long they can do that is also unknown. The US possibly could by tightening down the economic pressure even tighter. It appears we will not do that.

Regarding cost of our toys, we have probably way over paid for those toys.

Absolutely, although "it is much more complicated than that". This is such a massive subject it would be inappropriate to even attempt to discuss it in a Ukraine thread.

I can't see Russia attacking NATO while still bogged down in Ukraine, but if they do, I still think high volume use of cheap small drones can to a certain extent compensate for lack of manpower.  I also assume that a high volume drone attack could saturate air defense systems, but maybe this is wishful thinking on my part.

I think a drone swarm can saturate an Russian IADS system. Ukraine has demonstrated this. However, why would we bother with such an approach when our DEAD plan will render that system nonexistent?

I realize this type of warfare is not what we train for and not what we buy for, but it still exists.

Indeed it does. It is however a form of warfare we absolutely must train AGAINST, because we may well face opponents who adopt it. NATO and the US do not use a Russian style IADS, so our vulnerabilities are different. We have always used and intend to use AWACs type aircraft to manage the air battle, from the Willie Victors to the E-3s. There are very good reasons for that choice. Unfortunately the administration has canceled the E-7. It is unclear how we will proceed now, as the lack of a fully capable AWACS undermines our entire air war philosophy.

Most of all I think as a country, we need a Plan, something well thought out and considering all the myriad of possibilities in today's world.

This! 1000 Amens. Unfortunately to have such a plan that is any good we have to have the right people in the leadership positions at the Pentagon and in the myriad supporting positions that make such plans and subsequently execute them. We don't have that, and arguably haven't had that for a very long time. While Goldwater-Nichols may have solved some problems, it created many others, both directly and indirectly. This is a big part of the problem, but isn't close to the whole problem. Again, a massive issue.

You mention that NATO would have little time to organize, but that seems unlikely given modern satellite imaging. We know that Russia was building up forces on the border of Ukraine for months, just few actually believed they would pull the trigger on the invasions. We would undoubtedly see a similar buildup prior to invasions of a NATO country. 

Now I'm sure explanations would be given to cover the buildup (exercises, etc), but if NATO leadership is on point I suspect that forces could be organized or forward deployed, both to have reactive capability and as a deterrent.

Incidentally, This would be magnified 10x if China ever elected to invade Taiwan. The logistics prep of a massive amphibious invasion would be impossible to hide.

[Goose]

You mention that NATO would have little time to organize, but that seems unlikely given modern satellite imaging. We know that Russia was building up forces on the border of Ukraine for months, just few actually believed they would pull the trigger on the invasions. We would undoubtedly see a similar buildup prior to invasions of a NATO country. 

Now I'm sure explanations would be given to cover the buildup (exercises, etc), but if NATO leadership is on point I suspect that forces could be organized or forward deployed, both to have reactive capability and as a deterrent.

That is what Russia and the US said, and then Ukraine invaded Kursk :-). With NATO, the problem is that an Article 5 invocation before a battle actually starts isn't going to draw any response. The other problem is that there aren't really contingency plans that allow significant forces to be deployed on Day 1. During the Cold War, Germany, the UK, and the US had around 20 divisions (12 BRD, 4 UK, 4 US). They were all supposedly "ready to fight tonight". These troops were stationed on or relatively near the German border. According to plan many units of these forces would be in action from Day 1 before any Article 5 invocation was even possible. By Day 4 they all would be.
 
What is stationed in the Baltics? The Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) of about 7,700 troops total. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhan...d_Presence

The numbers involved, although a notable supplement to the armed forces of the country being defended, are limited so that they avoid seeming to threaten Russia. The chief value of the force is that it is impossible to invade Poland or the Baltic States without battling the soldiers and firing on the flags of the involved NATO states, giving cause for war. It is believed that the prospect of war with all those countries will deter aggression.

Frankly stated, they are a hostage force. They will be unable to defend the countries involved.
 
If NATO responds by choosing to fight (not a sure thing) it will take time to bring forward the necessary troops. Of course Russia might simplify that by moving forward themselves. It isn't going to be on day 1, and probably not week 1. NATO air power can be used much quicker if the political will allows. How quickly can/will the present administration make the decision to defend Latvia? I don't pretend to know, but I am guessing it won't be in the first 24 hours. By then, it may not matter.

---

If this were to happen in most administrations, I would think the undersecretary and the SecDef would be fired. Not expecting that now but would be happy to be wrong.

Totally agree. I will point out however that the SecDef may have actually run it by the President and received a verbal OK. The President may not have realized what he had agreed to, or he may have forgotten he even did agree. In any case, it is IMO very disturbing, at best. What is the "plan" in Ukraine and how does this series of events fit into the plan?

[Goose]

You mention that NATO would have little time to organize, but that seems unlikely given modern satellite imaging. We know that Russia was building up forces on the border of Ukraine for months, just few actually believed they would pull the trigger on the invasions. We would undoubtedly see a similar buildup prior to invasions of a NATO country. 

Now I'm sure explanations would be given to cover the buildup (exercises, etc), but if NATO leadership is on point I suspect that forces could be organized or forward deployed, both to have reactive capability and as a deterrent.

That is what Russia and the US said, and then Ukraine invaded Kursk :-). With NATO, the problem is that an Article 5 invocation before a battle actually starts isn't going to draw any response. The other problem is that there aren't really contingency plans that allow significant forces to be deployed on Day 1. During the Cold War, Germany, the UK, and the US had around 20 divisions (12 BRD, 4 UK, 4 US). They were all supposedly "ready to fight tonight". These troops were stationed on or relatively near the German border. According to plan many units of these forces would be in action from Day 1 before any Article 5 invocation was even possible. By Day 4 they all would be.
 
What is stationed in the Baltics? The Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) of about 7,700 troops total. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhan...d_Presence

The numbers involved, although a notable supplement to the armed forces of the country being defended, are limited so that they avoid seeming to threaten Russia. The chief value of the force is that it is impossible to invade Poland or the Baltic States without battling the soldiers and firing on the flags of the involved NATO states, giving cause for war. It is believed that the prospect of war with all those countries will deter aggression.

Frankly stated, they are a hostage force. They will be unable to defend the countries involved.
 
If NATO responds by choosing to fight (not a sure thing) it will take time to bring forward the necessary troops. Of course Russia might simplify that by moving forward themselves. It isn't going to be on day 1, and probably not week 1. NATO air power can be used much quicker if the political will allows. How quickly can/will the present administration make the decision to defend Latvia? I don't pretend to know, but I am guessing it won't be in the first 24 hours. By then, it may not matter.

---

If this were to happen in most administrations, I would think the undersecretary and the SecDef would be fired. Not expecting that now but would be happy to be wrong.

Totally agree. I will point out however that the SecDef may have actually run it by the President and received a verbal OK. The President may not have realized what he had agreed to, or he may have forgotten he even did agree. In any case, it is IMO very disturbing, at best. What is the "plan" in Ukraine and how does this series of events fit into the plan?

[dabigv13]

Totally agree. I will point out however that the SecDef may have actually run it by the President and received a verbal OK. The President may not have realized what he had agreed to, or he may have forgotten he even did agree. In any case, it is IMO very disturbing, at best. What is the "plan" in Ukraine and how does this series of events fit into the plan?

Some new reporting on this. The whole article is worth reading but I think this is the meat of it.

The Pentagon’s decision to suspend the shipments of weapons — including Patriot interceptor missiles and artillery ammunition — came after Trump asked Hegseth last month during their trip to the NATO summit to provide him with an assessment of US weapons stockpiles, one of the sources told CNN. Iran and Israel were bombing each other, and Trump wanted to be sure US troops in the region had sufficient munitions to defend themselves if necessary.
Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell confirmed last week that the department was conducting “a capability review … to ensure US military aid aligns with our defense priorities.”
But Trump did not specifically direct Hegseth to halt weapons shipments to Ukraine as part of that review, three of the sources said. That recommendation came from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, all five sources said, who has long been skeptical of sending large quantities of US military aid to Ukraine.
“A Europe first policy is not what America needs in this exceptionally dangerous time. We need to focus on China and Asia - clearly,” Colby wrote on X last year.
Colby then provided his recommendations to Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Feinberg, who approved of the move — particularly because of his longstanding concerns that the defense industry is not moving fast enough to replenish US stockpiles, two of the sources said. Hegseth provided the final signoff, thinking it would align with Trump’s “America first” priorities, one of the sources familiar with his thinking said.

It's of course still possible this could be the administration covering for one of the scenarios you posit, and Hegseth and Colby just have to eat sh*t on it.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/08/politics/...pons-pause

[dabigv13]

Totally agree. I will point out however that the SecDef may have actually run it by the President and received a verbal OK. The President may not have realized what he had agreed to, or he may have forgotten he even did agree. In any case, it is IMO very disturbing, at best. What is the "plan" in Ukraine and how does this series of events fit into the plan?

Some new reporting on this. The whole article is worth reading but I think this is the meat of it.

The Pentagon’s decision to suspend the shipments of weapons — including Patriot interceptor missiles and artillery ammunition — came after Trump asked Hegseth last month during their trip to the NATO summit to provide him with an assessment of US weapons stockpiles, one of the sources told CNN. Iran and Israel were bombing each other, and Trump wanted to be sure US troops in the region had sufficient munitions to defend themselves if necessary.
Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell confirmed last week that the department was conducting “a capability review … to ensure US military aid aligns with our defense priorities.”
But Trump did not specifically direct Hegseth to halt weapons shipments to Ukraine as part of that review, three of the sources said. That recommendation came from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, all five sources said, who has long been skeptical of sending large quantities of US military aid to Ukraine.
“A Europe first policy is not what America needs in this exceptionally dangerous time. We need to focus on China and Asia - clearly,” Colby wrote on X last year.
Colby then provided his recommendations to Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Feinberg, who approved of the move — particularly because of his longstanding concerns that the defense industry is not moving fast enough to replenish US stockpiles, two of the sources said. Hegseth provided the final signoff, thinking it would align with Trump’s “America first” priorities, one of the sources familiar with his thinking said.

It's of course still possible this could be the administration covering for one of the scenarios you posit, and Hegseth and Colby just have to eat sh*t on it.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/08/politics/...pons-pause

[TrumpCard]

As between all the various possible scenarios that might have caused the 180-degree turn in a 72-hour period, are any of them better than any others?  

To me, the upshot is: (1) the decision making process is messy, but that's inside baseball and I'm not sure the American public cares about the process; and (2) IF it turns out that Ukraine ends up getting its Patriots and other munitions (big IF, obviously), then the messy process ultimately led to the correct decision without inordinate delay (though of course small delays cost lives).

[TrumpCard]

As between all the various possible scenarios that might have caused the 180-degree turn in a 72-hour period, are any of them better than any others?  

To me, the upshot is: (1) the decision making process is messy, but that's inside baseball and I'm not sure the American public cares about the process; and (2) IF it turns out that Ukraine ends up getting its Patriots and other munitions (big IF, obviously), then the messy process ultimately led to the correct decision without inordinate delay (though of course small delays cost lives).

[BigJohn043]

If Iran was willing to trade away its nuclear enrichment program, the first thing they would do is claim they are still going down that road.  Otherwise, they have nothing to trade...

True. Let's hope that is the case and this is posturing. Of course, it could also be true that they are saying exactly what they mean.

Totally agree.  My point is that their claim that they are going to continue isn't really dispositive....

[BigJohn043]

If Iran was willing to trade away its nuclear enrichment program, the first thing they would do is claim they are still going down that road.  Otherwise, they have nothing to trade...

True. Let's hope that is the case and this is posturing. Of course, it could also be true that they are saying exactly what they mean.

Totally agree.  My point is that their claim that they are going to continue isn't really dispositive....

[GK3]

You mention that NATO would have little time to organize, but that seems unlikely given modern satellite imaging. We know that Russia was building up forces on the border of Ukraine for months, just few actually believed they would pull the trigger on the invasions. We would undoubtedly see a similar buildup prior to invasions of a NATO country. 

Now I'm sure explanations would be given to cover the buildup (exercises, etc), but if NATO leadership is on point I suspect that forces could be organized or forward deployed, both to have reactive capability and as a deterrent.

That is what Russia and the US said, and then Ukraine invaded Kursk :-). With NATO, the problem is that an Article 5 invocation before a battle actually starts isn't going to draw any response. The other problem is that there aren't really contingency plans that allow significant forces to be deployed on Day 1. During the Cold War, Germany, the UK, and the US had around 20 divisions (12 BRD, 4 UK, 4 US). They were all supposedly "ready to fight tonight". These troops were stationed on or relatively near the German border. According to plan many units of these forces would be in action from Day 1 before any Article 5 invocation was even possible. By Day 4 they all would be.
 
What is stationed in the Baltics? The Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) of about 7,700 troops total. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhan...d_Presence

The numbers involved, although a notable supplement to the armed forces of the country being defended, are limited so that they avoid seeming to threaten Russia. The chief value of the force is that it is impossible to invade Poland or the Baltic States without battling the soldiers and firing on the flags of the involved NATO states, giving cause for war. It is believed that the prospect of war with all those countries will deter aggression.

Frankly stated, they are a hostage force. They will be unable to defend the countries involved.
 
If NATO responds by choosing to fight (not a sure thing) it will take time to bring forward the necessary troops. Of course Russia might simplify that by moving forward themselves. It isn't going to be on day 1, and probably not week 1. NATO air power can be used much quicker if the political will allows. How quickly can/will the present administration make the decision to defend Latvia? I don't pretend to know, but I am guessing it won't be in the first 24 hours. By then, it may not matter.

---

If this were to happen in most administrations, I would think the undersecretary and the SecDef would be fired. Not expecting that now but would be happy to be wrong.

Totally agree. I will point out however that the SecDef may have actually run it by the President and received a verbal OK. The President may not have realized what he had agreed to, or he may have forgotten he even did agree. In any case, it is IMO very disturbing, at best. What is the "plan" in Ukraine and how does this series of events fit into the plan?

I would expect that if Russia masses sufficient assets close to the Baltic/Poland borders, it will not be a secret to NATO.  The "Trip Wire" forces in Poland/Baltic states will be in a difficult position.  Whether they function as the "trip wire" that allows Article 5 to be invoked and positive responses is as of today unknown.  Once Article 5 is invoked we shall see what happens. 
I also believe that we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans to be sufficient to give us dominance of the airspace over the resulting battlefield. Allowing us to bring up ground forces and fight the war in the Poland/Baltic States arena. Not a pretty picture if you live in those areas.  My questions will our DEAD plans work?  If we can't dominate the airspace we will have some issues. The first of which will be does NATO mean anything at all.

[GK3]

You mention that NATO would have little time to organize, but that seems unlikely given modern satellite imaging. We know that Russia was building up forces on the border of Ukraine for months, just few actually believed they would pull the trigger on the invasions. We would undoubtedly see a similar buildup prior to invasions of a NATO country. 

Now I'm sure explanations would be given to cover the buildup (exercises, etc), but if NATO leadership is on point I suspect that forces could be organized or forward deployed, both to have reactive capability and as a deterrent.

That is what Russia and the US said, and then Ukraine invaded Kursk :-). With NATO, the problem is that an Article 5 invocation before a battle actually starts isn't going to draw any response. The other problem is that there aren't really contingency plans that allow significant forces to be deployed on Day 1. During the Cold War, Germany, the UK, and the US had around 20 divisions (12 BRD, 4 UK, 4 US). They were all supposedly "ready to fight tonight". These troops were stationed on or relatively near the German border. According to plan many units of these forces would be in action from Day 1 before any Article 5 invocation was even possible. By Day 4 they all would be.
 
What is stationed in the Baltics? The Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) of about 7,700 troops total. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhan...d_Presence

The numbers involved, although a notable supplement to the armed forces of the country being defended, are limited so that they avoid seeming to threaten Russia. The chief value of the force is that it is impossible to invade Poland or the Baltic States without battling the soldiers and firing on the flags of the involved NATO states, giving cause for war. It is believed that the prospect of war with all those countries will deter aggression.

Frankly stated, they are a hostage force. They will be unable to defend the countries involved.
 
If NATO responds by choosing to fight (not a sure thing) it will take time to bring forward the necessary troops. Of course Russia might simplify that by moving forward themselves. It isn't going to be on day 1, and probably not week 1. NATO air power can be used much quicker if the political will allows. How quickly can/will the present administration make the decision to defend Latvia? I don't pretend to know, but I am guessing it won't be in the first 24 hours. By then, it may not matter.

---

If this were to happen in most administrations, I would think the undersecretary and the SecDef would be fired. Not expecting that now but would be happy to be wrong.

Totally agree. I will point out however that the SecDef may have actually run it by the President and received a verbal OK. The President may not have realized what he had agreed to, or he may have forgotten he even did agree. In any case, it is IMO very disturbing, at best. What is the "plan" in Ukraine and how does this series of events fit into the plan?

I would expect that if Russia masses sufficient assets close to the Baltic/Poland borders, it will not be a secret to NATO.  The "Trip Wire" forces in Poland/Baltic states will be in a difficult position.  Whether they function as the "trip wire" that allows Article 5 to be invoked and positive responses is as of today unknown.  Once Article 5 is invoked we shall see what happens. 
I also believe that we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans to be sufficient to give us dominance of the airspace over the resulting battlefield. Allowing us to bring up ground forces and fight the war in the Poland/Baltic States arena. Not a pretty picture if you live in those areas.  My questions will our DEAD plans work?  If we can't dominate the airspace we will have some issues. The first of which will be does NATO mean anything at all.

[dabigv13]

This is pretty cool, not sure I have seen video of this before.

A Ukrainian interceptor drone takes out a Russian Shahed style attack drone. An idea that could scale very well if they are effective, as the Shaheds are likely a fair bit more expensive than the interceptors.

https://x.com/prestonstew_/status/1943387643821039883

[dabigv13]

This is pretty cool, not sure I have seen video of this before.

A Ukrainian interceptor drone takes out a Russian Shahed style attack drone. An idea that could scale very well if they are effective, as the Shaheds are likely a fair bit more expensive than the interceptors.

https://x.com/prestonstew_/status/1943387643821039883

[cctop]

This is pretty cool, not sure I have seen video of this before.

A Ukrainian interceptor drone takes out a Russian Shahed style attack drone. An idea that could scale very well if they are effective, as the Shaheds are likely a fair bit more expensive than the interceptors.

https://x.com/prestonstew_/status/1943387643821039883

Would that Ukrainian drone be piloted manually or is it automated?

[cctop]

This is pretty cool, not sure I have seen video of this before.

A Ukrainian interceptor drone takes out a Russian Shahed style attack drone. An idea that could scale very well if they are effective, as the Shaheds are likely a fair bit more expensive than the interceptors.

https://x.com/prestonstew_/status/1943387643821039883

Would that Ukrainian drone be piloted manually or is it automated?

[dabigv13]

I don't know about this particular interception. Ukraine has been working on autonomous drones, my understanding is they are being used in very small numbers, vast majority still human pilot driven.

A recent article-

https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tec...15020.html

Significantly, some of Ukraine's interceptor drones are already capable of autonomous operation, meaning they can detect and engage enemy UAVs without direct human control. This development marks a major leap forward in drone warfare and reflects Ukraine's growing competence in autonomous defense technologies.

.....


Also, very notably, for the first time the Trump administration will use some existing drawdown authority for new shipments of weapons to Ukraine. There is ~1 billion existing drawdown authority remaining from bills passed during the last administration. Reporting today that a new ~300million dollar package being prepared. A very welcome development.

"President Donald Trump for the first time since returning to office will send weapons to Kyiv under a presidential power frequently used by his predecessor, two sources familiar with the decision said on Thursday, a move suggesting new interest by the president in defending Ukraine.

More than three years after Russia's invasion of its neighbor, Trump's team will identify arms from U.S. stockpiles to send to Ukraine under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, the sources said, with one saying they could be worth around $300 million...

So far, the Trump administration has only sent weapons authorized by former President Joe Biden, who was a staunch supporter of Kyiv. Presidential Drawdown Authority allows the president to draw from weapons stocks to help allies in an emergency."

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/tru...025-07-10/
https://x.com/RALee85/status/1943408947387674809

[dabigv13]

I don't know about this particular interception. Ukraine has been working on autonomous drones, my understanding is they are being used in very small numbers, vast majority still human pilot driven.

A recent article-

https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tec...15020.html

Significantly, some of Ukraine's interceptor drones are already capable of autonomous operation, meaning they can detect and engage enemy UAVs without direct human control. This development marks a major leap forward in drone warfare and reflects Ukraine's growing competence in autonomous defense technologies.

.....


Also, very notably, for the first time the Trump administration will use some existing drawdown authority for new shipments of weapons to Ukraine. There is ~1 billion existing drawdown authority remaining from bills passed during the last administration. Reporting today that a new ~300million dollar package being prepared. A very welcome development.

"President Donald Trump for the first time since returning to office will send weapons to Kyiv under a presidential power frequently used by his predecessor, two sources familiar with the decision said on Thursday, a move suggesting new interest by the president in defending Ukraine.

More than three years after Russia's invasion of its neighbor, Trump's team will identify arms from U.S. stockpiles to send to Ukraine under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, the sources said, with one saying they could be worth around $300 million...

So far, the Trump administration has only sent weapons authorized by former President Joe Biden, who was a staunch supporter of Kyiv. Presidential Drawdown Authority allows the president to draw from weapons stocks to help allies in an emergency."

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/tru...025-07-10/
https://x.com/RALee85/status/1943408947387674809

[TrumpCard]

Has anyone heard news suggesting the possibility of another supplemental appropriations package for Ukraine?  If not, then Ukraine still will be in a world of hurt in the near future.  The last $700 million of drawdown authority will not last long.

[TrumpCard]

Has anyone heard news suggesting the possibility of another supplemental appropriations package for Ukraine?  If not, then Ukraine still will be in a world of hurt in the near future.  The last $700 million of drawdown authority will not last long.

[Mick]

Has anyone heard news suggesting the possibility of another supplemental appropriations package for Ukraine?  If not, then Ukraine still will be in a world of hurt in the near future.  The last $700 million of drawdown authority will not last long.

No, but the EU has voted 2.3 billion euros for reconstruction.

EU announces new €2.3 billion agreements package at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025 - European Commission

[Mick]

Has anyone heard news suggesting the possibility of another supplemental appropriations package for Ukraine?  If not, then Ukraine still will be in a world of hurt in the near future.  The last $700 million of drawdown authority will not last long.

No, but the EU has voted 2.3 billion euros for reconstruction.

EU announces new €2.3 billion agreements package at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025 - European Commission

[M T]

$2.3B or even $18B is a drop of water in an ocean. 

Months ago the World Bank said it would cost $524B, before the hundreds of drones nightly
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...025-02-25/

[M T]

$2.3B or even $18B is a drop of water in an ocean. 

Months ago the World Bank said it would cost $524B, before the hundreds of drones nightly
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...025-02-25/

[Goose]

This is pretty cool, not sure I have seen video of this before.

A Ukrainian interceptor drone takes out a Russian Shahed style attack drone. An idea that could scale very well if they are effective, as the Shaheds are likely a fair bit more expensive than the interceptors.

https://x.com/prestonstew_/status/1943387643821039883

The problem with using low-cost small drones to intercept Shahed style drones is range. The Shahed has to fly within 5-10 km of where the drone is launched. Guns have the same problem, only a bit worse. Battery-powered interceptor drones are also generally quite a bit slower than a Shahed, so the geometry of such intercepts are even further limited. That can be addressed by using a drone with an internal combustion engine, but then the size and cost goes up. There is no free lunch.

Currently the "best" way to combat the Shahed type drones is with fighter aircraft firing very low-cost short range interceptor rockets. The expensive aircraft is much faster than the Shahed and can carry sensors with much longer range than interceptor drones can. The aircraft locates the target (ideally with help from AWACS) and transports the "cheap"  rockets relatively quickly to close range. The rocket is then the "drone", but it doesn't need to go very far or have any target acquisition capability. It can be a simple laser-designated munition or even a SARH munition, since Shahed drones can't shoot back.

Would that Ukrainian drone be piloted manually or is it automated?

Ideally, yes. Ideally the drones could be put along the border every 2 km or so, with an equal number of drones echeloned  in depth in case the initial drone misses. They would be launched by a networked computer system and would engage their targets autonomously, perhaps with some guidance from the IADS. It is going to require a whole lot of drones to make it work though. Its practicality is IMO dubious, given there are alternatives that work well.

[Goose]

This is pretty cool, not sure I have seen video of this before.

A Ukrainian interceptor drone takes out a Russian Shahed style attack drone. An idea that could scale very well if they are effective, as the Shaheds are likely a fair bit more expensive than the interceptors.

https://x.com/prestonstew_/status/1943387643821039883

The problem with using low-cost small drones to intercept Shahed style drones is range. The Shahed has to fly within 5-10 km of where the drone is launched. Guns have the same problem, only a bit worse. Battery-powered interceptor drones are also generally quite a bit slower than a Shahed, so the geometry of such intercepts are even further limited. That can be addressed by using a drone with an internal combustion engine, but then the size and cost goes up. There is no free lunch.

Currently the "best" way to combat the Shahed type drones is with fighter aircraft firing very low-cost short range interceptor rockets. The expensive aircraft is much faster than the Shahed and can carry sensors with much longer range than interceptor drones can. The aircraft locates the target (ideally with help from AWACS) and transports the "cheap"  rockets relatively quickly to close range. The rocket is then the "drone", but it doesn't need to go very far or have any target acquisition capability. It can be a simple laser-designated munition or even a SARH munition, since Shahed drones can't shoot back.

Would that Ukrainian drone be piloted manually or is it automated?

Ideally, yes. Ideally the drones could be put along the border every 2 km or so, with an equal number of drones echeloned  in depth in case the initial drone misses. They would be launched by a networked computer system and would engage their targets autonomously, perhaps with some guidance from the IADS. It is going to require a whole lot of drones to make it work though. Its practicality is IMO dubious, given there are alternatives that work well.

[TrumpCard]

Has anyone heard news suggesting the possibility of another supplemental appropriations package for Ukraine?  If not, then Ukraine still will be in a world of hurt in the near future.  The last $700 million of drawdown authority will not last long.

No, but the EU has voted 2.3 billion euros for reconstruction.

EU announces new €2.3 billion agreements package at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025 - European Commission

Some here said that the last administration's Ukraine policy was a terrible middle ground because it was costly and prolonged the war, but didn't give Ukraine a good chance to actually win.  I'm not sure whether the prior administration's pace and level of support was sufficient, but I do know one thing: The last billion dollars that we're in the process of drawing down is a waste unless the West follows it up with a whole lot more military aid (not reconstruction aid).  

Assuming everyone agrees with that premise, then, in a sane world, we could reach this reasonable conclusion:  Given that the last billion in authorized military aid will not make a substantial difference in the war, the fact that we are actually spending that billion suggests that we are open to the possibility of spending the more that will be necessary to actually make a substantial difference in the war. 

My fingers are crossed that I've got it right.  To be clear, I have heard nothing to suggest that I'm right, and I'm concerned that key U.S. officials have no intention of supporting additional military aid authorization.

[TrumpCard]

Has anyone heard news suggesting the possibility of another supplemental appropriations package for Ukraine?  If not, then Ukraine still will be in a world of hurt in the near future.  The last $700 million of drawdown authority will not last long.

No, but the EU has voted 2.3 billion euros for reconstruction.

EU announces new €2.3 billion agreements package at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025 - European Commission

Some here said that the last administration's Ukraine policy was a terrible middle ground because it was costly and prolonged the war, but didn't give Ukraine a good chance to actually win.  I'm not sure whether the prior administration's pace and level of support was sufficient, but I do know one thing: The last billion dollars that we're in the process of drawing down is a waste unless the West follows it up with a whole lot more military aid (not reconstruction aid).  

Assuming everyone agrees with that premise, then, in a sane world, we could reach this reasonable conclusion:  Given that the last billion in authorized military aid will not make a substantial difference in the war, the fact that we are actually spending that billion suggests that we are open to the possibility of spending the more that will be necessary to actually make a substantial difference in the war. 

My fingers are crossed that I've got it right.  To be clear, I have heard nothing to suggest that I'm right, and I'm concerned that key U.S. officials have no intention of supporting additional military aid authorization.

[Goose]

Some here said that the last administration's Ukraine policy was a terrible middle ground because it was costly and prolonged the war, but didn't give Ukraine a good chance to actually win.  I'm not sure whether the prior administration's pace and level of support was sufficient, but I do know one thing: The last billion dollars that we're in the process of drawing down is a waste unless the West follows it up with a whole lot more military aid (not reconstruction aid).  

Assuming everyone agrees with that premise, then, in a sane world, we could reach this reasonable conclusion:  Given that the last billion in authorized military aid will not make a substantial difference in the war, the fact that we are actually spending that billion suggests that we are open to the possibility of spending the more that will be necessary to actually make a substantial difference in the war. 

My fingers are crossed that I've got it right.  To be clear, I have heard nothing to suggest that I'm right, and I'm concerned that key U.S. officials have no intention of supporting additional military aid authorization.

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.
 
Your reasoning that if the present administration is willing to spend the already appropriated money it must believe doing so will be efficacious. However, it is quite possible the present administration believes it will be politically efficacious, not militarily efficacious. They may believe that this show of support for Ukraine will convince Putin the US isn't going to abandon Ukraine and that he can't get what he wants militarily. Putin will then accept a ceasefire and a negotiated peace. I am uncertain that I believe the present administration has a plan either. Its initial plan was to force Ukraine to accept a peace that would please Putin. When neither Putin nor Ukraine were willing to go along the administration had no answer. They too are continuing to do what we did before and hoping Putin will "be reasonable". If that does not happen, I have no idea at all what the administration might do.

[Goose]

Some here said that the last administration's Ukraine policy was a terrible middle ground because it was costly and prolonged the war, but didn't give Ukraine a good chance to actually win.  I'm not sure whether the prior administration's pace and level of support was sufficient, but I do know one thing: The last billion dollars that we're in the process of drawing down is a waste unless the West follows it up with a whole lot more military aid (not reconstruction aid).  

Assuming everyone agrees with that premise, then, in a sane world, we could reach this reasonable conclusion:  Given that the last billion in authorized military aid will not make a substantial difference in the war, the fact that we are actually spending that billion suggests that we are open to the possibility of spending the more that will be necessary to actually make a substantial difference in the war. 

My fingers are crossed that I've got it right.  To be clear, I have heard nothing to suggest that I'm right, and I'm concerned that key U.S. officials have no intention of supporting additional military aid authorization.

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.
 
Your reasoning that if the present administration is willing to spend the already appropriated money it must believe doing so will be efficacious. However, it is quite possible the present administration believes it will be politically efficacious, not militarily efficacious. They may believe that this show of support for Ukraine will convince Putin the US isn't going to abandon Ukraine and that he can't get what he wants militarily. Putin will then accept a ceasefire and a negotiated peace. I am uncertain that I believe the present administration has a plan either. Its initial plan was to force Ukraine to accept a peace that would please Putin. When neither Putin nor Ukraine were willing to go along the administration had no answer. They too are continuing to do what we did before and hoping Putin will "be reasonable". If that does not happen, I have no idea at all what the administration might do.

[Goose]

I would expect that if Russia masses sufficient assets close to the Baltic/Poland borders, it will not be a secret to NATO.

Probably you are correct. However, stranger things have happened. Both Poland and Russia in WW II saw the German army massing on their border and did next to nothing in response. Even Ukraine didn't believe Russia was going to attack them. If they had, the defensive forces in Kherson Oblast would not have been on maneuvers on the right bank of the river and about as far west as you can go.

The "Trip Wire" forces in Poland/Baltic states will be in a difficult position.  Whether they function as the "trip wire" that allows Article 5 to be invoked and positive responses is as of today unknown.  Once Article 5 is invoked we shall see what happens.

The assumption is that the hostage forces will be immediately engaged by the Russians and therefore start fighting to defend themselves. The theory is that in so doing they will commit their nations to fight Russia.  This would of necessity occur immediately irrespective of any Article 5 invocation. Of course, if Russia carefully avoids attacking these forces, what do they do? Do they have orders to execute a warplan? I very much doubt it. Article 5 can be invoked at any time, including before hostilities start. While this would seem to be an ideal way to deter an impending attack, IMO most NATO nations will not commit to defend former Warsaw Pact members (or the Baltics) in advance of any actual hostile action by Russia. It would not be politically possible. They will wait.

I also believe that we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans to be sufficient to give us dominance of the airspace over the resulting battlefield. Allowing us to bring up ground forces and fight the war in the Poland/Baltic States arena. Not a pretty picture if you live in those areas.

I agree we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans will eventually give us dominance of the airspace, including Russian GLOCs. The key word is eventually. First of all, if the NATO air forces do not go into battle almost immediately the delay in starting to fight will add to the non-trivial delay it takes to "sanitize" the battle space. During that time, Russia gets the opportunity to fight a token hostage force that may not have clear orders to resist. At least the 750 troops in the Berlin Brigade knew what they were supposed to do. The orders were clear and unequivocal. Back in the 1980s it was a given that the US, UK, and BRD forces would begin executing their warplan without any "political" hesitation. If France shows up within 24 hours, it would be a bonus. No Article 5, no phone calls to London/DC/Bonn. Instant war. With luck all the BRD reserve soldiers would have already joined their units as a precaution. 2 ACR, the "speed bump", expected to retain the south shoulder of the Fulda Gap from the first instant until there was nobody left. Russia faces nothing like that today. Worst case, they will be fairly deep into their objectives before NATO engages with "serious" forces. Given that, will the NATO countries even attempt to eject them? In the 1980s, the answer was very clear. Today, it is not.

My questions will our DEAD plans work?  If we can't dominate the airspace we will have some issues. The first of which will be does NATO mean anything at all.

FWVLIW IMO our SEAD/DEAD plans will work. We have seen this scenario before and practice against it. Russia has few if any surprises in terms of air or ground weapons. I would not be saying this if our opponent were China. Russia is unfortunately a relatively unstable country. If Putin starts to loose, he may do almost anything. I fear that, and I also fear  that NATO has not made it clear enough to Putin what we will or will not consider casus belli. IMO that is because our political class doesn't know either. During the Cold War, they did. No longer. A miscalculation by Putin is very, very possible. A delay in acting by NATO can also create a situation that fighting Russia becomes simply "too hard to do". If Russia already occupies most of the targeted country, is it worth the war it will take to eject them? For many countries, possibly most, IMO the answer will be "no". Those countries may include the US.

[Goose]

I would expect that if Russia masses sufficient assets close to the Baltic/Poland borders, it will not be a secret to NATO.

Probably you are correct. However, stranger things have happened. Both Poland and Russia in WW II saw the German army massing on their border and did next to nothing in response. Even Ukraine didn't believe Russia was going to attack them. If they had, the defensive forces in Kherson Oblast would not have been on maneuvers on the right bank of the river and about as far west as you can go.

The "Trip Wire" forces in Poland/Baltic states will be in a difficult position.  Whether they function as the "trip wire" that allows Article 5 to be invoked and positive responses is as of today unknown.  Once Article 5 is invoked we shall see what happens.

The assumption is that the hostage forces will be immediately engaged by the Russians and therefore start fighting to defend themselves. The theory is that in so doing they will commit their nations to fight Russia.  This would of necessity occur immediately irrespective of any Article 5 invocation. Of course, if Russia carefully avoids attacking these forces, what do they do? Do they have orders to execute a warplan? I very much doubt it. Article 5 can be invoked at any time, including before hostilities start. While this would seem to be an ideal way to deter an impending attack, IMO most NATO nations will not commit to defend former Warsaw Pact members (or the Baltics) in advance of any actual hostile action by Russia. It would not be politically possible. They will wait.

I also believe that we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans to be sufficient to give us dominance of the airspace over the resulting battlefield. Allowing us to bring up ground forces and fight the war in the Poland/Baltic States arena. Not a pretty picture if you live in those areas.

I agree we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans will eventually give us dominance of the airspace, including Russian GLOCs. The key word is eventually. First of all, if the NATO air forces do not go into battle almost immediately the delay in starting to fight will add to the non-trivial delay it takes to "sanitize" the battle space. During that time, Russia gets the opportunity to fight a token hostage force that may not have clear orders to resist. At least the 750 troops in the Berlin Brigade knew what they were supposed to do. The orders were clear and unequivocal. Back in the 1980s it was a given that the US, UK, and BRD forces would begin executing their warplan without any "political" hesitation. If France shows up within 24 hours, it would be a bonus. No Article 5, no phone calls to London/DC/Bonn. Instant war. With luck all the BRD reserve soldiers would have already joined their units as a precaution. 2 ACR, the "speed bump", expected to retain the south shoulder of the Fulda Gap from the first instant until there was nobody left. Russia faces nothing like that today. Worst case, they will be fairly deep into their objectives before NATO engages with "serious" forces. Given that, will the NATO countries even attempt to eject them? In the 1980s, the answer was very clear. Today, it is not.

My questions will our DEAD plans work?  If we can't dominate the airspace we will have some issues. The first of which will be does NATO mean anything at all.

FWVLIW IMO our SEAD/DEAD plans will work. We have seen this scenario before and practice against it. Russia has few if any surprises in terms of air or ground weapons. I would not be saying this if our opponent were China. Russia is unfortunately a relatively unstable country. If Putin starts to loose, he may do almost anything. I fear that, and I also fear  that NATO has not made it clear enough to Putin what we will or will not consider casus belli. IMO that is because our political class doesn't know either. During the Cold War, they did. No longer. A miscalculation by Putin is very, very possible. A delay in acting by NATO can also create a situation that fighting Russia becomes simply "too hard to do". If Russia already occupies most of the targeted country, is it worth the war it will take to eject them? For many countries, possibly most, IMO the answer will be "no". Those countries may include the US.

[GK3]

Some here said that the last administration's Ukraine policy was a terrible middle ground because it was costly and prolonged the war, but didn't give Ukraine a good chance to actually win.  I'm not sure whether the prior administration's pace and level of support was sufficient, but I do know one thing: The last billion dollars that we're in the process of drawing down is a waste unless the West follows it up with a whole lot more military aid (not reconstruction aid).  

Assuming everyone agrees with that premise, then, in a sane world, we could reach this reasonable conclusion:  Given that the last billion in authorized military aid will not make a substantial difference in the war, the fact that we are actually spending that billion suggests that we are open to the possibility of spending the more that will be necessary to actually make a substantial difference in the war. 

My fingers are crossed that I've got it right.  To be clear, I have heard nothing to suggest that I'm right, and I'm concerned that key U.S. officials have no intention of supporting additional military aid authorization.

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.
 
Your reasoning that if the present administration is willing to spend the already appropriated money it must believe doing so will be efficacious. However, it is quite possible the present administration believes it will be politically efficacious, not militarily efficacious. They may believe that this show of support for Ukraine will convince Putin the US isn't going to abandon Ukraine and that he can't get what he wants militarily. Putin will then accept a ceasefire and a negotiated peace. I am uncertain that I believe the present administration has a plan either. Its initial plan was to force Ukraine to accept a peace that would please Putin. When neither Putin nor Ukraine were willing to go along the administration had no answer. They too are continuing to do what we did before and hoping Putin will "be reasonable". If that does not happen, I have no idea at all what the administration might do.

Just keeping on doing what we have been doing, even when it isn't working has been in my opinion the hallmark of our war efforts since Vietnam. Even more worrisome in the Ukraine situation is that I am not sure we ever had an objective that we wanted to achieve and were willing to pay for other than the rather nebulous  "peace". I do not think that Putin has any intention of negotiating any kind of real peace that basically doesn't give him Ukraine or at least most of it. I am sure there is also the concern that if we get too involved then there will be direct US/NATO vs Russia conflict.
A big question is whether a direct NATO/Russian conflict is a foregone conclusion and we are just kicking the can down the road or there is some sort of off ramp that allows both sides to save face and not lose too much one way or the other, except of course all those Russian and Ukrainians  who have died or become wounded already.  Unfortunately, what works for NATO as a solution may well not work for Putin.  I do not think weakness or willing to settle for far less than he expected to achieve will work for Putin. My guess Putin is in it for the long haul or at least until he either wins or falls out of one of the Russian hotel windows.

[GK3]

Some here said that the last administration's Ukraine policy was a terrible middle ground because it was costly and prolonged the war, but didn't give Ukraine a good chance to actually win.  I'm not sure whether the prior administration's pace and level of support was sufficient, but I do know one thing: The last billion dollars that we're in the process of drawing down is a waste unless the West follows it up with a whole lot more military aid (not reconstruction aid).  

Assuming everyone agrees with that premise, then, in a sane world, we could reach this reasonable conclusion:  Given that the last billion in authorized military aid will not make a substantial difference in the war, the fact that we are actually spending that billion suggests that we are open to the possibility of spending the more that will be necessary to actually make a substantial difference in the war. 

My fingers are crossed that I've got it right.  To be clear, I have heard nothing to suggest that I'm right, and I'm concerned that key U.S. officials have no intention of supporting additional military aid authorization.

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.
 
Your reasoning that if the present administration is willing to spend the already appropriated money it must believe doing so will be efficacious. However, it is quite possible the present administration believes it will be politically efficacious, not militarily efficacious. They may believe that this show of support for Ukraine will convince Putin the US isn't going to abandon Ukraine and that he can't get what he wants militarily. Putin will then accept a ceasefire and a negotiated peace. I am uncertain that I believe the present administration has a plan either. Its initial plan was to force Ukraine to accept a peace that would please Putin. When neither Putin nor Ukraine were willing to go along the administration had no answer. They too are continuing to do what we did before and hoping Putin will "be reasonable". If that does not happen, I have no idea at all what the administration might do.

Just keeping on doing what we have been doing, even when it isn't working has been in my opinion the hallmark of our war efforts since Vietnam. Even more worrisome in the Ukraine situation is that I am not sure we ever had an objective that we wanted to achieve and were willing to pay for other than the rather nebulous  "peace". I do not think that Putin has any intention of negotiating any kind of real peace that basically doesn't give him Ukraine or at least most of it. I am sure there is also the concern that if we get too involved then there will be direct US/NATO vs Russia conflict.
A big question is whether a direct NATO/Russian conflict is a foregone conclusion and we are just kicking the can down the road or there is some sort of off ramp that allows both sides to save face and not lose too much one way or the other, except of course all those Russian and Ukrainians  who have died or become wounded already.  Unfortunately, what works for NATO as a solution may well not work for Putin.  I do not think weakness or willing to settle for far less than he expected to achieve will work for Putin. My guess Putin is in it for the long haul or at least until he either wins or falls out of one of the Russian hotel windows.