Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 09-28-2022

I wonder if Russians holding on to Kherson hints that they want to use the city as a bargaining chip, in hopes that Ukraine settles with giving up most of the Donbas and officially recognize Crimea as Russian, in exchange Russia will give up Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, or something along those lines.  No matter what, I don't think Ukraine accepts anything besides pre 2014 borders.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 09-28-2022

(09-28-2022, 08:24 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(09-28-2022, 07:58 AM)81alum Wrote:  

(09-27-2022, 09:08 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Race against time now before the rain and cold take over. I didn’t think Ukraine would be able to get as far as it has already, but soon the weather will make advances even more challenging.

Goose, doesn't winter put an under-supplied defender in an even worse position?  I'm trying to understand the differences between this situation and that of the Germans at Stalingrad.  Could the Ukrainians mount something like the Russian winter offensive from November though February 1942, trapping the overextended Russians?  How is winter going to make it easier to resupply the Russians in Kherson?  So much is said about the rain and mud, but eventually the ground freezes, and it becomes firm enough for vehicles and difficult to even dig a foxhole.  One might think that those conditions would favor a war of movement over a static war.  So why is the conventional wisdom that the Ukrainians can't continue their offensive when winter begins?

Ukraine can and will continue their offensive throughout the winter. The problem for both sides is that infantry can't spend too much time in the open or they will freeze. It is also real cold inside armored vehicles, even if the heaters are working. As you point out, digging new fighting positions becomes much more difficult. This all favors the defender who can stay inside existing structures and who has already created fighting positions. The defender can also rotate troops more easily to keep them warm. That doesn't mean Ukraine can't advance, it just means they will be cold and miserable doing so and can't use lots of infantry in the process. Under "normal" circumstances the poor weather would also make using air support very difficult, but so far in this war air support hasn't been much of a factor.

The "big deal" here really is the assumption that Russia would evacuate Kherson if they could. That is what a dispassionate military observer would probably recommend. Their supply lines are very tenuous (inadequate) and there is really no tactical advantage to hanging on there. One could argue there is a strategic reason in that if Russia intends to advance to Odessa they must have Kherson, but at present they are in no position to do so. Putin may not see it that way however. In any case, if/when the river freezes Russia can then (at least in theory) easily supply Kherson or easily withdraw from Kherson because they won't need bridges to do so. At that point Ukraine mostly forfeits the advantages they have gained from controlling the GLOCs by fire. This gives Russia the ability to get out of a real bad situation without losing lots of troops. We don't want that outcome. It also isn't for sure the river will freeze hard enough and long enough to allow withdrawal/relief of Kherson. Still, capturing Kherson before that is even a possibility would be better than waiting to find out. It just may not be possible.

FWIW, the Russian winter offensive near Stalingrad was made possible by the river freezing. At that point Russia was able to move supplies and troops to the right bank easily. Before that, the Russians in Stalingrad were told "You must fight like there is nothing to the east of the river". After that, there was plenty east of the river and it was going west.

A point that doesn't seem to get much discussion is how much longer can the USA continue to provide modern arms AND ammo to the Ukraine.  We have to be running up on some kind of limit before too long.  Sending 105 artillery pieces isn't going to cut it.  I read that the Ukraine is burning through 30,000 155 rounds every 60 days.  How long  before we have to start twisting arms of some our "allies" to make up some of the slack?  By the same token I am sure the Russian army is starting to have to use older ammo and gear too, but maybe not.  The side that runs out of stuff first loses.
The Iranian drones seem to be a problem also.    I have been wondering how the Ukrainian forces are dealing with the POW issue.  You don't need first line troops to guard the prisoners, but they still use up resources.  Maybe the Poles would volunteer to guard the Russians :)

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 09-28-2022

Render them to Iraqi Kurdistan. I’m sure they’ll be well taken care of there. (Jk)

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-28-2022

(09-28-2022, 09:13 AM)Treefence Wrote:  I wonder if Russians holding on to Kherson hints that they want to use the city as a bargaining chip, in hopes that Ukraine settles with giving up most of the Donbas and officially recognize Crimea as Russian, in exchange Russia will give up Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, or something along those lines.  No matter what, I don't think Ukraine accepts anything besides pre 2014 borders.

I think Russia held on to Kherson because withdrawing would have admitted they weren't going to take Odessa anytime soon. For quite a while this was a recognized "war aim" of Putin, so giving up on it was politically unacceptable. They also probably never anticipated Ukraine could use HIMARS to control the GLOCS as well as they have done. IOW Russia never anticipated being in such a bad position and when it became apparent that was possible they (predictably) were too slow to act. They are now at a serious tactical disadvantage.

Right now, the question is how much artillery ammunition can/has Russia delivered to the area around Kherson. Ukraine's problem is that they can't attack across the open ground with infantry because the Russian artillery will destroy them. They could possibly do so with a combined arms operation if they could accept pretty heavy losses getting to grips with the Russians. Ukraine would almost certainly need significant counter-battery activity to have a shot at this. Ukraine may believe they just don't have the assets to do this.

Ideally, Ukraine would find paths through the Russian defenses that would allow them to get across the River and behind the Russian defenses (while not suffering heavy losses doing it). The have done such a thing in the north. It may be there are just too many Russians in the south to do similarly. The assault may not "hit air" in Kherson Oblast. It also may be that Ukraine believes the Russians on the west side of the river are going to run out of artillery ammunition in a few days/weeks/months and there is no need to take heavy losses. They may be correct.

I totally agree that Ukraine at this point will not accept anything less than the pre 2014 borders. I can see a scenario where Ukraine gives up Crimea in exchange for all of Donbas, reconstruction, bi-lateral security arrangements and NATO membership. I don't see any scenario where Ukraine would accept less. For certain Ukraine will insist on all of Kherson Oblast being returned.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 09-28-2022

The US is set to announce a 1.1 billion dollar military aid package to Ukraine, which is rumored to include 18 HIMARS. That's a significant jump, I wonder what that means.  Any chance this would hint at ATACMS being included?  Anti UAV systems are also include, among other things.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-28-2022

(09-28-2022, 10:23 AM)Treefence Wrote:  The US is set to announce a 1.1 billion dollar military aid package to Ukraine, which is rumored to include 18 HIMARS. That's a significant jump, I wonder what that means.

It could mean the US has finally realized that the Ukrainians need some "mass" to accomplish their goals. One possibility would be to develop a NATO style armored striking force, but that would take lots of time and cost lots of money. It may be that the US and Ukraine have decided on a "third way". If one looks at how 2 ACR was "reconstructed" for deployment to Europe, it is clear that at least part of the US army is not convinced the "classical"  armored striking force has a future. It is in fact quite jarring compared to it's composition when it left in 1990 . Alternatively, this may be the necessary counter-battery force to get Ukraine "over the top" in Kherson. OTOH, it might just be the realization that Ukraine has produced great results with this weapon and therefore "more is better". I really do hope that some day soon we have books published on the give-and-take discussions between the US and Ukrainian generals about the "way ahead".

Quote:Any chance this would hint at ATACMS being included?  Anti UAV systems are also include, among other things.

ATACMS is a different issue IMHO. It is easy to supply to armies that already operate HIMARS/M270. Unfortunately our behavior  on this subject has turned supplying HIMARS into a major escalation even if Russia didn't perceive it as such initially. If Ukraine can make a case that they really need ATACMS for specific, limited targets, maybe we will do so. I am pretty sure Biden will not sign any kind of what he sees as a "blank check".

I hope the anti UAV systems work.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 09-28-2022

Supposedly will be "a few years" before all the weapons in this tranche are supplied. No more detail on what exactly will be arriving and when.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1575197476050833408?s=20&t=vFLlzEzptfpPtqOUhR9sjA[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 09-28-2022

(09-28-2022, 12:36 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Supposedly will be "a few years" before all the weapons in this tranche are supplied. No more detail on what exactly will be arriving and when.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1575197476050833408?s=20&t=vFLlzEzptfpPtqOUhR9sjA[/tweet]

I'd be suprised if this were true.  I wonder if that quote is from the 3 billion package on their independence day.  Not sure if this picture is legit, but this shows a boat with 18 HIMARS loaded up.  

[tweet][url=https://twitter.com/JayinKyiv/status/1575192155601088513?s=20&t=G8--jgX0AGguAGTc7cZoYQ]https://twitter.com/JayinKyiv/status/1575192155601088513?s=20&t=G8--jgX0AGguAGTc7cZoYQ[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 09-28-2022

That picture is probably not legit, unfortunately.

Quote:Since the funding is for contracts for weapons and equipment, it is aimed at helping Ukraine secure its longer-term defense needs. It could take a year or two for Ukraine to get the systems. The U.S. has used Pentagon drawdown authority to provide weapons more immediately, and another announcement for that Defense Department aid is expected early next week.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-poised-to-provide-11-billion-more-in-aid-to-ukraine/2022/09/28/4f96ab4a-3f4b-11ed-8c6e-9386bd7cd826_story.html

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 09-28-2022

(09-28-2022, 11:09 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(09-28-2022, 10:23 AM)Treefence Wrote:  The US is set to announce a 1.1 billion dollar military aid package to Ukraine, which is rumored to include 18 HIMARS. That's a significant jump, I wonder what that means.

It could mean the US has finally realized that the Ukrainians need some "mass" to accomplish their goals. One possibility would be to develop a NATO style armored striking force, but that would take lots of time and cost lots of money. It may be that the US and Ukraine have decided on a "third way". If one looks at how 2 ACR was "reconstructed" for deployment to Europe, it is clear that at least part of the US army is not convinced the "classical"  armored striking force has a future. It is in fact quite jarring compared to it's composition when it left in 1990 . Alternatively, this may be the necessary counter-battery force to get Ukraine "over the top" in Kherson. OTOH, it might just be the realization that Ukraine has produced great results with this weapon and therefore "more is better". I really do hope that some day soon we have books published on the give-and-take discussions between the US and Ukrainian generals about the "way ahead".

Quote:Any chance this would hint at ATACMS being included?  Anti UAV systems are also include, among other things.

ATACMS is a different issue IMHO. It is easy to supply to armies that already operate HIMARS/M270. Unfortunately our behavior  on this subject has turned supplying HIMARS into a major escalation even if Russia didn't perceive it as such initially. If Ukraine can make a case that they really need ATACMS for specific, limited targets, maybe we will do so. I am pretty sure Biden will not sign any kind of what he sees as a "blank check".

I hope the anti UAV systems work.

It said 12 Titan Counter-UAS systems are bieng sent over, sounds like a man-portable drone jammer?
https://bluehalo.com/product/titan/

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 09-28-2022

Okay I think the reason this might take years is because this aid package is coming from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, not the Pentagon or presidential drawdown authority, so this is more for long term security, similar to the 3 billion package on their independence day.  I'm not quite sure how all that works, or if the rules are set in stone.  One thing I also wonder about is that Lend Lease act for 2022, apparently it's based on a fiscal year, so it should start October 1st, anybody have any idea what that means?  Will we see a larger supply of stored weapons be delivered, or will we not see much of a change?  


https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-government-and-politics-746ae5a7113e9bb78562ee3a943c9260

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-28-2022

(09-28-2022, 01:25 PM)gocard14 Wrote:  It said 12 Titan Counter-UAS systems are bieng sent over, sounds like a man-portable drone jammer?
https://bluehalo.com/product/titan/

Probably so. Unfortunately systems like this are almost impossible to test. Even if you have an actual target unit to operate against the opposing force can often make a simple change and your jammer no longer does. Worked fine in testing, now doesn't. While it is possible this unit is a panacea, I have seen many more units like this that failed miserably than the few that succeeded at all. Users often also don't RTFM and expect more performance than the manufacturer claims. All in all, a hard problem.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Leftcoast - 09-28-2022

RTFM = Read the F'ing Manual?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-28-2022

(09-28-2022, 02:20 PM)Leftcoast Wrote:  RTFM = Read the F'ing Manual?

Yes.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 09-28-2022

I recall a while ago that folks here considered the Baltics incapable of being defended by NATO due to Russia’s exclave in Kaliningrad. Now it looks like *Lithuania* has sufficient military power to March into Kaliningrad. 

https://mobile.twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1575250454509981708?cxt=HHwWmMC41af8tNwrAAAA

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-28-2022

(09-28-2022, 06:14 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I recall a while ago that folks here considered the Baltics incapable of being defended by NATO due to Russia’s exclave in Kaliningrad. Now it looks like *Lithuania* has sufficient military power to March into Kaliningrad. 

https://mobile.twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1575250454509981708?cxt=HHwWmMC41af8tNwrAAAA

Maybe, but were they to attempt that most cities in Poland and Germany (as well as Lithuania) would have lots of rubble and many, many bodies to clean up. This is of course assuming they don't use nuclear weapons. Kaliningrad isn't dangerous because of it's troop strength.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 09-28-2022

LOL. Have you been watching the same war as us? Russian conventional capability can barely turn small Ukrainian towns into rubble and only with months of sustained artillery bombardment. 

Russian military on paper might have some good systems. But they used them up, don't know how to use them, or they're actually garbage.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 09-28-2022

My only point - which I tried, but failed, to make in a humorous way - is that the Baltics should be defensible absent a nuclear war (in which case, we’re all screwed). I don’t see their membership in NATO as such a big burden anymore. Add Fin/Swe and Russia’s northwestern border is not looking so great.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 09-28-2022

I wonder if the Ukrainians can barter the captured T-90M for some good US weapons…

https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/09/26/why-the-capture-of-a-russian-t-90m-tank-matters

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-28-2022

(09-28-2022, 06:45 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  LOL. Have you been watching the same war as us? Russian conventional capability can barely turn small Ukrainian towns into rubble and only with months of sustained artillery bombardment. 

Russian military on paper might have some good systems. But they used them up, don't know how to use them, or they're actually garbage.

Well, I think I have. I have seen that the Russian forces have many limitations. I have also seen them mess up a lot of Ukrainian cities. You don't need to level a city to kill lots of people. I don't laugh about that. The Iskander is a formidable weapon. Ask the Ukrainians if you don't believe me. While Russia has used up a lot of it's tactical ballistic missiles, they have clearly not committed all of them. One of Russia's problems has been they must maintain a credible defense of a very long land border. They can only draw down so far.

Kaliningrad is the headquarters of the Baltic fleet and was known to have 12 operational Iskander batteries. No reason to believe that has changed. Even without reloading that is 24 missiles into important targets. It would undoubtedly take a ground assault from Lithuania at least a full day to "win" that battle. It could take several. There are plenty of reloads in the massive warehouses of Kaliningrad. There is no place to run in Kaliningrad. They might all surrender, but I wouldn't bet on it. Even as TFU as Russia has been in Ukraine, they are still hitting the cities with KH-22s and there isn't much anybody can do about it. 

IMHO history has shown many times that underestimating your enemy is always a bad idea. The Allies believed that Germany was a spent force before Operation Wacht am Rhein. We won anyway, but lots of people died that probably didn't have to. Similarly, Ukraine isn't out of the woods yet. It is also important to remember that in war nothing is inevitable. Conventional wisdom was that Ukraine wouldn't last long and that their defeat was "inevitable". Didn't turn out that way. The idea that Ukraine's victory is "inevitable" is equally suspect. Russia isn't done. Fortunately, it appears that Ukraine and the Pentagon know that.

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