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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 06-03-2022

One thing I wonder, and if anyone has any insight it is welcomed, but what factor does Ukraine fully mobilizing just before the ware started. Estimates were that Ukraine had has about 200k active soldiers, and likely more than double that in reserve.  How long does it take for those reserves to be at full strength.  Also, assuming a number of people volunteered to join the armed forces after Feb 24th, how long will it take for those soldiers to be combat ready.  Given Russia had an estimated 190k soldiers for this attack, with a certain amount added from DNR, LNR, and Wagner, shouldn't we expect the troop numbers to favor Ukraine overwhelmingly at some point?  Obviously troop numbers alone aren't a full measure of military strength, but these numbers are part of why I'm optimistic long term for Ukraine, assuming western support doesn't dry up.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-03-2022

(06-03-2022, 12:45 PM)Treefence Wrote:  One thing I wonder, and if anyone has any insight it is welcomed, but what factor does Ukraine fully mobilizing just before the ware started. Estimates were that Ukraine had has about 200k active soldiers, and likely more than double that in reserve.  How long does it take for those reserves to be at full strength.  Also, assuming a number of people volunteered to join the armed forces after Feb 24th, how long will it take for those soldiers to be combat ready.  Given Russia had an estimated 190k soldiers for this attack, with a certain amount added from DNR, LNR, and Wagner, shouldn't we expect the troop numbers to favor Ukraine overwhelmingly at some point?  Obviously troop numbers alone aren't a full measure of military strength, but these numbers are part of why I'm optimistic long term for Ukraine, assuming western support doesn't dry up.
The Ukraine does have a highly motivated populace that wants to help protect the country. Many of them are already serving in volunteer home guard formations of various types. These units have, up to this point anyway, little formal training. While some have argued that fighting is the best way to learn to be a soldier, both the people doing it this way and the trainers point out this is emphatically not the case. If it were, armies wouldn't bother to train their troops. The problem is that much of soldiering is doing the same boring thing, like patrolling an area or guarding a checkpoint, day after day where you learn nothing much new. Then, you walk into a firefight and have to do the "right thing" immediately or you are dead. You have no training, and you haven't been in a firefight before. You don't know what to do, so you are dead and probably several of your colleagues are dead too because you F***** up. It isn't like sports, where you learn from game experience. Mistakes in war have a much higher cost and significantly shorten your career. Ukraine has been training troops as fast as they can on an ad-hock basis to a minimal standard. These units have done wonderfully well considering the fact they are recently organized and untrained. However, it is difficult to attack with such a force as they don't have either training or experience in doing so. They are also heterogeneously organized and of vastly varying capability so organizing an attack is difficult. Their transportation capabilities are also not real good (understatement).

Supposedly Ukraine is also fully training several battalions that have not been committed to the fight yet. These units are going to be used as an assault force to drive the Russians back. They are also supposedly going to use a lot of the T-72s they got from other former Warsaw Pact countries to form Mechanized Infantry/Armored units to participate in the offensives. Naturally, such units would be ineffective if not pretty well trained. These people are supposedly volunteers who were not part of the Ukrainian forces at the start of the war. Zelenskyy has been pretty cagey about these units, saying only that they should be available after "the second week in June". Whether this is true or not, I don't know, but it surely would be great if it were. It also makes sense. Recent events in the Donbas may hold back committing these units. If these units don't exist, they will need to be created before Ukraine can drive the Russians back. In order not to waste their offensive capabilities, it probably will require waiting until they can at least locally neutralize Russian artillery with some of the new weapons. Of course, overrunning said artillery will accomplish that too :-).


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 06-03-2022

(06-03-2022, 12:45 PM)Treefence Wrote:  One thing I wonder, and if anyone has any insight it is welcomed, but what factor does Ukraine fully mobilizing just before the ware started. Estimates were that Ukraine had has about 200k active soldiers, and likely more than double that in reserve.  How long does it take for those reserves to be at full strength.  Also, assuming a number of people volunteered to join the armed forces after Feb 24th, how long will it take for those soldiers to be combat ready.  Given Russia had an estimated 190k soldiers for this attack, with a certain amount added from DNR, LNR, and Wagner, shouldn't we expect the troop numbers to favor Ukraine overwhelmingly at some point?  Obviously troop numbers alone aren't a full measure of military strength, but these numbers are part of why I'm optimistic long term for Ukraine, assuming western support doesn't dry up.

Ukraine recently stated they are outnumbered 7 to 1 in some areas of the Donbas.  I don't know how to square that with your math, which suggests that the Ukrainians might outnumber the Russians.  I know Ukraine has soldiers elsewhere because it has to defend the whole country, but you wouldn't expect to see only 1/7 of Ukraine's army in the only area of the country where Russia is attacking aggressively.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 06-03-2022

Good post. I would add that the real important ratio is not overall army size, but the ratio at the active front. Ukraine has probably their most veteran units in the Donbas, but they also have regulars army units across their whole country, including areas not bordering Russia or an active area of fighting.

Russia is having marginal success in Luhansk because they have concentrated their forces and their firepower significantly at this front. Ukraine are themselves having some succes now near Kherson, likely because it is not as entrenched or defended as well as possible due to Russia using their troops in the Donbas. 

Russia has committed many of their training units' contracted soldiers to Ukraine. Not too familiar with the Ukrainian force disposition, but they do have at least some regular army soldiers training new soldiers, not to mention probably some of their better soldiers overseas learning new tech to bring back. If there are significant sized Ukrainian reserves being trained up with modernized western armor, I think things could tilt Ukraine's way later in the summer, when ground conditions will be optimal for mechanized maneuver warfare. But we haven't seen much if any of that from Ukraine yet, so it is still to be seen if Ukraine is more capable at it than Russia has thus far shown.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 06-03-2022

(06-03-2022, 02:49 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  
(06-03-2022, 12:45 PM)Treefence Wrote:  One thing I wonder, and if anyone has any insight it is welcomed, but what factor does Ukraine fully mobilizing just before the ware started. Estimates were that Ukraine had has about 200k active soldiers, and likely more than double that in reserve.  How long does it take for those reserves to be at full strength.  Also, assuming a number of people volunteered to join the armed forces after Feb 24th, how long will it take for those soldiers to be combat ready.  Given Russia had an estimated 190k soldiers for this attack, with a certain amount added from DNR, LNR, and Wagner, shouldn't we expect the troop numbers to favor Ukraine overwhelmingly at some point?  Obviously troop numbers alone aren't a full measure of military strength, but these numbers are part of why I'm optimistic long term for Ukraine, assuming western support doesn't dry up.

Ukraine recently stated they are outnumbered 7 to 1 in some areas of the Donbas.  I don't know how to square that with your math, which suggests that the Ukrainians might outnumber the Russians.  I know Ukraine has soldiers elsewhere because it has to defend the whole country, but you wouldn't expect to see only 1/7 of Ukraine's army in the only area of the country where Russia is attacking aggressively.

I have seen those reports of 7 to 1 ratios and it has confused me a bit, but it does sound like Russia is overloading their points of attacks, and right now I'd assume Ukraine has kept a number of units back to defend their vast border with Russia and Belarus, hopefully avoiding another attack towards Kyiv and other regions.  I also think the 7 to 1 ratio could be a bit of an exaggeration, but I couldn't tell you for sure.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-03-2022

(06-03-2022, 02:49 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Ukraine recently stated they are outnumbered 7 to 1 in some areas of the Donbas.  I don't know how to square that with your math, which suggests that the Ukrainians might outnumber the Russians.  I know Ukraine has soldiers elsewhere because it has to defend the whole country, but you wouldn't expect to see only 1/7 of Ukraine's army in the only area of the country where Russia is attacking aggressively.
It is certainly true the Ukraine has to defend their entire border. Russia is maintaining some pressure along the entire line of contact, so Ukraine can't strip lots of troops from one area and move them Donbas. Even around Odesa Ukraine has to keep troops because Russia could at least in theory stage an amphibious landing.

It is also true that essentially all the volunteer units are infantry only with little training. They have no organic transport and no experience being redeployed around the country. They aren't organized to do that. Many of these folks are not full-time soldiers and have "day jobs". They volunteered to protect their homes, not to go to the Donbas. While many of them might go if asked, the unit as a whole probably wouldn't. Organizationally difficult to do.

I don't know the exact composition of the units fighting in the Donbas, but I am pretty sure they started out being mostly "indigenous" units, much like elsewhere in Ukraine. These units were undoubtedly reinforced by more regular units as time went on and it became clear Russia was concentrating there, but there have been heavy casualties. Zelenskyy has stated that he isn't increasing the number units in contact because it would just result in higher casualties from Russian artillery without materially increasing their combat power. He is probably correct. Infantry vs artillery always ends badly for the former. Ukraine is expecting a lot from their new weapons. I hope they come soon and can allow Ukraine to use their strength to good effect.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - fullmetal - 06-03-2022

Here's an interesting take on Russia's force structure changes rendering it poorly-equipped to handle the invasion.  It downplays some of the more popular, previously discussed reasons behind the disparate Russian/Ukrainian military effectiveness.

https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 06-03-2022

(06-03-2022, 11:10 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I know there are folks here who want to see Ukraine fight to retake every inch of territory Russia has taken so far.  This is more directed at those in the media whom I have heard advocating for a negotiation to trade territory for peace.  Just compare the amount of territory Russia has stolen from Ukraine (46,000 sq miles) to the amount of territory the Arabs are trying to take from Israel (2,400 sq miles).  If the Israelis are willing to fight for generations to retain that relatively small amount of territory, what makes us think Ukrainians will not fight just as hard for 19x the amount of land?  And why should they not?

We should respect Ukraine’s wishes with how to respond to the invasion.  Its their territory and it is their soldiers and civilians who are dying.  If they want to fight to the last man standing, they should be armed and supported.  They also shouldn’t be faulted if at some point they sue for peace.  It is ridiculous that outsiders are whispering at how the ar should go.

BC


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-04-2022

(06-03-2022, 10:30 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  
(06-03-2022, 11:10 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I know there are folks here who want to see Ukraine fight to retake every inch of territory Russia has taken so far.  This is more directed at those in the media whom I have heard advocating for a negotiation to trade territory for peace.  Just compare the amount of territory Russia has stolen from Ukraine (46,000 sq miles) to the amount of territory the Arabs are trying to take from Israel (2,400 sq miles).  If the Israelis are willing to fight for generations to retain that relatively small amount of territory, what makes us think Ukrainians will not fight just as hard for 19x the amount of land?  And why should they not?

We should respect Ukraine’s wishes with how to respond to the invasion.  Its their territory and it is their soldiers and civilians who are dying.  If they want to fight to the last man standing, they should be armed and supported.  They also shouldn’t be faulted if at some point they sue for peace.  It is ridiculous that outsiders are whispering at how the ar should go.

BC
BC, I can't agree. Every nation has a right and duty to evaluate the situation and respond in a way they think appropriate. One could argue the US isn't giving the Ukrainians what they want when they want it. Are we ridiculous because that is true? The Swiss won't do certain things because it violates their neutrality policies. Are they not entitled to that position? Israel is walking a very fine line on this subject to avoid problems with Russia in Syria. I don't agree with that policy, but I can't say it is ridiculous.

It is even theoretically possible a point could reached when the US decides that helping Ukraine militarily is counter-productive. Consider the scenario where Ukraine takes back the entire Donbas (not just Feb 24, but all the way), and only Crimea remains under Russian control. Ukraine wants to take back Crimea and continue fighting, but Russia gives every indication that is a nuclear trigger. What do we do? That one isn't so clear IMHO. I can envision us saying "Obviously you can do whatever you think best, but we will no longer provide missiles and ammunition to continue the war. We will support you in negotiating a reasonable conclusion to hostilities, but we are not giving you a blank check". I am not saying that would be our position, but it wouldn't be ridiculous IMHO to take that position.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 06-04-2022

So Putin says if NATO-supplied MLRS systems hit Russian territory, Russia will hit the West.

This begs the question, what defines Russian territory? Does it include Russian occupied territory and Crimea, or pre 2014 map of Russia?


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 06-04-2022

(06-04-2022, 08:18 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  So Putin says if NATO-supplied MLRS systems hit Russian territory, Russia will hit the West.

This begs the question, what defines Russian territory? Does it include Russian occupied territory and Crimea, or pre 2014 map of Russia?

Yeah I've been wondering that as well. I believe from the US and Ukrainian point of view, those territories will be fair game.  Russia will specifically consider Crimea to be sovereign Russian territory. I don't think Russia will be stupid enough to attempt to attack the west, but if Ukraine does start to mount an offensive against Crimea, then maybe Putin will need to attack a NATO country, to claim he didn't lose to Ukraine, but all of the west combined.  That being said, if it gets to that point, I wonder if Putin will still be in power. A lot of guess work in all of this of course, but Crimea is going to be a very tricky situation no matter what.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-04-2022

(06-04-2022, 08:34 AM)Treefence Wrote:  
(06-04-2022, 08:18 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  So Putin says if NATO-supplied MLRS systems hit Russian territory, Russia will hit the West.

This begs the question, what defines Russian territory? Does it include Russian occupied territory and Crimea, or pre 2014 map of Russia?

Yeah I've been wondering that as well. I believe from the US and Ukrainian point of view, those territories will be fair game.  Russia will specifically consider Crimea to be sovereign Russian territory. I don't think Russia will be stupid enough to attempt to attack the west, but if Ukraine does start to mount an offensive against Crimea, then maybe Putin will need to attack a NATO country, to claim he didn't lose to Ukraine, but all of the west combined.  That being said, if it gets to that point, I wonder if Putin will still be in power. A lot of guess work in all of this of course, but Crimea is going to be a very tricky situation no matter what.
This is not just an academic question either. Even if Ukraine doesn't ultimately have the intention of taking back Crimea, taking back Kherson Oblast would undoubtedly draw artillery fire from Crimea. https://www.yahoo.com/news/frightened-occupation-authorities-transfer-pion-234819830.html. Those 210 mm guns aren't there to fire at local insurgents. There are more in Crimea. Is Ukraine just expected to accept that without attempting to suppress said artillery? Along those same lines, assume Ukraine is approaching the Russian border (which they have done in Kharkiv Oblast). What if Russia fires artillery from inside Russia proper? Can Ukraine reply using Soviet era guns but not M777? 152 mm shells are OK but 155 are not? Grads are fine but HIMARS isn't? Tricky is right.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 06-04-2022

Seemingly irrational behavior can be rational.  A rational person can use appearing irrational as an advantage.

Among the scenarios, what if Putin was given a year to live some months ago?  He no longer would care about being removed from power, either internally or externally.  What would be his concerns?  The safety of his family?  Making a name for himself in Russian history?  A smooth transition to the next leader?  He can rattle the swords all he wants as he won't have to live up to it.  Or would he try to go out in a blaze of what he sees as glory?

Going a bit further with this possibility....  If that situation were known to his top generals, he might be given a bit more leeway.  Not out of sympathy, but because they just have to wait for him to die rather than risk a coup.  As for blame, they can always claim they were just following orders.

What would happen in Russia if Putin were to die in the middle of this war?   What would happen to the war?  Would there be pressure for a hawk to take over and press the war, perhaps in Putin's name, or would there be pressure to bring the soldiers home?   I have no idea.

On the other hand, sometimes irrational behavior is just irrational.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 06-04-2022

If Putin truly has serious medical problems that any of his military staff is aware of, then I'm pretty sure our intelligence services know too. There is open source reporting that one of Russia's best thyroid surgeons has been flown in to see him on several occasions during periods of time when he has been out of the public eye, however most thyroid malignancies have very good prognosis and survival times.

If we knew about any serious health problems, probably not something we would openly declare, but it would inform US thinking and strategy. And I imagine if Putin dies, the war would probably end in some form or another pretty quickly. There is already widespread morale problems and refusal to fight in Russian units. I don't think there is any other leader in Russia they would fight for more than Putin.

All that being said, the Ukraine special operation may seem irrational to many of us, but I think it fits a clear pattern from Putin's perspective and recent history. Putin getting old and fearing the end or having a terminal medical condition could be true but it isn't necessary to explain this.

.....

Ukraine is counterattacking not only in Kherson oblast now, but also in Zaporizhia oblast and newly in Severodonetsk itself, at the most active front. Perhaps it's a fighting retreat still there but sounds like Ukraine intends to make Russia bleed for the city.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/AggregateOsint/status/1532951921971036162s=20&t=Hy1v8Bhaq50GSJGXp0wV5w[/tweet]

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/mdmitri91/status/1533048925346734080?s=20&t=_RDk7q8hf3NpQASHVHLlig[/tweet]

The reinforcements include foreign troops, who have been active on the front.

The son of a British MP, and a Royal Marine veteran of Afghanistan apparently there. I'm trying to find the tweet with the video of the takedown, was good.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/russia-says-tory-mps-son-involved-in-killing-chechen-commander-in-ukraine-ben-grant


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Mick - 06-04-2022

(06-04-2022, 09:58 AM)M T Wrote:  What would happen in Russia if Putin were to die in the middle of this war?   What would happen to the war?  Would there be pressure for a hawk to take over and press the war, perhaps in Putin's name, or would there be pressure to bring the soldiers home?   I have no idea.

Everyone in Russia except one scared, old, powerful, sick man knows what a catastrophic mistake it was to attack Ukraine. If Putin dies, I hope sane adults take over and drag Russia kicking and screaming back into the world community, to wit:

1. Immediate armistice.
2. Negotiations for pre-war borders.
3. Punishment for Russian officers too close to Putin and their failures.
4. Rapprochement with the West.
5. Pro-Western government installed.
6. Investment encouraged and accelerated in both Ukraine and USSR. McDonald's returns.
7. Russia joins NATO to help counter China.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-04-2022

[quote="dabigv13" pid='355299' dateline='1654367361']
Ukraine is counterattacking not only in Kherson oblast now, but also in Zaporizhia oblast and newly in Severodonetsk itself, at the most active front. Perhaps it's a fighting retreat still there but sounds like Ukraine intends to make Russia bleed for the city.



https://twitter.com/AggregateOsint/status/1532951921971036162s=20&t=Hy1v8Bhaq50GSJGXp0wV5w

It makes sense for Ukraine to fight in cities. There they can hide in buildings (ruined or not) and surprise Russian troops who can't see them coming. Much safer than fighting in the open. Artillery is still a problem but given lots of buildings, which one do the Russians target? Again, safer than digging trenches in the open (they know exactly where you are then). The trick is knowing when to leave. If you can win there, great. If not, you have to decide when it is "enough".


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 06-04-2022

Mariupol being a good example.  Long after the city was captured by Russia and the Ukrainians were hunkered down in the steel plant, they were still able to inflict casualties and, critically, divert Russian resources.

I don’t expect that Ukraine will be able to recapture Severodonetsk, but if they can get Russian troops bogged down in the city, and can take advantage of the terrain to hurt the occupying forces, it will help Ukraine elsewhere on the battlefield.

BC


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-04-2022

(06-04-2022, 12:51 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  Mariupol being a good example.  Long after the city was captured by Russia and the Ukrainians were hunkered down in the steel plant, they were still able to inflict casualties and, critically, divert Russian resources.

I don’t expect that Ukraine will be able to recapture Severodonetsk, but if they can get Russian troops bogged down in the city, and can take advantage of the terrain to hurt the occupying forces, it will help Ukraine elsewhere on the battlefield.

BC
Mariupol was indeed a good example. There was more to it than that however, as I found out after it was basically all over. Apparently the Ukrainians hunkered down in the steel plant still had the M14 in range of weapons that could destroy traffic on the road. Russia couldn't use that road as long as they held out there. I kept wondering why the Russians expended so much time and blood on that target. They could have just left them to rot. The problem was that it apparently closed the road.

Severodonetsk, like Mariupol, is a significant political target. However, if it becomes too costly Russia can just bypass it and let the Ukrainians surrounded therein wither. There is no M14 involved there, so the Ukrainians should not allow themselves to be cut off there. Of course, driving the Russians out will work too. Either way, do maximum damage to delay and destroy the enemy.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-04-2022

https://www.yahoo.com/news/analysis-ukraine-waits-west-tip-041145036.html captures the dynamic of Western aid arrival and the quantities Ukraine thinks it requires. Russia may be running on empty right now, but in most ways so is Ukraine. We need to do whatever is necessary to step up the delivery and usage of HIMARS.MLRS systems to  relieve some of the pressure on Ukrainian troops. This won't solve the SRBM problem or the cruise missile problem, bit it will allow Ukraine to drive Russian troops out The Ukrainians are motivated, the Russians are not. As long as the Russians are pretty sure they can just pound any Ukrainian attack into the dust with artillery, they fight OK. When that is not the case, they don't and end up retreating. Let's make that the norm.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 06-04-2022

Didn’t realize it, but Lysychansk is about 100 m above Severodonetsk and about 4 km away.

[Image: itsatrap.jpg]

BC