Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 04-22-2025

(04-20-2025, 07:10 AM)GK3 Wrote:  Our moderators have a very difficult task.  I refer you, myself and others to Carl von Clausewitz's statement that War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.  If you accept his theory then War is simply another form of politics, plain and simple.  Personally I believe the Ukrainian situation is a clear confirmation of his theory.  

That said I believe this board is not the place for the discussion that can arrive from consideration of his theory as it applies to this situation.  What is very interesting about this war is that it appears to be a watershed moment in the development of tactics, weapons and strategic thinking about the conduct of conflict between parties. 
I think this NYT article clearly articulates how this watershed moment is happening: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-drones-deaths.htmlhap
It describes how tanks, including the Abrams have been reduced to having little value. Drones dominate the frontlines and miles of fiber optic cable dangle from the trees.  Watch that film clip of a Ukrainian drone flying along a trench line dropping molten metal on the occupants. A far cry from my day in the jungles of SE Asia. 
There has been a lot of discussion this board of drone warfare, but the problem is that it is developing so fast that keep up with it is very hard and as the Time article describes some of this development does not occur in a lab but in a bunker in the war zone.  How many drones can you build for the cost of a single M1 Abrams?  This is basically war on the cheap but just as deadly.  Another issue this conflict is raises is whether a small country and hold its own against a much larger country simply through drones.  Drones are far cheaper, easier to produce and just as effective.  How much do they level the playing field.  Maybe none at all in the long term since if you do not have any land in which to put your bunker then you are sort of of out of luck. 
Another aspect of this is how much is this costing Russia in the long term. 
Another thought is will this war result in simply a war between drones? If drones have taken artillery and armor out of play and reduced the infantry to cowering in its bunkers, will the side with the best drones win? 
I think that this conflict will force every country with an army of significance will have to rethink everything after seeing how this conflict is playing out.

While drone warfare is having a massive impact in Ukraine, there clearly are limits. They seem much more effective as a defensive weapon then an offensive one. The increased situational awareness appears to favor the defender, as shown by both sides struggles to make meaningful advances without Russias use of human waves. 

We also saw in Gaza, that tanks, supported by infantry and air, could effectively neutralize drones and more importantly, their operators, though some losses are inevitable. 

This may be change as land-based drones become more advanced, but then they may lose some of the cheapness that makes them so attractive as an option.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 04-23-2025

(04-22-2025, 12:50 PM)gocard14 Wrote:  

(04-20-2025, 07:10 AM)GK3 Wrote:  Our moderators have a very difficult task.  I refer you, myself and others to Carl von Clausewitz's statement that War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.  If you accept his theory then War is simply another form of politics, plain and simple.  Personally I believe the Ukrainian situation is a clear confirmation of his theory.  

That said I believe this board is not the place for the discussion that can arrive from consideration of his theory as it applies to this situation.  What is very interesting about this war is that it appears to be a watershed moment in the development of tactics, weapons and strategic thinking about the conduct of conflict between parties. 
I think this NYT article clearly articulates how this watershed moment is happening: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-drones-deaths.htmlhap
It describes how tanks, including the Abrams have been reduced to having little value. Drones dominate the frontlines and miles of fiber optic cable dangle from the trees.  Watch that film clip of a Ukrainian drone flying along a trench line dropping molten metal on the occupants. A far cry from my day in the jungles of SE Asia. 
There has been a lot of discussion this board of drone warfare, but the problem is that it is developing so fast that keep up with it is very hard and as the Time article describes some of this development does not occur in a lab but in a bunker in the war zone.  How many drones can you build for the cost of a single M1 Abrams?  This is basically war on the cheap but just as deadly.  Another issue this conflict is raises is whether a small country and hold its own against a much larger country simply through drones.  Drones are far cheaper, easier to produce and just as effective.  How much do they level the playing field.  Maybe none at all in the long term since if you do not have any land in which to put your bunker then you are sort of of out of luck. 
Another aspect of this is how much is this costing Russia in the long term. 
Another thought is will this war result in simply a war between drones? If drones have taken artillery and armor out of play and reduced the infantry to cowering in its bunkers, will the side with the best drones win? 
I think that this conflict will force every country with an army of significance will have to rethink everything after seeing how this conflict is playing out.

While drone warfare is having a massive impact in Ukraine, there clearly are limits. They seem much more effective as a defensive weapon then an offensive one. The increased situational awareness appears to favor the defender, as shown by both sides struggles to make meaningful advances without Russias use of human waves. 

We also saw in Gaza, that tanks, supported by infantry and air, could effectively neutralize drones and more importantly, their operators, though some losses are inevitable. 

This may be change as land-based drones become more advanced, but then they may lose some of the cheapness that makes them so attractive as an option.

I think you are absolutely correct that drones are not yet a mature weapons system.  Russian losses in terms of tanks and artillery pieces in the conflict are brobdingnagian I believe that a significant number of those were caused by drones.  Reports reflect that Russia has lost roughly 10,425 tanks and 21590 artillery pieces. Certainly many of those losses can be attributed to the longer range weapons we supplied fairly early in the conflict.  
The following article discusses the effectiveness of Ukraine's drones.  How accurate the information is undetermined as far as I know, but it would help explain those brobdingnagian equipment losses. 
https://www.kyivpost.com/analysis/49712
Another interesting article: https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-drones-behind-80-russia-frontline-casualties-report-nyt-war-2024-11
Other reports reflect that our Abrams tank has not fared well for many of the same reasons. 
Anti drone technology has also improved by leaps and bounds, causing both sides to use fiber optic cable attached to drones to control them.- This picture reflects the aftermath of many drones flying over one area. 
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1jf60be/remains_of_fiber_optic_wires_from_drones_flying/
A big question is whether you can saturate an area with drones sufficiently that the defensive measures fail?  
A lot of questions to be answered here before we know the future of drone warfare.  When Russia first invaded, the big money said Ukraine was done in a week, and now here we are in a situation where Russia's sole advantage is a willingness to throw its conscripts into human wave attacks much like they did in WWII to save Stalingrad. 
Small state actors like Hezbollah, Houthi's etc can generate threats from drones, but they don't have the ability to generate drones at the rate of 300,000 a month.  Plus as I understand it jamming drones controlled by fiber optic cable is difficult, maybe impossible. At the immediate front, the drone doesn't need range it just needs control.  If you have seen the film clip of a Ukrainian drone flying down a Russian trench line dropping molten aluminum bits on the people in it you can understand its deadly effects. If it is true that Ukraine has found a way to jam the Russian glide bombs then once again the EE's get a win.  
To participate in the drone wars, you need the ability to make a lot of them, fast. Most of what you make may end up doing nothing but what matters can you get enough of them through jamming or whatever to hit their target.  I see these issues as yet unanswered but I also think that the armor and artillery branches that ruled more recent major conflicts may become less important.  A lot is going happen before we know how this will play out.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - martyup - 04-23-2025

(04-23-2025, 08:07 AM)GK3 Wrote:  To participate in the drone wars, you need the ability to make a lot of them, fast. 

I couldn't resist:

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 04-23-2025

Axios reporting on Trump's reported "final offer" for US involvement in peace talks:

https://www.axios.com/2025/04/22/trump-russia-ukraine-peace-plan-crimea-donbas

What Russia gets
What Russia gets:

1. "De jure" U.S. recognition of Russian control in Crimea.
   
2. "De-facto recognition" of the Russia's occupation of nearly all of Luhansk oblast and the occupied portions of Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
   
3. A promise that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO. The text notes that Ukraine could become part of the European Union.
   
4. The lifting of sanctions imposed since 2014.
   
5. Enhanced economic cooperation with the U.S., particularly in the energy and industrial sectors.
   

What Ukraine gets:

1. "A robust security guarantee" involving an ad hoc group of European countries and potentially also like-minded non-European countries. The document is vague in terms of how this peacekeeping operation would function and does not mention any U.S. participation.
   
2. The return of the small part of Kharkiv oblast Russia has occupied.
   
3. Unimpeded passage of the Dnieper River, which runs along the front line in parts of southern Ukraine.
   
4. Compensation and assistance for rebuilding, though the document does not say where the funding will come from.
   

Thus far I have not seen any real signs that Putin is willing to accept any deal, so the first big question is if this is even in the cards on the Russian side. Politically, I'm not sure how well this would play in Ukraine, but to be frank given the circumstances an essential freezing of the front lines is probably in Ukraine's favor given the unlikelihood of regaining significant territory through a counter-offensive. 

Of course, Ukraine understands any agreement with Russia is hardly worth the paper it is printed on, so the question becomes if Ukraine thinks the time spent in a cease fire is more beneficial for themselves or for Russia? I would be inclined to think that the time to refortify, reconstitute men and material etc, while beneficial to both sides, would favor the defender more on balance.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 04-23-2025

(04-23-2025, 02:07 PM)gocard14 Wrote:  Axios reporting on Trump's reported "final offer" for US involvement in peace talks:

https://www.axios.com/2025/04/22/trump-russia-ukraine-peace-plan-crimea-donbas

What Russia gets
What Russia gets:

1. "De jure" U.S. recognition of Russian control in Crimea.
   
2. "De-facto recognition" of the Russia's occupation of nearly all of Luhansk oblast and the occupied portions of Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
   
3. A promise that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO. The text notes that Ukraine could become part of the European Union.
   
4. The lifting of sanctions imposed since 2014.
   
5. Enhanced economic cooperation with the U.S., particularly in the energy and industrial sectors.
   

What Ukraine gets:

1. "A robust security guarantee" involving an ad hoc group of European countries and potentially also like-minded non-European countries. The document is vague in terms of how this peacekeeping operation would function and does not mention any U.S. participation.
   
2. The return of the small part of Kharkiv oblast Russia has occupied.
   
3. Unimpeded passage of the Dnieper River, which runs along the front line in parts of southern Ukraine.
   
4. Compensation and assistance for rebuilding, though the document does not say where the funding will come from.
   

Thus far I have not seen any real signs that Putin is willing to accept any deal, so the first big question is if this is even in the cards on the Russian side. Politically, I'm not sure how well this would play in Ukraine, but to be frank given the circumstances an essential freezing of the front lines is probably in Ukraine's favor given the unlikelihood of regaining significant territory through a counter-offensive. 

Of course, Ukraine understands any agreement with Russia is hardly worth the paper it is printed on, so the question becomes if Ukraine thinks the time spent in a cease fire is more beneficial for themselves or for Russia? I would be inclined to think that the time to refortify, reconstitute men and material etc, while beneficial to both sides, would favor the defender more on balance.

The real problem with any "security guarantee" is that Russia can be 98% (maybe more) certain that none of the countries offering the guarantee will actually fight. If they intended to do so, they would already be doing it. Ukraine's only chance in the present war was to use massive aid from  outside sources to literally drive the Russian army out of Ukraine. They were unable to do so. One could discuss why that was true and who was to "blame" forever. I expect many books are already being written. The fact that few people seemed to understand that is what amazes me. I can see Ukraine not being willing to publicly state that belief, even if the held it. The "west" OTOH should have understood that was the case from the start. As I have previously stated IMO both Ukraine and the "west" assumed Russia would just quit when it became apparent that the cost of victory was "too high". Intention vs Capability got us again.
 
Going forward, the Ukrainian government is saying it wants to develop a new military that is so powerful Russia will not dare attack Ukraine. They use Israel as a notional model. The problem is that Israel's opponents while large in number have never actually united against Israel. Most of these countries are not very militarily powerful. Many of them have internal problems that keep them from greatly strengthening their military. Most of them are not well off. Russia is a much more serious opponent. Ukraine was never in the same economic class as Russia even before the war. Russia's GDP per capita in 2020 was 2.7 times that of Ukraine. In 2024 it was 2.9 times. Ukraine is also going to need massive capital infusion to restore the rump country that remains. The idea that Ukraine alone will ever be able to "deter" Russia without obtaining nuclear weapons and a credible deliver system is IMO a fantasy. Ukraine hoped that NATO membership would do that. It might if it were available to them. The question would be whether these countries that won't fight for Ukraine today would do so if Ukraine invoked Article 5. We will never know, because there are many countries that are members of NATO today (including the US) who will never allow that question to be come relevant. Ukraine isn't ever joining NATO. Russia wouldn't like it, but neither does lots of NATO.

Who has the most to gain from a cease-fire depends on which side has the better means to restore/increase their forces. The current proposal as I understand it involves the "west", particularly the US removing sanctions against Russia. That will be an absolutely massive advantage for the Russian economy. There is no equivalent opportunity available to Ukraine. Russia can also continue increasing its manpower available to fight. It is unclear Ukraine can do the same. For these reasons IMO Russia will strategically benefit much more from a pause than Ukraine will. The morale benefits are arguable. One possibility is that the Ukrainian population sees no viable way ahead for Ukraine and starts migrating elsewhere. Soldiers decide further resistance is futile and leave the military. OTOH the Russian population may find out a lot more about their losses and have time to contemplate what little benefit occupying the part of Ukraine they already have actually provides. It is not a victory for Putin. The Ukrainian government still exists and Ukraine still exists. Putin may have many more questions to answer about why that is so. I have no idea what happens there.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - ADPinWDC - 04-23-2025

Totally agree with Goose:
"The real problem with any "security guarantee" is that Russia can be 98% (maybe more) certain that none of the countries offering the guarantee will actually fight. If they intended to do so, they would already be doing it."

1) Any "guarantee" offered by Europe with weak Armies is just hand waving.  

2) UK and France three weeks ago were strutting around offering 25,000 troops to be stationed inside UKR as the "assurance" -- then they could not define "Rules of Engagement" when they shot at by Russia... Do they shoot back?  With what level of ordnance, ammo, air attack, missiles... ?  No answer.   Path to WW3 with Russia killing NATO member soldiers.  
#BadEscalation. 

AND, Europe is out of ammo now; they cannot train troops!  

3) So, now Europe is left HIRING UKR to fight Russia as the default condition.  No Ceasefire, because it cannot be ENFORCED.  It is just ink on paper. .

Mess.  USA is walking away from a "Quagmire" that Europe lacks der Wille unt the means to deal with.  
Cruel Karma for France leaving us IndoChina in the 60s.
No John Wayne to ride in and take out the Bad Guys.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 04-23-2025

(04-23-2025, 07:08 PM)ADPinWDC Wrote:  Totally agree with Goose:
"The real problem with any "security guarantee" is that Russia can be 98% (maybe more) certain that none of the countries offering the guarantee will actually fight. If they intended to do so, they would already be doing it."

To be clear, that includes the USA, from day 1.

Quote:1) Any "guarantee" offered by Europe with weak Armies is just hand waving.  

2) UK and France three weeks ago were strutting around offering 25,000 troops to be stationed inside UKR as the "assurance" -- then they could not define "Rules of Engagement" when they shot at by Russia... Do they shoot back?  With what level of ordnance, ammo, air attack, missiles... ?  No answer.   Path to WW3 with Russia killing NATO member soldiers.  
#BadEscalation.

Possibly true. OTOH one can argue that is the reason Russia would not do it. That is why the US has troops in the Baltic States (and Korea for that matter). Tactically they are a "speed bump". They can't stop a Russian invasion attempt. They can slow it down, and their blood ensures a US kinetic response, not "hand waving". This isn't new. 2ACR served a similar role during the Cold War. They even called themselves the "speed bump" and they all knew their orders included the word "retain".  They intended to do exactly that, and Russia knew it. Further, Russia feared they actually could. 5th Panzer also had some interesting ideas :-).

Quote:AND, Europe is out of ammo now; they cannot train troops!  

3) So, now Europe is left HIRING UKR to fight Russia as the default condition.  No Ceasefire, because it cannot be ENFORCED.  It is just ink on paper. .

Mess.  USA is walking away from a "Quagmire" that Europe lacks der Wille unt the means to deal with.  
Cruel Karma for France leaving us IndoChina in the 60s.

Of course France argues the exact opposite :-). It is true we refused to supply the air cover they asked for. That might have been one of the few good decisions made by the US regarding IndoChina. It is also quite true that the US urged the FRG to follow a "Don't scare the Bear" policy after the end of the Cold War. That doesn't absolve them from responsibility, but we were very complicit.

Quote:No John Wayne to ride in and take out the Bad Guys.

True. However it is unclear that Ukraine as a military force is "done". It is also unclear negotiations are "done". IMO  Russia never wanted a cease fire or peace anyway. Their apparent insistence that Ukraine agree to cede Crimea to Russia as a requirement for peace guaranteed that Ukraine would reject the offer. Their constitution explicitly forbids doing that. Zelenskyy couldn't do that if he wanted to. The Constitutional Court would void it if he did. The US knew such a peace deal was DOA for that reason alone.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 04-25-2025

(04-23-2025, 08:47 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(04-23-2025, 07:08 PM)ADPinWDC Wrote:  Totally agree with Goose:
"The real problem with any "security guarantee" is that Russia can be 98% (maybe more) certain that none of the countries offering the guarantee will actually fight. If they intended to do so, they would already be doing it."

To be clear, that includes the USA, from day 1.

Quote:1) Any "guarantee" offered by Europe with weak Armies is just hand waving.  

2) UK and France three weeks ago were strutting around offering 25,000 troops to be stationed inside UKR as the "assurance" -- then they could not define "Rules of Engagement" when they shot at by Russia... Do they shoot back?  With what level of ordnance, ammo, air attack, missiles... ?  No answer.   Path to WW3 with Russia killing NATO member soldiers.  
#BadEscalation.

Possibly true. OTOH one can argue that is the reason Russia would not do it. That is why the US has troops in the Baltic States (and Korea for that matter). Tactically they are a "speed bump". They can't stop a Russian invasion attempt. They can slow it down, and their blood ensures a US kinetic response, not "hand waving". This isn't new. 2ACR served a similar role during the Cold War. They even called themselves the "speed bump" and they all knew their orders included the word "retain".  They intended to do exactly that, and Russia knew it. Further, Russia feared they actually could. 5th Panzer also had some interesting ideas :-).

Quote:AND, Europe is out of ammo now; they cannot train troops!  

3) So, now Europe is left HIRING UKR to fight Russia as the default condition.  No Ceasefire, because it cannot be ENFORCED.  It is just ink on paper. .

Mess.  USA is walking away from a "Quagmire" that Europe lacks der Wille unt the means to deal with.  
Cruel Karma for France leaving us IndoChina in the 60s.

Of course France argues the exact opposite :-). It is true we refused to supply the air cover they asked for. That might have been one of the few good decisions made by the US regarding IndoChina. It is also quite true that the US urged the FRG to follow a "Don't scare the Bear" policy after the end of the Cold War. That doesn't absolve them from responsibility, but we were very complicit.

Quote:No John Wayne to ride in and take out the Bad Guys.

True. However it is unclear that Ukraine as a military force is "done". It is also unclear negotiations are "done". IMO  Russia never wanted a cease fire or peace anyway. Their apparent insistence that Ukraine agree to cede Crimea to Russia as a requirement for peace guaranteed that Ukraine would reject the offer. Their constitution explicitly forbids doing that. Zelenskyy couldn't do that if he wanted to. The Constitutional Court would void it if he did. The US knew such a peace deal was DOA for that reason alone.

Ever since the terms were made public, primarily that Ukraine give up claims to Crimea, the whole peace talk thing made no sense at all.  If you know one side won't agree to the terms, why do it? Ukraine is probably stronger now than it was 9 months ago.  The Russian Economy has issues and if the war drags on what happens?  Is Putin just trying to convince the home folk that he is really trying to stop the war and its continuing just because Ukraine won't give up Crimea.  Maybe he can sell that at home, seems unlikely.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 04-25-2025

(04-25-2025, 09:22 AM)GK3 Wrote:  Ever since the terms were made public, primarily that Ukraine give up claims to Crimea, the whole peace talk thing made no sense at all.  If you know one side won't agree to the terms, why do it?

There are several possible reasons, one or more of which may be true at the same time. If Putin was actually looking at a negotiation it might make sense to start out with a very hard line position. Maybe what seems impossible will become possible. If not, Putin could concede things that were never going to happen anyway. That would get Putin the maximum benefits available. It is possible that will still happen. It depends on whether the US really does intend to abandon negotiations and whether the Europeans will step in to continue/join them.  It could also be a tactic to stall negotiations long enough for Russia to complete some set of goals in the Donbas. Putin may believe there is a "stopping point" that leaves him in a much stronger position than he now holds. Lastly, it could be simply a means to torpedo negotiations while absolving Russia from "blame", at least among Putin supporters.

Quote:Ukraine is probably stronger now than it was 9 months ago.

Not IMO. No matter how one looks at it the removal of all US military aid and intelligence support will be at best a major blow to Ukraine's ability to prevent further Russian advances, let alone driving Russia out of Ukraine. The level of attrition Russia is inflicting on Ukraine is increasing, not decreasing. Russia has managed to produce more of their "better" cruise missiles and they have also resumed using tactical ballistic missiles at least occasionally. The Ukraine definitely has to ration its Patriot missiles which lets more threats through. Eventually Ukraine will run out of Patriots. IMO the Russian "spring offensive" has not produced any significant results yet. I am guessing Russia is waiting to see what happens with US support and what (if anything) the Europeans will do. No point in losing lots of troops if you don't have to do so. It is also possible that the Russians have more problems than we know about. I suspect that if that is the case those problems will get "solved" one way or another. The war definitely isn't on "pause", but it seems that the intensity on the Russian side just isn't there yet.

Quote:The Russian Economy has issues and if the war drags on what happens?  Is Putin just trying to convince the home folk that he is really trying to stop the war and its continuing just because Ukraine won't give up Crimea.  Maybe he can sell that at home, seems unlikely.

The Russian economy does have issues. It has had issues for a long time. What will come of that is of course TBD. The US and/or the Europeans could increase the pressure by applying more sanctions on Russia. How probable that is is unfortunately very questionable. In any case it appears very improbable that the Russian economy will force Putin to stop the war in the short term. This is especially true if Putin can get the sanctions lifted without doing so.
 
IMO Putin isn't trying to convince his public he is trying to stop the war. In fact, it is the opposite. His public needs to see him win the war. Putin's main worry is that if he stops short of occupying all of Ukraine and eliminating the "Nazis" the public will be quite "upset". The public will become even more cognizant of the losses their country and the "public" have suffered. Convincing them it was "worth it" without a "victory" is problematic.  That undoubtedly worries Putin much more.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 04-25-2025

Details of the Ukraine/Europe counterproposal…

https://www.reuters.com/world/documents-show-differences-over-us-peace-drive-ukraine-2025-04-25/

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 04-26-2025

(04-25-2025, 09:27 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  Details of the Ukraine/Europe counterproposal…

https://www.reuters.com/world/documents-show-differences-over-us-peace-drive-ukraine-2025-04-25/

BC

It also appears Trump may no longer be a PutinFan;

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - 82lsju - 04-26-2025

(04-26-2025, 06:38 PM)GK3 Wrote:  

(04-25-2025, 09:27 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  Details of the Ukraine/Europe counterproposal…

https://www.reuters.com/world/documents-show-differences-over-us-peace-drive-ukraine-2025-04-25/

BC

It also appears Trump may no longer be a PutinFan;

subject to change every 20 minutes....

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 04-26-2025

(04-26-2025, 07:30 PM)82lsju Wrote:  

(04-26-2025, 06:38 PM)GK3 Wrote:  

(04-25-2025, 09:27 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  Details of the Ukraine/Europe counterproposal…

https://www.reuters.com/world/documents-show-differences-over-us-peace-drive-ukraine-2025-04-25/

BC

It also appears Trump may no longer be a PutinFan;

subject to change every 20 minutes....

The real question is IMO that even assuming the US believes Putin does not want peace until he has a complete victory, what should we DO. One answer would be to continue providing material and intelligence support to Ukraine in the same manner we did previously. The problem with that approach is that it gives Ukraine no path to driving Russia out of Ukraine. Another path that the Administration has cited before as possible is to apply sanctions through a "secondary boycott" approach. Countries that buy Russian oil would be sanctioned by the US. That would certainly hurt Russia. However the pushback from countries like India might be quite significant. The US could also align more closely with Ukraine, give them 120 surplus F-16s and build an air force. Three years ago, that might have worked. Can Ukraine last long enough to take advantage of such a strategy in their current situation? The final possibility is to just wash our hands of the whole thing and leave Ukraine and the Europeans to work it out. The major problem with that approach is that the US will have to live with whatever happens. That may be very, very undesirable for the US going forward.

I have seen no evidence the US is prepared to deal with the decisions that need to be made. We apparently didn't do that in 2022 and have not done so subsequently. The question " What is the desired end state?" has not been answered, and the path to get there (wherever 'there' is) has not been articulated. Hard to succeed under those circumstances.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Hurlburt88 - 04-27-2025

cynical perspective here.   I wonder if the Trump administration is playing a delicate game trying to help end this without Putin ending up destroyed from within Russia and some worse situation resulting.   Can Putin withstand ending the war without being able to tell both the right and left in Russia that something has been achieved?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 04-27-2025

I am not aware that the US has made any demands of Russia in the vein of the mineral mining demands on Ukraine.  As far as I can tell, Russia gets all it gained by aggression and gets Ukraine to stop fighting back. 

Maybe Russia is offering prison space whose former occupants have been buried?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 04-28-2025

https://www.yahoo.com/news/nato-cant-ignore-russian-militarys-042817353.html

This is a major example of how the Ukraine war has (at least to some extent) "immunized" the Russian military against its potential opponents. Obviously all is not sweetness and light for Russian artillery, but they have fixed a lot of their "slows". Too bad, they were much easier to defeat three years ago.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - fullmetal - 04-28-2025

(04-28-2025, 08:48 PM)Goose Wrote:  Too bad, they were much easier to defeat three years ago.

We probably didn't know it at the time, lol

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Mick - 04-29-2025

(01-28-2023, 10:23 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Good recent article from RUSI on the issue of Russian nuke usage in the event of a Russian military collapse.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/could-russian-military-collapse-lead-nuclear-war

Quote:For most of us in the West, a wholesale Russian collapse would be a cause for celebration, heralding a rapid end to the war and an alleviation of some of the economic effects which the conflict has engendered – in particular high energy and food costs. However, in reality, a mutiny would entail a few days of very significant risk.

...

Moscow would be in turmoil following the mutiny and the loss of so much territory. Putin would doubtless blame and sack Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Army Chief Valery Gerasimov, but his own fingerprints are too firmly on the war to avoid some consequences. This might be the moment when Alexander Bortnikov (Director of the FSB) or Nikolai Patrushev (a previous FSB Director) makes a move to supplant Putin. The strong probability is that any new leader would be from the same ex-KGB stable as Putin and equally or even more hawkish.

Medvedev is right that no nuclear-armed country has ever lost a war of national survival. This would be new territory for the whole world, and it would be a high-risk moment. Furthermore, a power struggle in Moscow would raise questions about the command authority over the Russian nuclear arsenal. In the words of a former senior UK defence official, ‘Mutiny would by definition destroy the reliability of the chain of command’.

This is when bad or even disastrous decisions could be made. The detonation of a nuclear device over the Black Sea or over central Ukraine as a warning shot to stop the Ukrainian advance might even be at the lower end of the spectrum of options presented to a Russian leadership in disarray. A new nationalist leader in Moscow might argue that NATO countries had enabled the Ukrainian success and should therefore be regarded as targets.

Medvedev threatened nuclear strikes on NATO countries. He's not defense minister anymore which frees him to expand his rhetoric, this time threatening Sweden and Finland (and other new NATO members).

Ukraine war latest: Russia threatens Nato with nuclear strikes

I used to have an event manager who would screw up on occasion. I knew she screwed up because whenever she did, she wouldn't tell me about the screwup right away, she would have a senior partner send me an "unprompted" note lauding her skills and capabilities. It was always a "brace yourself" moment. 

I get that same feeling every time I read a senior Russian official threaten a NATO country or Ukraine with nuclear annihilation. It feels like they are signaling something. We don't like that NATO countries are funding Ukraine's war, and we want it to stop, but we reserve the right to use North Korean and Chinese assets?

Ukraine war latest: Russia threatens Nato with nuclear strikes

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 04-29-2025

(04-29-2025, 06:18 AM)Mick Wrote:  I used to have an event manager who would screw up on occasion. I knew she screwed up because whenever she did, she wouldn't tell me about the screwup right away, she would have a senior partner send me an "unprompted" note lauding her skills and capabilities. It was always a "brace yourself" moment. 

I get that same feeling every time I read a senior Russian official threaten a NATO country or Ukraine with nuclear annihilation. It feels like they are signaling something. We don't like that NATO countries are funding Ukraine's war, and we want it to stop, but we reserve the right to use North Korean and Chinese assets?

Ukraine war latest: Russia threatens Nato with nuclear strikes

Using threats of nuclear strikes as a "signal" is very problematic. For one thing these threats can be intended for "internal" consumption, demonstrating the "power" of the Russian state. Even if not so intended they MAY be so interpreted, destroying their value as a signal. These threats can be a "general" signal to NATO (and the US) not to mess with Russia and oppose its aims. They could also be attempts to sow discord and uncertainty in NATO, thus preventing adoption of a agreed-upon strategy. They could also be targeted to a particular action recently taken by a NATO member. Historically misinterpretation of "signals" has led to war or the prolongation of existing conflict. The Russian's "strategic ambiguity" with these threats is therefore inherently very dangerous. The more frequent the threats without clarification of actual intent can lead to "the west" becoming numb to them.
 
At present, IMO Russia's leadership (Putin) is quite aware of the dangers of nuclear conflict. They are not going to use a single nuclear weapon as a signal. They know that doing so may lead to massive retaliation, either intentionally or accidentally (due to not understanding it as a "signal"). Putin also knows (probably in detail) the results of Russian war games during the Cold War. The use of nuclear weapons almost inevitably leads to at least a proportionate nuclear response. Often it leads to a "more than proportionate" response to "signal" intent. Pretty soon, it inevitably becomes MAD.
 
There are IMO two real dangers in the current situation. The first is a situation in Russia that leads Putin to desperation where he feels he has nothing to lose. I am not sure that a disastrous defeat in Ukraine would do that. That just means the war goes on, and Ukraine is never in their wildest going to be a threat to dictate peace from the steps of the Kremlin. A coup and/or serious domestic unrest is a much more likely scenario leading to such desperation. The second unfortunately more probable threat is that Putin believes "the west" is "degenerate" and will be so fearful of MAD that Russia can wage a limited nuclear war with impunity. He may believe that leadership of "the west" now lacks the will that was present during the Cold War, creating a different correlation of forces. He is not there yet, but he may be much closer than any of us would wish. The most probable thing that may deter Putin from testing that hypothesis is the uncertainty of the order to use a nuclear weapon being promptly obeyed. The consequences of that could rapidly become dire for Putin.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 04-29-2025

It strikes me that 3 days truce could be used to move troops through a vulnerable area to a new front.

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