Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 07-26-2024

(07-26-2024, 10:38 AM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-scale-back-front-lines-112941562.html

Russia has the option to control the pace of the war. They can (and probably will) go on defense, certainly by when the rains start at the latest. Russia will take a breakthrough if they can get it in the short term. If they don't, pausing to rebuild their mass of untrained/partially trained troops makes sense. They undoubtedly intend to overwhelm Ukraine with numbers next spring if they can't do it this year. IMO Ukraine making it until Russia goes on defense is a "win". It wasn't (and isn't quite yet) a sure thing.

Next year Ukraine may be in better shape. It also may be in similar shape. If it is in a similar condition next spring, IMO the Ukraine will outright lose the war. Then again, I was unsure but not optimistic about their chances through this summer. What is hard to calibrate is how well Russia's military can and will perform. Russia did some smart things this year that really pushed Ukraine to the wall. However, Russia couldn't close the deal. Their "meat assaults" couldn't overcome Ukraine's defenses even though Ukraine was stretch very thin. The constant missile (and now air) attacks, while seriously harming Ukraine, so far isn't sufficient. It does have a cumulative effect though.

In theory, Russia can amass enough troops and open enough new offensives that Ukraine simply will fail due to lack of numbers. In practice it is unclear they can execute. It is unclear they actually have a strategy beyond banging away until Ukraine folds up due to morale collapse or Ukraine is no longer able to be adequately supplied by the west. Ukraine needs a strategy to deny Russia the ability to fight the war on Russia's schedule and whim. If Ukraine can't do that, they eventually lose, period.

If next year Ukraine is in similar shape as now, they are indeed pretty much dead. If the West is unwilling/unable to provide what Ukraine needs, they need to seek the best deal they can get which won't be a good deal. On the other hand if the F 16's prove really useful and NATO and the USA continue to supply needed arms and ammunition., the result may be different. 
I do not see Russia being able to do anything to throw more mostly untrained troops into the meat grinder, and being forced to use older and older equipment to support their opporations.  I believe NATO and the West can give Ukraine what it needs to win, or at least survive if we have the will.  Maybe whoever wins the drone war wins the war.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 07-26-2024

The U.S. and E.U. together have a combined GDP that's like 20x Russia's GDP.  Of course the West has the capability to provide sufficient assistance to Ukraine to allow Ukraine to survive this war.  The question is whether the West has the will to make the sacrifices, and to accept the risks, associated with providing sufficient assistance.  

For all the talk of Russia's allies in China, Iran, and N. Korea, I have not heard about any outright assistance to Russia.  Instead, I've heard of the others helping Russia avoid sanctions (i.e. profiting from the below market purchase of Russian energy and from the above-market sale of weapons to Russia).  That's important for Russia to have, but it's not comparable in any way to the type of assistance Ukraine has received to date.  

On November 6, we'll have more information about the U.S.'s willingness to do its part to continue providing the necessary assistance to Ukraine.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-26-2024

(07-26-2024, 03:27 PM)GK3 Wrote:  If next year Ukraine is in similar shape as now, they are indeed pretty much dead. If the West is unwilling/unable to provide what Ukraine needs, they need to seek the best deal they can get which won't be a good deal. On the other hand if the F 16's prove really useful and NATO and the USA continue to supply needed arms and ammunition., the result may be different.

Indeed! IMO the accompanying requirement is that Ukraine needs to dictate the place and tempo of the conflict. Russia doesn't do well when it has to react to changing situations not of its own choosing. Ukraine had a period where they had the initiative. Unfortunately Ukraine was unable to execute their offensive. Having F-16s and adequate ammunition will help them in a new offensive operation. They also need lots of other material, like adequate effective minefield  breaching equipment. They also need trained troops that can move rapidly and exploit opportunities. It won't be easy.

Quote:I do not see Russia being able to do anything to throw more mostly untrained troops into the meat grinder, and being forced to use older and older equipment to support their opporations.  I believe NATO and the West can give Ukraine what it needs to win, or at least survive if we have the will.  Maybe whoever wins the drone war wins the war.

FWIW I think "survive" for Ukraine just isn't an option. Russia will grind them down. IMO the side that can dictate the course of the war will win. Granted, this is a tautology, but IMO Ukraine must keep Russia on its back foot and inflict disproportionate casualties when advancing, not retreating. You can't retreat your way to victory. Drones can for certain help make that happen. Drone strikes that cut of Russian logistics at key moments can change the nature of a battle. However the key is to make Russia fight when and where you want, not visa-versa.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 07-26-2024

Is your position that Ukraine can't just "survive" the war: (1) merely a restatement of your earlier position that Ukraine won't have a viable economy without re-taking a substantial portion of the industrial heartland it has lost; or (2) an even more pessimistic view, which is that Ukraine's military will collapse if it continues the same basic strategy that it has used for most of the time since Thanksgiving 2022, even though Ukraine has inflicted far more casualties than it has suffered using that strategy and even though Ukraine has lost only a marginal amount of land using that strategy.

Here's what seems notable to me about the last 1.5 years.  For Ukraine, the short time period in mid-2023 when it attacked Russia was Ukraine's most unsuccessful period of the war so far.  Maybe Ukraine just executed the attack very poorly.  But maybe being on the attack in this particular war isn't all it's cracked up to be.  

Here's a different take. Ukraine might run out of troops before Russia ever would, but there are many other pressure points that could come into play before either side runs out of troops.  I don't have a strong view regarding Ukraine's optimal strategy, but it's completely plausible to me that the optimal strategy would be to play defense primarily, while also opportunistically attacking bases, troop formations, and critical infrastructure.  In the 1980s, Afghanistan ultimately succeeded against Russia with a similar sort of strategy (and Russia's dictatorship fell soon after).  Ukraine may not be as economically successful or as populous as Russia, but it has a brobdingnagian leg up on Afghanistan on both those metrics.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-26-2024

(07-26-2024, 05:37 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Is your position that Ukraine can't just "survive" the war: (1) merely a restatement of your earlier position that Ukraine won't have a viable economy without re-taking a substantial portion of the industrial heartland it has lost; or (2) an even more pessimistic view, which is that Ukraine's military will collapse if it continues the same basic strategy that it has used for most of the time since Thanksgiving 2022, even though Ukraine has inflicted far more casualties than it has suffered using that strategy and even though Ukraine has lost only a marginal amount of land using that strategy.

Some of both. The economic argument is as cogent as ever. However, IMO Ukraine's military may collapse from either of two different causes. The first is a collapse of morale due to no visible path to victory. While it is unquestionably true Russia has suffered many, many more casualties than Ukraine has, Russia is still there, still banging away. We have seen many signs of "weariness". Troops can put up with a lot if they believe their sacrifice and pain means something. However, if they start to believe it does not they can fall apart fast. The troops want to know "How does this end?" and if the answer is "We don't know, we have to keep fighting until Russia just gives up. It is an indefinite period of time." eventually the troops will decide it just isn't worth it. They will lose confidence in the leadership and things will fall apart very rapidly.

The other way is that Russia finally creates enough pressure across the whole battle front that Ukraine simply runs out of reserves. That almost happened in the north-east this year. Eventually even the poorly led Russian army will realize that stretching Ukraine out is the way to go. If there is nobody in front of you, even "meat" attacks succeed.  It may be that Ukraine has enough troops but fails to respond to a new threat because they fear a breakthrough else where. It may be they can't move the reserves they have fast enough. It may also just be there are two many damn Russians and it doesn't matter what Ukraine does. What has saved Ukraine from this so far is that the Russian leadership hasn't had the ability to execute this kind of strategy. That may persist, but I wouldn't bet on that. A very important factor in this war is that Ukraine cannot afford major defeats but Russia can. They can keep trying until they get it right or Ukraine makes a mistake.

Quote:Here's what seems notable to me about the last 1.5 years.  For Ukraine, the short time period in mid-2023 when it attacked Russia was Ukraine's most unsuccessful period of the war so far.  Maybe Ukraine just executed the attack very poorly.  But maybe being on the attack in this particular war isn't all it's cracked up to be.

Offense in "modern" war is ALWAYS much more difficult than defense.  No surprise there. Ukraine did make many mistakes in their execution of their attack. However external constraints had a lot to do with that. Ukraine had virtually no air force. The minefield clearing materials promised by the west were inadequate and even the promised items often never arrived. The offensive was delayed beyond the intended date giving the Russians even more time to prepare. It is also true that the Ukrainian staff had never executed anything like this offensive before, even in practice drills. Neither had the troops. Lots of reasons it didn't "work".

However, it is impossible to "win" a modern war by remaining on the strategic defensive. It is possible, at least in theory, to bomb your enemy into submission and not use ground troops at all. It is possible to interdict all their foreign trade so they economically collapse. However, Ukraine doesn't have the wherewithal to do any of these things. For them, a "conventional" attack is the only way to victory. Russia could in theory win in Ukraine by bombing them into submission. They are trying, but so far it hasn't worked. However, if western support dries up, it may. Russia also apparently believes it must attack on the ground to win, and is willing to pay the price.

Quote:Here's a different take. Ukraine might run out of troops before Russia ever would, but there are many other pressure points that could come into play before either side runs out of troops.  I don't have a strong view regarding Ukraine's optimal strategy, but it's completely plausible to me that the optimal strategy would be to play defense primarily, while also opportunistically attacking bases, troop formations, and critical infrastructure.  In the 1980s, Afghanistan ultimately succeeded against Russia with a similar sort of strategy (and Russia's dictatorship fell soon after).  Ukraine may not be as economically successful or as populous as Russia, but it has a of immense proportions leg up on Afghanistan on both those metrics.

IMO Afghanistan's strategy was wholly different than "playing defense". They had no "defense". The had no government. They had no "army". Russia occupied the entire country. It was the subsequent guerilla  offense that cause Russia to eventually leave. Ukraine could attempt that. At the beginning of this conflict many people expected exactly that outcome. However, Afghanistan is an entirely different place. Parts of it are very mountainous. There are lots of places to hide. The Afghans were both racially and religiously different from the Russians. The Afghans as a people are also much less dependent on "creature comforts" (like electricity and roads!) than Ukrainians are. The Afghans could also fight a very "low-tech war. They were socialized to do exactly that. Finally, Afghanistan was not in any way essential to Russia, politically or economically. The could leave, and did.

IMO there is no comparison at all between the two wars. If one of the two negative scenarios I presented as possibilities plays out, we may see a guerilla war in Ukraine. My guess is that it will end quickly and very, very violently. Putin is quite capable of genocide. Will we and other western nations stand by and watch?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 07-26-2024

(07-26-2024, 06:59 PM)Goose Wrote:  If one of the two negative scenarios I presented as possibilities plays out, we may see a guerilla war in Ukraine. My guess is that it will end quickly and very, very violently. Putin is quite capable of genocide. Will we and other western nations stand by and watch?

Europe, probably yes, they've proven they don't care and that they're willing to elect nationalists to look the other way.  
The U.S., ask me in 4 months and I'll give you a better answer.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-26-2024

(07-26-2024, 07:28 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  

(07-26-2024, 06:59 PM)Goose Wrote:  If one of the two negative scenarios I presented as possibilities plays out, we may see a guerilla war in Ukraine. My guess is that it will end quickly and very, very violently. Putin is quite capable of genocide. Will we and other western nations stand by and watch?

Europe, probably yes, they've proven they don't care and that they're willing to elect nationalists to look the other way.  
The U.S., ask me in 4 months and I'll give you a better answer.

Deal! I just hope we don't ever need to answer it "for real" :-).

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-28-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/only-six-ukrainian-pilots-trained-170948625.html

Article is a bit misleading in that even if only six Ukrainians received training in the EU, at least double that were trained in the US and should be fully ready to go. That said, the extremely slow pace of actually sourcing the aircraft from the alleged suppliers is very worrying. Russia has found out that their corrupt military didn't actually have the resources it claimed it had. Several European countries are demonstrating they have a similar problem, in that the state of their equipment is not as advertised. Shouldn't be a surprise, their governments have been in an "I see nothing!!" mode since the early 90s. As in most things, the only nation with enough mass to easily supply Ukraine is the US, yet for reasons I can't fathom the US is not an enthusiastic supporter of the F-16 effort. We could give Ukraine 50 aircraft without batting an eye. We are replacing F-16s with F-35s continuously. We have a large surplus already and that surplus will only grow.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-30-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-says-russian-cruise-missile-172131294.html

No kidding? Seriously, the four remaining operational submarines are indeed the primary Russian naval threat remaining in the Black Sea. They almost certainly will not be used in the Sea of Azov. It is too shallow in most places to provide safety by submerging. The entrance is also tricky and insecure.

At the start of the war Russia had six Kilos available in the Black Sea. One of them was frightfully obsolete and unusable in a conflict. Subsequently another was seriously damaged by Ukraine while in dry dock. Probably not salvageable with what is available in the Black Sea support facilities. This leaves four Kilos, of which only three are Kalibr capable improved Kilo-class vessels. The fourth has been overhauled but not upgraded to fire Kalibr missiles. It is however quite capable of torpedoing anything that needs it. These boats will remain a problem for quite a while until Ukraine sinks them. Mining the entry to the home port where the live is the best way to do that.

The good news is that these submarines do require extensive maintenance. Eventually they will require an overhaul, which takes lots of time in dry dock. Today the preferred place to get that done would be the Admiralty Shipyard in St. Petersburg. There are other shipyards that can in theory do the work, but that isn't the "normal" pattern. None of them have access to the Black Sea. Eventually the Kilos will be dangerous to operate. That will not be tomorrow, but since none of these boats have had a major overhaul in three years, some of them must be getting close!

These boats are important in that they can fire missiles into Ukraine from the south. That complicates Ukraine's defense because it can't rely on a limited approach angle. Russia will drive these boats into the ground doing this. They don't much care about the risks. Once one doesn't return that may change.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 07-31-2024

F16 deliveries have started.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-31/ukraine-gets-first-delivery-of-f-16-fighter-jets-after-long-wait?sref=yYYRek8e

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 07-31-2024

F16 over Lviv

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1818749982117446042

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-31-2024

(07-31-2024, 07:32 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  F16 over Lviv

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1818749982117446042

Good start. Would be interesting to know where it took off from and where it landed. It wouldn't surprise me at all if they were flying from/to NATO installations. The two jets delivered so far undoubtedly aren't ready to go to war yet. Hopefully soon, and flying over western Ukraine does send a message that they are almost ready. Lets hope they get a chance to matter. When/if they do, they won't be flying from "safe" airfields.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-02-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-flying-shockingly-deep-inside-093539385.html

Lots of "interesting" statements in this article, some of which we can know from other sources are basically true. Some other assertions/conclusions are IMO nonsense. Interestingly we see many statements from various sources saying that the Ukraine's F-16s are not going to be able to operate effectively on or over the FEBA. The assertion is made that Russia's air defenses (basically all SAM based) are ubiquitous, indestructible  and totally effective. Then we also see articles like this one that say:

Quote:"We've seen numerous times where the Ukrainians have penetrated Russian air defenses and then flown aircraft that the Ukrainians really have no right to fly as deep as they have into Russia," he said.
"Russian air defenses should have very easily taken them out."

Obviously both sets of statements cannot be equally true. They are largely contradictory. The article also contains the statement

Quote:That has created a situation of mutual air denial, in which both sides are mostly limited to using their own aircraft in their own territory.

IMO that statement is fundamentally and demonstrably false.

Regarding the ability of Russian air defenses against inbound aircraft. Ever heard of Mathias Rust? He flew through the entire Warsaw Pact and Russian boundary defensive SAM belts back in 1987. The Russian border air defense system did detect him but couldn't target him. They passed the contact to the PVO. The vectored interceptor found him but didn't kill him. Remember, this was at the height of the cold war. Russia was poised to defeat attack from NATO. A Cessna from the FRG landed in Red Square.

Obviously technology has advanced. Russia's radars and SAMs are "better" than they were in 1987. However, they are NOT more numerous. The Russian border defenses were much "thicker" in the late 1980s than they are today. One of the reasons the S-400 has such long range is that it needed to have a larger kill radius to make up for its lower numbers. (There are other reasons as well). The radar horizon and geometry are not different today. Russia also has always had some missile systems defending high value targets inside the country. These are "point defense" batteries. They are often single batteries. These systems are numerous but not numerous enough to defend everything. On top of that is the inevitable "loss of the edge" for SAM troops defending points well inside Russian territory. They don't ever expect to be needed. Most importantly the PVO is completely gone. It used to be a massive organization with a massive number of aircraft and pilots. It could fill the inevitable gaps in the SAM belts. Again, it is GONE.

In the Ukraine war it is important to realize that the defense system the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet Union was not designed to protect Russia from Ukrainian aircraft. Quite the opposite. The Soviet SAM systems in Crimea were legendarily thick and oriented towards defending the Russian Navy in Sevastopol and all the critical defense manufacturing based in Ukraine. Obviously, when Ukraine didn't join the Russian Federation Russia was left with a situation where the had very little to defend themselves against an attack from Ukraine. Russia didn't immediately start a "crash program" to defend themselves against Ukraine. They had money problems. Russia also realistically didn't expect to be attacked by Ukraine :-).

During the interval from about 2008ish to the present, Russia has indeed significantly improved it's air defense system against Ukraine. However, it isn't nearly dense enough to interdict the entire boundary against low-altitude penetration. That is a simple and obvious fact. If you stay low and avoid overflying known SAM sites you will be pretty safe. If you fly around at 10,000 ft or higher you are at risk from SAMs. Below that, you are largely "safe" unless you are stupid. You are at risk from guns and MANPADS/TORs etc., but if one avoids troop concentrations you are pretty safe. For drones, some losses are acceptable. Thus, it is no surprise at all that Ukrainian drones can show up anywhere in Russia. Drones are also on a one-way trip. They don't have to do it twice.

The "correct" way for Russia to defend against these attacks is to fly a Mainstay inside Russian airspace and survey the Ukrainian airspace. If a drone is detected that would pose a threat to cross into Russia, the A-50 could vector an aircraft (from an already airborne "dronecap") that would fly to where the drone is and shoot it down (with guns to save money). Unfortunately for Russia they don't seem to be able to do that. They certainly have never demonstrated the ability to do it "at scale". In Syria they have very occasionally operated that way with up to four aircraft, but that isn't exactly a "high threat" situation. In short, it would seem Russia has a major "capability gap" that Ukraine is and will continue to exploit until Russia fills that hole. FWIW Ukraine has exactly the same problem. They have improvised a defense against drones and cruise missiles, at least for many of the cities. This defense however "leaks" substantially. The F-16s will greatly improve Ukraine's ability to defend against such attacks. Ukraine appears to understand this and intends to do it.

The "mutual air denial" statement IMO is a total myth. Ukraine never has an air force that was anywhere near big enough or modern enough to operate at altitude against Russia inside Russian air space or even over the FEBA. They had no SEAD ability at all. They were also in a situation where they couldn't afford losses because getting replacement aircraft was at best difficult and uncertain. They needed to retain their air force, such as it was, for primarily defensive operations. Russia OTOH arrogantly attempted to operate at high altitude on the first day of the war. With some very slight "help" from the US, the Ukrainian SAMs were ready and had a field day. After that Russia was more careful but still sustained losses. The simple fact is that the Russia air force is not trained or equipped to operate in a "high threat" environment. They have no read SEAD plan. As a result, they don't even try to actively attack Ukrainian air defenses. The Russian air force basically sat out the first two years of the war. In mid 2023 to the present Russian air activity  has increased but in general it occurs behind the FEBA. The (very belated) arrival of practical glide bombs has given the Russian air force the ability to launch attacks from inside "safe" airspace.

Ukraine is very resource limited in its air defense role. Ukraine has occasionally forward deployed a Patriot battery and inflicted major losses on the Russians. This happened largely because the Russian aircraft apparently didn't detect they were at risk and dive for the deck. Ukraine cannot do this regularly and they apparently have had two (German) Patriot launchers damaged in the attempt. Ukraine can't afford losses and can't afford to keep these assets out of "point defense" mode very long. IMO if the Russian air force was motivated and actually established a program to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and take out most of the Ukrainian SAMS, it could be done. Right now, that isn't happening, but Ukraine knows that assuming it never will is a bad idea.

Ukraine OTOH is inflicting attrition on Russian air defenses. This must be oriented towards eventually F-16 utilization, because for drones S-400 batteries aren't all that much of a threat. Fly around them at low altitude. They can't see you. Ukraine also knows that it can't afford many losses of F-16 if it has  only 50 of them. That will be a constraint. However, Ukraine appears to be "shaping the battlefield" to operate F-16s offensively. At a minimum, Ukraine has demonstrated that it can make "holes" in the Russian defensive SAM belt.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-03-2024

https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1819737437997830404?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet

This is the submarine that was previously damaged in dry dock. Subsequent photos showed what appeared to be two large holes in the submarine. Essentially everybody agreed it couldn't be repaired by facilities available in the Black Sea. However, all of those assessments believed that the "holes" were through both the external casing AND the pressure hull. There is no way to really tell that from the photos. IMO there are two possible explanations of how this boat could have been repaired.

The first possibility is that the "holes" were not hull penetrations, but rather damage to just the casing. The pressure hull was therefore undamaged. The casing is not watertight and does not resist the sea pressure. It is repairable without special equipment. IMO that must have been what actually happened. The second possibility is that there were hull penetrations. Repairing the pressure hull and re-certifying test depth would require special welding capabilities that are present only at shipyards that build and overhaul submarines. It would be a major repair that would probably require extensive disassembly of compartments surrounding the repair. None of the facilities directly accessible from the Black Sea can do this type of work. That is why the "experts" declared the boat unable to be repaired in the Black Sea. It is possible that the Russians welded a "patch" over the damage to the pressure hull. The boat wouldn't be able to dive to any significant depth but it could still submerge. Flow noise would also probably slightly increase. Given the lack of a direct anti-submarine threat in the Black Sea, that may have been deemed "good enough". I wouldn't want to go to sea on such a boat, but I suspect the crew would get little choice :-).

Ukraine claims that this time they actually sank her. I would wait a while before I would believe that. She may have simply submerged to avoid further attacks. OTOH she may have actually "sunk" because of external damage, but if the boat was "buttoned up" when she did there may be little or no internal damage. She could therefore be raised and repaired again without too much difficulty. Of course if the pressure hull was ruptured or hatches were open the interior of the submarine would flood, and that would be beyond repair.

Ukraine also clams destruction of between one and four S-400 sites, depending on which reports one believes. If so, that is also a big deal :-).

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-04-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-finally-deploying-f-16-133644686.html

It is now "official". Ukraine has a small number of jets operational inside Ukraine. How many we do not know. IMO their first use will be shooting down drones and cruise missiles well inside Ukraine. We should look for that in the press. One never knows though, as Ukraine often is quite ambitious in utilizing new capabilities. Ukraine has been attacking SAM sites inside Crimea, in fact deep inside Crimea. Why? One answer is to get drones through, but given the low altitude drones utilize things like S-400s are only capable of point defense with a small radius. Not of themselves a "priority" target. Another answer is that Ukraine intends to use its F-16s deep into Crimea fairly soon. That would be a real shock to everybody, particularly the Russians :-). The weather will eventually be an issue. Although the F-16 is not just a fair weather aircraft operations are always inhibited by bad weather. Lets hope Ukraine can get "up to speed" before the weather starts to inhibit the process.

Ukraine is also pushing for neighboring nations to shoot down missiles fired by Russia into Ukraine. I think there is no chance at all this will ever happen. Ukraine shouldn't waste its time and influence on this effort. While Poland probably has the means and desire to help Ukraine in this effort Poland realizes that the rest of NATO steadfastly opposes getting directly involved in the war. Poland knows if it does this Russia will retaliate. Poland also knows an Article 5 invocation wouldn't succeed because Poland would be rightly viewed as the instigator of the Russian response. None of the other bordering nations would be willing (Hungary, Slovakia) or able (everybody else) to aid in the effort. Zelenskyy should save his efforts for thing he can actually get. A big "get" would be active US support for the F-16 effort. We are still not anywhere near fully behind this effort.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 08-06-2024

(08-04-2024, 07:54 AM)Goose Wrote:  Ukraine is also pushing for neighboring nations to shoot down missiles fired by Russia into Ukraine. I think there is no chance at all this will ever happen. Ukraine shouldn't waste its time and influence on this effort. While Poland probably has the means and desire to help Ukraine in this effort Poland realizes that the rest of NATO steadfastly opposes getting directly involved in the war. Poland knows if it does this Russia will retaliate. Poland also knows an Article 5 invocation wouldn't succeed because Poland would be rightly viewed as the instigator of the Russian response. 

If a country were to shoot down a Russian missile while the missile was traveling over Ukrainian territory en route to killing Ukrainian people, that would be considered an aggressive/instigating act against Russia?  I understand that laws are often counterintuitive, but that really seems backwards.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-06-2024

(08-06-2024, 02:41 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  If a country were to shoot down a Russian missile while the missile was traveling over Ukrainian territory en route to killing Ukrainian people, that would be considered an aggressive/instigating act against Russia? 

I understand that laws are often counterintuitive, but that really seems backwards.

Russia would certainly consider it so. In point of fact, shooting down/destroying any nations "property" over territory that is not yours is arguably classifiable as an act of war. Replace missile with ship and I think that is pretty clear. If you are taking overt military action to defend another nation you are de-facto an ally of that nation and actively participating in the war. Selling or giving weapons to Ukraine doesn't make you an "ally". Actively participating to defend Ukraine does.

In any case it doesn't matter what the "letter of the law" may be. Russia would say it was an act of war by Poland and the other NATO nations aren't going to go to war with Russia because Poland did something they absolutely knew would draw that response.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 08-07-2024

Something is happening in Kursk, but unclear exactly what.

Ukrainian sources claim (and Russian sources support) a pretty decent chunk of land and captured POWs, in addition to two helos and several vehicles destroyed. Ukraine has lost a Buk and some IFVs. Seems the Russian defensive lines are pretty much paper thin along most of their border. Will Ukraine retreat soon after a raid, as they have before, or try to dig in and hold Russian territory for a while?

Much initial consternation from many informed Ukrainian observers that this was a waste of resources with a ragged, retreating Ukrainian defense in Donetsk. However the tune has changed a bit today as Russia seems to be really scrambling to get a hold of things.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 08-07-2024

Interesting reports of a Ukranian offensive in the Kursk region:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-keeps-up-air-attacks-russias-kursk-regional-governor-says-2024-08-07/

Unlike previous incursions, this seems to be the regular Ukrainian military and in force rather then smaller militias. Videos of leopards and strykers have been circulating, with air defense for protection. One video of a Ukrainian BUK being destroyed. 

I wonder what their main objective is: 
Capture and hold Russian Territory for leverage in negotiations?
Propoganda/morale boost?
Force Russia to divert forces from other areas? All of the above?

It seems to be too involved to just be a "raid and get out" incursion like previous ones that were reported.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 08-07-2024

https://x.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1821207731488878823

Perhaps 50 captured POWs pictured here. Saw a video yesterday of perhaps 20 being marched back to the Ukrainian border.

https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1821118237230182664

Russian Mi28 helo with its tail rotor appearing to be hit by a Ukrainian FPV drone 

https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1820867599502098688

Destroyed Russian Ka52 helo.

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