[BostonCard]

And on another front…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1576667525974495233?s=21&t=R1B-PnkjRR3fQhCHl5K4Pg[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

And on another front…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1576667525974495233?s=21&t=R1B-PnkjRR3fQhCHl5K4Pg[/tweet]

BC

[TrumpCard]

I think it was only a few months ago (May/June) that Russia took the northeastern part of Donetsk Oblast.  These towns didn't fall in the initial invasion, but after a grinding battle that culminated in Russia's capture of Severodonetsk.  I don't really understand how the tables turned so dramatically.  I would have thought that Russia would have an easy time defending this territory after taking it (since defense is easier than offense).  We can't just attribute this to the incompetence of the Russian soldiers.  They were the same soldiers who took the same terrain not that long ago.  What gives?  Was it the HIMARS that caused this reversal of fortune?

[TrumpCard]

I think it was only a few months ago (May/June) that Russia took the northeastern part of Donetsk Oblast.  These towns didn't fall in the initial invasion, but after a grinding battle that culminated in Russia's capture of Severodonetsk.  I don't really understand how the tables turned so dramatically.  I would have thought that Russia would have an easy time defending this territory after taking it (since defense is easier than offense).  We can't just attribute this to the incompetence of the Russian soldiers.  They were the same soldiers who took the same terrain not that long ago.  What gives?  Was it the HIMARS that caused this reversal of fortune?

[Goose]

I think it was only a few months ago (May/June) that Russia took the northeastern part of Donetsk Oblast.  These towns didn't fall in the initial invasion, but after a grinding battle that culminated in Russia's capture of Severodonetsk.  I don't really understand how the tables turned so dramatically.  I would have thought that Russia would have an easy time defending this territory after taking it (since defense is easier than offense).  We can't just attribute this to the incompetence of the Russian soldiers.  They were the same soldiers who took the same terrain not that long ago. What gives?

No, in general they aren't. Most of those soldiers (that survived) are either in the area around the city of Donetsk conducting "meaningless offensive operations" or have been redeployed to Kherson/Crimea. Some have been pulled back into Russia proper to refit. This pullback is similar to the one Russia conducted before the shift to the Donbas offensive. Most of the troops defending these areas are DPR and LPR militia stiffened by a few Russian regiments. Unsurprisingly, they don't fight very hard. As I said in another post, some Russian milbloggers think Putin is sandbagging and will counter with a new offensive once Ukraine is weakened by battle losses and the need to defend more territory. I assume both the Ukraine and the US are watching that situation carefully.

Was it the HIMARS that caused this reversal of fortune?

To a significant extent. It put more strain on the Russian logistics apparatus than it could manage. It also can make a "hole" in just about any defense in the "finger of God" mode. I think Ukraine has used the latter ability quite a bit recently. That is why I really wish Ukraine had 30-50 of these units rather than 26 or so HIMARS/M270/MARS. The Russians appear to be scared to death of them, because they have no effective counter weapon.

[Goose]

I think it was only a few months ago (May/June) that Russia took the northeastern part of Donetsk Oblast.  These towns didn't fall in the initial invasion, but after a grinding battle that culminated in Russia's capture of Severodonetsk.  I don't really understand how the tables turned so dramatically.  I would have thought that Russia would have an easy time defending this territory after taking it (since defense is easier than offense).  We can't just attribute this to the incompetence of the Russian soldiers.  They were the same soldiers who took the same terrain not that long ago. What gives?

No, in general they aren't. Most of those soldiers (that survived) are either in the area around the city of Donetsk conducting "meaningless offensive operations" or have been redeployed to Kherson/Crimea. Some have been pulled back into Russia proper to refit. This pullback is similar to the one Russia conducted before the shift to the Donbas offensive. Most of the troops defending these areas are DPR and LPR militia stiffened by a few Russian regiments. Unsurprisingly, they don't fight very hard. As I said in another post, some Russian milbloggers think Putin is sandbagging and will counter with a new offensive once Ukraine is weakened by battle losses and the need to defend more territory. I assume both the Ukraine and the US are watching that situation carefully.

Was it the HIMARS that caused this reversal of fortune?

To a significant extent. It put more strain on the Russian logistics apparatus than it could manage. It also can make a "hole" in just about any defense in the "finger of God" mode. I think Ukraine has used the latter ability quite a bit recently. That is why I really wish Ukraine had 30-50 of these units rather than 26 or so HIMARS/M270/MARS. The Russians appear to be scared to death of them, because they have no effective counter weapon.

[Treefence]

I think it's also important to note that Russia has been experiencing unsustainable attrition, based on those visually confirmed in the Oryx list.  Granted Russia has tons of reserves, but as they dig into them their quality goes down.  It's hard to estimate the casualties for Russia, but Ukraine claims over 60k killed, and while most countries will exaggerate the losses they inflict on enemies, Ukraine has been commended for being somewhat realistic with their estimates.  Even if it's closer to 40k dead, you'd add a multiplier to estimate wounded, and all of a sudden it makes sense why they have hallow defensive lines.  Ukrainian attacks also seem to be very well coordinated, and articles have come out talking about how western military leaders have helped in planning them, using their own intelligence information as a factor.

[Treefence]

I think it's also important to note that Russia has been experiencing unsustainable attrition, based on those visually confirmed in the Oryx list.  Granted Russia has tons of reserves, but as they dig into them their quality goes down.  It's hard to estimate the casualties for Russia, but Ukraine claims over 60k killed, and while most countries will exaggerate the losses they inflict on enemies, Ukraine has been commended for being somewhat realistic with their estimates.  Even if it's closer to 40k dead, you'd add a multiplier to estimate wounded, and all of a sudden it makes sense why they have hallow defensive lines.  Ukrainian attacks also seem to be very well coordinated, and articles have come out talking about how western military leaders have helped in planning them, using their own intelligence information as a factor.

[BostonCard]

I’m probably revealing my ignorance here, but is defending “more territory” the right metric?  Area of territory defended is meaningless, or Russia would be in big trouble having to nominally defend the largest country on the planet.  But Russia doesn’t really have to defend Siberia, or even the border with Finland (and there are reports that it isn’t).  So, really, it is a question of the line of defense, right?  I suppose that now that Ukraine has extended its control in Karkiv to the border with Russia, it does have to worry about Russia attacking from Belgorod or Belarus again, but it took Russia months to set up an attacking force from there, so I presume Ukraine will know if it is threatened again.  So, as Russia retreats to consolidate its own vulnerable lines, that also reduces the breadth of the lines for Ukraine.  I think under that logic, the advantage that Russia gets is that it can concentrate its forces so it will be harder for Ukraine to push further, but I don’t think it means that Ukraine will have a harder time defending its territory once it is consolidated.  What am I missing?

BC

[BostonCard]

I’m probably revealing my ignorance here, but is defending “more territory” the right metric?  Area of territory defended is meaningless, or Russia would be in big trouble having to nominally defend the largest country on the planet.  But Russia doesn’t really have to defend Siberia, or even the border with Finland (and there are reports that it isn’t).  So, really, it is a question of the line of defense, right?  I suppose that now that Ukraine has extended its control in Karkiv to the border with Russia, it does have to worry about Russia attacking from Belgorod or Belarus again, but it took Russia months to set up an attacking force from there, so I presume Ukraine will know if it is threatened again.  So, as Russia retreats to consolidate its own vulnerable lines, that also reduces the breadth of the lines for Ukraine.  I think under that logic, the advantage that Russia gets is that it can concentrate its forces so it will be harder for Ukraine to push further, but I don’t think it means that Ukraine will have a harder time defending its territory once it is consolidated.  What am I missing?

BC

[Goose]

I’m probably revealing my ignorance here, but is defending “more territory” the right metric?  Area of territory defended is meaningless, or Russia would be in big trouble having to nominally defend the largest country on the planet.  But Russia doesn’t really have to defend Siberia, or even the border with Finland (and there are reports that it isn’t).  So, really, it is a question of the line of defense, right?  I suppose that now that Ukraine has extended its control in Karkiv to the border with Russia, it does have to worry about Russia attacking from Belgorod or Belarus again, but it took Russia months to set up an attacking force from there, so I presume Ukraine will know if it is threatened again.  So, as Russia retreats to consolidate its own vulnerable lines, that also reduces the breadth of the lines for Ukraine.  I think under that logic, the advantage that Russia gets is that it can concentrate its forces so it will be harder for Ukraine to push further, but I don’t think it means that Ukraine will have a harder time defending its territory once it is consolidated.  What am I missing?

BC

Area doesn't matter as much as the length of the line of contact. If the line of contact becomes longer you generally need more troops. In an "ideal" situation, the defender doesn't need to garrison the line of contact. The defender distributes his forces in depth near transportation hubs and "important" points in the defended area. The defender doesn't want to concentrate too much because it is easier for the opponent to damage the concentrated force. Distributed forces are harder to damage.

The defender then moves the necessary forces from their locations to counter attempts by the enemy to cross the line of contact. Sounds good, and it can work. However, there are problems. If the enemy can damage the lines of communication by air, artillery, or special forces, the defenders may not get there in time. Obviously, if the attacker can threaten multiple attacking axis simultaneously, the defender has to move forces to multiple places. The defender may not have adequate forces or adequate knowledge about the attackers real intentions. These are all serious problems.

Worse problems arise when the political and economic considerations of the country are added to the mix. There may be many points near the line of contact that are heavily populated or critically important to the economy. The attacker cannot be allowed to "harm" these points even temporarily. They must be defended "forward". This constrains the defender to garrison these points. It may also be necessary to prevent the attacker from moving freely inside the defended area because the attacker can threaten multiple critical points simultaneously that can't support each other if attacked. These points too must be defended "forward". The more area you hold the more of these points you have. It spreads you out and makes you strong nowhere.

It is also necessary to occupy the line of contact to at least the point you can observe and monitor your enemy. At times it may be advisable to build either field or permanent fortifications to deter/slow down your enemy. If you do this, you must overwatch the obstacles or they are useless. This eats troops too and is the ultimate example of a "forward" defense. Hard though it may seem to believe today, the argument about a "forward" vs a reactive defense in depth was a MAJOR point of contention in NATO during the cold war. As Germany became stronger and more important in NATO, the idea of not defending Germany "forward" became a political minefield. Defending "forward" was not popular with the US and the UK military.

Ukraine suffers from not having a heavily mechanized force that is well trained and can move rapidly from one area to another and fight on arrival. In theory, Russia could do that, but in practice they have not been able to do that. The forces of the DPR and LPR are even less mobile than Ukraine. As a result both sides are vulnerable to a concentration of force by the attacker. Russia has just shown us a textbook example of "he who defends everywhere defends nowhere", but as their slow attempts to move forces to reinforce Lyman and Izyum show, they are also incapable of a "mobile defense in depth". They also had no prepared rally point that the forces being attacked could break contact and retreat to.

Ukraine has shown the ability to concentrate a striking force and use it. Russia has not. Their attacks in the beginning of the war were "setpieces" against an enemy that wasn't fully prepared. Russia's advances in the Donbas, while very real and very destructive, were artillery driven. They simply fired until the defenders had to give way. Ukraine never suffered an encirclement or a "loss of control". They gave ground, they lost battles, but they never lost cohesion. Russia has lost cohesion a couple of times recently.

The fear is that Ukraine will be spread out in the areas they have returned to their control, and therefore will be vulnerable in the same way Russia was. If Russia can execute an offensive as effectively as Ukraine just did, the fear will be real. So far, Russia hasn't been able to do such a thing.

[Goose]

I’m probably revealing my ignorance here, but is defending “more territory” the right metric?  Area of territory defended is meaningless, or Russia would be in big trouble having to nominally defend the largest country on the planet.  But Russia doesn’t really have to defend Siberia, or even the border with Finland (and there are reports that it isn’t).  So, really, it is a question of the line of defense, right?  I suppose that now that Ukraine has extended its control in Karkiv to the border with Russia, it does have to worry about Russia attacking from Belgorod or Belarus again, but it took Russia months to set up an attacking force from there, so I presume Ukraine will know if it is threatened again.  So, as Russia retreats to consolidate its own vulnerable lines, that also reduces the breadth of the lines for Ukraine.  I think under that logic, the advantage that Russia gets is that it can concentrate its forces so it will be harder for Ukraine to push further, but I don’t think it means that Ukraine will have a harder time defending its territory once it is consolidated.  What am I missing?

BC

Area doesn't matter as much as the length of the line of contact. If the line of contact becomes longer you generally need more troops. In an "ideal" situation, the defender doesn't need to garrison the line of contact. The defender distributes his forces in depth near transportation hubs and "important" points in the defended area. The defender doesn't want to concentrate too much because it is easier for the opponent to damage the concentrated force. Distributed forces are harder to damage.

The defender then moves the necessary forces from their locations to counter attempts by the enemy to cross the line of contact. Sounds good, and it can work. However, there are problems. If the enemy can damage the lines of communication by air, artillery, or special forces, the defenders may not get there in time. Obviously, if the attacker can threaten multiple attacking axis simultaneously, the defender has to move forces to multiple places. The defender may not have adequate forces or adequate knowledge about the attackers real intentions. These are all serious problems.

Worse problems arise when the political and economic considerations of the country are added to the mix. There may be many points near the line of contact that are heavily populated or critically important to the economy. The attacker cannot be allowed to "harm" these points even temporarily. They must be defended "forward". This constrains the defender to garrison these points. It may also be necessary to prevent the attacker from moving freely inside the defended area because the attacker can threaten multiple critical points simultaneously that can't support each other if attacked. These points too must be defended "forward". The more area you hold the more of these points you have. It spreads you out and makes you strong nowhere.

It is also necessary to occupy the line of contact to at least the point you can observe and monitor your enemy. At times it may be advisable to build either field or permanent fortifications to deter/slow down your enemy. If you do this, you must overwatch the obstacles or they are useless. This eats troops too and is the ultimate example of a "forward" defense. Hard though it may seem to believe today, the argument about a "forward" vs a reactive defense in depth was a MAJOR point of contention in NATO during the cold war. As Germany became stronger and more important in NATO, the idea of not defending Germany "forward" became a political minefield. Defending "forward" was not popular with the US and the UK military.

Ukraine suffers from not having a heavily mechanized force that is well trained and can move rapidly from one area to another and fight on arrival. In theory, Russia could do that, but in practice they have not been able to do that. The forces of the DPR and LPR are even less mobile than Ukraine. As a result both sides are vulnerable to a concentration of force by the attacker. Russia has just shown us a textbook example of "he who defends everywhere defends nowhere", but as their slow attempts to move forces to reinforce Lyman and Izyum show, they are also incapable of a "mobile defense in depth". They also had no prepared rally point that the forces being attacked could break contact and retreat to.

Ukraine has shown the ability to concentrate a striking force and use it. Russia has not. Their attacks in the beginning of the war were "setpieces" against an enemy that wasn't fully prepared. Russia's advances in the Donbas, while very real and very destructive, were artillery driven. They simply fired until the defenders had to give way. Ukraine never suffered an encirclement or a "loss of control". They gave ground, they lost battles, but they never lost cohesion. Russia has lost cohesion a couple of times recently.

The fear is that Ukraine will be spread out in the areas they have returned to their control, and therefore will be vulnerable in the same way Russia was. If Russia can execute an offensive as effectively as Ukraine just did, the fear will be real. So far, Russia hasn't been able to do such a thing.

[dabigv13]

Very interesting video with interviews from a small tank squad and the sappers they worked with to take a fortified Russian position earlier during the Kharkiv offensive. 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RFERL/status/1575885757373468675?s=20&t=tI03VPZDoj7_r8j0ZRyZwA[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Very interesting video with interviews from a small tank squad and the sappers they worked with to take a fortified Russian position earlier during the Kharkiv offensive. 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RFERL/status/1575885757373468675?s=20&t=tI03VPZDoj7_r8j0ZRyZwA[/tweet]

[Goose]

Very interesting video with interviews from a small tank squad and the sappers they worked with to take a fortified Russian position earlier during the Kharkiv offensive. 

https://twitter.com/RFERL/status/1575885...r8j0ZRyZwA

Amazing! Thanks for posting it. This was a "textbook" example of a perfectly executed combined arms operation where the infantry cleared the way ahead of anti-tank forces (mines in this case) and then the tanks attacked the fortified objective. Just like you draw it up! It is also nice that the Ukrainians pointed out the Russians panicked and ran. They had never been under tank fire before and that is indeed scary. The officer was signaling he understood they weren't fighting an "A" unit. His infantry wouldn't have run :-).

It is also interesting they labeled the commander as a "squadron" commander. In NATO parlance, a squadron is 19 tanks, not 4. 4 tanks is a platoon. Maybe a translation issue.

[Goose]

Very interesting video with interviews from a small tank squad and the sappers they worked with to take a fortified Russian position earlier during the Kharkiv offensive. 

https://twitter.com/RFERL/status/1575885...r8j0ZRyZwA

Amazing! Thanks for posting it. This was a "textbook" example of a perfectly executed combined arms operation where the infantry cleared the way ahead of anti-tank forces (mines in this case) and then the tanks attacked the fortified objective. Just like you draw it up! It is also nice that the Ukrainians pointed out the Russians panicked and ran. They had never been under tank fire before and that is indeed scary. The officer was signaling he understood they weren't fighting an "A" unit. His infantry wouldn't have run :-).

It is also interesting they labeled the commander as a "squadron" commander. In NATO parlance, a squadron is 19 tanks, not 4. 4 tanks is a platoon. Maybe a translation issue.

[GK3]

Very interesting video with interviews from a small tank squad and the sappers they worked with to take a fortified Russian position earlier during the Kharkiv offensive. 

https://twitter.com/RFERL/status/1575885...r8j0ZRyZwA

Amazing! Thanks for posting it. This was a "textbook" example of a perfectly executed combined arms operation where the infantry cleared the way ahead of anti-tank forces (mines in this case) and then the tanks attacked the fortified objective. Just like you draw it up! It is also nice that the Ukrainians pointed out the Russians panicked and ran. They had never been under tank fire before and that is indeed scary. The officer was signaling he understood they weren't fighting an "A" unit. His infantry wouldn't have run :-).

It is also interesting they labeled the commander as a "squadron" commander. In NATO parlance, a squadron is 19 tanks, not 4. 4 tanks is a platoon. Maybe a translation issue.

You can't help but be impressed by the guys leading the Ukrainians.  I suppose NATO deserves some credit for the training they have done since Crimea.  I have some questions maybe you can shed some light on

If the Russians have really lost 40,000 to 60,000 dead and over 2000 vehicles, plus at least that many more wounded, you are talking about 10 or 12 divisions worth of men and equipment?  Is that really possible?  Normally I would think you would want to run your new recruits through 90 days of training and integrate them into established units with combat hardened NCOs and Officers.  That doesn't sound like they are doing. Seems like a recipe for disaster.  How do you see Russia trying to regain some control over the battle space?  The Ukrainians seem to be very well led, and up to using the latest technical gadgets and almost certainly getting vast amounts of current intel from various western electronic sources.  I see the Ukraine's biggest danger is getting over confident and biting off more they can chew somewhere and taking some losses they can't afford. 
Winter is a big question. Will both sides sit down and train and re-equip their units or will one side or the other go on the offense once the ground freezes over.
I also see lots of pictures of small Ukrainian groups, armed with something other than the standard weapons you see, but some with a surppressed weapon and often at least one guy with an obvious sniper rifle. I assume these guys are part of some special ops unit that are probably running missions behind the front lines.  Any insight into how they are using those kinds of troops, they clearly have them?
EDIT - reports now of major breakthroughs along the Dnipro north of Kherson.

[GK3]

Very interesting video with interviews from a small tank squad and the sappers they worked with to take a fortified Russian position earlier during the Kharkiv offensive. 

https://twitter.com/RFERL/status/1575885...r8j0ZRyZwA

Amazing! Thanks for posting it. This was a "textbook" example of a perfectly executed combined arms operation where the infantry cleared the way ahead of anti-tank forces (mines in this case) and then the tanks attacked the fortified objective. Just like you draw it up! It is also nice that the Ukrainians pointed out the Russians panicked and ran. They had never been under tank fire before and that is indeed scary. The officer was signaling he understood they weren't fighting an "A" unit. His infantry wouldn't have run :-).

It is also interesting they labeled the commander as a "squadron" commander. In NATO parlance, a squadron is 19 tanks, not 4. 4 tanks is a platoon. Maybe a translation issue.

You can't help but be impressed by the guys leading the Ukrainians.  I suppose NATO deserves some credit for the training they have done since Crimea.  I have some questions maybe you can shed some light on

If the Russians have really lost 40,000 to 60,000 dead and over 2000 vehicles, plus at least that many more wounded, you are talking about 10 or 12 divisions worth of men and equipment?  Is that really possible?  Normally I would think you would want to run your new recruits through 90 days of training and integrate them into established units with combat hardened NCOs and Officers.  That doesn't sound like they are doing. Seems like a recipe for disaster.  How do you see Russia trying to regain some control over the battle space?  The Ukrainians seem to be very well led, and up to using the latest technical gadgets and almost certainly getting vast amounts of current intel from various western electronic sources.  I see the Ukraine's biggest danger is getting over confident and biting off more they can chew somewhere and taking some losses they can't afford. 
Winter is a big question. Will both sides sit down and train and re-equip their units or will one side or the other go on the offense once the ground freezes over.
I also see lots of pictures of small Ukrainian groups, armed with something other than the standard weapons you see, but some with a surppressed weapon and often at least one guy with an obvious sniper rifle. I assume these guys are part of some special ops unit that are probably running missions behind the front lines.  Any insight into how they are using those kinds of troops, they clearly have them?
EDIT - reports now of major breakthroughs along the Dnipro north of Kherson.

[OutsiderFan]

This is part of Russia's problem that most people don't really take into account...

Russia was suppose to have paid for 1.5 million military uniforms. They were never delivered.  This kind of thing is the rule not the exception in a corrupt and lawless country. Poor equipment due to grift and profiteering by corrupt vendors compromises the quality of Russia's fighting forces that are suppose to be good on paper, but aren't as good as expected in reality. 

Poor leadership, unreliable equipment, lack of discipline, it all leads to losses, low morale, and weakens what "should" be a stronger fighting force. 

Apparently, Russian forces in Kherson don't have adequate winter gear. The list of Russian failures to do basic stuff is pretty impressive. No reason to believe these underlying weaknesses will some how be addressed. Using nuclear weapons isn't going to change these realities either.

[OutsiderFan]

This is part of Russia's problem that most people don't really take into account...

Russia was suppose to have paid for 1.5 million military uniforms. They were never delivered.  This kind of thing is the rule not the exception in a corrupt and lawless country. Poor equipment due to grift and profiteering by corrupt vendors compromises the quality of Russia's fighting forces that are suppose to be good on paper, but aren't as good as expected in reality. 

Poor leadership, unreliable equipment, lack of discipline, it all leads to losses, low morale, and weakens what "should" be a stronger fighting force. 

Apparently, Russian forces in Kherson don't have adequate winter gear. The list of Russian failures to do basic stuff is pretty impressive. No reason to believe these underlying weaknesses will some how be addressed. Using nuclear weapons isn't going to change these realities either.

[GK3]

This is part of Russia's problem that most people don't really take into account...

Russia was suppose to have paid for 1.5 million military uniforms. They were never delivered.  This kind of thing is the rule not the exception in a corrupt and lawless country. Poor equipment due to grift and profiteering by corrupt vendors compromises the quality of Russia's fighting forces that are suppose to be good on paper, but aren't as good as expected in reality. 

Poor leadership, unreliable equipment, lack of discipline, it all leads to losses, low morale, and weakens what "should" be a stronger fighting force. 

Apparently, Russian forces in Kherson don't have adequate winter gear. The list of Russian failures to do basic stuff is pretty impressive. No reason to believe these underlying weaknesses will some how be addressed. Using nuclear weapons isn't going to change these realities either.

We learned what happens when you don't have proper winter gear for your troops in 1950 in Korea.  The Russians know, if anyone knows, the importance of making sure you troops have proper winter gear and the equipment has the proper lubricants etc.  But I suppose that doesn't preclude them from ignoring those lessons.

[GK3]

This is part of Russia's problem that most people don't really take into account...

Russia was suppose to have paid for 1.5 million military uniforms. They were never delivered.  This kind of thing is the rule not the exception in a corrupt and lawless country. Poor equipment due to grift and profiteering by corrupt vendors compromises the quality of Russia's fighting forces that are suppose to be good on paper, but aren't as good as expected in reality. 

Poor leadership, unreliable equipment, lack of discipline, it all leads to losses, low morale, and weakens what "should" be a stronger fighting force. 

Apparently, Russian forces in Kherson don't have adequate winter gear. The list of Russian failures to do basic stuff is pretty impressive. No reason to believe these underlying weaknesses will some how be addressed. Using nuclear weapons isn't going to change these realities either.

We learned what happens when you don't have proper winter gear for your troops in 1950 in Korea.  The Russians know, if anyone knows, the importance of making sure you troops have proper winter gear and the equipment has the proper lubricants etc.  But I suppose that doesn't preclude them from ignoring those lessons.

[BostonCard]

How’s that annexation going?

[tweet]https://twitter.com/michaelbd/status/1576938439010058246?s=46&t=65bn9Bmh4LPYunmS_USKWQ[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

How’s that annexation going?

[tweet]https://twitter.com/michaelbd/status/1576938439010058246?s=46&t=65bn9Bmh4LPYunmS_USKWQ[/tweet]

BC

[OutsiderFan]

I believe the proper spelling is "annexed" to reference the phony actions Russia has taken to claim Ukraine territory as its own.

[OutsiderFan]

I believe the proper spelling is "annexed" to reference the phony actions Russia has taken to claim Ukraine territory as its own.

[BostonCard]

Always funny…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/darthputinkgb/status/1576911266219950082?s=46&t=65bn9Bmh4LPYunmS_USKWQ[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

Always funny…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/darthputinkgb/status/1576911266219950082?s=46&t=65bn9Bmh4LPYunmS_USKWQ[/tweet]

BC

[Goose]

If the Russians have really lost 40,000 to 60,000 dead and over 2000 vehicles, plus at least that many more wounded, you are talking about 10 or 12 divisions worth of men and equipment?  Is that really possible?

The US apparently agrees with an estimate of 80,000 Russian casualties, of which 40,000 were KIA. It is a difficult number to get your head around, I agree. Even if it is "wrong" (which to some extent is certainly is), the number of Russian casualties is "brobdingnagian". The equipment losses are independently counted by some observers from various photint sources (e.g. Oryx). They are pretty solid. So, given the evidence we have, I guess it is "real". How Putin is keeping 40,000 deaths quiet is a mystery, but we really have little insight into rural Russia where most of the losses are.

Normally I would think you would want to run your new recruits through 90 days of training and integrate them into established units with combat hardened NCOs and Officers.  That doesn't sound like they are doing. Seems like a recipe for disaster.  How do you see Russia trying to regain some control over the battle space?

Russian training, even back in the "best" Soviet times, was substandard. In all cases the "destination" units were expected to make a significant contribution to recruit training. Except for the navy (to some extent) Russia has never had an NCO cadre that could contribute much to recruit training or offer field leadership. Raw discipline yes, but beyond that, not much. Interestingly for a country that created "the new Soviet man", Russian officers maintained the old Imperial disdain for the troops. Even junior lieutenants consider themselves "above it all". This is still the case. This approach could kind of work when their was a professional officer class and a political state that at least in theory inspired loyalty. Truly "universal" military training for two years at least produced an obedient soldier who could do simple tasks and created a "we are all in this together" mentality. If he lived long enough, he could become very good.

In the existing kleptocracy with one year of training for some and no "moral" justification doesn't work. The contract soldiers tend to be people who can't get a better job. Nobody believes and everybody just wants to survive and steal a washing machine if possible. It is a recipe for disaster. Russia's "successes" in Syria and elsewhere revolve around having the "locals" do the actual fighting and the Wagner group stepping in where a little "extra" is needed. Thus the heavy use of LDR and DPR troops despite the fact they are not reliable.

The fear I have is that somewhere in this mess their does exist the remnants of a professional officer class that will be allowed to whip a few divisions into shape and reach the old Soviet standard. Those guys would be a real problem for Ukraine. Unless Russia can do that, their only hope is that the west becomes tired of this war or Ukraine collapses economically. Neither of these two outcomes are impossible, but that is no way to run a war.

The Ukrainians seem to be very well led, and up to using the latest technical gadgets and almost certainly getting vast amounts of current intel from various western electronic sources.  I see the Ukraine's biggest danger is getting over confident and biting off more they can chew somewhere and taking some losses they can't afford.

I agree. I would add the danger that if the war slows down and the Ukrainian population starts to take stock of their losses, both in blood and treasure, they will become discouraged. It is going to be a hard winter in Ukraine. Their economy is a shambles. In many of the recaptured areas there won't be utilities. Its lots easier enduring these things when you think you are "winning", but when nothing is happening it is lots more difficult.

Winter is a big question. Will both sides sit down and train and re-equip their units or will one side or the other go on the offense once the ground freezes over.

I think Ukraine is going to try real hard to maintain an active operational pace because the leadership is concerned about the effects cited above and also because Ukraine right now has the advantage. If Ukraine can force Russia to maintain a high defensive tempo, that will prevent Russia from regrouping. I think that is the plan.

I also see lots of pictures of small Ukrainian groups, armed with something other than the standard weapons you see, but some with a surppressed weapon and often at least one guy with an obvious sniper rifle. I assume these guys are part of some special ops unit that are probably running missions behind the front lines.  Any insight into how they are using those kinds of troops, they clearly have them?

Can't help you much there. They certainly have "special ops" but I think they have even more "irregular forces" that operate behind Russian lines as guerrillas. They are only loosely controlled but can do bigger things than the "special ops" guys can. I think lots of the explosions and assassinations are the work of these guerrillas.

[Goose]

If the Russians have really lost 40,000 to 60,000 dead and over 2000 vehicles, plus at least that many more wounded, you are talking about 10 or 12 divisions worth of men and equipment?  Is that really possible?

The US apparently agrees with an estimate of 80,000 Russian casualties, of which 40,000 were KIA. It is a difficult number to get your head around, I agree. Even if it is "wrong" (which to some extent is certainly is), the number of Russian casualties is "brobdingnagian". The equipment losses are independently counted by some observers from various photint sources (e.g. Oryx). They are pretty solid. So, given the evidence we have, I guess it is "real". How Putin is keeping 40,000 deaths quiet is a mystery, but we really have little insight into rural Russia where most of the losses are.

Normally I would think you would want to run your new recruits through 90 days of training and integrate them into established units with combat hardened NCOs and Officers.  That doesn't sound like they are doing. Seems like a recipe for disaster.  How do you see Russia trying to regain some control over the battle space?

Russian training, even back in the "best" Soviet times, was substandard. In all cases the "destination" units were expected to make a significant contribution to recruit training. Except for the navy (to some extent) Russia has never had an NCO cadre that could contribute much to recruit training or offer field leadership. Raw discipline yes, but beyond that, not much. Interestingly for a country that created "the new Soviet man", Russian officers maintained the old Imperial disdain for the troops. Even junior lieutenants consider themselves "above it all". This is still the case. This approach could kind of work when their was a professional officer class and a political state that at least in theory inspired loyalty. Truly "universal" military training for two years at least produced an obedient soldier who could do simple tasks and created a "we are all in this together" mentality. If he lived long enough, he could become very good.

In the existing kleptocracy with one year of training for some and no "moral" justification doesn't work. The contract soldiers tend to be people who can't get a better job. Nobody believes and everybody just wants to survive and steal a washing machine if possible. It is a recipe for disaster. Russia's "successes" in Syria and elsewhere revolve around having the "locals" do the actual fighting and the Wagner group stepping in where a little "extra" is needed. Thus the heavy use of LDR and DPR troops despite the fact they are not reliable.

The fear I have is that somewhere in this mess their does exist the remnants of a professional officer class that will be allowed to whip a few divisions into shape and reach the old Soviet standard. Those guys would be a real problem for Ukraine. Unless Russia can do that, their only hope is that the west becomes tired of this war or Ukraine collapses economically. Neither of these two outcomes are impossible, but that is no way to run a war.

The Ukrainians seem to be very well led, and up to using the latest technical gadgets and almost certainly getting vast amounts of current intel from various western electronic sources.  I see the Ukraine's biggest danger is getting over confident and biting off more they can chew somewhere and taking some losses they can't afford.

I agree. I would add the danger that if the war slows down and the Ukrainian population starts to take stock of their losses, both in blood and treasure, they will become discouraged. It is going to be a hard winter in Ukraine. Their economy is a shambles. In many of the recaptured areas there won't be utilities. Its lots easier enduring these things when you think you are "winning", but when nothing is happening it is lots more difficult.

Winter is a big question. Will both sides sit down and train and re-equip their units or will one side or the other go on the offense once the ground freezes over.

I think Ukraine is going to try real hard to maintain an active operational pace because the leadership is concerned about the effects cited above and also because Ukraine right now has the advantage. If Ukraine can force Russia to maintain a high defensive tempo, that will prevent Russia from regrouping. I think that is the plan.

I also see lots of pictures of small Ukrainian groups, armed with something other than the standard weapons you see, but some with a surppressed weapon and often at least one guy with an obvious sniper rifle. I assume these guys are part of some special ops unit that are probably running missions behind the front lines.  Any insight into how they are using those kinds of troops, they clearly have them?

Can't help you much there. They certainly have "special ops" but I think they have even more "irregular forces" that operate behind Russian lines as guerrillas. They are only loosely controlled but can do bigger things than the "special ops" guys can. I think lots of the explosions and assassinations are the work of these guerrillas.

[Treefence]

Russia has lost significantly more than 2k vehicles, you can audit this list if you want, but they regularly review and check for duplicates at Oryx, they are some of the best at what they do. They Show 6,647 total Russian vehicle losses, including 4,064 destroyed and 2,122 captured.  And keep in mind, this is only equipment that has visually confirmed to be lost, so it's likely a decent amount higher.  Granted, they have captured 614 pieces of equipment from Ukraine, but even still, Russia has experienced unsustainable losses during this war, which is why they have been digging into their reserves for months.  

 https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/at...pment.html

[Treefence]

Russia has lost significantly more than 2k vehicles, you can audit this list if you want, but they regularly review and check for duplicates at Oryx, they are some of the best at what they do. They Show 6,647 total Russian vehicle losses, including 4,064 destroyed and 2,122 captured.  And keep in mind, this is only equipment that has visually confirmed to be lost, so it's likely a decent amount higher.  Granted, they have captured 614 pieces of equipment from Ukraine, but even still, Russia has experienced unsustainable losses during this war, which is why they have been digging into their reserves for months.  

 https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/at...pment.html

[GK3]

Russia has lost significantly more than 2k vehicles, you can audit this list if you want, but they regularly review and check for duplicates at Oryx, they are some of the best at what they do. They Show 6,647 total Russian vehicle losses, including 4,064 destroyed and 2,122 captured.  And keep in mind, this is only equipment that has visually confirmed to be lost, so it's likely a decent amount higher.  Granted, they have captured 614 pieces of equipment from Ukraine, but even still, Russia has experienced unsustainable losses during this war, which is why they have been digging into their reserves for months.  

 https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/at...pment.html

Thank you for the reference.  I had heard of those numbers but thought them to be perhaps the result of too much Vodka.  Those are astounding.  Ukraine can easily replaces its losses from those captured I would think.  Can the Ukraine keep itself adequately supplied with munitions, food and all the other stuff an army moving fast needs?  Think Patton in 1944.
If the rumors of Ukrainian armor breakthrough near Kherson and now driving South along the West bank of the Dnipro, a bunch of Russian troops could be in serious trouble.  I hope it is true.  The river provides a nice immediate defense against counter attacks from the East.  Doesn't do much to stop artillery and air strikes, but it helps.

---

Russia has lost significantly more than 2k vehicles, you can audit this list if you want, but they regularly review and check for duplicates at Oryx, they are some of the best at what they do. They Show 6,647 total Russian vehicle losses, including 4,064 destroyed and 2,122 captured.  And keep in mind, this is only equipment that has visually confirmed to be lost, so it's likely a decent amount higher.  Granted, they have captured 614 pieces of equipment from Ukraine, but even still, Russia has experienced unsustainable losses during this war, which is why they have been digging into their reserves for months.  

 https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/at...pment.html

Thank you for the reference.  The numbers are astounding.  From the numbers captured it would seem that the Ukrainians now have more tanks than when they started without getting any from elsewhere.  It also makes you wonder how many more the Russians have to give up?  I know they are reputed to have never scrapped any weapon no matter how old, but there has to be a finite limit somewhere.
I also hope the reports of Ukrainian breakthroughs North of Kherson and now driving South along the Dnipro are true.  If so, a lot of Russian troops will find themselves between a rock and hard spot.  The river is a nice immediate buffer against land counterattacks.

[GK3]

Russia has lost significantly more than 2k vehicles, you can audit this list if you want, but they regularly review and check for duplicates at Oryx, they are some of the best at what they do. They Show 6,647 total Russian vehicle losses, including 4,064 destroyed and 2,122 captured.  And keep in mind, this is only equipment that has visually confirmed to be lost, so it's likely a decent amount higher.  Granted, they have captured 614 pieces of equipment from Ukraine, but even still, Russia has experienced unsustainable losses during this war, which is why they have been digging into their reserves for months.  

 https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/at...pment.html

Thank you for the reference.  I had heard of those numbers but thought them to be perhaps the result of too much Vodka.  Those are astounding.  Ukraine can easily replaces its losses from those captured I would think.  Can the Ukraine keep itself adequately supplied with munitions, food and all the other stuff an army moving fast needs?  Think Patton in 1944.
If the rumors of Ukrainian armor breakthrough near Kherson and now driving South along the West bank of the Dnipro, a bunch of Russian troops could be in serious trouble.  I hope it is true.  The river provides a nice immediate defense against counter attacks from the East.  Doesn't do much to stop artillery and air strikes, but it helps.

---

Russia has lost significantly more than 2k vehicles, you can audit this list if you want, but they regularly review and check for duplicates at Oryx, they are some of the best at what they do. They Show 6,647 total Russian vehicle losses, including 4,064 destroyed and 2,122 captured.  And keep in mind, this is only equipment that has visually confirmed to be lost, so it's likely a decent amount higher.  Granted, they have captured 614 pieces of equipment from Ukraine, but even still, Russia has experienced unsustainable losses during this war, which is why they have been digging into their reserves for months.  

 https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/at...pment.html

Thank you for the reference.  The numbers are astounding.  From the numbers captured it would seem that the Ukrainians now have more tanks than when they started without getting any from elsewhere.  It also makes you wonder how many more the Russians have to give up?  I know they are reputed to have never scrapped any weapon no matter how old, but there has to be a finite limit somewhere.
I also hope the reports of Ukrainian breakthroughs North of Kherson and now driving South along the Dnipro are true.  If so, a lot of Russian troops will find themselves between a rock and hard spot.  The river is a nice immediate buffer against land counterattacks.

[Mick]

We learned what happens when you don't have proper winter gear for your troops in 1950 in Korea.  The Russians know, if anyone knows, the importance of making sure you troops have proper winter gear and the equipment has the proper lubricants etc.  But I suppose that doesn't preclude them from ignoring those lessons.

If we learned it in 1950 in Korea, then we ignored the lessons from the winter of 1944/45 in the Battle of the Bulge at Bastogne.  17,000 Americans from the First, Third and Seventh armies were hospitalized from the cold.

Battle of the Bulge - Wikipedia

[Mick]

We learned what happens when you don't have proper winter gear for your troops in 1950 in Korea.  The Russians know, if anyone knows, the importance of making sure you troops have proper winter gear and the equipment has the proper lubricants etc.  But I suppose that doesn't preclude them from ignoring those lessons.

If we learned it in 1950 in Korea, then we ignored the lessons from the winter of 1944/45 in the Battle of the Bulge at Bastogne.  17,000 Americans from the First, Third and Seventh armies were hospitalized from the cold.

Battle of the Bulge - Wikipedia

[Treefence]

GK3, Yeah the Oryx list has been pretty incredible to follow.  As far as the captured number goes, some pieces of equipment can be used faster than others.  A lot of items were captured in the recent Kharkiv offensive (Izium) but I'm guessing it takes weeks if not months to get all of those operable for Ukraine, with some that may never be repairable. Overall, Russia has been by far the biggest military supplier to Ukraine, as their soldiers have a tendency to abandon everything when things go wrong.  We also saw lots of evidence that Ukraine captured tons of Soviet/Russian artillery ammo, which I think they were running low on.  Assuming it's usable, I'd imagine it will be used more on the Kharkiv/Luhansk front, to avoid transporting it necessarily, but maybe that means reserves they have elsewhere can be used in Kherson, Goose would have more insight than I do.

[Treefence]

GK3, Yeah the Oryx list has been pretty incredible to follow.  As far as the captured number goes, some pieces of equipment can be used faster than others.  A lot of items were captured in the recent Kharkiv offensive (Izium) but I'm guessing it takes weeks if not months to get all of those operable for Ukraine, with some that may never be repairable. Overall, Russia has been by far the biggest military supplier to Ukraine, as their soldiers have a tendency to abandon everything when things go wrong.  We also saw lots of evidence that Ukraine captured tons of Soviet/Russian artillery ammo, which I think they were running low on.  Assuming it's usable, I'd imagine it will be used more on the Kharkiv/Luhansk front, to avoid transporting it necessarily, but maybe that means reserves they have elsewhere can be used in Kherson, Goose would have more insight than I do.

[Goose]

We learned what happens when you don't have proper winter gear for your troops in 1950 in Korea.  The Russians know, if anyone knows, the importance of making sure you troops have proper winter gear and the equipment has the proper lubricants etc.  But I suppose that doesn't preclude them from ignoring those lessons.

If we learned it in 1950 in Korea, then we ignored the lessons from the winter of 1944/45 in the Battle of the Bulge at Bastogne.  17,000 Americans from the First, Third and Seventh armies were hospitalized from the cold.

Battle of the Bulge - Wikipedia

It isn't just lack of cold weather gear, although that can be an issue. Infantry fighting in bitter cold is going to get frostbite and hypothermia if they can't be withdrawn and warmed up periodically. In the middle of a battle like the Bulge you can't do that. Many US troops were cut off from any shelter and had to spend days in the cold without fires. No matter what gear you have, guys are going to get sick and lose combat effectiveness. Also, at that point the US did not have a program to train troops in cold weather warfare. Even today, if you aren't a Marine or part of 10th Mountain you probably haven't done the training.

The US Army in WW II did have enough cold weather gear. They were aware of the need. What they didn't have was adequate transport to meet the needs of the troops already in Europe and those newly arriving. Warm coats and long johns took second fiddle to bullets and gas. It was also intended that the cold weather gear would be distributed to the troops when they were rotated out of the line or not yet in the line. Lots of troops never got rotated and some that did never received the gear. It is also true that a lot of the cold weather gear wasn't very "user friendly". It wasn't waterproof and when it got snow on it and the snow melted you had a cold wet coat. Many troops also claimed they couldn't fire their weapons wearing the gloves issued because the fingers were too big.

---

GK3, Yeah the Oryx list has been pretty incredible to follow.  As far as the captured number goes, some pieces of equipment can be used faster than others.  A lot of items were captured in the recent Kharkiv offensive (Izium) but I'm guessing it takes weeks if not months to get all of those operable for Ukraine, with some that may never be repairable. Overall, Russia has been by far the biggest military supplier to Ukraine, as their soldiers have a tendency to abandon everything when things go wrong.  We also saw lots of evidence that Ukraine captured tons of Soviet/Russian artillery ammo, which I think they were running low on.  Assuming it's usable, I'd imagine it will be used more on the Kharkiv/Luhansk front, to avoid transporting it necessarily, but maybe that means reserves they have elsewhere can be used in Kherson, Goose would have more insight than I do.

Unfortunately I have no real "data". I know that one issue will be that the captured ammo, even if "known good", will have to be inventoried and added to the supply system. Otherwise, the units that need it won't know it exists. It is undoubtedly spread out in places Ukraine doesn't want it to be, so it will have to be transported to supply points. The logistics and "paperwork" (even though it is computerized) will be substantial. Just counting it all will take time, and I would imagine it has to be guarded.

I would imagine that Ukraine would carefully evaluate each cache of ammunition by testing it. The last thing you want is to give a unit thousands of rounds of bad 152 mm shells that fall short and kill your own troops. Its going to take some time.

---

Thank you for the reference.  The numbers are astounding.  From the numbers captured it would seem that the Ukrainians now have more tanks than when they started without getting any from elsewhere.

Perhaps, though we can't know how many Ukraine captured and could actually use. Fortunately, Ukraine also got quite a few tanks from the ex-Warsaw Pact NATO nations.

 It also makes you wonder how many more the Russians have to give up?  I know they are reputed to have never scrapped any weapon no matter how old, but there has to be a finite limit somewhere.

Yes, but we are nowhere near that limit yet. The problem for Russia now is that they have the tanks, and to some degree they have the troops, but they are spread out throughout Russia defending the country. Which ones do you move, and how many can you afford to move?

[Goose]

We learned what happens when you don't have proper winter gear for your troops in 1950 in Korea.  The Russians know, if anyone knows, the importance of making sure you troops have proper winter gear and the equipment has the proper lubricants etc.  But I suppose that doesn't preclude them from ignoring those lessons.

If we learned it in 1950 in Korea, then we ignored the lessons from the winter of 1944/45 in the Battle of the Bulge at Bastogne.  17,000 Americans from the First, Third and Seventh armies were hospitalized from the cold.

Battle of the Bulge - Wikipedia

It isn't just lack of cold weather gear, although that can be an issue. Infantry fighting in bitter cold is going to get frostbite and hypothermia if they can't be withdrawn and warmed up periodically. In the middle of a battle like the Bulge you can't do that. Many US troops were cut off from any shelter and had to spend days in the cold without fires. No matter what gear you have, guys are going to get sick and lose combat effectiveness. Also, at that point the US did not have a program to train troops in cold weather warfare. Even today, if you aren't a Marine or part of 10th Mountain you probably haven't done the training.

The US Army in WW II did have enough cold weather gear. They were aware of the need. What they didn't have was adequate transport to meet the needs of the troops already in Europe and those newly arriving. Warm coats and long johns took second fiddle to bullets and gas. It was also intended that the cold weather gear would be distributed to the troops when they were rotated out of the line or not yet in the line. Lots of troops never got rotated and some that did never received the gear. It is also true that a lot of the cold weather gear wasn't very "user friendly". It wasn't waterproof and when it got snow on it and the snow melted you had a cold wet coat. Many troops also claimed they couldn't fire their weapons wearing the gloves issued because the fingers were too big.

---

GK3, Yeah the Oryx list has been pretty incredible to follow.  As far as the captured number goes, some pieces of equipment can be used faster than others.  A lot of items were captured in the recent Kharkiv offensive (Izium) but I'm guessing it takes weeks if not months to get all of those operable for Ukraine, with some that may never be repairable. Overall, Russia has been by far the biggest military supplier to Ukraine, as their soldiers have a tendency to abandon everything when things go wrong.  We also saw lots of evidence that Ukraine captured tons of Soviet/Russian artillery ammo, which I think they were running low on.  Assuming it's usable, I'd imagine it will be used more on the Kharkiv/Luhansk front, to avoid transporting it necessarily, but maybe that means reserves they have elsewhere can be used in Kherson, Goose would have more insight than I do.

Unfortunately I have no real "data". I know that one issue will be that the captured ammo, even if "known good", will have to be inventoried and added to the supply system. Otherwise, the units that need it won't know it exists. It is undoubtedly spread out in places Ukraine doesn't want it to be, so it will have to be transported to supply points. The logistics and "paperwork" (even though it is computerized) will be substantial. Just counting it all will take time, and I would imagine it has to be guarded.

I would imagine that Ukraine would carefully evaluate each cache of ammunition by testing it. The last thing you want is to give a unit thousands of rounds of bad 152 mm shells that fall short and kill your own troops. Its going to take some time.

---

Thank you for the reference.  The numbers are astounding.  From the numbers captured it would seem that the Ukrainians now have more tanks than when they started without getting any from elsewhere.

Perhaps, though we can't know how many Ukraine captured and could actually use. Fortunately, Ukraine also got quite a few tanks from the ex-Warsaw Pact NATO nations.

 It also makes you wonder how many more the Russians have to give up?  I know they are reputed to have never scrapped any weapon no matter how old, but there has to be a finite limit somewhere.

Yes, but we are nowhere near that limit yet. The problem for Russia now is that they have the tanks, and to some degree they have the troops, but they are spread out throughout Russia defending the country. Which ones do you move, and how many can you afford to move?