[Goose]

A very informative article on FPV drones and their limitations, from a former drone pilot who volunteered with the Ukrainian armed forces.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-foug...d-of-suck/

I have to wonder about the accuracy of his opinions.  I agree that currently artillery has more range but the instant they fire counter battery radars can detect their launch points and launch counter battery attacks.  This means the artillery and rocket launchers are forced to move after firing and make themselves good targets.  

but there is more

For those who may have a serious interest in this subject, here is a more comprehensive view of this issue and well worth the read.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/05/...t%2C%20and

And for those who have a serious interest in this, the author of the above article has a podcast worth checking out: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/le...1762473030

IMO these posts both deserve a big BZ. Read them, they are worth it! I also do not think the facts presented and opinions expressed in them are at variance.  The first link expresses a personal experience with the limitations of FPV attack drones of the "quadcopter" type. It is a bit dated but does include a section on fiber-optic controlled FPV drones. I think one of its main contributions is attempting to counter the impression that FPV drones mostly "work" and can be counted upon to "complete the mission" almost all of the time. That just isn't so. One wouldn't know that from looking at all the video of successful engagements posted on the internet. Acknowledging the large number of FPV drone successes in a second-strike role on immobilized targets (both human and mechanical) is IMO a very important contribution of this post.
 
GK3's first link is a more analytical look at what drones can and cannot accomplish. This more "high level" look is IMO very valuable. The article also points out the unique factors in the Ukraine war that has led to FPV drones playing roles they for which they are not optimal. The advice to the US Army to formulate a more reasoned approach to the future utilization of drones is IMO on point. Unfortunately the US Army has an absolutely abysmal record in their attempts to develop the "Army of the Future". Many tens of billions has been wasted to little result. There is  IMO no reason to believe they will do "better" with drones, unfortunately.
 
I was particularly gratified that both authors noted the similar capabilities provided by company and battalion level mortars to the current use of FPV drones. I am very on board that idea :-). The ability of mortars to deliver much more explosive on target for less cost is a major advantage. The US has such dedicated assets and they aren't going away. In some cases the mortar carriers used by armored units are quite old and hard to maintain. That needs to be fixed where it exists.
 
The one factor that both articles mentions is the contribution of drones to situational awareness, target location, and adjusting fires when needed. Integrating this capability into US Army doctrine and making it "work" optimally is IMO the most important immediate task. The Ukraine war initially demonstrated the the delays in the Russian artillery fire direction system were disastrously long. The Russians have attacked that problem with at least uneven results. Since Russian units in general do not have "organic" mortar resources Russia inherently has a "longer" path. The US fire direction loop is much faster (partly because it is much shorter). Drones can improve target acquisition to the point it may stress the system. Lots of scenarios need to be evaluated at the various NTCs to get this right.
 
Counter-battery radars are a very "interesting" topic. They have been around forever. Most of them in the past were FMCW radars. That made them stand out on any ESM/Elint system. They were trivial to identify. AFAIK these radars are still of that type. LPI counter-battery radars are not (yet) common. Counter-battery radars have one immense problem. In order to respond quickly to an incoming artillery strike they have to be transmitting all the time. They can't "pop up" and then shut down. They have to just sit there and take it. These radars are therefore great targets for destruction via HARM missiles. Worst case they are warned by other command elements that HARMs are flying and they shut down. AARGMs are designed to counter that tactic.
 
"Back in the day" the Army Security Agency (ASA) also had systems designed to locate counter batter radars and allow the artillery itself to suppress them. Watkins-Johnson built the MLQ-24 back in the mid 70s. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/navy-cryp...3984-SDla/ I also know some of the individuals who worked at the fixed site on the Schneeburg. Note from the second picture the presence of mechanical spinning DF antennas (WJ L-6). Doing DF that way was horribly "slow" but counter-batter radars being on all the time makes it a reasonable tactic. Of course, the MLQ-24 was expected to do many other things where that advantage did not exist. Unfortunately electronic warfare was never a priority to the US Army. The ASA was folded into INSCOM in 1977. That IMO was a mistake. The MLQ-24 had limitations that were budget driven. It did not cover frequencies above 12 GHz. The Soviets by then had many systems that operated in Ku band, 12-18 GHz. "No requirement". Cost too much. The Army was also not interested even in an ALQ-78 style monopulse sum and difference DF system because they couldn't afford the two channel receivers. The Army definitely was not interested in a computer-controlled automatic system even though W-J had such a system available. Too costly. Thus the MLQ-24 was obsolete by design.
 
The Army was still interested in locating counter-battery radar at the divisional level in the late 1990s. The system contracted to fulfill that requirement is quite familiar to me. The system had so many implementation problems the Army didn't buy it (thank goodness). Devolution in action. It could never pass Op-Eval. It STILL was a single channel system with a spinning DF antenna. It was a computer controlled automatic system and it did reach 18 GHz. It also had a wider IF processing bandwidth. After 20+ years these were some "improvements". To bad it never worked :-).
 
One historic problem for both the US and the Soviet Union was lack of sufficient numbers of counter-battery radars. Another has been the difficulty in fusing together the data from multiple sites. That data then needs to be used to create appropriate fire-missions. In many cases this process needs to be expedited. The US is pretty good at this, Russia less so. Drones have changed the game considerably because they search behind enemy lines looking for, among other things, artillery. These drones are a threat all the time, not just when a battery is firing. The drone can get an extremely good location fix on its target. Today, that data needs to be expeditiously converted into a fire-mission for the counter-battery battle.
 
In the future I expect that every battery will have a tethered drone that has the ability to detect counter-battery radars. The drone gets its power up the tether so it can stay aloft indefinitely. The drone will have an interferometer that can produce very high quality Direction of Arrival (DOA) bearings from counter-battery radar emissions. Bearings and Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) data from multiple drones will be merged to generate an almost immediate firing solution. The life of counter-battery radars is already short on the modern battlefield. It will get shorter.

[Goose]

A very informative article on FPV drones and their limitations, from a former drone pilot who volunteered with the Ukrainian armed forces.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-foug...d-of-suck/

I have to wonder about the accuracy of his opinions.  I agree that currently artillery has more range but the instant they fire counter battery radars can detect their launch points and launch counter battery attacks.  This means the artillery and rocket launchers are forced to move after firing and make themselves good targets.  

but there is more

For those who may have a serious interest in this subject, here is a more comprehensive view of this issue and well worth the read.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/05/...t%2C%20and

And for those who have a serious interest in this, the author of the above article has a podcast worth checking out: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/le...1762473030

IMO these posts both deserve a big BZ. Read them, they are worth it! I also do not think the facts presented and opinions expressed in them are at variance.  The first link expresses a personal experience with the limitations of FPV attack drones of the "quadcopter" type. It is a bit dated but does include a section on fiber-optic controlled FPV drones. I think one of its main contributions is attempting to counter the impression that FPV drones mostly "work" and can be counted upon to "complete the mission" almost all of the time. That just isn't so. One wouldn't know that from looking at all the video of successful engagements posted on the internet. Acknowledging the large number of FPV drone successes in a second-strike role on immobilized targets (both human and mechanical) is IMO a very important contribution of this post.
 
GK3's first link is a more analytical look at what drones can and cannot accomplish. This more "high level" look is IMO very valuable. The article also points out the unique factors in the Ukraine war that has led to FPV drones playing roles they for which they are not optimal. The advice to the US Army to formulate a more reasoned approach to the future utilization of drones is IMO on point. Unfortunately the US Army has an absolutely abysmal record in their attempts to develop the "Army of the Future". Many tens of billions has been wasted to little result. There is  IMO no reason to believe they will do "better" with drones, unfortunately.
 
I was particularly gratified that both authors noted the similar capabilities provided by company and battalion level mortars to the current use of FPV drones. I am very on board that idea :-). The ability of mortars to deliver much more explosive on target for less cost is a major advantage. The US has such dedicated assets and they aren't going away. In some cases the mortar carriers used by armored units are quite old and hard to maintain. That needs to be fixed where it exists.
 
The one factor that both articles mentions is the contribution of drones to situational awareness, target location, and adjusting fires when needed. Integrating this capability into US Army doctrine and making it "work" optimally is IMO the most important immediate task. The Ukraine war initially demonstrated the the delays in the Russian artillery fire direction system were disastrously long. The Russians have attacked that problem with at least uneven results. Since Russian units in general do not have "organic" mortar resources Russia inherently has a "longer" path. The US fire direction loop is much faster (partly because it is much shorter). Drones can improve target acquisition to the point it may stress the system. Lots of scenarios need to be evaluated at the various NTCs to get this right.
 
Counter-battery radars are a very "interesting" topic. They have been around forever. Most of them in the past were FMCW radars. That made them stand out on any ESM/Elint system. They were trivial to identify. AFAIK these radars are still of that type. LPI counter-battery radars are not (yet) common. Counter-battery radars have one immense problem. In order to respond quickly to an incoming artillery strike they have to be transmitting all the time. They can't "pop up" and then shut down. They have to just sit there and take it. These radars are therefore great targets for destruction via HARM missiles. Worst case they are warned by other command elements that HARMs are flying and they shut down. AARGMs are designed to counter that tactic.
 
"Back in the day" the Army Security Agency (ASA) also had systems designed to locate counter batter radars and allow the artillery itself to suppress them. Watkins-Johnson built the MLQ-24 back in the mid 70s. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/navy-cryp...3984-SDla/ I also know some of the individuals who worked at the fixed site on the Schneeburg. Note from the second picture the presence of mechanical spinning DF antennas (WJ L-6). Doing DF that way was horribly "slow" but counter-batter radars being on all the time makes it a reasonable tactic. Of course, the MLQ-24 was expected to do many other things where that advantage did not exist. Unfortunately electronic warfare was never a priority to the US Army. The ASA was folded into INSCOM in 1977. That IMO was a mistake. The MLQ-24 had limitations that were budget driven. It did not cover frequencies above 12 GHz. The Soviets by then had many systems that operated in Ku band, 12-18 GHz. "No requirement". Cost too much. The Army was also not interested even in an ALQ-78 style monopulse sum and difference DF system because they couldn't afford the two channel receivers. The Army definitely was not interested in a computer-controlled automatic system even though W-J had such a system available. Too costly. Thus the MLQ-24 was obsolete by design.
 
The Army was still interested in locating counter-battery radar at the divisional level in the late 1990s. The system contracted to fulfill that requirement is quite familiar to me. The system had so many implementation problems the Army didn't buy it (thank goodness). Devolution in action. It could never pass Op-Eval. It STILL was a single channel system with a spinning DF antenna. It was a computer controlled automatic system and it did reach 18 GHz. It also had a wider IF processing bandwidth. After 20+ years these were some "improvements". To bad it never worked :-).
 
One historic problem for both the US and the Soviet Union was lack of sufficient numbers of counter-battery radars. Another has been the difficulty in fusing together the data from multiple sites. That data then needs to be used to create appropriate fire-missions. In many cases this process needs to be expedited. The US is pretty good at this, Russia less so. Drones have changed the game considerably because they search behind enemy lines looking for, among other things, artillery. These drones are a threat all the time, not just when a battery is firing. The drone can get an extremely good location fix on its target. Today, that data needs to be expeditiously converted into a fire-mission for the counter-battery battle.
 
In the future I expect that every battery will have a tethered drone that has the ability to detect counter-battery radars. The drone gets its power up the tether so it can stay aloft indefinitely. The drone will have an interferometer that can produce very high quality Direction of Arrival (DOA) bearings from counter-battery radar emissions. Bearings and Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) data from multiple drones will be merged to generate an almost immediate firing solution. The life of counter-battery radars is already short on the modern battlefield. It will get shorter.

[GK3]

A very informative article on FPV drones and their limitations, from a former drone pilot who volunteered with the Ukrainian armed forces.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-foug...d-of-suck/

I have to wonder about the accuracy of his opinions.  I agree that currently artillery has more range but the instant they fire counter battery radars can detect their launch points and launch counter battery attacks.  This means the artillery and rocket launchers are forced to move after firing and make themselves good targets.  

but there is more

For those who may have a serious interest in this subject, here is a more comprehensive view of this issue and well worth the read.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/05/...t%2C%20and

And for those who have a serious interest in this, the author of the above article has a podcast worth checking out: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/le...1762473030

IMO these posts both deserve a big BZ. Read them, they are worth it! I also do not think the facts presented and opinions expressed in them are at variance.  The first link expresses a personal experience with the limitations of FPV attack drones of the "quadcopter" type. It is a bit dated but does include a section on fiber-optic controlled FPV drones. I think one of its main contributions is attempting to counter the impression that FPV drones mostly "work" and can be counted upon to "complete the mission" almost all of the time. That just isn't so. One wouldn't know that from looking at all the video of successful engagements posted on the internet. Acknowledging the large number of FPV drone successes in a second-strike role on immobilized targets (both human and mechanical) is IMO a very important contribution of this post.
 
GK3's first link is a more analytical look at what drones can and cannot accomplish. This more "high level" look is IMO very valuable. The article also points out the unique factors in the Ukraine war that has led to FPV drones playing roles they for which they are not optimal. The advice to the US Army to formulate a more reasoned approach to the future utilization of drones is IMO on point. Unfortunately the US Army has an absolutely abysmal record in their attempts to develop the "Army of the Future". Many tens of billions has been wasted to little result. There is  IMO no reason to believe they will do "better" with drones, unfortunately.
 
I was particularly gratified that both authors noted the similar capabilities provided by company and battalion level mortars to the current use of FPV drones. I am very on board that idea :-). The ability of mortars to deliver much more explosive on target for less cost is a major advantage. The US has such dedicated assets and they aren't going away. In some cases the mortar carriers used by armored units are quite old and hard to maintain. That needs to be fixed where it exists.
 
The one factor that both articles mentions is the contribution of drones to situational awareness, target location, and adjusting fires when needed. Integrating this capability into US Army doctrine and making it "work" optimally is IMO the most important immediate task. The Ukraine war initially demonstrated the the delays in the Russian artillery fire direction system were disastrously long. The Russians have attacked that problem with at least uneven results. Since Russian units in general do not have "organic" mortar resources Russia inherently has a "longer" path. The US fire direction loop is much faster (partly because it is much shorter). Drones can improve target acquisition to the point it may stress the system. Lots of scenarios need to be evaluated at the various NTCs to get this right.
 
Counter-battery radars are a very "interesting" topic. They have been around forever. Most of them in the past were FMCW radars. That made them stand out on any ESM/Elint system. They were trivial to identify. AFAIK these radars are still of that type. LPI counter-battery radars are not (yet) common. Counter-battery radars have one immense problem. In order to respond quickly to an incoming artillery strike they have to be transmitting all the time. They can't "pop up" and then shut down. They have to just sit there and take it. These radars are therefore great targets for destruction via HARM missiles. Worst case they are warned by other command elements that HARMs are flying and they shut down. AARGMs are designed to counter that tactic.
 
"Back in the day" the Army Security Agency (ASA) also had systems designed to locate counter batter radars and allow the artillery itself to suppress them. Watkins-Johnson built the MLQ-24 back in the mid 70s. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/navy-cryp...3984-SDla/ I also know some of the individuals who worked at the fixed site on the Schneeburg. Note from the second picture the presence of mechanical spinning DF antennas (WJ L-6). Doing DF that way was horribly "slow" but counter-batter radars being on all the time makes it a reasonable tactic. Of course, the MLQ-24 was expected to do many other things where that advantage did not exist. Unfortunately electronic warfare was never a priority to the US Army. The ASA was folded into INSCOM in 1977. That IMO was a mistake. The MLQ-24 had limitations that were budget driven. It did not cover frequencies above 12 GHz. The Soviets by then had many systems that operated in Ku band, 12-18 GHz. "No requirement". Cost too much. The Army was also not interested even in an ALQ-78 style monopulse sum and difference DF system because they couldn't afford the two channel receivers. The Army definitely was not interested in a computer-controlled automatic system even though W-J had such a system available. Too costly. Thus the MLQ-24 was obsolete by design.
 
The Army was still interested in locating counter-battery radar at the divisional level in the late 1990s. The system contracted to fulfill that requirement is quite familiar to me. The system had so many implementation problems the Army didn't buy it (thank goodness). Devolution in action. It could never pass Op-Eval. It STILL was a single channel system with a spinning DF antenna. It was a computer controlled automatic system and it did reach 18 GHz. It also had a wider IF processing bandwidth. After 20+ years these were some "improvements". To bad it never worked :-).
 
One historic problem for both the US and the Soviet Union was lack of sufficient numbers of counter-battery radars. Another has been the difficulty in fusing together the data from multiple sites. That data then needs to be used to create appropriate fire-missions. In many cases this process needs to be expedited. The US is pretty good at this, Russia less so. Drones have changed the game considerably because they search behind enemy lines looking for, among other things, artillery. These drones are a threat all the time, not just when a battery is firing. The drone can get an extremely good location fix on its target. Today, that data needs to be expeditiously converted into a fire-mission for the counter-battery battle.
 
In the future I expect that every battery will have a tethered drone that has the ability to detect counter-battery radars. The drone gets its power up the tether so it can stay aloft indefinitely. The drone will have an interferometer that can produce very high quality Direction of Arrival (DOA) bearings from counter-battery radar emissions. Bearings and Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) data from multiple drones will be merged to generate an almost immediate firing solution. The life of counter-battery radars is already short on the modern battlefield. It will get shorter.

, 
Very interesting, thanks so much for your informative response.  My experience in these types of things dates to the 1960's.  If you want to have a lot of fun, try carrying the base plate for an 81 mm mortar for a few hours.  As I recall the M29 system weighed nearly 100 lbs. It broke down into three components and schlepping it around in steep terrain was irrational.  As time went on, many units left their mortars at their firebases or base camps. I have no idea of what kind of mobile platform we have moving these types of weapons on the battlefield today.

It seems to me that whoever sorts out their counter battery systems first will have a big leg up.

[GK3]

A very informative article on FPV drones and their limitations, from a former drone pilot who volunteered with the Ukrainian armed forces.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-foug...d-of-suck/

I have to wonder about the accuracy of his opinions.  I agree that currently artillery has more range but the instant they fire counter battery radars can detect their launch points and launch counter battery attacks.  This means the artillery and rocket launchers are forced to move after firing and make themselves good targets.  

but there is more

For those who may have a serious interest in this subject, here is a more comprehensive view of this issue and well worth the read.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/05/...t%2C%20and

And for those who have a serious interest in this, the author of the above article has a podcast worth checking out: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/le...1762473030

IMO these posts both deserve a big BZ. Read them, they are worth it! I also do not think the facts presented and opinions expressed in them are at variance.  The first link expresses a personal experience with the limitations of FPV attack drones of the "quadcopter" type. It is a bit dated but does include a section on fiber-optic controlled FPV drones. I think one of its main contributions is attempting to counter the impression that FPV drones mostly "work" and can be counted upon to "complete the mission" almost all of the time. That just isn't so. One wouldn't know that from looking at all the video of successful engagements posted on the internet. Acknowledging the large number of FPV drone successes in a second-strike role on immobilized targets (both human and mechanical) is IMO a very important contribution of this post.
 
GK3's first link is a more analytical look at what drones can and cannot accomplish. This more "high level" look is IMO very valuable. The article also points out the unique factors in the Ukraine war that has led to FPV drones playing roles they for which they are not optimal. The advice to the US Army to formulate a more reasoned approach to the future utilization of drones is IMO on point. Unfortunately the US Army has an absolutely abysmal record in their attempts to develop the "Army of the Future". Many tens of billions has been wasted to little result. There is  IMO no reason to believe they will do "better" with drones, unfortunately.
 
I was particularly gratified that both authors noted the similar capabilities provided by company and battalion level mortars to the current use of FPV drones. I am very on board that idea :-). The ability of mortars to deliver much more explosive on target for less cost is a major advantage. The US has such dedicated assets and they aren't going away. In some cases the mortar carriers used by armored units are quite old and hard to maintain. That needs to be fixed where it exists.
 
The one factor that both articles mentions is the contribution of drones to situational awareness, target location, and adjusting fires when needed. Integrating this capability into US Army doctrine and making it "work" optimally is IMO the most important immediate task. The Ukraine war initially demonstrated the the delays in the Russian artillery fire direction system were disastrously long. The Russians have attacked that problem with at least uneven results. Since Russian units in general do not have "organic" mortar resources Russia inherently has a "longer" path. The US fire direction loop is much faster (partly because it is much shorter). Drones can improve target acquisition to the point it may stress the system. Lots of scenarios need to be evaluated at the various NTCs to get this right.
 
Counter-battery radars are a very "interesting" topic. They have been around forever. Most of them in the past were FMCW radars. That made them stand out on any ESM/Elint system. They were trivial to identify. AFAIK these radars are still of that type. LPI counter-battery radars are not (yet) common. Counter-battery radars have one immense problem. In order to respond quickly to an incoming artillery strike they have to be transmitting all the time. They can't "pop up" and then shut down. They have to just sit there and take it. These radars are therefore great targets for destruction via HARM missiles. Worst case they are warned by other command elements that HARMs are flying and they shut down. AARGMs are designed to counter that tactic.
 
"Back in the day" the Army Security Agency (ASA) also had systems designed to locate counter batter radars and allow the artillery itself to suppress them. Watkins-Johnson built the MLQ-24 back in the mid 70s. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/navy-cryp...3984-SDla/ I also know some of the individuals who worked at the fixed site on the Schneeburg. Note from the second picture the presence of mechanical spinning DF antennas (WJ L-6). Doing DF that way was horribly "slow" but counter-batter radars being on all the time makes it a reasonable tactic. Of course, the MLQ-24 was expected to do many other things where that advantage did not exist. Unfortunately electronic warfare was never a priority to the US Army. The ASA was folded into INSCOM in 1977. That IMO was a mistake. The MLQ-24 had limitations that were budget driven. It did not cover frequencies above 12 GHz. The Soviets by then had many systems that operated in Ku band, 12-18 GHz. "No requirement". Cost too much. The Army was also not interested even in an ALQ-78 style monopulse sum and difference DF system because they couldn't afford the two channel receivers. The Army definitely was not interested in a computer-controlled automatic system even though W-J had such a system available. Too costly. Thus the MLQ-24 was obsolete by design.
 
The Army was still interested in locating counter-battery radar at the divisional level in the late 1990s. The system contracted to fulfill that requirement is quite familiar to me. The system had so many implementation problems the Army didn't buy it (thank goodness). Devolution in action. It could never pass Op-Eval. It STILL was a single channel system with a spinning DF antenna. It was a computer controlled automatic system and it did reach 18 GHz. It also had a wider IF processing bandwidth. After 20+ years these were some "improvements". To bad it never worked :-).
 
One historic problem for both the US and the Soviet Union was lack of sufficient numbers of counter-battery radars. Another has been the difficulty in fusing together the data from multiple sites. That data then needs to be used to create appropriate fire-missions. In many cases this process needs to be expedited. The US is pretty good at this, Russia less so. Drones have changed the game considerably because they search behind enemy lines looking for, among other things, artillery. These drones are a threat all the time, not just when a battery is firing. The drone can get an extremely good location fix on its target. Today, that data needs to be expeditiously converted into a fire-mission for the counter-battery battle.
 
In the future I expect that every battery will have a tethered drone that has the ability to detect counter-battery radars. The drone gets its power up the tether so it can stay aloft indefinitely. The drone will have an interferometer that can produce very high quality Direction of Arrival (DOA) bearings from counter-battery radar emissions. Bearings and Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) data from multiple drones will be merged to generate an almost immediate firing solution. The life of counter-battery radars is already short on the modern battlefield. It will get shorter.

, 
Very interesting, thanks so much for your informative response.  My experience in these types of things dates to the 1960's.  If you want to have a lot of fun, try carrying the base plate for an 81 mm mortar for a few hours.  As I recall the M29 system weighed nearly 100 lbs. It broke down into three components and schlepping it around in steep terrain was irrational.  As time went on, many units left their mortars at their firebases or base camps. I have no idea of what kind of mobile platform we have moving these types of weapons on the battlefield today.

It seems to me that whoever sorts out their counter battery systems first will have a big leg up.

[BostonCard]

In honor of the 25th anniversary of Britney Spears’ album “Oops… I did it again”, Ukraine seems to have taken another four Russian warplanes, these in a base some 900 km (500 miles) from the border.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/j...plnews_d-1

BC

[BostonCard]

In honor of the 25th anniversary of Britney Spears’ album “Oops… I did it again”, Ukraine seems to have taken another four Russian warplanes, these in a base some 900 km (500 miles) from the border.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/j...plnews_d-1

BC

[GK3]

A very informative article on FPV drones and their limitations, from a former drone pilot who volunteered with the Ukrainian armed forces.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-foug...d-of-suck/

I have to wonder about the accuracy of his opinions.  I agree that currently artillery has more range but the instant they fire counter battery radars can detect their launch points and launch counter battery attacks.  This means the artillery and rocket launchers are forced to move after firing and make themselves good targets.  

but there is more

For those who may have a serious interest in this subject, here is a more comprehensive view of this issue and well worth the read.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/05/...t%2C%20and

And for those who have a serious interest in this, the author of the above article has a podcast worth checking out: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/le...1762473030

IMO these posts both deserve a big BZ. Read them, they are worth it! I also do not think the facts presented and opinions expressed in them are at variance.  The first link expresses a personal experience with the limitations of FPV attack drones of the "quadcopter" type. It is a bit dated but does include a section on fiber-optic controlled FPV drones. I think one of its main contributions is attempting to counter the impression that FPV drones mostly "work" and can be counted upon to "complete the mission" almost all of the time. That just isn't so. One wouldn't know that from looking at all the video of successful engagements posted on the internet. Acknowledging the large number of FPV drone successes in a second-strike role on immobilized targets (both human and mechanical) is IMO a very important contribution of this post.
 
GK3's first link is a more analytical look at what drones can and cannot accomplish. This more "high level" look is IMO very valuable. The article also points out the unique factors in the Ukraine war that has led to FPV drones playing roles they for which they are not optimal. The advice to the US Army to formulate a more reasoned approach to the future utilization of drones is IMO on point. Unfortunately the US Army has an absolutely abysmal record in their attempts to develop the "Army of the Future". Many tens of billions has been wasted to little result. There is  IMO no reason to believe they will do "better" with drones, unfortunately.
 
I was particularly gratified that both authors noted the similar capabilities provided by company and battalion level mortars to the current use of FPV drones. I am very on board that idea :-). The ability of mortars to deliver much more explosive on target for less cost is a major advantage. The US has such dedicated assets and they aren't going away. In some cases the mortar carriers used by armored units are quite old and hard to maintain. That needs to be fixed where it exists.
 
Very true, back in the day setting up a new mortar position took time, lots of time and you needed an FO who knew what he was doing.  Today, with GPS etc it can be much easier and faster to survey your mortar position and be prepared to fire.  Using drones to replace a FO saves a body and is probably more accurate. 

The one factor that both articles mentions is the contribution of drones to situational awareness, target location, and adjusting fires when needed. Integrating this capability into US Army doctrine and making it "work" optimally is IMO the most important immediate task. The Ukraine war initially demonstrated the the delays in the Russian artillery fire direction system were disastrously long. The Russians have attacked that problem with at least uneven results. Since Russian units in general do not have "organic" mortar resources Russia inherently has a "longer" path. The US fire direction loop is much faster (partly because it is much shorter). Drones can improve target acquisition to the point it may stress the system. Lots of scenarios need to be evaluated at the various NTCs to get this right.
 
Counter-battery radars are a very "interesting" topic. They have been around forever. Most of them in the past were FMCW radars. That made them stand out on any ESM/Elint system. They were trivial to identify. AFAIK these radars are still of that type. LPI counter-battery radars are not (yet) common. Counter-battery radars have one immense problem. In order to respond quickly to an incoming artillery strike they have to be transmitting all the time. They can't "pop up" and then shut down. They have to just sit there and take it. These radars are therefore great targets for destruction via HARM missiles. Worst case they are warned by other command elements that HARMs are flying and they shut down. AARGMs are designed to counter that tactic.
 
"Back in the day" the Army Security Agency (ASA) also had systems designed to locate counter batter radars and allow the artillery itself to suppress them. Watkins-Johnson built the MLQ-24 back in the mid 70s. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/navy-cryp...3984-SDla/ I also know some of the individuals who worked at the fixed site on the Schneeburg. Note from the second picture the presence of mechanical spinning DF antennas (WJ L-6). Doing DF that way was horribly "slow" but counter-batter radars being on all the time makes it a reasonable tactic. Of course, the MLQ-24 was expected to do many other things where that advantage did not exist. Unfortunately electronic warfare was never a priority to the US Army. The ASA was folded into INSCOM in 1977. That IMO was a mistake. The MLQ-24 had limitations that were budget driven. It did not cover frequencies above 12 GHz. The Soviets by then had many systems that operated in Ku band, 12-18 GHz. "No requirement". Cost too much. The Army was also not interested even in an ALQ-78 style monopulse sum and difference DF system because they couldn't afford the two channel receivers. The Army definitely was not interested in a computer-controlled automatic system even though W-J had such a system available. Too costly. Thus the MLQ-24 was obsolete by design.
 
The Army was still interested in locating counter-battery radar at the divisional level in the late 1990s. The system contracted to fulfill that requirement is quite familiar to me. The system had so many implementation problems the Army didn't buy it (thank goodness). Devolution in action. It could never pass Op-Eval. It STILL was a single channel system with a spinning DF antenna. It was a computer controlled automatic system and it did reach 18 GHz. It also had a wider IF processing bandwidth. After 20+ years these were some "improvements". To bad it never worked :-).
 
One historic problem for both the US and the Soviet Union was lack of sufficient numbers of counter-battery radars. Another has been the difficulty in fusing together the data from multiple sites. That data then needs to be used to create appropriate fire-missions. In many cases this process needs to be expedited. The US is pretty good at this, Russia less so. Drones have changed the game considerably because they search behind enemy lines looking for, among other things, artillery. These drones are a threat all the time, not just when a battery is firing. The drone can get an extremely good location fix on its target. Today, that data needs to be expeditiously converted into a fire-mission for the counter-battery battle.
 
In the future I expect that every battery will have a tethered drone that has the ability to detect counter-battery radars. The drone gets its power up the tether so it can stay aloft indefinitely. The drone will have an interferometer that can produce very high quality Direction of Arrival (DOA) bearings from counter-battery radar emissions. Bearings and Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) data from multiple drones will be merged to generate an almost immediate firing solution. The life of counter-battery radars is already short on the modern battlefield. It will get shorter.

Yes, shoot and scoot will be the mantra

[GK3]

A very informative article on FPV drones and their limitations, from a former drone pilot who volunteered with the Ukrainian armed forces.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-foug...d-of-suck/

I have to wonder about the accuracy of his opinions.  I agree that currently artillery has more range but the instant they fire counter battery radars can detect their launch points and launch counter battery attacks.  This means the artillery and rocket launchers are forced to move after firing and make themselves good targets.  

but there is more

For those who may have a serious interest in this subject, here is a more comprehensive view of this issue and well worth the read.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/05/...t%2C%20and

And for those who have a serious interest in this, the author of the above article has a podcast worth checking out: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/le...1762473030

IMO these posts both deserve a big BZ. Read them, they are worth it! I also do not think the facts presented and opinions expressed in them are at variance.  The first link expresses a personal experience with the limitations of FPV attack drones of the "quadcopter" type. It is a bit dated but does include a section on fiber-optic controlled FPV drones. I think one of its main contributions is attempting to counter the impression that FPV drones mostly "work" and can be counted upon to "complete the mission" almost all of the time. That just isn't so. One wouldn't know that from looking at all the video of successful engagements posted on the internet. Acknowledging the large number of FPV drone successes in a second-strike role on immobilized targets (both human and mechanical) is IMO a very important contribution of this post.
 
GK3's first link is a more analytical look at what drones can and cannot accomplish. This more "high level" look is IMO very valuable. The article also points out the unique factors in the Ukraine war that has led to FPV drones playing roles they for which they are not optimal. The advice to the US Army to formulate a more reasoned approach to the future utilization of drones is IMO on point. Unfortunately the US Army has an absolutely abysmal record in their attempts to develop the "Army of the Future". Many tens of billions has been wasted to little result. There is  IMO no reason to believe they will do "better" with drones, unfortunately.
 
I was particularly gratified that both authors noted the similar capabilities provided by company and battalion level mortars to the current use of FPV drones. I am very on board that idea :-). The ability of mortars to deliver much more explosive on target for less cost is a major advantage. The US has such dedicated assets and they aren't going away. In some cases the mortar carriers used by armored units are quite old and hard to maintain. That needs to be fixed where it exists.
 
Very true, back in the day setting up a new mortar position took time, lots of time and you needed an FO who knew what he was doing.  Today, with GPS etc it can be much easier and faster to survey your mortar position and be prepared to fire.  Using drones to replace a FO saves a body and is probably more accurate. 

The one factor that both articles mentions is the contribution of drones to situational awareness, target location, and adjusting fires when needed. Integrating this capability into US Army doctrine and making it "work" optimally is IMO the most important immediate task. The Ukraine war initially demonstrated the the delays in the Russian artillery fire direction system were disastrously long. The Russians have attacked that problem with at least uneven results. Since Russian units in general do not have "organic" mortar resources Russia inherently has a "longer" path. The US fire direction loop is much faster (partly because it is much shorter). Drones can improve target acquisition to the point it may stress the system. Lots of scenarios need to be evaluated at the various NTCs to get this right.
 
Counter-battery radars are a very "interesting" topic. They have been around forever. Most of them in the past were FMCW radars. That made them stand out on any ESM/Elint system. They were trivial to identify. AFAIK these radars are still of that type. LPI counter-battery radars are not (yet) common. Counter-battery radars have one immense problem. In order to respond quickly to an incoming artillery strike they have to be transmitting all the time. They can't "pop up" and then shut down. They have to just sit there and take it. These radars are therefore great targets for destruction via HARM missiles. Worst case they are warned by other command elements that HARMs are flying and they shut down. AARGMs are designed to counter that tactic.
 
"Back in the day" the Army Security Agency (ASA) also had systems designed to locate counter batter radars and allow the artillery itself to suppress them. Watkins-Johnson built the MLQ-24 back in the mid 70s. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/navy-cryp...3984-SDla/ I also know some of the individuals who worked at the fixed site on the Schneeburg. Note from the second picture the presence of mechanical spinning DF antennas (WJ L-6). Doing DF that way was horribly "slow" but counter-batter radars being on all the time makes it a reasonable tactic. Of course, the MLQ-24 was expected to do many other things where that advantage did not exist. Unfortunately electronic warfare was never a priority to the US Army. The ASA was folded into INSCOM in 1977. That IMO was a mistake. The MLQ-24 had limitations that were budget driven. It did not cover frequencies above 12 GHz. The Soviets by then had many systems that operated in Ku band, 12-18 GHz. "No requirement". Cost too much. The Army was also not interested even in an ALQ-78 style monopulse sum and difference DF system because they couldn't afford the two channel receivers. The Army definitely was not interested in a computer-controlled automatic system even though W-J had such a system available. Too costly. Thus the MLQ-24 was obsolete by design.
 
The Army was still interested in locating counter-battery radar at the divisional level in the late 1990s. The system contracted to fulfill that requirement is quite familiar to me. The system had so many implementation problems the Army didn't buy it (thank goodness). Devolution in action. It could never pass Op-Eval. It STILL was a single channel system with a spinning DF antenna. It was a computer controlled automatic system and it did reach 18 GHz. It also had a wider IF processing bandwidth. After 20+ years these were some "improvements". To bad it never worked :-).
 
One historic problem for both the US and the Soviet Union was lack of sufficient numbers of counter-battery radars. Another has been the difficulty in fusing together the data from multiple sites. That data then needs to be used to create appropriate fire-missions. In many cases this process needs to be expedited. The US is pretty good at this, Russia less so. Drones have changed the game considerably because they search behind enemy lines looking for, among other things, artillery. These drones are a threat all the time, not just when a battery is firing. The drone can get an extremely good location fix on its target. Today, that data needs to be expeditiously converted into a fire-mission for the counter-battery battle.
 
In the future I expect that every battery will have a tethered drone that has the ability to detect counter-battery radars. The drone gets its power up the tether so it can stay aloft indefinitely. The drone will have an interferometer that can produce very high quality Direction of Arrival (DOA) bearings from counter-battery radar emissions. Bearings and Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) data from multiple drones will be merged to generate an almost immediate firing solution. The life of counter-battery radars is already short on the modern battlefield. It will get shorter.

Yes, shoot and scoot will be the mantra

[GK3]

In honor of the 25th anniversary of Britney Spears’ album “Oops… I did it again”, Ukraine seems to have taken another four Russian warplanes, these in a base some 900 km (500 miles) from the border.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/j...plnews_d-1

BC

Ukraine's drone warfare seems to be expanding.  This is an interesting read on what they are apparently doing now.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...be-decoys/

One has to wonder how long artillery in its current form can survive. Is a stalemate the final result?

[GK3]

In honor of the 25th anniversary of Britney Spears’ album “Oops… I did it again”, Ukraine seems to have taken another four Russian warplanes, these in a base some 900 km (500 miles) from the border.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/j...plnews_d-1

BC

Ukraine's drone warfare seems to be expanding.  This is an interesting read on what they are apparently doing now.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...be-decoys/

One has to wonder how long artillery in its current form can survive. Is a stalemate the final result?

[dabigv13]

And Ukrainian special forces does it again. 

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1938933881043907005

SBU has confirmed the attack on the Kirovske airfield in occupied Crimea. In a successful overnight operation on June 27–28, SBU drones destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 and three helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28. Secondary detonations continued throughout the night.

In these behind the lines attacks on airfields, I'd imagine the drones are likely facing much lower degrees of jamming and competition for frequencies as compared to the front lines. A good use case.

[dabigv13]

And Ukrainian special forces does it again. 

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1938933881043907005

SBU has confirmed the attack on the Kirovske airfield in occupied Crimea. In a successful overnight operation on June 27–28, SBU drones destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 and three helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28. Secondary detonations continued throughout the night.

In these behind the lines attacks on airfields, I'd imagine the drones are likely facing much lower degrees of jamming and competition for frequencies as compared to the front lines. A good use case.

[BostonCard]

Meanwhile, in Sumy, the situation appears to have stabilized.

https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-halt...g-06-2025/

BC

[BostonCard]

Meanwhile, in Sumy, the situation appears to have stabilized.

https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-halt...g-06-2025/

BC

[M T]

Ukraine loses F-16 fighter jet and pilot in overnight Russian attacks

[M T]

Ukraine loses F-16 fighter jet and pilot in overnight Russian attacks

[Goose]

Very interesting, thanks so much for your informative response.  My experience in these types of things dates to the 1960's.  If you want to have a lot of fun, try carrying the base plate for an 81 mm mortar for a few hours.  As I recall the M29 system weighed nearly 100 lbs. It broke down into three components and schlepping it around in steep terrain was irrational.  As time went on, many units left their mortars at their firebases or base camps. I have no idea of what kind of mobile platform we have moving these types of weapons on the battlefield today.

Your 1960's experience is still relevant, unfortunately. There have been world-wide attempts to make a lighter 81 mm mortar that can be carried by leg infantry. Progress has been made. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M252_mortar The first M252s were only marginally lighter than the M29 (two pounds less) but the M252A1 weighs "only" 79 lbs. Better but not a game-changer.

The US has always had an "eclectic" approach to moving mortars with vehicles. The current thinking is that the 120mm mortar is the best fit for vehicle use. The following list details the vehicles currently in use.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1064_mortar_carrier https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1129_mortar_carrier https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armored_Mu...se_Vehicle

 The M1064 is based on the M113. These vehicles are old and clearly obsolete. They need to be replaced. The replacement is being "slow walked" via very low production rates. The Stryker-based M1129 is already in fairly heavy use, particularly with Stryker brigades. It is also present in infantry formations. Unfortunately it carries with it all the survivability limitations of the Stryker. Ukraine has demonstrated that the Bradley's survivability is essential on the modern battlefield. Ukraine pretty quickly restricted the Strykers to "behind the lines" operations, and even in that role its maintenance requirements made it unpopular. The AMPV is supposed to fix that, but not everyone is "convinced". An interesting sidelight is that these vehicles carry with them an 81 mm mortar that can be dismounted and used as well. Makes ammunition supply more complicated but maybe a good idea. These assets can be both battalion level assets and company level assets depending on the type of units involved.
 
Towed mortars are also included in the US Army inventory. These mortars, while towed by vehicles like the HMMWV, can also be dismounted and emplaced for firing. The M120A1 is transported on the M326 Mortar Stowage Kit when used in that configuration. Light infantry and paratroops that have no Strykers/AMPVs. The towed mortars provide these units some indirect fire "heavy weapons" capability. However these units sometimes operate in terrain where even HMMWVs cannot operate. In that case, it is back to the troops carrying the 3 piece disassembled mortar. The M252A1 being lighter helps but obviously the guy carrying the mortar tube has an "extra" 30.5 lbs to deal with. The more serious problem is that each round of 81 mm mortar ammunition weighs about 10 pounds. In order to have meaningful weight of fires, lots of 11Bs will have to carry mortar rounds as well as everything else they need. The two "ammunition bearers" in the 5 man mortar team can possibly carry 4 rounds each, but 3 is more reasonable. That is "six and done". Arguably not worth bringing the mortar along.
 
The US Army did recognize the problem with man-packing the 81 mm mortar. By mid-1970s prototypes of the M224 60 mm mortar were being tested in Vietnam.  The current version, the M224A1 (https://jpeoaa.army.mil/Project-Offices/...MM-M224A1/), weighs 37.9 lbs. As https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Public...084723-267 says

The M224A1 60-mm mortar system provides Infantry, Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs), Ranger, and USMC rifle companies with an effective, efficient, and flexible weapon.

Each M224A1 has a crew of 3. Normally 2 such units are part of Infantry/Airbore/Ranger companies. Each company therefore has an indirect fire element that can be directly tasked by the company command team. The response time is minimal. While man-packing the M224A1 is feasible, ammunition supply remains an issue. Each HE round weighs 3.1 lbs. Carrying lots of them is still difficult. However they are approximately 1/3 the weight of 81 mm HE rounds.
 
Mechanized Infantry does not have 60 mm mortars. Carrying these devices inside a IFV would be next to impossible. These formations instead rely on the battalion level carrier mounted 120 mm mortars for indirect fire support. Of course Mechanized Infantry also has tank and IFV weapons for direct fire tasks. Forgoing the 60 mm mortars "makes sense".
 
The units referenced above may also have support from 81 mm mortars (towed, man-packed, or possibly Stryker mounted). These are battalion assets but can obviously be attached to company-sized formations. Regarding the man-pack option, the previous link states:

Note. When man-packing the M252A1 over long distances during continuous operations, the commander considers the hazard to Soldiers for an increased risk of injury and limited element maneuverability due to the weight of the system and ammunition. The commander must consider the attachment of a security element when enemy contact is possible

 

It seems to me that whoever sorts out their counter battery systems first will have a big leg up.

Indeed. However the US Army relies upon the USAF to "sanitize" the battle area of enemy artillery that could be a threat to US formations. This activity takes place before the Army even starts fighting and continues as necessary while the battle is going on. Rinse and repeat. Thus the US Army doesn't need to provide much counter-battery fire. Will this approach work in future wars? While it has in the past we better make damn sure it does because we don't have much of a plan B.
 
The army does have a counter-battery capability oriented towards a low number of targets that escaped detection/destruction. Artillery has limited range. Our opponents have to place it far enough forward to be effective. That constrains the area the USAF has to cleanse. The US Army intends mostly to use ATACMS/PrSM to destroy targets of opportunity detected by Army assets (such as counter-battery radar and direct drone observation). Right now, the Army actually does that pretty well. The problem (if any) is lack of mass. The effort is resourced to defeat the remaining less than 10% of the enemy's artillery. It can't do 100% of it.
 
In the future the Army needs to expand its ability to detect and target enemy artillery using assets other than counter-battery radar. The lifetime of such radars will be very short in the future. For our opponents, it already is. They are literally sitting ducks. That may happen to us as well, at least to a degree. The US Army needs to develop the ability technology to detect, geolocate, and target both hostile artillery and hostile counter-battery radars without "external" help. Drones will play an integral part in this process. Both ELINT and visual detection will be needed.  It is not yet possible to put a counter-battery radar in the "small" drones such as we see so often in Ukraine. The US Army should be working hard to achieve that capability however.

[Goose]

Very interesting, thanks so much for your informative response.  My experience in these types of things dates to the 1960's.  If you want to have a lot of fun, try carrying the base plate for an 81 mm mortar for a few hours.  As I recall the M29 system weighed nearly 100 lbs. It broke down into three components and schlepping it around in steep terrain was irrational.  As time went on, many units left their mortars at their firebases or base camps. I have no idea of what kind of mobile platform we have moving these types of weapons on the battlefield today.

Your 1960's experience is still relevant, unfortunately. There have been world-wide attempts to make a lighter 81 mm mortar that can be carried by leg infantry. Progress has been made. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M252_mortar The first M252s were only marginally lighter than the M29 (two pounds less) but the M252A1 weighs "only" 79 lbs. Better but not a game-changer.

The US has always had an "eclectic" approach to moving mortars with vehicles. The current thinking is that the 120mm mortar is the best fit for vehicle use. The following list details the vehicles currently in use.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1064_mortar_carrier https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1129_mortar_carrier https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armored_Mu...se_Vehicle

 The M1064 is based on the M113. These vehicles are old and clearly obsolete. They need to be replaced. The replacement is being "slow walked" via very low production rates. The Stryker-based M1129 is already in fairly heavy use, particularly with Stryker brigades. It is also present in infantry formations. Unfortunately it carries with it all the survivability limitations of the Stryker. Ukraine has demonstrated that the Bradley's survivability is essential on the modern battlefield. Ukraine pretty quickly restricted the Strykers to "behind the lines" operations, and even in that role its maintenance requirements made it unpopular. The AMPV is supposed to fix that, but not everyone is "convinced". An interesting sidelight is that these vehicles carry with them an 81 mm mortar that can be dismounted and used as well. Makes ammunition supply more complicated but maybe a good idea. These assets can be both battalion level assets and company level assets depending on the type of units involved.
 
Towed mortars are also included in the US Army inventory. These mortars, while towed by vehicles like the HMMWV, can also be dismounted and emplaced for firing. The M120A1 is transported on the M326 Mortar Stowage Kit when used in that configuration. Light infantry and paratroops that have no Strykers/AMPVs. The towed mortars provide these units some indirect fire "heavy weapons" capability. However these units sometimes operate in terrain where even HMMWVs cannot operate. In that case, it is back to the troops carrying the 3 piece disassembled mortar. The M252A1 being lighter helps but obviously the guy carrying the mortar tube has an "extra" 30.5 lbs to deal with. The more serious problem is that each round of 81 mm mortar ammunition weighs about 10 pounds. In order to have meaningful weight of fires, lots of 11Bs will have to carry mortar rounds as well as everything else they need. The two "ammunition bearers" in the 5 man mortar team can possibly carry 4 rounds each, but 3 is more reasonable. That is "six and done". Arguably not worth bringing the mortar along.
 
The US Army did recognize the problem with man-packing the 81 mm mortar. By mid-1970s prototypes of the M224 60 mm mortar were being tested in Vietnam.  The current version, the M224A1 (https://jpeoaa.army.mil/Project-Offices/...MM-M224A1/), weighs 37.9 lbs. As https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Public...084723-267 says

The M224A1 60-mm mortar system provides Infantry, Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs), Ranger, and USMC rifle companies with an effective, efficient, and flexible weapon.

Each M224A1 has a crew of 3. Normally 2 such units are part of Infantry/Airbore/Ranger companies. Each company therefore has an indirect fire element that can be directly tasked by the company command team. The response time is minimal. While man-packing the M224A1 is feasible, ammunition supply remains an issue. Each HE round weighs 3.1 lbs. Carrying lots of them is still difficult. However they are approximately 1/3 the weight of 81 mm HE rounds.
 
Mechanized Infantry does not have 60 mm mortars. Carrying these devices inside a IFV would be next to impossible. These formations instead rely on the battalion level carrier mounted 120 mm mortars for indirect fire support. Of course Mechanized Infantry also has tank and IFV weapons for direct fire tasks. Forgoing the 60 mm mortars "makes sense".
 
The units referenced above may also have support from 81 mm mortars (towed, man-packed, or possibly Stryker mounted). These are battalion assets but can obviously be attached to company-sized formations. Regarding the man-pack option, the previous link states:

Note. When man-packing the M252A1 over long distances during continuous operations, the commander considers the hazard to Soldiers for an increased risk of injury and limited element maneuverability due to the weight of the system and ammunition. The commander must consider the attachment of a security element when enemy contact is possible

 

It seems to me that whoever sorts out their counter battery systems first will have a big leg up.

Indeed. However the US Army relies upon the USAF to "sanitize" the battle area of enemy artillery that could be a threat to US formations. This activity takes place before the Army even starts fighting and continues as necessary while the battle is going on. Rinse and repeat. Thus the US Army doesn't need to provide much counter-battery fire. Will this approach work in future wars? While it has in the past we better make damn sure it does because we don't have much of a plan B.
 
The army does have a counter-battery capability oriented towards a low number of targets that escaped detection/destruction. Artillery has limited range. Our opponents have to place it far enough forward to be effective. That constrains the area the USAF has to cleanse. The US Army intends mostly to use ATACMS/PrSM to destroy targets of opportunity detected by Army assets (such as counter-battery radar and direct drone observation). Right now, the Army actually does that pretty well. The problem (if any) is lack of mass. The effort is resourced to defeat the remaining less than 10% of the enemy's artillery. It can't do 100% of it.
 
In the future the Army needs to expand its ability to detect and target enemy artillery using assets other than counter-battery radar. The lifetime of such radars will be very short in the future. For our opponents, it already is. They are literally sitting ducks. That may happen to us as well, at least to a degree. The US Army needs to develop the ability technology to detect, geolocate, and target both hostile artillery and hostile counter-battery radars without "external" help. Drones will play an integral part in this process. Both ELINT and visual detection will be needed.  It is not yet possible to put a counter-battery radar in the "small" drones such as we see so often in Ukraine. The US Army should be working hard to achieve that capability however.

[GK3]

Very interesting, thanks so much for your informative response.  My experience in these types of things dates to the 1960's.  If you want to have a lot of fun, try carrying the base plate for an 81 mm mortar for a few hours.  As I recall the M29 system weighed nearly 100 lbs. It broke down into three components and schlepping it around in steep terrain was irrational.  As time went on, many units left their mortars at their firebases or base camps. I have no idea of what kind of mobile platform we have moving these types of weapons on the battlefield today.

Your 1960's experience is still relevant, unfortunately. There have been world-wide attempts to make a lighter 81 mm mortar that can be carried by leg infantry. Progress has been made. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M252_mortar The first M252s were only marginally lighter than the M29 (two pounds less) but the M252A1 weighs "only" 79 lbs. Better but not a game-changer.

The US has always had an "eclectic" approach to moving mortars with vehicles. The current thinking is that the 120mm mortar is the best fit for vehicle use. The following list details the vehicles currently in use.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1064_mortar_carrier https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1129_mortar_carrier https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armored_Mu...se_Vehicle

 The M1064 is based on the M113. These vehicles are old and clearly obsolete. They need to be replaced. The replacement is being "slow walked" via very low production rates. The Stryker-based M1129 is already in fairly heavy use, particularly with Stryker brigades. It is also present in infantry formations. Unfortunately it carries with it all the survivability limitations of the Stryker. Ukraine has demonstrated that the Bradley's survivability is essential on the modern battlefield. Ukraine pretty quickly restricted the Strykers to "behind the lines" operations, and even in that role its maintenance requirements made it unpopular. The AMPV is supposed to fix that, but not everyone is "convinced". An interesting sidelight is that these vehicles carry with them an 81 mm mortar that can be dismounted and used as well. Makes ammunition supply more complicated but maybe a good idea. These assets can be both battalion level assets and company level assets depending on the type of units involved.
 
Towed mortars are also included in the US Army inventory. These mortars, while towed by vehicles like the HMMWV, can also be dismounted and emplaced for firing. The M120A1 is transported on the M326 Mortar Stowage Kit when used in that configuration. Light infantry and paratroops that have no Strykers/AMPVs. The towed mortars provide these units some indirect fire "heavy weapons" capability. However these units sometimes operate in terrain where even HMMWVs cannot operate. In that case, it is back to the troops carrying the 3 piece disassembled mortar. The M252A1 being lighter helps but obviously the guy carrying the mortar tube has an "extra" 30.5 lbs to deal with. The more serious problem is that each round of 81 mm mortar ammunition weighs about 10 pounds. In order to have meaningful weight of fires, lots of 11Bs will have to carry mortar rounds as well as everything else they need. The two "ammunition bearers" in the 5 man mortar team can possibly carry 4 rounds each, but 3 is more reasonable. That is "six and done". Arguably not worth bringing the mortar along.
 
The US Army did recognize the problem with man-packing the 81 mm mortar. By mid-1970s prototypes of the M224 60 mm mortar were being tested in Vietnam.  The current version, the M224A1 (https://jpeoaa.army.mil/Project-Offices/...MM-M224A1/), weighs 37.9 lbs. As https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Public...084723-267 says

The M224A1 60-mm mortar system provides Infantry, Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs), Ranger, and USMC rifle companies with an effective, efficient, and flexible weapon.

Each M224A1 has a crew of 3. Normally 2 such units are part of Infantry/Airbore/Ranger companies. Each company therefore has an indirect fire element that can be directly tasked by the company command team. The response time is minimal. While man-packing the M224A1 is feasible, ammunition supply remains an issue. Each HE round weighs 3.1 lbs. Carrying lots of them is still difficult. However they are approximately 1/3 the weight of 81 mm HE rounds.
 
Mechanized Infantry does not have 60 mm mortars. Carrying these devices inside a IFV would be next to impossible. These formations instead rely on the battalion level carrier mounted 120 mm mortars for indirect fire support. Of course Mechanized Infantry also has tank and IFV weapons for direct fire tasks. Forgoing the 60 mm mortars "makes sense".
 
The units referenced above may also have support from 81 mm mortars (towed, man-packed, or possibly Stryker mounted). These are battalion assets but can obviously be attached to company-sized formations. Regarding the man-pack option, the previous link states:

Note. When man-packing the M252A1 over long distances during continuous operations, the commander considers the hazard to Soldiers for an increased risk of injury and limited element maneuverability due to the weight of the system and ammunition. The commander must consider the attachment of a security element when enemy contact is possible

 

It seems to me that whoever sorts out their counter battery systems first will have a big leg up.

Indeed. However the US Army relies upon the USAF to "sanitize" the battle area of enemy artillery that could be a threat to US formations. This activity takes place before the Army even starts fighting and continues as necessary while the battle is going on. Rinse and repeat. Thus the US Army doesn't need to provide much counter-battery fire. Will this approach work in future wars? While it has in the past we better make damn sure it does because we don't have much of a plan B.
 
The army does have a counter-battery capability oriented towards a low number of targets that escaped detection/destruction. Artillery has limited range. Our opponents have to place it far enough forward to be effective. That constrains the area the USAF has to cleanse. The US Army intends mostly to use ATACMS/PrSM to destroy targets of opportunity detected by Army assets (such as counter-battery radar and direct drone observation). Right now, the Army actually does that pretty well. The problem (if any) is lack of mass. The effort is resourced to defeat the remaining less than 10% of the enemy's artillery. It can't do 100% of it.
 
In the future the Army needs to expand its ability to detect and target enemy artillery using assets other than counter-battery radar. The lifetime of such radars will be very short in the future. For our opponents, it already is. They are literally sitting ducks. That may happen to us as well, at least to a degree. The US Army needs to develop the ability technology to detect, geolocate, and target both hostile artillery and hostile counter-battery radars without "external" help. Drones will play an integral part in this process. Both ELINT and visual detection will be needed.  It is not yet possible to put a counter-battery radar in the "small" drones such as we see so often in Ukraine. The US Army should be working hard to achieve that capability however.

How do you see weapons like the M982 Excalibur developing?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1MqWYwRE2M

If weapons like that add range and significant accuracy it could make a difference.

[GK3]

Very interesting, thanks so much for your informative response.  My experience in these types of things dates to the 1960's.  If you want to have a lot of fun, try carrying the base plate for an 81 mm mortar for a few hours.  As I recall the M29 system weighed nearly 100 lbs. It broke down into three components and schlepping it around in steep terrain was irrational.  As time went on, many units left their mortars at their firebases or base camps. I have no idea of what kind of mobile platform we have moving these types of weapons on the battlefield today.

Your 1960's experience is still relevant, unfortunately. There have been world-wide attempts to make a lighter 81 mm mortar that can be carried by leg infantry. Progress has been made. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M252_mortar The first M252s were only marginally lighter than the M29 (two pounds less) but the M252A1 weighs "only" 79 lbs. Better but not a game-changer.

The US has always had an "eclectic" approach to moving mortars with vehicles. The current thinking is that the 120mm mortar is the best fit for vehicle use. The following list details the vehicles currently in use.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1064_mortar_carrier https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1129_mortar_carrier https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armored_Mu...se_Vehicle

 The M1064 is based on the M113. These vehicles are old and clearly obsolete. They need to be replaced. The replacement is being "slow walked" via very low production rates. The Stryker-based M1129 is already in fairly heavy use, particularly with Stryker brigades. It is also present in infantry formations. Unfortunately it carries with it all the survivability limitations of the Stryker. Ukraine has demonstrated that the Bradley's survivability is essential on the modern battlefield. Ukraine pretty quickly restricted the Strykers to "behind the lines" operations, and even in that role its maintenance requirements made it unpopular. The AMPV is supposed to fix that, but not everyone is "convinced". An interesting sidelight is that these vehicles carry with them an 81 mm mortar that can be dismounted and used as well. Makes ammunition supply more complicated but maybe a good idea. These assets can be both battalion level assets and company level assets depending on the type of units involved.
 
Towed mortars are also included in the US Army inventory. These mortars, while towed by vehicles like the HMMWV, can also be dismounted and emplaced for firing. The M120A1 is transported on the M326 Mortar Stowage Kit when used in that configuration. Light infantry and paratroops that have no Strykers/AMPVs. The towed mortars provide these units some indirect fire "heavy weapons" capability. However these units sometimes operate in terrain where even HMMWVs cannot operate. In that case, it is back to the troops carrying the 3 piece disassembled mortar. The M252A1 being lighter helps but obviously the guy carrying the mortar tube has an "extra" 30.5 lbs to deal with. The more serious problem is that each round of 81 mm mortar ammunition weighs about 10 pounds. In order to have meaningful weight of fires, lots of 11Bs will have to carry mortar rounds as well as everything else they need. The two "ammunition bearers" in the 5 man mortar team can possibly carry 4 rounds each, but 3 is more reasonable. That is "six and done". Arguably not worth bringing the mortar along.
 
The US Army did recognize the problem with man-packing the 81 mm mortar. By mid-1970s prototypes of the M224 60 mm mortar were being tested in Vietnam.  The current version, the M224A1 (https://jpeoaa.army.mil/Project-Offices/...MM-M224A1/), weighs 37.9 lbs. As https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Public...084723-267 says

The M224A1 60-mm mortar system provides Infantry, Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs), Ranger, and USMC rifle companies with an effective, efficient, and flexible weapon.

Each M224A1 has a crew of 3. Normally 2 such units are part of Infantry/Airbore/Ranger companies. Each company therefore has an indirect fire element that can be directly tasked by the company command team. The response time is minimal. While man-packing the M224A1 is feasible, ammunition supply remains an issue. Each HE round weighs 3.1 lbs. Carrying lots of them is still difficult. However they are approximately 1/3 the weight of 81 mm HE rounds.
 
Mechanized Infantry does not have 60 mm mortars. Carrying these devices inside a IFV would be next to impossible. These formations instead rely on the battalion level carrier mounted 120 mm mortars for indirect fire support. Of course Mechanized Infantry also has tank and IFV weapons for direct fire tasks. Forgoing the 60 mm mortars "makes sense".
 
The units referenced above may also have support from 81 mm mortars (towed, man-packed, or possibly Stryker mounted). These are battalion assets but can obviously be attached to company-sized formations. Regarding the man-pack option, the previous link states:

Note. When man-packing the M252A1 over long distances during continuous operations, the commander considers the hazard to Soldiers for an increased risk of injury and limited element maneuverability due to the weight of the system and ammunition. The commander must consider the attachment of a security element when enemy contact is possible

 

It seems to me that whoever sorts out their counter battery systems first will have a big leg up.

Indeed. However the US Army relies upon the USAF to "sanitize" the battle area of enemy artillery that could be a threat to US formations. This activity takes place before the Army even starts fighting and continues as necessary while the battle is going on. Rinse and repeat. Thus the US Army doesn't need to provide much counter-battery fire. Will this approach work in future wars? While it has in the past we better make damn sure it does because we don't have much of a plan B.
 
The army does have a counter-battery capability oriented towards a low number of targets that escaped detection/destruction. Artillery has limited range. Our opponents have to place it far enough forward to be effective. That constrains the area the USAF has to cleanse. The US Army intends mostly to use ATACMS/PrSM to destroy targets of opportunity detected by Army assets (such as counter-battery radar and direct drone observation). Right now, the Army actually does that pretty well. The problem (if any) is lack of mass. The effort is resourced to defeat the remaining less than 10% of the enemy's artillery. It can't do 100% of it.
 
In the future the Army needs to expand its ability to detect and target enemy artillery using assets other than counter-battery radar. The lifetime of such radars will be very short in the future. For our opponents, it already is. They are literally sitting ducks. That may happen to us as well, at least to a degree. The US Army needs to develop the ability technology to detect, geolocate, and target both hostile artillery and hostile counter-battery radars without "external" help. Drones will play an integral part in this process. Both ELINT and visual detection will be needed.  It is not yet possible to put a counter-battery radar in the "small" drones such as we see so often in Ukraine. The US Army should be working hard to achieve that capability however.

How do you see weapons like the M982 Excalibur developing?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1MqWYwRE2M

If weapons like that add range and significant accuracy it could make a difference.

[dabigv13]

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/01...t-00436048

The Pentagon has halted shipments of some air defense missiles and other precision munitions to Ukraine due to worries that U.S. weapons stockpiles have fallen too low.

The decision was driven by the Pentagon’s policy chief, Elbridge Colby, and was made after a review of Pentagon munitions stockpiles, leading to concerns that the total number of artillery rounds, air defense missiles and precision munitions was sinking, according to three people familiar with the issue.
......
Money in the fund was all obligated by the end of the Biden administration, with deliveries coming whenever the systems are ready. The drawdowns from current stockpiles have continued under the Trump administration, which has been using up the last of the $61 billion in funding to replenish U.S. stocks of weapons and provide billions in aid for Israel and other partners.

The article is not very clear, but it seems to be saying that funding previously passed to provide missiles from US stocks is being ignored, and funding to purchase new weapons for Ukraine has been diverted.

Colby has been vocally against Ukraine aid for a long time now.

......

More details. As had been discussed previously on this thread, several of these weapons systems are irreplaceable by any other country besides the US.

https://x.com/nickschifrin/status/1940158711772979533

BREAKING: White House confirms it has halted weapons that Ukraine was scheduled to receive, including PAC3 Patriots, 155mm artillery rounds, GMLRS, Stinger, AIM-7, and Hellfire missiles.

@AnnaKelly47
tells me: “This decision was made to put America’s interests first following a DOD review of our nation’s military support and assistance to other countries across the globe. The strength of the United States Armed Forces remains unquestioned — just ask Iran.”

[dabigv13]

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/01...t-00436048

The Pentagon has halted shipments of some air defense missiles and other precision munitions to Ukraine due to worries that U.S. weapons stockpiles have fallen too low.

The decision was driven by the Pentagon’s policy chief, Elbridge Colby, and was made after a review of Pentagon munitions stockpiles, leading to concerns that the total number of artillery rounds, air defense missiles and precision munitions was sinking, according to three people familiar with the issue.
......
Money in the fund was all obligated by the end of the Biden administration, with deliveries coming whenever the systems are ready. The drawdowns from current stockpiles have continued under the Trump administration, which has been using up the last of the $61 billion in funding to replenish U.S. stocks of weapons and provide billions in aid for Israel and other partners.

The article is not very clear, but it seems to be saying that funding previously passed to provide missiles from US stocks is being ignored, and funding to purchase new weapons for Ukraine has been diverted.

Colby has been vocally against Ukraine aid for a long time now.

......

More details. As had been discussed previously on this thread, several of these weapons systems are irreplaceable by any other country besides the US.

https://x.com/nickschifrin/status/1940158711772979533

BREAKING: White House confirms it has halted weapons that Ukraine was scheduled to receive, including PAC3 Patriots, 155mm artillery rounds, GMLRS, Stinger, AIM-7, and Hellfire missiles.

@AnnaKelly47
tells me: “This decision was made to put America’s interests first following a DOD review of our nation’s military support and assistance to other countries across the globe. The strength of the United States Armed Forces remains unquestioned — just ask Iran.”

[Mick]

Way down on the sophistication list is the American Browning M-2 .50 caliber machine gun, preferred by the Ukrainian army. Originally conceived by John Browning at the end of WWI, it was introduced in WWII, and used in most conflicts since then. It's the oldest firearm used by the U. S. Military save for the .45 ACP M1911 pistol (also designed by Browning). 

It's the primary machine gun used by NATO countries and Ukraine finds it useful both for soldiers and robotic platforms, both the weapons and the ammunition are ubiquitous and are fits for AI-driven offensive needs.

The American-made M2 'Ma Deuce" machine gun is becoming Ukraine's weapon of choice for arming AI-enabled fighting robots

They've been using M2s in automated turrets since at least January, 2024:

New remotely controlled Browning M2 machine gun in service with Ukrainian forces

Ukrainians downed Russian cruise missile with an M2 (video):

Ukrainians Down Russian Cruise Missile With M2 Browning Machine Gun

[Mick]

Way down on the sophistication list is the American Browning M-2 .50 caliber machine gun, preferred by the Ukrainian army. Originally conceived by John Browning at the end of WWI, it was introduced in WWII, and used in most conflicts since then. It's the oldest firearm used by the U. S. Military save for the .45 ACP M1911 pistol (also designed by Browning). 

It's the primary machine gun used by NATO countries and Ukraine finds it useful both for soldiers and robotic platforms, both the weapons and the ammunition are ubiquitous and are fits for AI-driven offensive needs.

The American-made M2 'Ma Deuce" machine gun is becoming Ukraine's weapon of choice for arming AI-enabled fighting robots

They've been using M2s in automated turrets since at least January, 2024:

New remotely controlled Browning M2 machine gun in service with Ukrainian forces

Ukrainians downed Russian cruise missile with an M2 (video):

Ukrainians Down Russian Cruise Missile With M2 Browning Machine Gun

[Mick]

No more U. S. weapons for Ukraine.

Pentagon halts weapons shipment to Ukraine amid concerns over U.S. stockpile

[Mick]

No more U. S. weapons for Ukraine.

Pentagon halts weapons shipment to Ukraine amid concerns over U.S. stockpile

[TrumpCard]

Leaving aside the merits of the decision, this was predictable.

[TrumpCard]

Leaving aside the merits of the decision, this was predictable.

[dabigv13]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/02/us/po...tions.html

The US seems to be disengaging from sanctions against Russia.

Our government wants Ukraine to capitulate.

[dabigv13]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/02/us/po...tions.html

The US seems to be disengaging from sanctions against Russia.

Our government wants Ukraine to capitulate.

[M T]

Leaving aside the merits of the decision, this was predictable.

Except I thought it waz against the law to misappropriate funds allocated by Congress

[M T]

Leaving aside the merits of the decision, this was predictable.

Except I thought it waz against the law to misappropriate funds allocated by Congress

[TrumpCard]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/02/us/po...tions.html

The US seems to be disengaging from sanctions against Russia.

Our government wants Ukraine to capitulate.

Not subtle

[TrumpCard]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/02/us/po...tions.html

The US seems to be disengaging from sanctions against Russia.

Our government wants Ukraine to capitulate.

Not subtle

[dabigv13]

https://x.com/TBowmanNPR/status/1940434066438054362

An NPR reporter has the exact amounts of these weapons that were en route and now being held in Poland.

Here’s the list of US munitions approved for Ukraine but now being held in Poland.
92 AIM missiles
30 Patriots missiles (PAC3MSE)
8496 155mm Howitzer rounds
142 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles
252 GMLRs missiles
25 Stinger missiles
125 AT-4 grenade launchers

By AIM I am presuming from earlier reporting that these are AIM-7 missiles. These are no longer in front line service with the US military.

This is seemingly an illegal impoundment, but I may be wrong. 

In any case, unclear who would do anything about it, when the people who are trusted with enforcing the laws are the ones breaking it.

A couple Republican congressmen are upset about the hold. Others don't seem to want to look into too closely.

Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) said he is probing “very intensely” whether the Pentagon’s freeze is a breach of Ukraine aid legislation that Congress passed in 2024. He also argued the pause is coming “at the wrong time,” weakening Trump’s efforts to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate a peace deal with Ukraine.

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/02...e-00437299

[dabigv13]

https://x.com/TBowmanNPR/status/1940434066438054362

An NPR reporter has the exact amounts of these weapons that were en route and now being held in Poland.

Here’s the list of US munitions approved for Ukraine but now being held in Poland.
92 AIM missiles
30 Patriots missiles (PAC3MSE)
8496 155mm Howitzer rounds
142 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles
252 GMLRs missiles
25 Stinger missiles
125 AT-4 grenade launchers

By AIM I am presuming from earlier reporting that these are AIM-7 missiles. These are no longer in front line service with the US military.

This is seemingly an illegal impoundment, but I may be wrong. 

In any case, unclear who would do anything about it, when the people who are trusted with enforcing the laws are the ones breaking it.

A couple Republican congressmen are upset about the hold. Others don't seem to want to look into too closely.

Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) said he is probing “very intensely” whether the Pentagon’s freeze is a breach of Ukraine aid legislation that Congress passed in 2024. He also argued the pause is coming “at the wrong time,” weakening Trump’s efforts to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate a peace deal with Ukraine.

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/02...e-00437299

[Goose]

How do you see weapons like the M982 Excalibur developing?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1MqWYwRE2M

If weapons like that add range and significant accuracy it could make a difference.

Excalibur, like many other "precision" weapons, has become a failure in Ukraine. It is subject to GPS jamming and therefore becomes much less accurate. https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2025/04/13...e_vignette The linked article contains some blatant errors in tangential areas but in the main is IMO accurate.

IMO Excalibur is a very flawed concept even if it worked reliably. The three major advantages of gun artillery are 1) They can deliver lots of explosive power rapidly on an area target, and 2) they can do this repeatedly on demand, and 3) they can do this at reasonable cost. Excalibur is an attempt to add a "precision strike" capability to artillery. The cost of these shells is at least 23 times as much as a "regular" HE 155 mm shell. "Fire for Effect" with these shells is therefore prohibitively expensive and not possible.
 
The explosive power of a single Excalibur is 22 kg, the same as a "regular" 155 mm shell. One round may not destroy the target. There are quite a few articles on the internet about the "Fallacy of Precision". The trend in the US (and NATO) is to greatly improve accuracy. That by itself is a good thing. The problem is that the cost of that accuracy is often a reduction in the number of rounds available and/or the destructive effort of those rounds. One can often hit the target but not disable it or destroy it. The example of the Russian Lancet drones that hit the targets but did little damage is pertinent.
 
Excalibur was originally directed at "corner cases". It was developed to allow artillery to fire at targets where collateral civilian damage was an issue and/or targets that could not be engaged by a "conventional" barrage. This "justified" developing the Excalibur. There was a clandestine political objective whose influence cannot be underestimated. Quoting the above link

With a range of approximately 25 miles when fired from standard howitzers like the M777, and up to 43 miles in tests with advanced systems, the Excalibur offers commanders the ability to hit distant targets without relying on air support.

Not relying on air support is a big deal politically. The US Army "likes" that. The ATACMS missile is better suited to most of the targets the Excalibur would engage. The problem is that the USAF looks askance at any tactical missiles the US Army wants to develop, past, present, and likely future. Missiles are a USAF function in their mind. The political clout of the Air Force forced the Army to limit their budget for tactical missiles. This resulted in having too few ATACMS missiles and slowed down the PrSM. The USAF couldn't complain about a 155 mm artillery round. Thus Excalibur.
 
Precision guided artillery rounds are always going to be vastly more expensive than a precision guided tactical missile. Their size (thus explosive weight, electronics, and antennas) are constrained by the size of the launch tube. The firing shock of a gun-launched projectile (even one with RAP) is always going to be much larger than the launch shock of a missile (which is far from negligible). Excalibur is going to need modifications to operate in the presence of GPS jamming. That means more channels and more antennas. Much easier to do on a missile than a shell. The Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb does everything Excalibur can do. It already has a 93 km range and a explosive weight of 16 kg. IMO you put your money there, not in Excalibur. Both weapons need investment to drive down their costs. Neither is affordable in the quantity required. It is clear that the SDB will continue to be purchased. The "adapter" to convert the SDB into a guided missile is the cost driver. Find an alternative to Saab and Boeing and I bet the cost can drop by a factor of at least 5.

[Goose]

How do you see weapons like the M982 Excalibur developing?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1MqWYwRE2M

If weapons like that add range and significant accuracy it could make a difference.

Excalibur, like many other "precision" weapons, has become a failure in Ukraine. It is subject to GPS jamming and therefore becomes much less accurate. https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2025/04/13...e_vignette The linked article contains some blatant errors in tangential areas but in the main is IMO accurate.

IMO Excalibur is a very flawed concept even if it worked reliably. The three major advantages of gun artillery are 1) They can deliver lots of explosive power rapidly on an area target, and 2) they can do this repeatedly on demand, and 3) they can do this at reasonable cost. Excalibur is an attempt to add a "precision strike" capability to artillery. The cost of these shells is at least 23 times as much as a "regular" HE 155 mm shell. "Fire for Effect" with these shells is therefore prohibitively expensive and not possible.
 
The explosive power of a single Excalibur is 22 kg, the same as a "regular" 155 mm shell. One round may not destroy the target. There are quite a few articles on the internet about the "Fallacy of Precision". The trend in the US (and NATO) is to greatly improve accuracy. That by itself is a good thing. The problem is that the cost of that accuracy is often a reduction in the number of rounds available and/or the destructive effort of those rounds. One can often hit the target but not disable it or destroy it. The example of the Russian Lancet drones that hit the targets but did little damage is pertinent.
 
Excalibur was originally directed at "corner cases". It was developed to allow artillery to fire at targets where collateral civilian damage was an issue and/or targets that could not be engaged by a "conventional" barrage. This "justified" developing the Excalibur. There was a clandestine political objective whose influence cannot be underestimated. Quoting the above link

With a range of approximately 25 miles when fired from standard howitzers like the M777, and up to 43 miles in tests with advanced systems, the Excalibur offers commanders the ability to hit distant targets without relying on air support.

Not relying on air support is a big deal politically. The US Army "likes" that. The ATACMS missile is better suited to most of the targets the Excalibur would engage. The problem is that the USAF looks askance at any tactical missiles the US Army wants to develop, past, present, and likely future. Missiles are a USAF function in their mind. The political clout of the Air Force forced the Army to limit their budget for tactical missiles. This resulted in having too few ATACMS missiles and slowed down the PrSM. The USAF couldn't complain about a 155 mm artillery round. Thus Excalibur.
 
Precision guided artillery rounds are always going to be vastly more expensive than a precision guided tactical missile. Their size (thus explosive weight, electronics, and antennas) are constrained by the size of the launch tube. The firing shock of a gun-launched projectile (even one with RAP) is always going to be much larger than the launch shock of a missile (which is far from negligible). Excalibur is going to need modifications to operate in the presence of GPS jamming. That means more channels and more antennas. Much easier to do on a missile than a shell. The Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb does everything Excalibur can do. It already has a 93 km range and a explosive weight of 16 kg. IMO you put your money there, not in Excalibur. Both weapons need investment to drive down their costs. Neither is affordable in the quantity required. It is clear that the SDB will continue to be purchased. The "adapter" to convert the SDB into a guided missile is the cost driver. Find an alternative to Saab and Boeing and I bet the cost can drop by a factor of at least 5.

[BostonCard]

Bad timing for the US to halt weapons transfers.

https://www.wsj.com/world/what-the-halt-..._permalink

The pace of drone strikes has increased dramatically over the last 12 months, from about 500 to over 5000.

BC

[BostonCard]

Bad timing for the US to halt weapons transfers.

https://www.wsj.com/world/what-the-halt-..._permalink

The pace of drone strikes has increased dramatically over the last 12 months, from about 500 to over 5000.

BC