Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-03-2025

Good point, thanks for pointing that out. However if the US were to block other countries from exporting weapons, I imagine that would just supercharge the current growth of European defense companies to produce weapons that don't rely at all on US tech. Short term it certainly would be an issue for companies that use US tech now however.

Would be a difficult thing to reverse once that parallel engineering and production investment occurs.

If the US does not implement a complete blockade of US tech, at least Europe probably has a lot more existing AMRAAMs they could spare than Patriots, but in any case air defense would be probably the hardest thing for Ukraine to completely support domestically or with European assistance.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-03-2025

Well, there it is.

Quote:"The US is pausing all current military aid to Ukraine until Trump determines the country’s leaders demonstrate a good-faith commitment to peace, according to a senior Defense Department official"

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-03/trump-pauses-military-aid-to-ukraine-after-clash-with-zelenskiy

"A good-faith commitment to peace" regarding a country being invaded is positively Orwellian.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - fullmetal - 03-03-2025

White House pauses all military aid to Ukraine
https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/03/us-pauses-military-aid-to-ukraine-says-white-house.html

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 03-03-2025

Reorienting the thread back to the battlefield. The NY Times has a big piece on how drones have totally changed the battlefield.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-drones-deaths.html?smtyp=cur&smid=bsky-nytime

BC

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - 81alum - 03-03-2025

(03-03-2025, 06:20 PM)BostonCard Wrote: Reorienting the thread back to the battlefield. The NY Times has a big piece on how drones have totally changed the battlefield.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-drones-deaths.html?smtyp=cur&smid=bsky-nytime

BC

I found that article very interesting. Technological advances in warfare have a way of changing expectations for how a war will go in unpredictable ways. At least Ukraine can make its own drones.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - newguy - 03-03-2025

i am deeply concerned about Ukraine's future.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-03-2025

I agree it is very bad for Ukraine. I still think they will be able to remain a sovereign nation for some time as Russia's military is extremely depleted.

The one silver lining to this is that Ukraine may be able to "take the gloves off" in some ways they were restricted from before when having to concern themselves with US opinions on what they did or didn't blow up or kill. Perhaps not yet, they still probably think they should do everything possible to see if the US will get back on side. But once that becomes obviously clear, look out. More blown pipelines, more assassinations in Russia. All stuff they have demonstrated capability for already, but only infrequently.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 03-03-2025

(03-03-2025, 07:47 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: I agree it is very bad for Ukraine. I still think they will be able to remain a sovereign nation for some time as Russia's military is extremely depleted.

The one silver lining to this is that Ukraine may be able to "take the gloves off" in some ways they were restricted from before when having to concern themselves with US opinions on what they did or didn't blow up or kill. Perhaps not yet, they still probably think they should do everything possible to see if the US will get back on side. But once that becomes obviously clear, look out. More blown pipelines, more assassinations in Russia. All stuff they have demonstrated capability for already, but only infrequently.

You make some good points. Considering the current situaton, I would take the position if I were Ukraine that any restrictions attached to use of American Weapons are henceforth invalid and will not be adhered to.
ATM, on paper, Russia wins the war, but they are still a long ways from winning it. The more cheap FPV drones they can produce the more they can replace front line Infantry. The Russians have proven themselves underachievers at stopping drone attacks. I think whoever wins the drone technology war probably wins the war. If Ukraine can continue to produce thousands of cheap FPV drones with protected guidance and control systems then I think Russia could be in a world of hurt. Buying drones from Iran and and soldiers from NK will only work so long. I think the Russian People will absorb a lot, but as they proved in Afghanistan, eventually they say Nyet. Putin is not a young man, while he might not fall to his death from a basement apartment, he may simply die due to natural causes.
It seems to me that Russia has fought WWI and WWII types of wars because it could and it never faced an enemy that could force it to change. Now it has, much as we did first in Viet Nam then through the Middle East. They tried it once in Afghanistan and we all know how that worked out.
So the big question is how much loss and suffering can Putin sell at home. Western Europe has populations of about 200 million, Russia has a population of about 140 million. In my opinion, they only thing that makes Russia player in today's world is it's nuclear arsenal.
If Western Europe and perhaps South Korea or others can provide enough help in the short term, trying to take Ukraine might simply be a bridge too far. Russia has a finite amount of manpower they can apply, assuming of course they want to feed their people and keep all their oil fields and refineries running.
I regret we seem to have withdrawn our support, but Ukraine has not yet lost.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-03-2025

Timely article on what a European security deployment to Ukraine could look like. I am not necessarily optimistic the political will is really there, and neither are the authors, but good to see some discussion of what a European security force could look like. I quoted extensively but the entire article is worth reading, and free.

Quote:The multinational task force envisioned does not need to be everywhere in Ukraine. It needs to have a presence on three directions, and with sufficient mobility to redeploy as necessary along the front. Any future Russian attack would invariably be along several predictable directions. Today, most of the fighting is concentrated typically along three to four sectors of the front at a time. Hence, a relatively small force package can be sufficient for introducing risk into Russian calculus. The most obvious directions would be Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk. Western formations would deploy to these regions not as frontline troops, but as supporting echelons backing Ukrainian forces.

A European commitment would also help avoid a worst-case scenario after any ceasefire, in which Ukraine sees itself as abandoned without any security commitment or Western military presence. The army will demobilize and many of the men may then leave abroad, which would shrink the force significantly. Essentially, this is also about Ukrainians seeing that they have a future and that, in the event of another Russian invasion, they also have a chance.
.....
Given the significant degradation in Russian force quality over the course of the last three years of fighting, the initial force deployed could be as few as three combat brigades, or their equivalents. The force may need to grow over time as Russia reconstitutes. This would amount to perhaps 15,000 to 20,000 personnel in country, with another 30,000 to 40,000 required for sustained rotation, for a total of 45,000 to 60,000 troops. A notional force structure would include a divisional headquarters, three maneuver brigades, a logistics brigade, and a fires brigade. Conversely, nations could set up their own national support elements in place of a logistics brigade.
.......
European leaders may worry what will happen if this force is engaged by Russian strike capabilities. There is a somewhat fraught discussion at present about the need for robust air defenses. Yet the war has shown that dispersal is highly effective, as is entrenchment, and Ukrainian air defense (much of it Western systems) intercepts a significant percentage of Russian strikes. If anything, the experience has illustrated that air and missile defenses are more effective than expected, while a force that is properly dispersed is a very unattractive target for prestige strike systems. A multinational force could manage its footprint in country to make itself a hard target, in much the same way as hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian troops do every day. Indeed, mass casualty events are rare, even relatively close to the front line. If losses take place from skirmishes, or incidents, there’s no reason they would lead to a war with Russia, and in many similar cases have not in the past.
.....
It will be objected that European air forces currently lack the training, munitions, or command-and-control infrastructure to execute such operations. This is in some cases correct. And initially, U.S. support may be necessary when it comes to logistical and organizational capacity. But addressing such a glaring set of deficiencies is vital to restoring NATO’s conventional deterrence posture and this is a solvable problem. Indeed, it is the problem Europe should be solving, and the foremost priority for European investment into their militaries. Making European airpower useable against its primary threat should be a driver of force planning across the continent irrespective of commitments made to Ukraine.
......
Russia may strongly object to such a force if it is proposed in negotiations. So long, however, as a commitment is not made to exclude European forces from Ukraine after a ceasefire, then it is doubtful that a Russian military that is currently struggling to break through Ukrainian defenses would be immediately recommitted to the attack should Ukrainians on the line of contact be reinforced from European militaries. In short, Moscow may protest, but it is not clear in such a scenario that it could prevent such a policy being implemented.

The policy set out above would require significant investment and the political determination by European states that they were prepared to fight for Ukraine. It will also require reprioritization, at least in the interim, when looking at their current commitments. Strategically there is a compelling case that it is better to prevent the subjugation of Ukraine than face an emboldened Russia elsewhere on the continent. Politically, this is a matter for the member states. However, current debate on this topic veers between vague security commitments without any reference to the necessary force requirements, and wild statements of troop requirements that make the proposition insurmountable. A more careful examination of what it takes demonstrates that it is possible, but will be costly in resources and political will.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/willpower-not-manpower-is-europes-main-limitation-for-a-force-in-ukraine/

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 03-04-2025

(03-03-2025, 05:17 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: Well, there it is.

Quote:"The US is pausing all current military aid to Ukraine until Trump determines the country’s leaders demonstrate a good-faith commitment to peace, according to a senior Defense Department official"

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-03/trump-pauses-military-aid-to-ukraine-after-clash-with-zelenskiy

"A good-faith commitment to peace" regarding a country being invaded is positively Orwellian.

Amen, to even have someone have the guts to say that boggles my mind. (maybe not guts but total lack of understanding of the situation)

(03-03-2025, 11:28 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: Timely article on what a European security deployment to Ukraine could look like. I am not necessarily optimistic the political will is really there, and neither are the authors, but good to see some discussion of what a European security force could look like. I quoted extensively but the entire article is worth reading, and free.

Quote:The multinational task force envisioned does not need to be everywhere in Ukraine. It needs to have a presence on three directions, and with sufficient mobility to redeploy as necessary along the front. Any future Russian attack would invariably be along several predictable directions. Today, most of the fighting is concentrated typically along three to four sectors of the front at a time. Hence, a relatively small force package can be sufficient for introducing risk into Russian calculus. The most obvious directions would be Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk. Western formations would deploy to these regions not as frontline troops, but as supporting echelons backing Ukrainian forces.

A European commitment would also help avoid a worst-case scenario after any ceasefire, in which Ukraine sees itself as abandoned without any security commitment or Western military presence. The army will demobilize and many of the men may then leave abroad, which would shrink the force significantly. Essentially, this is also about Ukrainians seeing that they have a future and that, in the event of another Russian invasion, they also have a chance.
.....
Given the significant degradation in Russian force quality over the course of the last three years of fighting, the initial force deployed could be as few as three combat brigades, or their equivalents. The force may need to grow over time as Russia reconstitutes. This would amount to perhaps 15,000 to 20,000 personnel in country, with another 30,000 to 40,000 required for sustained rotation, for a total of 45,000 to 60,000 troops. A notional force structure would include a divisional headquarters, three maneuver brigades, a logistics brigade, and a fires brigade. Conversely, nations could set up their own national support elements in place of a logistics brigade.
.......
European leaders may worry what will happen if this force is engaged by Russian strike capabilities. There is a somewhat fraught discussion at present about the need for robust air defenses. Yet the war has shown that dispersal is highly effective, as is entrenchment, and Ukrainian air defense (much of it Western systems) intercepts a significant percentage of Russian strikes. If anything, the experience has illustrated that air and missile defenses are more effective than expected, while a force that is properly dispersed is a very unattractive target for prestige strike systems. A multinational force could manage its footprint in country to make itself a hard target, in much the same way as hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian troops do every day. Indeed, mass casualty events are rare, even relatively close to the front line. If losses take place from skirmishes, or incidents, there’s no reason they would lead to a war with Russia, and in many similar cases have not in the past.
.....
It will be objected that European air forces currently lack the training, munitions, or command-and-control infrastructure to execute such operations. This is in some cases correct. And initially, U.S. support may be necessary when it comes to logistical and organizational capacity. But addressing such a glaring set of deficiencies is vital to restoring NATO’s conventional deterrence posture and this is a solvable problem. Indeed, it is the problem Europe should be solving, and the foremost priority for European investment into their militaries. Making European airpower useable against its primary threat should be a driver of force planning across the continent irrespective of commitments made to Ukraine.
......
Russia may strongly object to such a force if it is proposed in negotiations. So long, however, as a commitment is not made to exclude European forces from Ukraine after a ceasefire, then it is doubtful that a Russian military that is currently struggling to break through Ukrainian defenses would be immediately recommitted to the attack should Ukrainians on the line of contact be reinforced from European militaries. In short, Moscow may protest, but it is not clear in such a scenario that it could prevent such a policy being implemented.

The policy set out above would require significant investment and the political determination by European states that they were prepared to fight for Ukraine. It will also require reprioritization, at least in the interim, when looking at their current commitments. Strategically there is a compelling case that it is better to prevent the subjugation of Ukraine than face an emboldened Russia elsewhere on the continent. Politically, this is a matter for the member states. However, current debate on this topic veers between vague security commitments without any reference to the necessary force requirements, and wild statements of troop requirements that make the proposition insurmountable. A more careful examination of what it takes demonstrates that it is possible, but will be costly in resources and political will.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/willpower-not-manpower-is-europes-main-limitation-for-a-force-in-ukraine/

I do hope the Europeans bail us out of the mess we have created. If I am Ukraine, there is NO way I am agreeing to a peace treaty without substantial security guarantees. I do not currently count the USA as such a guarantee. If you trust the Russians to live up to any agreement they sign, I have a few bridges I can sell you. There is only one thing Putin understands is POWER. He now appears to have snookered us into buying his BS. Fortunately Western Europe has enough manpower and technology to fill in for us if they are willing.
If you look at the map and are a Western European leader you have ask who is next? If we (Euro Leader Thought) bail on Ukraine whose next, Baltic States, Finland, or Poland? Western Europe has lived with the Russian Bear on their eastern boundary for a long, long time.
I believe that if they are smart, they would rather fight in Ukraine rather than the Balkans, Poland or Finland.
There is a lot they can do to help Ukraine without putting boots on the ground. Help upgrade the F16's, more weapons, more ammo, and technical help to help keep the Ukrainian drone warfare going.
I do not think any rational Euro Leader thinks he can trust Putin for anything.
Western Europe has more people, better tech and at least equivalent weapons. Only question is whether they will stand up and be counted when the going gets tough.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - newguy - 03-04-2025

(03-03-2025, 05:17 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: Well, there it is.

Quote:"The US is pausing all current military aid to Ukraine until Trump determines the country’s leaders demonstrate a good-faith commitment to peace, according to a senior Defense Department official"

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-03/trump-pauses-military-aid-to-ukraine-after-clash-with-zelenskiy

"A good-faith commitment to peace" regarding a country being invaded is positively Orwellian.

and Zelenskyy is the new Emmanuel Goldstein.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - fullmetal - 03-04-2025

I gather Europe will shift its defense spending to continental industries rather than US defense materiel. That's the sound of potential contracts ten, twenty years out going up in smoke.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - ADPinWDC - 03-05-2025

And now... that didn't take long. Zelensky wants a deal even without "US Backstop"
VOLTE FACE ON MINERALS DEAL, PEACE
Today -- President Zelensky has looped back to offer signing the Minerals Deal, and working on peace... "in any convenient forum".

US, Ukraine sound optimistic notes on mineral deal
by Sarakshi Rai - 03/04/25
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/trumps-first-100-days/5175087-us-ukraine-mineral-deal/
The U.S. and Ukraine signaled Tuesday the minerals deal between the two countries is very much alive, despite continued fallout from the contentious White House meeting between President Trump and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky last week.
Speaking to reporters at the Capitol on Tuesday morning, Vice President Vance said he was certain a deal could be reached.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-05-2025

The US is cutting off intelligence sharing along with the military aid. Seemingly also directing allies to stop intelligence sharing, though the reporting on this is still contradictory. Satellites that previously monitored Russia and Belarus, now monitor Mexico and Canada.

I imagine if Ukraine continues to resist the backstabbing, the US will start intelligence sharing with Russia to target Ukraine.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - newguy - 03-05-2025

(03-05-2025, 09:26 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: I imagine if Ukraine continues to resist the backstabbing, the US will start intelligence sharing with Russia to target Ukraine.

i wish i could say that can't happen, but these days, you never know........

RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-05-2025

Every US action to try and broker a ceasefire has been a knife at Ukraine's back. Where are the knives at Russia's back? Why only gifts to Russia (stopping cyber operations against Russia, discussing Russian sanction relief, stopping enforcement actions against Russian oligarchs, stopping counterintelligence actions against Russian influence campaigns, calling Zelensky a dictator but not Putin)?

RE: Way OT: Ukraine Multiple Post Alert :-) - Goose - 03-05-2025

Hi all. Into this vale of tears I am going to interject 13 long posts I have created regarding drone usage in the Ukraine war. It is long, no question about it. Hopefully it will be interesting to at least some. It contains lots of links that hopefully somewhat justify my "analysis" and predictions.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine Drones 1 - Introduction - Goose - 03-05-2025

(01-21-2025, 06:28 PM)GK3 Wrote: Ukraine seems to be proving that small cheap drones even without fancy guidance systems can function as counter battery fire. Ukraine has cost russia billions I would think just via their cheap drone systems. How many drones can you build for the cost of a SPH? Do you think Reaper drones can survive very long in peer vs peer conflicts? They were great when the other side had no real air defense systems, but I wonder how long one would survive in the Ukraine vs Russia conflict. I presume we are working on smaller, much cheaper drones with at least semi hardened controls etc. The Ukraine conflict is sort like either the Spanish Civil War or WWI when new technology came on line and changed the nature of conflicts.

Interesting points. In fact, it is very probable that Russia has had more success in using drones for counter-battery than Ukraine has. Looking at drones in counter-battery fire lead me into the suitability of drones for various battlefield tasks. There is a lot of information available on the internet. There are also many authors that have apparently valuable information, some of which unverifiable. These authors also clearly have biases and vested interests. In the following I am going to cite quite a few links. Some of them are about commercial drone specifications and are 100% reliable, if sometimes intentionally opaque. There is other information I will cite whose provenance varies from "probably true" to "almost certainly fiction" with "who knows?" in the middle. I will try to identify which is which when citing it.

In the following posts I will attempt to provide as much information as possible about the state of "drone warfare" in Ukraine. I will first present the characteristics of the various drone types along with information on how they are being/will be used in Ukraine. I will in the main try to avoid editorial comment in this first part of the document. It will therefore be somewhat dry. Subsequently I will make a bold attempt at what I think it all means.

IMO it is real important to understand the SERIOUS limitations on what we know about drone warfare in Ukraine. The material that makes it onto the internet almost exclusively describes cases where the drone was successful, on both the Ukrainian and Russian "sides". There is little or no context. How many drones are sent out and accomplish nothing? How many drones crash due to enemy action, either electronic warfare or kinetic action? How many drones attempt to deliver their weapons and miss? There is reason to believe these events are actually quite common. Through all human history I know of no aviator that over-estimated the damage they have done to the enemy :-). There is no reason that should be less true today. Some information on drone attrition and mission failure rates does exist. However, it is somewhat anecdotal and not "official". It is sometimes self-contradictory. We have to make do with what we have.

There are two important considerations in all FPV drone operations that IMO are a required background for understanding some limitations of these drones. First, the control and video range of FPV drones have inherent physical tradeoffs in range and altitude. The following table illustrates a situation that obviously affects how FPV drones can be operated. The control commands of the operator and the video pictures from the drones must be exchanged with minimal failures. The radio horizon thereby provides a maximum limit on the range at which a drone can operate. The following table assumes the drone operator has an antenna mounted at a height of two meters. This height can probably be achieved by a drone operator operating from a bunker in the field. The antenna would of necessity be visible to enemy drones. It should therefore be as inconspicuous as possible.
Drone               Radio
Altitude (m)   Range (km)
      2      10.09
    10      13.33
30      24.60
200      55.53
3000      200.00
This table reveals that at a range of 13.33 km the operator will lose the video from and the control of the drone if the drone descends below an altitude of 10 meters. The range of a Paladin and M777 howitzer is 24 km using common ammunition. These units will not normally be placed very near the FEBA and when/if they are it will be in a "shoot and scoot" operation. Thus, the multirotor operator is limited in how close to the ground his drone may be when the ordinance is released. This significantly affects accuracy, as the longer the munition is falling, the more imperfections in shape and "windage" will affect its landing spot. One-way drone operators can no longer control the drone or see the target below that altitude. This renders the drone unguided during this interval, significantly degrading accuracy.

The situation described in the table relates to an earth model that is without obstructions. Obviously even in Ukraine there are trees and hills. Howitzers traditionally like to hide behind hills. The presence of any such obstructions makes the situation worse. Reconnaissance drone operators are probably not sitting on the front line. OTOH FPV Kamikaze drone operators often are quite close because their drones are short-range.

Increasing the power of the transmitter on the drone and/or installing better antennas will not increase the range. Many commercial drones do not have transmitters powerful enough to cover their maximum linear range because it would drain the battery too much and the drone is not going to return to base (RTB) if it goes beyond half its maximum unloaded distance. The power must be increased if the drone is to be used on one way missions. Placing the antenna for the drone operators (but not the operators) on a hill can increase the control range. Putting the antenna on the roof of a structure can as well. Obviously the down side is the antenna becomes more conspicuous inviting a counterstrike. Many FPV drone controllers do not support a remote antenna in any case.

It must be noted that "range" does not always translate into distance from the antenna. If the drone is searching a given area it may repeatedly cover the same area looking for targets. In that case it may need a long flight range but can tolerate a much shorter control/view range. OTOH some long range drones fly so far at low altitude that some kind of message forwarding is required. This may be accomplished by other drones, conventional aircraft, or satellites. In these cases the "network delay" may be significant. This can render FPV manual flying difficult to impossible. Some drones therefore rely on GPS/INS or terrain following to reach their desired waypoints/targets.

The second area where IMO there is confusion is cost. While it is absolutely true the drones being used in Ukraine (by both sides) are MUCH cheaper than the mil-spec competition made in the US and the EU, it seems there is significant confusion about cost. A range of [drone costs] broken down by category illustrates the actual prices. The Mavic 3 is at the top the entry-level camera drones range. DJI sells the Mavic 3 Pro with an "entry-level" controller for $2,199. One can find the drone by itself for $1,800 or so. Thus, the price is actually quite cheap given the capability. This is an issue the US military does have to confront. However, it isn't as cheap as it is often portrayed in the news. The price increase as drones become larger is quite nonlinear. It goes up faster than the capability goes up. Adding more and more capability to the drone requires the additions become smaller and lighter. Once the threshold of consumer electronics practice is exceeded, prices shoot up.

While I was gathering information for these posts I found this report [CNAS] that addressed the same subjects in a manner far more comprehensive than I ever could. IMO this report is a must-read. It isn't short, but it is all IMO worthwhile. It contains an interesting conclusion section starting on page 38. IMO that is a quadruple must-read. The only major deficiency of this report is that it was released in February 2024. Quite a bit has happened in the last year, so reading the rest of my efforts might still be worthwhile :-). Subsequent events do arguably modify a couple of the conclusions of CNAS report.

Please visit this [link]. Scroll to the top and read this whole thing. It surveys almost all the important characteristics of drones and discusses the limiting factors on drone performance. The table of ranges is also particularly useful. This [link] talks about drones in general and provides good specific examples of each type. It categorizes drones into three basic types, Fixed-Wing Drones, Multirotor Drones, and VTOL Drones. I follow that nomenclature. I will also divide drones into those that are "one way attack" (Kamikaze) and those that are not.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine Drones 2 - Multirotor - Goose - 03-05-2025

These narrative videos, [Ref 1] , and [Ref 2] provide some insight into the history and current state of drone warfare in Ukraine. IMO after 27 minutes Ref 1 unfortunately has very low entropy. Otherwise, watching them both IMO is very useful. These videos do (atypically) provide some references to Ukrainian losses and difficulties but also highlight how tactics have evolved.

There are many posts on the internet showing various multirotor drones being used in Ukraine. Multirotor drones suffer from the significant handicap that rotors are much less efficient providers of lift than wings. This means lots of the battery power is burned up just staying in the air. The DJI Mavic 3 is a "solid" reference point the "close range" drone class. The CNAS report stated that the Mavic is by far the most used drone by both sides. The Mavic-3 specification table must be somewhat carefully interpreted. The specs are not in general simultaneous valid. The 28 km range is the total distance traveled, not the two-way range. This is pretty much universal in all such drone specs. This range is achieve at sea level, no wind, camera off, and flying at 9 m/s (nowhere near the maximum of 21 m/s). If the camera is operating the 28 km drops by at least 1/3, giving a range of 19 km.

As specified by the manufacturer (DJI) the Mavic 3 can carry a "payload" of only 100 g. However, it is possible to use a lighter camera configuration and overload the drone to carry a larger payload. The Ukrainians have done this. The Mavic 3 Pro has the same specs FWIW. Elsewhere on the net one can find articles on overloading this drone. The US M67 hand grenade weight is 400 g. Therefore a Mavic 3 can in theory carry two such grenades. The video example in Ref 1 @ 8:56 only show them carrying one. It was apparently an MK-2 clone, which weighs 600 g. It is probable Ukraine has some lighter custom made "bombs" with less explosive but lighter weight. Based on the typical mission length from the article, the range is reduced by up 50% carrying the grenade. The Ukrainian installed second battery can allow trading off range vs carrying capacity to some extent. However the total load is ultimately limited by the lift the drone lift fans can generate.

[Ref 3] contains a good narrative article about targeting Russian forces using Mavic 3 drones.

Several internet articles reference "racing drones" (RD). RD in the Ukraine context is easily misunderstood. RD in Ukraine refers more to how the drone is operated than specific drone characteristics. RD requires immersive technology (goggles) and very low latency data links. It requires the drone software disable its safety features such as obstacle avoidance and platform stabilization (permanently or under operator control). Thus the operator can fly the drone into dangerous situations in order to strike a target. He can also easily crash it. In this context the Mavic 3 is regarded as an RD, as we see in the literature. The RD trades off range, safety, and endurance for speed, agility, and payload. This is required to deliver a kinetically useful payload at relatively high speed to a precise point on the target. These are exclusively kamikaze weapons. This technology is typical of this type of drone. The drone may natively have relatively high performance but it must also carry a useful kinetic payload. The small consumer "racing drones" available on the entertainment market have neither the range nor the payload to be at all useful militarily.

There are larger multirotor drones that can to some degree overcome the rather severe payload restrictions of a Mavic 3 drone class. Two lists of commercial heavy lift drone candidates (with good associated discussion) are available here and here. The DJI FlyCart 30 is a multirotor heavy lift drone. The specifications and detailed discussion for this drone provides good insight into its capabilities. Apparently Amazon is using this drone in commercial service. It can carry a 30 kg payload. The drone has a 28 km one-way range with no payload and a 16 km one-way range with a 30 kg load. Thus, this drone could presumably deliver a 30 kg free-fall weapon at a range of 11 km and return to base. The typical price for the drone (without controller) is $20,560.00. A similar drone can be found here. This page has a calculator for various payload/range combinations. This is a US product with a price tag of $55,495.00.

There are many "intermediate" stage drones that can carry smaller but "useful" payloads. When evaluating such drones it is important to distinguish their "gross" payload from the available munition payload. The camera, navigation and radio payload must often be subtracted from the supplied number. A good example is the TDRONE-1200. This offering is oriented toward custom configurations so exact specs are elusive. It may reflect better the "typical" Ukrainian approach. The "typical" price per unit is $3699.00 ~ $5098.00, not including things like the battery(!).

The following narrative [Ref 4] documents the use of these heavier drones. They have the ability to carry must more lethal payloads and IMO are much more kinetically useful. There are several important points made in this article that will be cited later in this document.

The pictures in this article are interesting. It would appear some of the "bombs" being used are cluster type munitions. Some of the munition bodies in the last picture are IMO certainly cluster munition carriers. These types of munitions are much more effective if they are "two stage". The first (small) explosion scatters the munitions over a relatively wide area and then each sub-munition explodes when it hits the ground or when it has traveled a specified distance. Such two stage munitions are difficult to fabricate. It does not appear the ones in the picture are two stage, but it is hard to tell. For reference, a 30 kg payload could reasonably distribute about the 1.5 times the number of M24/M26 munitions as carried by a M864 155 mm shell. 30 kg of M42 would be 144 munitions, but the structure/explosives to disperse them consume quite a bit of available payload.

The black munition on the tabletop appears to be fabricated as a small mortar bomb. For reference, a 60 mm mortar bomb weighs +/- 1.3 kg. A relatively small amount of that is propellant charge (often wrapped around the shell base in "rings". The number of rings is changed as a gross function of range). The explosive charge in the projectile is typically about 300 grams. The rest is fragmentation metal and fuse. The tail section is necessary to provide aerodynamic stability.

The article contains one conclusion that IMO is very ill supported. The article states

"A non-profit group called the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) found Russia is sacrificing nearly 60 soldiers, killed and wounded, for every square kilometer of ground captured in eastern Ukraine. ISW reported that Russia may have lost as many as 3,000 casualties in the Pokrovsk area alone during one two-week period earlier this month".

The article uses this statement to justify the assertion that the Ukrainian strategy of "turning increasingly to unmanned aerial drone units like this one" is working. However, Ukraine has relatively massive quantities of other combat arms operating in the same area. What proportion are caused by drones they don't say. It would seem they don't know. If they did, why omit it? The article attributes exactly one Russian death to drones. The cited ISW analysis does say that "Ukrainian drones continue to be the most effective weapon to repel Russian assaults in the Pokrovsk direction." However, this statement is being made in the face of continued deterioration of the Ukrainian position in that area. Things are manifestly and undeniably worse in the Pokrovsk area than they were on the 24th of December. That is not indicative of the strategy "working". Unfortunately I see quite a few similar poorly supported arguments made in other articles.

RE: Way OT: Ukraine Drones 3 - Multirotor & Dragon - Goose - 03-05-2025

Narrative [Ref 5] discusses (among many other interesting things) the Ukrainian "Baba Yaga heavy bomber drones". These heavy lift multirotor drones were derived from the Ukrainian-built R-18 agricultural drone and are still in use. These drones carry a maximum payload of 30 kg. The article references carrying 6 mortar shells (presumably 81 mm at 4.5 kg each). They have subsequently been supplemented by similar drones built in other countries. These newer drones span a payload range from 15 kg to 30 kg.

Narrative [Ref 6] discusses the employment of these drones, in this case a Vampire drone. The following quote is IMO very significant

Quote:For accomplishing any kind of mission, the drone can carry up to a maximum of 15 kg, although in practice, the effective payload is up to 12 kg. The "combat radius" is 8 to 12 km for a sortie to the designated point and back. The tactic is simple: reconnaissance units deploy smaller quadcopter camera drones to find targets, then a Vampire crew is called on the spot to deliver a strike.

The difference between the 8 km range and the 12 km range is undoubtedly payload and, to a lesser extent, speed. These narratives provides a good context for how these drones operate and is definitely worth reading. How literally accurate they are is unknown. Citing the DJI Matrice 300 as a "Baba Yaga" is pretty suspect. By spec, it has a 2.7 kg payload. OTOH the source has no obvious biases and reports on both Ukraine and Russian drone production and performance. Both references are IMO very much worth reading.

The Vampire is a Ukrainian product. Ukraine has aggressively demonstrated it intends to participate in the commercial drone market. The two multirotor drones shown are similar to other commercial offerings. The larger one was verbally indicated to have a 15 kg payload capacity. There were some more detailed internet presentation that strangely I can't find anymore. Make me wonder a bit.

Equally importantly, Ukraine has demonstrated that it fully intends to preserve its access to the DJI drones it now uses. Ukraine claims that it has purchased 60% of the drones DJI constructed in its entire history. Ukraine also claims it still has significant access to Chinese drones and drone components. This is accomplished through "front companies" to evade Chinese export restrictions. No way to know how true that may be now or going forward.

The special case of the Ukrainian "Dragon" drone is included in this section because it uses a multirotor drone and is a unique application. I have included some extra explanatory material in this section. This material is intended to explain the real benefit of these drones. The focus of most internet articles is IMO misdirected.

Wikipedia describes the mechanics of the weapon. The primary use of the drone is to set fires in the foliage that shelters Russian troop concentrations. There are several examples in this narrative. As one can see the spread of the thermite is significant. Being hit by the falling metal is indeed a terrifying thought. It can indeed affect morale. However that is a very secondary effect of this weapon. The fires it starts can destroy any personnel or equipment in the area. At the very least the Russian troops will be deprived of cover and vulnerable to other weapons. Remaining in the area of fire and smoke is probably impossible. Ordnance present in the area can be detonated directly by the thermite or by the resulting fire, although it may just burn vigorously instead.

There are discussions of dropping thermite through open hatches of tanks. Ukraine reports from a height of 80 meters the CEP of solid explosive weapons is about 3 meters (while the drone is stationary). Therefore the ability to reliably hit an object the diameter of a tank hatch (while moving) with a stream of liquid metal that is dissociating in the air is very questionable. However, if you drop a lot of it, some will fall into an open hatch. It certainly will cause damage, but whether that damage leads to a secondary fire/explosion is far from certain. A much more serious threat is that the thermite will inevitably hit the much larger area of Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) favored by Russian tanks. The ERA won't explode. It can (in theory) only be set off by shock. It will however burn real well and real hot. The tank will undoubtedly be rendered unserviceable, along with anyone still in it.

A video of this exact event may be found here. This article contains a discussion of how the tank was destroyed. There is also a discussion of using napalm on tanks. It is worth reading. Napalm is an ideal weapon to start forest fires and to destroy armored vehicles. It also flows well into trenches. However it has a low specific gravity. A drone can't enough of it (due to volume constraints) to be effective over a wide area.

If an anti-personnel incendiary weapon is desired for drone use, Willie Peter (WP) is a much more effective choice. It explosively ignites spontaneously in air and spreads fragments widely, none of which can be extinguished. A 3 meter CEP is just fine :-). It also creates a toxic thick smoke. 30 kg of WP is a lot. Unfortunately it probably will not start a forest fire, at least not nearly as well as thermite will. WP cannot be manufactured without special equipment. Lots of Ukraine's drone ordinance is artisanal. Given how the Ukrainians store their drone munitions (last picture in Ref 4), I don't think WP would be a good choice :-).

Russia did not start the war using multirotor drones. They eventually emulated what Ukraine was doing to some extent. There isn't a lot of data available about this on the Internet. There are quite a few articles about Russian fixed-wing drones. From that I concluded Russia wasn't really that interested in multirotor drones initially. They are now.