Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 06-07-2025

Another interesting new drone attack. A Russian military train was attacked, with reported loss of 13 tanks, 100+ vehicles, and lots of fuel. Russian sources claim the Ukrainian drones were loaded onto grain transports on the same train. I'm a bit skeptical of those details, but the attack on the train does seem to have happened in some fashion at least.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1931424789383569752

Quote:Absolute madness — “Another shocking failure by our special services. There is no point in staying silent anymore — the enemy blew up a locomotive that was transporting tanks, dozens of armored vehicles, and military transport equipment.

At one point during movement, hatches on grain transport wagons opened, and drones flew out. These drones attacked the military equipment placed on the platform cars. It’s unclear who came up with the idea of sending military hardware along with grain wagons. It’s also unknown how Ukraine’s Security Service managed to hide the drones there.

The first strike hit the locomotive, causing the train to lose speed and eventually stop. As a result, the enemy destroyed most of the equipment without resistance. Internally, the operation is being called ‘Spider Web 2.0.’

Someone must be held accountable for this.” — write enraged Russian military correspondents.

On the map, you can see a massive fire currently captured by satellites at the location of the strike on the echelon.

https://x.com/visionergeo/status/1931427724653998353

....


Also a Russian Su-35 was downed near Sumy. Some initial reports claim it was an F16, UAF has not confirmed this yet.

Quote:The Russian Su-35S was shot down just 16 kilometers from the Sumy/Kursk border. 

That'll teach the VKS (will it? Probably not) that whilst it's great to have missiles that outrange your opponent, that does involve staying at range...

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1931371243682324522

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 06-09-2025

(06-07-2025, 02:31 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Another interesting new drone attack. A Russian military train was attacked, with reported loss of 13 tanks, 100+ vehicles, and lots of fuel. Russian sources claim the Ukrainian drones were loaded onto grain transports on the same train. I'm a bit skeptical of those details, but the attack on the train does seem to have happened in some fashion at least.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1931424789383569752

Quote:Absolute madness — “Another shocking failure by our special services. There is no point in staying silent anymore — the enemy blew up a locomotive that was transporting tanks, dozens of armored vehicles, and military transport equipment.

At one point during movement, hatches on grain transport wagons opened, and drones flew out. These drones attacked the military equipment placed on the platform cars. It’s unclear who came up with the idea of sending military hardware along with grain wagons. It’s also unknown how Ukraine’s Security Service managed to hide the drones there.

The first strike hit the locomotive, causing the train to lose speed and eventually stop. As a result, the enemy destroyed most of the equipment without resistance. Internally, the operation is being called ‘Spider Web 2.0.’

Someone must be held accountable for this.” — write enraged Russian military correspondents.

On the map, you can see a massive fire currently captured by satellites at the location of the strike on the echelon.

https://x.com/visionergeo/status/1931427724653998353

....


Also a Russian Su-35 was downed near Sumy. Some initial reports claim it was an F16, UAF has not confirmed this yet.

Quote:The Russian Su-35S was shot down just 16 kilometers from the Sumy/Kursk border. 

That'll teach the VKS (will it? Probably not) that whilst it's great to have missiles that outrange your opponent, that does involve staying at range...

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1931371243682324522

Intersting wrinkle on the Su35 shootdown

https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-f16-shoots-down-russia-jet-2082811

Per report Ukraine used a swedish Saab 340 AEW&C to guide the F16 and target the AMRAAM. If true this would represent a significant increase in Ukraine's air capabilities and could push russian air even further back from the front line. Main limitation is probably how much air time they can get on the Saab 340s and i think they only got the one of them. 

If tC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-09-2025

(06-09-2025, 10:10 AM)gocard14 Wrote:  Intersting wrinkle on the Su35 shootdown

https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-f16-shoots-down-russia-jet-2082811

Per report Ukraine used a swedish Saab 340 AEW&C to guide the F16 and target the AMRAAM. If true this would represent a significant increase in Ukraine's air capabilities and could push russian air even further back from the front line. Main limitation is probably how much air time they can get on the Saab 340s and i think they only got the one of them. 
If tC

They have received one of the two they are scheduled to receive. The presence of these aircraft does greatly enhance Ukraine's ability to locate Russian air targets, including both aircraft and cruise missiles. The Russian air force has been using glide bombs with great success. Doing so has required approaching the line of contact. The ability of the AWACS to detect the Russian aircraft early and vector the F-16s to the correct area will make it much more risky for Russian air. The F-16 will not need to use its own radar until the last minute, if at all. This makes it more difficult for the Russian aircraft to know it is being targeted until it is too late. It also makes shooting down cruise missiles lots easier because the F-16 can be directed to them. They don't have to search as much.
 
Eyes in the sky are always a big help. Obviously the AWACS will be a sought-after target. The S-400 was designed as an AWACS-killer, among other things.
 
The main limitation on how effective this AWACS will be is the lack of sufficient numbers of F-16s. Shooting down an SU-35 is great, but doing that with regularity is the only way to deter Russia from continuing with its glide bomb attacks. There just aren't enough F-16s or F-16 pilots to do that. What could have been :-(.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Maple Leaf - 06-09-2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia-drones-weapons.html

"The Ukrainian military says its new weapon system, which launches antiaircraft missiles from a remote-controlled speedboat, has brought down two Russian jet fighters."

"The latest addition to this remote-controlled arsenal is the Magura V7, a homemade weapon system that launches antiaircraft missiles from a 24-foot remote-controlled speedboat."

"The system shot down two Russian Su-30 warplanes last month, according to the Ukrainian agency and independent analysts, in what is believed to be the first-ever successful use in combat by a drone boat against a fighter jet."

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-09-2025

https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-administration-diverted-20-000-121854257.html

It is unclear to me what 20,000 "anti-Shaheds" missiles would be used for in the Middle East. Iran has already twice attempted to use massive strikes using a large number of these drones. None of them got through. Clearly Israel doesn't need these missiles. So where are they actually going? Qatar?

Does anybody have a guess on what type of missiles are involved in this transfer? I haven't yet seen that explicitly reported.

UPDATE: Looks like these.
https://militarnyi.com/en/news/u-s-redirects-20-000-anti-drone-missiles-originally-intended-for-ukraine-to-the-middle-east/

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 06-09-2025

(06-09-2025, 01:06 PM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-administration-diverted-20-000-121854257.html

It is unclear to me what 20,000 "anti-Shaheds" missiles would be used for in the Middle East. Iran has already twice attempted to use massive strikes using a large number of these drones. None of them got through. Clearly Israel doesn't need these missiles. So where are they actually going? Qatar?

Does anybody have a guess on what type of missiles are involved in this transfer? I haven't yet seen that explicitly reported.

UPDATE: Looks like these.
https://militarnyi.com/en/news/u-s-redirects-20-000-anti-drone-missiles-originally-intended-for-ukraine-to-the-middle-east/

Potentially, they could have shielded Ukraine from Russian drone attacks for a while.  Perhaps the diversion from Ukraine was the whole point, not where they go to.

The article you referenced said:

Quote:Although the systems were purchased under a program designated for Ukraine, U.S. law permits the Secretary of Defense to reallocate the equipment to American forces in cases of “urgent need.”

I'm not aware of any "urgent need" by American forces in the Middle East.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-09-2025

(06-09-2025, 02:08 PM)M T Wrote:  

(06-09-2025, 01:06 PM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-administration-diverted-20-000-121854257.html

It is unclear to me what 20,000 "anti-Shaheds" missiles would be used for in the Middle East. Iran has already twice attempted to use massive strikes using a large number of these drones. None of them got through. Clearly Israel doesn't need these missiles. So where are they actually going? Qatar?

Does anybody have a guess on what type of missiles are involved in this transfer? I haven't yet seen that explicitly reported.

UPDATE: Looks like these.
https://militarnyi.com/en/news/u-s-redirects-20-000-anti-drone-missiles-originally-intended-for-ukraine-to-the-middle-east/

Potentially, they could have shielded Ukraine from Russian drone attacks for a while.  Perhaps the diversion from Ukraine was the whole point, not where they go to.

Indeed the diversion of these missiles from Ukraine may be the whole point. OTOH I am not sure these missiles work all that well against drones, no matter what the BAE folks say.  These missiles were not originally designed for this role. The "anti-air" proximity detonator capability was an add-on. An infrared guidance system was an add on. A Shahed 136 is not exactly a "bright" target. It may be we didn't want to reveal that our promised wonder-weapons don't actually work all that well. Wouldn't be the first time.

https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/apkws_will_become_even_better_against_drones_bae_systems_adds_fire_and_forget_function-13434.html
https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/once_promised_to_ukraine_dragonfire_combat_laser_needs_two_more_years_and_12_bln_to_enter_production-14756.html

Quote:The article you referenced said:

Quote:Although the systems were purchased under a program designated for Ukraine, U.S. law permits the Secretary of Defense to reallocate the equipment to American forces in cases of “urgent need.”

I'm not aware of any "urgent need" by American forces in the Middle East.

Nor am I.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 06-09-2025

https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-plans-test-natos-resolve-german-intelligence-chief-warns-2025-06-09/

I hope we are never in a position to answer the question of whether NATO would respond to a “little green men” in Estonia situation.

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-09-2025

(06-09-2025, 04:22 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-plans-test-natos-resolve-german-intelligence-chief-warns-2025-06-09/

I hope we are never in a position to answer the question of whether NATO would respond to a “little green men” in Estonia situation.

BC

I don't believe we would ever see "little green men" in the Baltics. That approach worked in Ukraine because there were a very large number of people in the Donbas that did actually prefer Russia. Thus the "little green men" with no insignia could credibly be locals. That isn't true in the Baltics. The real danger there is that Russia can overwhelm one or more of these countries in a few days, maybe a few hours. Collective defense would be a tough sell facing such a fiat accompli. IMO the BND is correct to question the willingness of the various NATO nations to risk everything in the defense of their neighbor, let alone their neighbor thrice removed.

During the Cold War the assumption was that Article 5 would only be invoked in response to a Russian attack upon some NATO member state. The members were certain the US would respond militarily and in force. The the various members really had little choice but to do the same in those circumstances (although France was a question mark for many years). It was also assumed that Russia would not stop with a "limited" aggression and a general war was unavoidable anyway. Today, since the US participation is far from certain, other NATO countries are performing their calculus. For many years the US preserved the peace by treating Article 5 as a sacred bond. Article 5 actually only requires that each nation will take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” That is far from a sacred bond. NATO only worked because everyone, including the US, pretended it was. The current administration has removed that pretense. Unfortunately that is a Pandora's box.
 
https://cepa.org/article/willfully-vague-why-natos-article-5-is-so-misunderstood/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=22505184673&gclid=Cj0KCQjwjJrCBhCXARIsAI5x66X3Ly3jMo5RivWjUeTki8oV3FtWqlOWiPemTtGz5wmzHoj7rijNhtUaAl91EALw_wcB
I am pretty sure today the US would send TV re-runs, not coal oil.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 06-10-2025

(06-09-2025, 08:47 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(06-09-2025, 04:22 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-plans-test-natos-resolve-german-intelligence-chief-warns-2025-06-09/

I hope we are never in a position to answer the question of whether NATO would respond to a “little green men” in Estonia situation.

BC

I don't believe we would ever see "little green men" in the Baltics. That approach worked in Ukraine because there were a very large number of people in the Donbas that did actually prefer Russia. Thus the "little green men" with no insignia could credibly be locals. That isn't true in the Baltics. The real danger there is that Russia can overwhelm one or more of these countries in a few days, maybe a few hours. Collective defense would be a tough sell facing such a fiat accompli. IMO the BND is correct to question the willingness of the various NATO nations to risk everything in the defense of their neighbor, let alone their neighbor thrice removed.

During the Cold War the assumption was that Article 5 would only be invoked in response to a Russian attack upon some NATO member state. The members were certain the US would respond militarily and in force. The the various members really had little choice but to do the same in those circumstances (although France was a question mark for many years). It was also assumed that Russia would not stop with a "limited" aggression and a general war was unavoidable anyway. Today, since the US participation is far from certain, other NATO countries are performing their calculus. For many years the US preserved the peace by treating Article 5 as a sacred bond. Article 5 actually only requires that each nation will take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” That is far from a sacred bond. NATO only worked because everyone, including the US, pretended it was. The current administration has removed that pretense. Unfortunately that is a Pandora's box.
 
https://cepa.org/article/willfully-vague-why-natos-article-5-is-so-misunderstood/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=22505184673&gclid=Cj0KCQjwjJrCBhCXARIsAI5x66X3Ly3jMo5RivWjUeTki8oV3FtWqlOWiPemTtGz5wmzHoj7rijNhtUaAl91EALw_wcB
I am pretty sure today the US would send TV re-runs, not coal oil.

Our less than enthusiastic support of the Article 5 currently is probably very good for Western Europe and they see the need to rebuild their military, England and Germany seem particularly inclined in this direction. While the Baltic States are probably not considered much more than a bump in the road, I wonder how easy it would really be for Russia.  They have found making headway in Ukraine far more difficult than they planned despite the fact Ukraine has no real airpower to bother them. By invading the Baltic States I would assume that the combined NATO air forces would be committed to the fray.  Something Russia has not had to deal with in the Ukrainian conflict.  After watching the Russian efforts the last two years I would have to wonder how they would fare in a conflict with a peer military.  
I understand your point about the willingness of the other NATO countries to come to the defense the Baltic States, but I do think the other NATO states would prefer to take the fight to the Russians before they reach their own country. My guess is that the BND probably has a pretty good handle on some of these issues and may well have a good handle on Russian plans.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-10-2025

(06-10-2025, 01:07 PM)GK3 Wrote:  Our less than enthusiastic support of the Article 5 currently is probably very good for Western Europe and they see the need to rebuild their military, England and Germany seem particularly inclined in this direction.

While I do believe that Western Europe sees the need to rebuild their military forces, I think our less than total commitment to Article 5 is a catastrophe. There are several reasons this is the case. If the US doesn't respond, can NATO "win"? If a large part of the European body politic decides the answer is "no", their nations will be unwilling to participate in a losing war. Even if the public in any given nation thinks NATO can win if they all stick together, the question then becomes "Will everybody participate?". It then becomes a "game theory" problem and Europe has a very long history of not trusting each other, for good reason. Without the US being there as the "adult in the room" it is very probable some nations will at least try to sit it out. This exact problem existed when France left the active military wing of NATO. The rest of Europe wasn't sure France would fight. At that time the fact the US certainly would ensured NATO still was a credible force. Otherwise, it would not have been.

NATO has also accepted former Warsaw pact states that can contribute little to NATOs military strength while at the same time presenting attractive targets to Russia. Many of the "original" NATO countries feel little affection or sense of obligation to these countries. Europe did just fine with these states as Russian satellites. IMO Berlin and Paris are not going to war for Bulgaria no matter what Article 5 says unless the US does too. During the Cold War Russia's Communist ideology gave European states good reason to believe  that Russia would not stop at a few nearby territorial acquisitions. That is no longer the case. Many Europeans find it credible that Russia would take Ukraine and that would be it. Same argument applies to Bulgaria, Romania and probably Hungary and Slovakia. The Czech Republic and Poland are a different case. The Germany government would see the necessity to fight for both, but given the current strength of its forces it is unclear to me they could or would. If Germany won't, nobody else can as Germany is "in the way". Finland is IMO also at risk of abandonment. Sweden would undoubtedly want to help them, but would not do it alone. Who else would feel a moral obligation to honor their collective defense commitment? If the US will not it gives everybody else the moral cover to do the same.

It must also be recognized that before 1945 Russia was part of the European "balance of power". At various times Russia was allied with Britain, France, and Germany, occasionally more than one at the same time. One of the fundamental contributions of NATO was the isolation of Russia from "the concert of Europe". If the US cannot be relied upon to "answer the bell", one or more NATO nations may chose to break that isolation and ally themselves with Russia. Their calculus may be that this is their best course to avoid war and obtain cheap fuels. This would be even more attractive if it brings no diplomatic consequences from the US. In today's world aligning with Russia may be a rational act, or at least appear to be.

It has been 34 years since the end of the Cold War. A generation has grown up in Europe that didn't believe they would ever fight a war. Germany abolished conscription in 2011 after 20 years of nothing like UMT. France stopped UMT in 1996. Italy stopped in 2005. The important fact is nobody really thought a war in Europe was possible. One important "side effect" of NATO is that military conflict between NATO nations became unthinkable. We were all "on the same side". If the US is no longer present to champion that theory, the various European nations may no longer feel the solidarity, but in any case their populations do not (present tense) support the creation of strong military. The Ukraine war changed the calculus. War in Europe was not just possible, it was happening. That (and not the US commitment wavering) is primarily why the European nations are (or at least attempting) increasing their military spending. However, it is far from clear their populations understand what will be required and accept the fact many of their children must be ready to fight a war.
 
The administrations admonitions about defense spending in 2017 got some lip service but little action. After Russia invaded Ukraine, that progressively changed. Many of the PIGS are going to be unable to do much, because their economies aren't strong enough to do so. Portugal 1.55% of GDP in 2024, Italy 1.61% in 2024, Spain 1.28% in 2024.  Greece does much better, 3.08% in 2024. The UK has always been slightly above 2%,  France broke 2% of GDP in 2023, Germany broke 2% the same year. While promises to increase this spending to 2.5% and more abound, the reality is that all these European nations have domestic problems and political constraints that make a 0.5% increase in their defense spending unlikely. More importantly, these nations have no credible means to increase the manning of their armed forces. The UK is in a particularly bad way, having to "lay up" several warships for lack of crews. Many specialist go to sea "back to back", moved from one returning ship to another deploying ship with no shore leave in between. During the Cold War, the BRD fielded 12 divisions and the DDR fielded 3. Today, the combined Germany fields 2 and change. There is no substitute for people, especially when fighting Russia. NATO has way too few service personnel and no way ahead to fix that problem. This isn't a problem caused by the US commitment wavering, but it matters more because the much larger number of already organized and trained US manpower will not be available.

Quote:While the Baltic States are probably not considered much more than a bump in the road, I wonder how easy it would really be for Russia.  They have found making headway in Ukraine far more difficult than they planned despite the fact Ukraine has no real airpower to bother them. By invading the Baltic States I would assume that the combined NATO air forces would be committed to the fray.  Something Russia has not had to deal with in the Ukrainian conflict.

A lot may depend on how much of a surprise such a Russian attack achieves. How quickly the NATO nations (sans the US) could make a decision to fight is very questionable. Being democracies the government must at a minimum take into consideration how much public support such an action would have. Given that any nation fighting for the Baltics would become a target for Russian missile retaliation, how many will sign up, and how quickly? The command structure would also have lots of "holes" if all the US pieces aren't there. The Baltic States have the misfortune to be near a part of Russia that contained the best and largest Russian IADS system. Protecting Leningrad was important. S-400 missiles launched from Russian territory can dominate the entire Baltic States airspace. Kaliningrad also has powerful air defense capability, although quite a few S-400s have been transferred to the south. Presumably if an attack on the Baltics was on offer, that would be reversed.
 
Until a successful SEAD operation can be executed much of NATO air would have a very difficult time operating near, let alone in the Baltics. The somewhat "good news" is that Norway has 52 F-35As operational. The Dutch have 49 F-35As. Even better, the Norwegian Air Force has demonstrated the ability to write coherent ATOs for a SEAD operation. They have obviously never executed one. How "ready" are both nations to execute SEAD in Russian territory? How ready are their populations for the inevitable Russian missile retaliation? If you bomb Russia you have to expect that reply. Can they be ready to execute "in time"? How many F-35A aircraft could be spared from national air defense requirements? How "ready" is the Dutch component?

Quote:After watching the Russian efforts the last two years I would have to wonder how they would fare in a conflict with a peer military. 

They wouldn't be fighting a "peer" military. What they would be fighting is a coalition of nations with vastly disparate capabilities that have limited ability to work together and no common set of operations. Coalition warfare has its problems. It also has its strengths. Nobody can possibly know how well NATO will perform without the US being a major participant. Everybody takes turns in the various leadership positions during exercises, but very few exercises take place without at least some US participation. None of these nations have any relevant actual combat experience. The UK and France contributed to the First Gulf War, but almost all of the planning and logistics was supplied by the US. The UK Chief of the Defence Staff a few years ago said that the UK couldn't fight unless the US supplied the transportation and logistics. Didn't go over well, but unfortunately may be accurate.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-10-2025

(06-10-2025, 01:07 PM)GK3 Wrote:  I understand your point about the willingness of the other NATO countries to come to the defense the Baltic States, but I do think the other NATO states would prefer to take the fight to the Russians before they reach their own country. My guess is that the BND probably has a pretty good handle on some of these issues and may well have a good handle on Russian plans.

IMO the issue is that many of the nations involved are unsure that Russia taking the Baltics inherently presages Russia reaching their own territory. Even if it does, that decision can be postponed until "later". If you do decide to help the Baltics you will call down upon your head Russian retribution immediately. If you don't participate, Russia may just stop there. They were part of Russia for years and most of Europe did just fine. If they don't stop, the Baltics wouldn't have been much help anyway :-). 

I think the BND has pretty good sources inside most European governments, including their own :-). IMO the problem is none of these countries actually yet have a settled policy on NATO without the US. Everybody is still feeling their way. Even more importantly, economic conditions and domestic political considerations, like AfD and the RN have the possibility of forcing a policy change overnight.  I do know that some nations are attempting to rely on bilateral relations with the US as an alternative to NATO. No sure that is a good plan, but... Equally, I am sure that even Putin doesn't know what Russian "plans" actually are. He certainly knows his goals, but how he intends to get there is probably heavily dependent on events. One thing I am sure of is that what the head of the BND says publicly probably should be taken with a bag of salt.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 06-10-2025

I wonder whether Russia could undertake a new invasion within the next 4 years. At that point, the leadership of the US has a good chance of changing and its commitment to NATO may change.(*)

Granted, the world has seen how fickle the US can be and needs to be better prepared for that fickleness. 
 
(*)This is assuming the US continues as it has for nearly 250 years.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Mick - 06-11-2025

(06-10-2025, 09:55 PM)M T Wrote:  I wonder whether Russia could undertake a new invasion within the next 4 years. At that point, the leadership of the US has a good chance of changing and its commitment to NATO may change.(*)

Granted, the world has seen how fickle the US can be and needs to be better prepared for that fickleness. 
 
(*)This is assuming the US continues as it has for nearly 250 years.

Is the U. S. fickle, or is it just one guy? Have we been fickle in the past? We answered the bell multiple times in the last century.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-11-2025

(06-11-2025, 06:33 AM)Mick Wrote:  

(06-10-2025, 09:55 PM)M T Wrote:  I wonder whether Russia could undertake a new invasion within the next 4 years. At that point, the leadership of the US has a good chance of changing and its commitment to NATO may change.(*)

Granted, the world has seen how fickle the US can be and needs to be better prepared for that fickleness. 
 
(*)This is assuming the US continues as it has for nearly 250 years.

Is the U. S. fickle, or is it just one guy? Have we been fickle in the past? We answered the bell multiple times in the last century.

As our British friends point out repeatedly, we "answered the bell" in WW I three years late and WW II two years late. No Zimmerman Telegram and no Pearl Harbor, would the US have answered at all? Open question. There has always been and still is today a very large percentage of the population that believes "Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course".
 
When Washington said that, the US was indeed distant but not at all detached, as events in his own administration had amply demonstrated (Jay Treaty).  The US was unable to follow an "isolationist" policy from  1792 through 1815, as events clearly demonstrated. It was probably true that nobody could successfully invade us but it was amply demonstrated that we could be blockaded and our commerce destroyed. The US couldn't survive that. After 1815 the US was able to stay out of international affairs except when we decided to participate (Mexican war, Spanish War). The US greatly benefited from the Pax Britannia.  The US was allowed to build a great power economy without the associated costs. We got a "free ride" from Great Britain. By the early 1900s, cracks were forming in that system. The Pax Britannia was falling apart. After WW I, Britannia no longer ruled the waves. The policy of the US toward "neutrality" fully went out the window in 1942. That was "only" 150 years, and was somewhat of a fluke. Great Britain wanted peace and free trade to increase its national welfare. So did the US. Britain paid the price in the immense cost of her RN and the necessity to fight "small wars" every so often. That was to our great advantage. We paid very little for our own defense.

After WW II the US was the only "great power" nation that was not devastated by the war. We were going to have to take over Britain's role as they simply could no longer do it. After WW I the isolationist majority (at the time) wanted things to be as they were before. They couldn't be, as events demonstrated. NATO was founded by the US in order to 1) oppose Russian ambitions and 2) to force the European nations to not fight each other. The second part is often forgotten. By founding NATO the US made the implicit pact that we wouldn't be late to the party again. Technology had made our position not distant at all. The idea was that collective security works only if everybody subscribes to it. If one "great power" chooses instead to follow a policy of short-term self interest, it makes no sense for the other collective security participants to constrain themselves. It is a classical game theory situation.

In so far as the current administration follows a policy of short-term self interest, the commitment from other nations  is equally destroyed, if not immediately, very soon. They have their own isolationists to deal with. Even a reversal of policy by the US  (by say the next administration) has every likelihood of not "fixing" the broken social contract. The US was in  a unique position after WW II. We are not in that position today. It isn't impossible that trust and unity of purpose can be restored, but it will not be all that easy. Until now, the concept of NATO "failing" was not even considered. Today it is being considered at some level by all members and some nations may decide to go another way. France almost did under de Gaulle. It can happen, especially if the "big dog" is no longer a player. As with many things, it is much easier to destroy them that to create them.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 06-11-2025

(06-11-2025, 08:16 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(06-11-2025, 06:33 AM)Mick Wrote:  

(06-10-2025, 09:55 PM)M T Wrote:  I wonder whether Russia could undertake a new invasion within the next 4 years. At that point, the leadership of the US has a good chance of changing and its commitment to NATO may change.(*)

Granted, the world has seen how fickle the US can be and needs to be better prepared for that fickleness. 
 
(*)This is assuming the US continues as it has for nearly 250 years.

Is the U. S. fickle, or is it just one guy? Have we been fickle in the past? We answered the bell multiple times in the last century.

As our British friends point out repeatedly, we "answered the bell" in WW I three years late and WW II two years late. No Zimmerman Telegram and no Pearl Harbor, would the US have answered at all? Open question. There has always been and still is today a very large percentage of the population that believes "Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course".
 
When Washington said that, the US was indeed distant but not at all detached, as events in his own administration had amply demonstrated (Jay Treaty).  The US was unable to follow an "isolationist" policy from  1792 through 1815, as events clearly demonstrated. It was probably true that nobody could successfully invade us but it was amply demonstrated that we could be blockaded and our commerce destroyed. The US couldn't survive that. After 1815 the US was able to stay out of international affairs except when we decided to participate (Mexican war, Spanish War). The US greatly benefited from the Pax Britannia.  The US was allowed to build a great power economy without the associated costs. We got a "free ride" from Great Britain. By the early 1900s, cracks were forming in that system. The Pax Britannia was falling apart. After WW I, Britannia no longer ruled the waves. The policy of the US toward "neutrality" fully went out the window in 1942. That was "only" 150 years, and was somewhat of a fluke. Great Britain wanted peace and free trade to increase its national welfare. So did the US. Britain paid the price in the immense cost of her RN and the necessity to fight "small wars" every so often. That was to our great advantage. We paid very little for our own defense.

After WW II the US was the only "great power" nation that was not devastated by the war. We were going to have to take over Britain's role as they simply could no longer do it. After WW I the isolationist majority (at the time) wanted things to be as they were before. They couldn't be, as events demonstrated. NATO was founded by the US in order to 1) oppose Russian ambitions and 2) to force the European nations to not fight each other. The second part is often forgotten. By founding NATO the US made the implicit pact that we wouldn't be late to the party again. Technology had made our position not distant at all. The idea was that collective security works only if everybody subscribes to it. If one "great power" chooses instead to follow a policy of short-term self interest, it makes no sense for the other collective security participants to constrain themselves. It is a classical game theory situation.

In so far as the current administration follows a policy of short-term self interest, the commitment from other nations  is equally destroyed, if not immediately, very soon. They have their own isolationists to deal with. Even a reversal of policy by the US  (by say the next administration) has every likelihood of not "fixing" the broken social contract. The US was in  a unique position after WW II. We are not in that position today. It isn't impossible that trust and unity of purpose can be restored, but it will not be all that easy. Until now, the concept of NATO "failing" was not even considered. Today it is being considered at some level by all members and some nations may decide to go another way. France almost did under de Gaulle. It can happen, especially if the "big dog" is no longer a player. As with many things, it is much easier to destroy them that to create them.

Very True, but I do not see Russia being in that much better of a position, and perhaps in an even worse position.  They have by all accounts ground up the stored armor from yesteryear and is approaching the point that it will no longer be able to replace is losses in the Ukraine.
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage#:~:text=%5B6%5D%20Russia%20has%20one%20factory,60%20to%2090%20per%20year.
If I were the Ukraine, I would find a way to hit that single tank factory with a drone strike. 
Common sense would seem to indicate that Russia is far from able to launch an attack into NATO at the current time. This would seem to give European NATO countries some time to get their act together and time for us to decide what we as a country want to do.  
I believe that the Western European NATO countries will act and spend more money on their defense. 
Whatever Putin may want to do, he still has to deal with the small population, limited industrial ability to produce modern weapons. and a group of individuals who probably do not want to see their assets blown up and thrown away to satisfy his ego. At the same time Russia has the one thing that has saved it since Napoleon and that is its vast size and miserable Winters. Put all your factories East of the Urals and no one will ever touch them.  Even today I am not sure any cruise missile can reach those factories. 
You also cannot avoid the fact that our military has downsized so far it would be seriously challenged to fight even a one front conflict.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 06-11-2025

(06-11-2025, 06:33 AM)Mick Wrote:  

(06-10-2025, 09:55 PM)M T Wrote:  I wonder whether Russia could undertake a new invasion within the next 4 years. At that point, the leadership of the US has a good chance of changing and its commitment to NATO may change.(*)

Granted, the world has seen how fickle the US can be and needs to be better prepared for that fickleness. 
 
(*)This is assuming the US continues as it has for nearly 250 years.

Is the U. S. fickle, or is it just one guy? Have we been fickle in the past? We answered the bell multiple times in the last century.

The US, with its 4-year cycle, may change by 180 degrees on any 4-year boundary.  In this cycle, there was a dramatic change

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - fullmetal - 06-11-2025

Quote:“We cannot leave the security of Europe in the hands of voters in Wisconsin every 4 years," says France's Europe Minister, Jean-Noël Barrot

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 06-11-2025

(06-09-2025, 10:45 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(06-09-2025, 10:10 AM)gocard14 Wrote:  Intersting wrinkle on the Su35 shootdown

https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-f16-shoots-down-russia-jet-2082811

Per report Ukraine used a swedish Saab 340 AEW&C to guide the F16 and target the AMRAAM. If true this would represent a significant increase in Ukraine's air capabilities and could push russian air even further back from the front line. Main limitation is probably how much air time they can get on the Saab 340s and i think they only got the one of them. 
If tC

They have received one of the two they are scheduled to receive. The presence of these aircraft does greatly enhance Ukraine's ability to locate Russian air targets, including both aircraft and cruise missiles. The Russian air force has been using glide bombs with great success. Doing so has required approaching the line of contact. The ability of the AWACS to detect the Russian aircraft early and vector the F-16s to the correct area will make it much more risky for Russian air. The F-16 will not need to use its own radar until the last minute, if at all. This makes it more difficult for the Russian aircraft to know it is being targeted until it is too late. It also makes shooting down cruise missiles lots easier because the F-16 can be directed to them. They don't have to search as much.
 
Eyes in the sky are always a big help. Obviously the AWACS will be a sought-after target. The S-400 was designed as an AWACS-killer, among other things.
 
The main limitation on how effective this AWACS will be is the lack of sufficient numbers of F-16s. Shooting down an SU-35 is great, but doing that with regularity is the only way to deter Russia from continuing with its glide bomb attacks. There just aren't enough F-16s or F-16 pilots to do that. What could have been :-(.

Does Ukraine have more F-16s and/or more pilots coming in the pipeline?  If it's matter of holding out until reinforcements arrive, Ukraine has shown multiple times over that it has the will to do that.

Alternatively, is there a world in which one or more NATO countries decide to enforce a "no fly zone" over the parts of Ukraine that remain in Ukrainian control?  If that's even remotely plausible, would that be sufficient to alter the course of the war?

Apologies if this has been addressed. I try to stay current on this thread, but I lapse sometimes, plus my memory isn't what it was.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 06-11-2025

(06-11-2025, 12:31 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Does Ukraine have more F-16s and/or more pilots coming in the pipeline? 

A total of 85 F-16s of various types have been promised to Ukraine. The distribution is 24 from the Netherlands, 19 from Denmark, 12 from Norway, and 30 from Belgium. Denmark has already delivered 12 F-16s to Ukraine. The 24 from the Netherlands have all been delivered to Ukraine. These aircraft are what Ukraine is currently flying. In addition, another 18 Dutch F-16s have been transferred to Romania and are being used to train pilots at the European F-16 training center (EFTC).  Norway has delivered 10 aircraft to Ukraine, 6 of which are flyable. There is some confusion about the actual state of the Norwegian deliveries. Belgium's F-16 deliveries are contingent on F-35 deliveries from Lockheed. These deliveries have been repeatedly delayed, so when the F-16s can actually leave Belgium is very uncertain. The maintenance status of these F-16s is also a bit uncertain. The current estimate is that all will be transferred by the end of 2028. This is a total of 42 aircraft. 3 aircraft have been destroyed. A 7% loss rate isn't great, but given the circumstances is not all that high. As a point of comparison the USAF lost rate for B-52s in the Linebacker II effort was less than 2%.

Ukraine therefore has 39 flyable F-16s in its inventory.  That is two squadrons worth, more or less. With an 80% availability (pretty high) that would mean 31 jets ready to fly each day. The article https://www.csis.org/analysis/f-16s-unleashed-how-they-will-impact-ukraines-war#:~:text=With%2018%20jets%20per%20squadron,reserve%20that%20can%20replace%20losses addresses the actual requirements for a "reasonable" F-16 force in Ukraine.

Quote:Ukraine needs close to 12 fighter squadrons to achieve the air support needed for the war on the ground, with four squadrons primarily responsible for each core mission set: (1) suppression of enemy air defenses, (2) air interdiction, and (3) defensive counter air. This aim would require 216 F-16s, with 18 aircraft in each squadron.

Maybe Ukraine can get by with less, but 39 isn't near enough.

How many pilots Ukraine has is another question. The US has trained 12 for sure. Probably a second class has graduated but I can find no reference to that happening. The EFTC has graduated a class that contained Ukrainian pilots (probably 7). This article points to the problem. Ukraine is busy fighting. It is difficult to pull experienced pilots out of the fight to train them on the F-16. They are needed where they are. As I have previously pointed out, pilots of Soviet jets often have difficulty converting to NATO aircraft. There muscle memory is all wrong. https://kyivindependent.com/us-revising-f-16-training-to-focus-on-younger-pilots-wsj-reports/ talks about the shift in training as a result. As of October 17, 2024 Ukraine had only 11 qualified F-16 pilots. Moonfish was the 12th. In any case, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/43566 talks about the problem from Ukraine's point of view. It is a recent article. Yes, lack of pilots is a big problem. By now Ukraine probably has "more" pilots but nowhere near the 25 it takes to make up a US 18 aircraft F-16 squadron. The 40 in the article is nonsense.

One may get confused by the articles touting the fact the UK has "trained" 200 F-16 pilots. That just isn't accurate. These pilots have undergone English language training and basic flight training. The accelerated flight training adopted for Ukrainian F-16 pilots will take 18 months. https://www.newsweek.com/uk-ukrainian-f16-pilot-training-fighter-jets-russia-2028952. The number of pilots that can be trained to fight in Ukraine per year is clearly inadequate even for the number of F-16s Ukraine already has. This training pipeline is expanding, but very slowly. "Wait til next year" seems to be the permanent motto.

(06-11-2025, 12:31 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  If it's matter of holding out until reinforcements arrive, Ukraine has shown multiple times over that it has the will to do that.

I must admit Ukraine is doing better morale-wise at this point than I expected. IMO the attempt to force Russia into a cease-fire actually helped Ukraine even though it didn't happen. It gave the public hope that even if victory would be impossible, at least an end to the killing and the missile strikes was possible. There was a way ahead other than defeat and all the troops had to do is hold on "for a while". I also expected a strong Russian offensive when the mud went away. That did not happen, although the steady Russian infantry attacks are advancing faster than back in 2024. If Russia does mount a "summer offensive" that starts to succeed it is very unclear to me how long Ukraine can hold out. Russia has certainly built up its manpower. It remains to be seen if they can use it.
 
There are also many questions regarding weapons supply to Ukraine. At the present there is still quite a bit of US material that had been previously programmed for Ukraine arriving. As that stream dries up, things will get much harder in Ukraine.  Will the US appropriate more money for weapons? How much can Europe supply, and how quickly? Ukraine will not have enough pilots to operate the 39 F-16s it has until fall, if then. Appearances indicate Ukraine has had an increase in pilots this spring that is allowing them to be more aggressive in the air. That is a "good" thing. Let's see how far they can take it. If they can scare the VKS enough (which apparently doesn't take much) the glide-bomb attacks can be successfully deterred. That is probably the best we can hope for in the near term.

(06-11-2025, 12:31 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Alternatively, is there a world in which one or more NATO countries decide to enforce a "no fly zone" over the parts of Ukraine that remain in Ukrainian control? 

Absolutely no chance.

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