Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-24-2024

(05-24-2024, 08:22 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Russian S-400 battery turned into pricey fireworks by ATACMS with cluster munitions.

https://x.com/yarotrof/status/1793942422138806460

Very interesting! I guess the S-400's vaunted ability to "shoot down" ballistic missiles is indeed a bit over-stated. The ATACMS apparently were M39 or M39A1 as these are the models with cluster munitions. Too bad we aren't making them any more. They are nice because they can "miss" the center of the target and still spread bomblets over the target area, as was seen in this video. I believe that in this conflict Patriots have shot down Iskanders (SS-26 variety), which is in the same class as ATACMS. In fairness it seems Russia is not deploying and using their acquisition radars as part of an IADS in Ukraine. That does reduce the warning time. OTOH, there may be reasons they are not.

This is indeed how the ATACMS is supposed to be used. High value targets that can be moved relatively easily (like the S-400) can be ephemeral. Locate it and hit it before they move it.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 05-24-2024

(05-24-2024, 08:22 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Russian S-400 battery turned into pricey fireworks by ATACMS with cluster munitions.

https://x.com/yarotrof/status/1793942422138806460

Surely looks like precision hits to me

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-24-2024

Article about Russian jamming. Much here has been discussed previously, but aircraft dropped SDBs being sent to Ukraine (and performing much better than the derivative ground launched SDBs) is interesting and newly disclosed.

Also new I think is Ukraine asking for M26 cluster rounds for HIMARS, an older round with less range and accuracy being remanufactured for the GLSDB.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/24/russia-jamming-us-weapons-ukraine/

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-24-2024

One Bradley gets disabled by repeated drone and RPG strikes. Another Bradley comes, taking significant incoming fire but able to evacuate the crew from the first one.

https://x.com/RALee85/status/1794043371817722008

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-24-2024

Thread on why GLSDB is having more accuracy problems compared to SDB.

TLDR- SDBs are probably spending less time/distance in GPS denied environment as compared to GLSDB. The GPS/INS system is the same in air and ground launched SDBs.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1794084713868513578

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-24-2024

(05-24-2024, 10:11 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Article about Russian jamming. Much here has been discussed previously, but aircraft dropped SDBs being sent to Ukraine (and performing much better than the derivative ground launched SDBs) is interesting and newly disclosed.

Also new I think is Ukraine asking for M26 cluster rounds for HIMARS, an older round with less range and accuracy being remanufactured for the GLSDB.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/24/russia-jamming-us-weapons-ukraine/

Great article! Interesting that there appears to have been a software fix for the JDAM that helps a lot. It is very probable that many of our GPS guided weapons have unexpected/undocumented assumptions baked into their software. When these weapons are not jammed, they work fine. It may even be true that they work fine in the presence of jamming that does not cause these particular assumption(s) to be false. If the "right kind" of jamming is used however, they "go stupid". Also from the article:

Quote:In interviews, Ukrainian officials described an overly bureaucratic process that they said had complicated a path toward urgently needed adjustments to improve the failing weaponry.

countered by

Quote:The U.S. defense official rejected claims that bureaucracy has slowed the response. The Pentagon and weapons manufacturers have provided solutions sometimes within hours or days, the official said, but did not provide examples.

I believe the Ukrainians. U.S. defense officials are experts at CYA and denying a problem exists. These officials probably aren't exactly lying. They never actually looked for a problem and probably wouldn't understand it if they saw it. Not their job. They know of no problems. One only needs a cursory look at the last 25 years or so of such pronouncements to seriously doubt their accuracy. I am sure there are success stories. I strongly suspect there are many more failures than successes.

The SDB working better than the GLSDB is indeed a bit of a mystery. As I understood it the GLSDBs we were providing to Ukraine were to be launched from their own single-round launchers, not HIMARS. That was one of their big advantages. The initial failure reports seemed to be saying that mud was interfering with the launcher. That doesn't sound like HIMARS launchers. The SDB has the advantage that it doesn't undergo anywhere near the G load and acceleration that a rocket propelled  GLSDB does. That may cause the INS to be less accurate. If the GPS is working, that shouldn't matter much. If it is being jammed, then it very well could.

One last quote from the article that IMO is the most important point of this whole piece:

Quote:The Ukrainian officials said they expect that weapons effective on the battlefield now will similarly slump within a year.
“The Russians will learn how to fight it,” the second Ukrainian official said. “That’s how the arms race works.”

Indeed! This is why it is CRITICAL to move at the speed of war and destroy the enemy before he has the opportunity to "lean how to fight it". We keep giving the Russians time, and doing that can very well defeat Ukraine. We inoculate them to the disease without delivering a fatal dose. That happens over and over.

Ukraine likes cluster munitions because they don't require perfect accuracy. It would be very nice if the US finally realized the obvious and started manufacturing these weapons again. Yes, duds are dangerous to civilians both during and after the war. They are also dangerous to friendly troops crossing an area hit by cluster munitions. OTOH, that means said troops are advancing, and that is what is required to win. I seriously doubt this will happen, but it still would be IMO a very "good" thing if it did.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-25-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-air-defense-woes-t-185235715.html

The above article is very pessimistic. There are some missing key factors. However, its fundamental thesis is IMO clearly correct. Patriots cannot put a shield over Ukraine's sky that is largely invulnerable to air attacks of any and all kinds. It was never designed to do that and not nearly enough such systems exist to do that. Even if Ukraine had every last one of them in existence it wouldn't be enough. That is a simple fact. The article points out that the Patriot systems can be overwhelmed by too many targets. They can easily run out of (very expensive) missiles.

The Patriot should never be shooting at cruise missiles and low speed Iranian knock-off drones. This is where the article goes wrong IMO. Those targets should be taken out by the Ukrainian air force. Gun systems and short range air defense systems can help in this effort but they cannot be quickly moved to concentrate where the large number of threats are intended to overwhelm the air defenses.  Aircraft can, and that is why it "works". The Iranian strike on Israel was defended exactly that way. The massive quantity of relatively "easy" targets were handled by the air forces. The ballistic missiles were handled by the Arrow systems. Granted Israel had the benefit of a buffer zone in which to do this, but even lacking that Ukraine should be able to intercept and destroy the vast majority of such threats. The F-16s are needed RTFN. That isn't going to happen because we didn't anticipate the threat and plan ahead. The US needs to train more than 12 pilots a year (more like 70 or so) and provide all our F-16s that are at or going to the boneyard to Ukraine. This force can also hold at risk Russian aircraft launching air to ground weapons of all types. They can do so both inside Ukraine and inside Russia to a limited extent. If this is not accomplished, Ukraine is indeed toast. It will be just a matter of time.

The summer offensive by Ukraine in 2023 was very important because it would have threatened Crimea, possibly leading to driving the Russians out of there. Ukraine desperately needs a way to "hurt" Russia enough that the Russians could eventually be forced to stop the war. Killing a lot of Russian troops won't do it apparently. Blowing up the Russian oil/gas industry might do it, but to date Ukraine simply doesn't have the quantity of weapons to do it. Taking back Crimea would IMO do it, but Ukraine wasn't able to do so in 2023 and is even less able to do so in 2024. The "why" of that inability only matters in so far as rectifying it is concerned.

Right now, Russia is in a situation it can attack Ukraine from the air indefinitely with little risk of damage to themselves that matters enough to even move the pain meter.  Practice is making Russia better at it and the more aggressive VKS is only going to make things monotonically worse. The US needs a strategy to allow Ukraine to win this war in a time frame that is short enough that Ukraine can survive long enough to execute it. Without that, success is not an option. The time frame now is even shorter than it was in 2023. I am pretty sure that the Ukrainian troops are becoming aware of this situation (in so far as they were not already) and will simply give up if there is no path to victory. Right now, there isn't. What is the "west" thinking is the "way ahead"? With no strategy there is no victory, full stop.

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TrumpCard - TrumpCard - 05-25-2024

From everything I’ve read, the US strategy appears to be positioning for a not-too-bad negotiated resolution. The US view appears to be “can’t we all just get along.”  Same strategy in Gaza (though, obviously, there are many differences between the conflcits).  I just think the US wants to play peacemaker and doesn’t have the appetite for war, even when just.

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RE: TrumpCard - Goose - 05-25-2024

(05-25-2024, 11:15 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I just think the US wants to play peacemaker and doesn’t have the appetite for war, even when just.

You could be correct. I simply don't believe our "strategy" is even that coherent. I think the US has a long list of things it doesn't want to happen, e.g Ukraine being overrun by Russia. The US then does a few things to make that not happen but doesn't ensure its actions will actually have the desired result. Then, when it becomes clear the outcome will not be what we desire we often do something even more stupid to attempt the "fix" our failures. I fear we are there again in Ukraine.

If we couldn't figure out a way for Ukraine to win, it was grossly irresponsible to offer them our support. If the US has decided that we just want a negotiated settlement that will leave Ukraine defenseless against Russia and allow Russia to take over the remaining Ukraine after "a decent interval", our actions in this war are immoral. We propped Ukraine up with the understanding we were going to help them "win". If that is not the case, lots of Ukrainians died for absolutely nothing. That would be on us, and other nations would justly lose all confidence in our word and in our morality. We can't claim we didn't know any better.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 05-26-2024

I didn’t say that the US would leave Ukraine defenseless after the negotiated settlement. I think a negotiated settlement might well include a NATO force in Ukraine to help defend the new border and deter further attacks.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-26-2024

(05-26-2024, 01:32 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I didn’t say that the US would leave Ukraine defenseless after the negotiated settlement. I think a negotiated settlement might well include a NATO force in Ukraine to help defend the new border and deter further attacks.

There are at least two serious problems with this approach. First, given our track record in Ukraine there is little chance that Ukraine (or Russia for that matter) would believe our assertion that we would actively help defend their border has any meaning at all. In the Budapest agreements we said we would do just that. We never have. Even if the administration that signed the agreement fully intended to do so, their is no reasonable assurance that subsequent administrations (or the US Congress) would honor it. History says we won't. Even if there is a "hostage force" in Ukraine, it may not fight. The Russians could just avoid it as much as possible while issuing all kinds of threats. That force itself would be inadequate to actually protect Ukraine and without massive reinforcement and support from NATO it wouldn't be effective. It still comes back to NATO's "will", which based on history and the current state of play in Ukraine is totally lacking. Why would NATO fight to defend a "rump" Ukraine and won't fight now to defend a viable one? There would be even more reasons not to do so.

Second, given the current state of public opinion in the NATO countries the probability of any of them agreeing to send such a force and thereby make a commitment to defend the rump Ukraine is zero. The simple fact is that nations act in their own perceived interests. If the US and NATO will not send troops now to defend Ukraine because they do not consider it in their vital interest, why would they station troops in a rump Ukraine? The same risks of a direct conflict with Russia would exist. Nobody is going to do that. If Ukraine became a full NATO member then possibly the necessity to support NATO (even if the individual nations really don't want to on its own merit) would perhaps allow such a force to exist. However, the probability of all NATO nations agreeing to Ukrainian membership in NATO is even lower that some bilateral agreements being created. Even the US didn't support that before this war. Why would we now?

Last, a Ukrainian state based on current military positions is simply not viable. Ukraine was the poorest country in Europe before they lost access to the sea of Azov and the transportation network in the south and east of the country. It carried most of their trade. What remains would be much worse off even setting aside all the war damage to the rest of the country. Such an agreement would simply leave a situation that is not viable.  See Czechoslovakia in 1938 and what happened in spring of 1939. It may postpone the inevitable, but it will still be inevitable.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gailtate - 05-26-2024

Thoughts on a Sunday morning in May: At the very moment the Free World needs an America to be led by an inspiring, serious and wise statesman or stateswoman, a commander-in-chief steeped in history and instinctively capable of zooming back and forth between details and the big picture of international relations, we are once again stuck with a "choice" between stumbling senility and oblivious narcissism. Any wonder why Hamas, Putin, Xi, the Iranian mullahs, et. al., are rubbing their hands and operating with unmitigated impunity? Their collective future is so bright they gotta wear shades. This is not good, folks.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-26-2024

(05-26-2024, 08:45 AM)gailtate Wrote:  Thoughts on a Sunday morning in May: At the very moment the Free World needs an America to be led by an inspiring, serious and wise statesman or stateswoman, a commander-in-chief steeped in history and instinctively capable of zooming back and forth between details and the big picture of international relations, we are once again stuck with a "choice" between stumbling senility and oblivious narcissism. Any wonder why Hamas, Putin, Xi, the Iranian mullahs, et. al., are rubbing their hands and operating with unmitigated impunity? Their collective future is so bright they gotta wear shades. This is not good, folks.

At the (IMO somewhat distant) risk of a Terry Rule violation, AMEN!

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 05-26-2024

(05-26-2024, 08:01 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(05-26-2024, 01:32 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I didn’t say that the US would leave Ukraine defenseless after the negotiated settlement. I think a negotiated settlement might well include a NATO force in Ukraine to help defend the new border and deter further attacks.

There are at least two serious problems with this approach. First, given our track record in Ukraine there is little chance that Ukraine (or Russia for that matter) would believe our assertion that we would actively help defend their border has any meaning at all. In the Budapest agreements we said we would do just that. We never have. Even if the administration that signed the agreement fully intended to do so, their is no reasonable assurance that subsequent administrations (or the US Congress) would honor it. History says we won't. Even if there is a "hostage force" in Ukraine, it may not fight. The Russians could just avoid it as much as possible while issuing all kinds of threats. That force itself would be inadequate to actually protect Ukraine and without massive reinforcement and support from NATO it wouldn't be effective. It still comes back to NATO's "will", which based on history and the current state of play in Ukraine is totally lacking. Why would NATO fight to defend a "rump" Ukraine and won't fight now to defend a viable one? There would be even more reasons not to do so.

Second, given the current state of public opinion in the NATO countries the probability of any of them agreeing to send such a force and thereby make a commitment to defend the rump Ukraine is zero. The simple fact is that nations act in their own perceived interests. If the US and NATO will not send troops now to defend Ukraine because they do not consider it in their vital interest, why would they station troops in a rump Ukraine? The same risks of a direct conflict with Russia would exist. Nobody is going to do that. If Ukraine became a full NATO member then possibly the necessity to support NATO (even if the individual nations really don't want to on its own merit) would perhaps allow such a force to exist. However, the probability of all NATO nations agreeing to Ukrainian membership in NATO is even lower that some bilateral agreements being created. Even the US didn't support that before this war. Why would we now?

Last, a Ukrainian state based on current military positions is simply not viable. Ukraine was the poorest country in Europe before they lost access to the sea of Azov and the transportation network in the south and east of the country. It carried most of their trade. What remains would be much worse off even setting aside all the war damage to the rest of the country. Such an agreement would simply leave a situation that is not viable.  See Czechoslovakia in 1938 and what happened in spring of 1939. It may postpone the inevitable, but it will still be inevitable.

We agree that more Western support would (or would have) helped Ukraine maintain territorial integrity (mostly).  We also agree that the West's unfortunate posture probably will prevent Ukraine from taking back the territory that Russia invaded.  The point of disagreement relates to what will happen if Russia were to sign a peace treaty in which it agrees to observe certain borders.  You raise two main problems, both of which are real, but, I think, surmountable.  

First, you say Ukraine already was the poorest country in Europe and it can't survive without better access to the sea.  I think Ukraine's ability to survive economically depends more on stability than it does on territorial integrity.  Ukraine has suffered calamity after calamity throughout its history.  Invaded and sacked multiple times, multiple revolutions, famine, genocide, even a major nuclear accident.  If Ukraine were to sign a treaty that Russia actually observed, that would create a surge of optimism that hasn't existed for the vast majority of Ukraine's history.  There's enough land and access to the sea to support an economy.  No one is saying that Ukraine will ever be Poland or Hungary (which themselves still have plenty of problems).  But if people were to believe in a stable future without a high risk of further invasions, I don't think economic strife would cause the country to collapse.  It would just be another poor country with a difficult history of living in Russia's shadow.  

Second, you say NATO would not put troops in Ukraine and Russia would not observe any peace treaty.  Maybe I should have put this first because, in my mind, it's the elephant in the room.  The economy and political system eventually will collapse if the people live in constant fear of another Russian invasion.  But I think it's important to set the stage.  In my view, everything else will fall into place (enough for Ukraine to survive as an independent nation) if people believe in the strength of the peace treaty.  

So, why would the U.S. or other Western nations put troops in Ukraine to solidify a peace treaty?  

(1) The U.S. already has ~$50,000 troops in Eastern Europe, and it could reposition some of those troops in Ukraine without substantially affecting the U.S. budget (which is a major consideration in light of our current political climate).   

(2) The U.S. has shown a willingness to put a certain number of its troops in harm's way in the Baltics to show Russia that the U.S. is all-in on defending the East/West border.  There is proof of concept that it has worked so far in the Baltics, and the administration might well conclude that the same thing would be true in Ukraine.

(3) Although NATO membership for Ukraine would be nice symbolism, the U.S.'s willingness to defend Ukraine is the only factor that really matters.  Russia observed its treaty with Finland in part because it believed that the U.S. and other major western powers would defend Finland (even though Finland was not a NATO member at the time).  

(4) There is one decisive factor that would distinguish the U.S.'s decision whether to defend Ukraine pre-2022 with the U.S.'s decision whether to defend Ukraine after a potential peace treaty.  Pre-2021, Russia and Ukraine were engaged in active hostilities.  The U.S. would have been intervening in an active conflict in which Russia had recently taken territory and was obviously engaging in ongoing efforts to take more.  If the U.S. put troops in Ukraine and Russia just continued on its course, there would have been a direct conflict between U.S. troops and Russian troops (or Russian proxies at a minimum).  After a treaty, presumably there would be a fortified border like what we see in Korea (though not at the same density of troops due to the length of the Russian/Ukrainian border).  If Russia wanted to take more territory, it would have to initiate a new invasion directly into a "peacekeeping" force.  Russia has demonstrated in the past (e.g. Yalta, Finland) that it won't risk starting WWIII by violating a treaty that establishes a West/East border.  Russia can do better by focusing any expansion efforts on geographic areas that are more under its sphere of influence (the Caucasus).  

(5) If you're saying that the U.S. or West should have sent troops to defend Ukraine pre-2014, then I agree, but those were very different political times.  Obama was attempting a "re-set" with Russia.  Bush was tied up in two major conflicts for most of his presidency.  Before the Iraq War went south, Ukraine was run by a pro-Russian strongman who would not have accepted Western troops even if we wanted to put them there.  Before that, Yeltsin was trying to move Russia towards a more friendly relationship with the West and we weren't about to undermine him by putting troops directly on his border.  In sum, a 2024 peace treaty would be the most logical time since the Fall of the Soviet Union for the U.S. or the West to put troops in Ukraine.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-26-2024

(05-26-2024, 02:48 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  We agree that more Western support would (or would have) helped Ukraine maintain territorial integrity (mostly).  We also agree that the West's unfortunate posture probably will prevent Ukraine from taking back the territory that Russia invaded.  The point of disagreement relates to what will happen if Russia were to sign a peace treaty in which it agrees to observe certain borders.  You raise two main problems, both of which are real, but, I think, surmountable.  

First, you say Ukraine already was the poorest country in Europe and it can't survive without better access to the sea.  I think Ukraine's ability to survive economically depends more on stability than it does on territorial integrity. Ukraine has suffered calamity after calamity throughout its history.  Invaded and sacked multiple times, multiple revolutions, famine, genocide, even a major nuclear accident.  If Ukraine were to sign a treaty that Russia actually observed, that would create a surge of optimism that hasn't existed for the vast majority of Ukraine's history.  There's enough land and access to the sea to support an economy.  No one is saying that Ukraine will ever be Poland or Hungary (which themselves still have plenty of problems).  But if people were to believe in a stable future without a high risk of further invasions, I don't think economic strife would cause the country to collapse.  It would just be another poor country with a difficult history of living in Russia's shadow. 

You are certainly correct that stability would be a big help. Unfortunately stability cannot overcome geography. During all those historical calamities mentioned above Ukraine had the Dnipro river to bring their bulk commodities from the central and northern areas to the Black Sea. They also had the ports along the Sea of Azov that could do the same thing. Even while they were a conquered nation ruled by outsiders, Ukraine had that. They now have neither. After the industrialization in Soviet times Ukraine also had a major steel and shipbuilding economy, most of which was either in the Donbas or supported by industries in the Donbas. The majority of the transportation system in Ukraine was built to service this south and eastern part of Ukraine. It was Ukraine's industrial heart. These industries were well into decline by 1990 but they at least still existed and made money. Ukraine no longer has any of that. So, what would Ukraine still have if a peace treaty is signed? They will have a second-class port that is not well connected to most of their remaining agricultural land by road or rail. Worse still the transport of bulk commodities by road or rail is much more expensive than doing so by river/sea. Ukraine will be at a massive financial disadvantage from the get-go against among others, Russia. The oil and gas assets Ukraine had available for exploitation are unfortunately mostly in the territory taken by Russia. AFAIK, that is it. Other than a bright and inventive populace, those are Ukraine's assets if the war ended today. Maybe that would allow them to get by as an economic basket case. However, under those circumstances the bright and inventive part of the population will emigrate very quickly. Besides stability, a reasonable path to prosperity is needed to successfully run a capitalistic economy. IMO Ukraine will not have that. 

Quote:Second, you say NATO would not put troops in Ukraine and Russia would not observe any peace treaty.  Maybe I should have put this first because, in my mind, it's the elephant in the room.  The economy and political system eventually will collapse if the people live in constant fear of another Russian invasion.  But I think it's important to set the stage.  In my view, everything else will fall into place (enough for Ukraine to survive as an independent nation) if people believe in the strength of the peace treaty.

I agree that is necessary. I don't agree it is sufficient :-). 

Quote:So, why would the U.S. or other Western nations put troops in Ukraine to solidify a peace treaty?  

(1) The U.S. already has ~$50,000 troops in Eastern Europe, and it could reposition some of those troops in Ukraine without substantially affecting the U.S. budget (which is a major consideration in light of our current political climate).

Possibly true. However the US military is already way overstretched in the world. The troops needed for Ukraine will exacerbate this situation. The truth is that our current situation is not sustainable even without another "hostage force" being required.

Quote:(2) The U.S. has shown a willingness to put a certain number of its troops in harm's way in the Baltics to show Russia that the U.S. is all-in on defending the East/West border.  There is proof of concept that it has worked so far in the Baltics, and the administration might well conclude that the same thing would be true in Ukraine.

The elephant in that room is that the Baltics are part of NATO. Even without troops in the country we are in theory on the hook to defend them. That means that no real "decision" is required to send troops there. It is part of our NATO commitment. In addition, there are bilateral agreements between the US and the Baltics. Ukraine OTOH has no NATO membership and no bilateral defense treaties with the US. The administration would have an impossible task justifying such a deployment without legislative consent. Good luck with that.

Quote:(3) Although NATO membership for Ukraine would be nice symbolism, the U.S.'s willingness to defend Ukraine is the only factor that really matters.

I agree. Every day we clearly demonstrate the limitations on our will to defend Ukraine. How does that change and even if we claimed it had would anybody (especially Russia and Ukraine) believe us?

Quote:Russia observed its treaty with Finland in part because it believed that the U.S. and other major western powers would defend Finland (even though Finland was not a NATO member at the time).

I can assure you the Finnish military didn't believe that for one second. Their plan was 1) to make it difficult enough for Russia to conquer Finland that it wouldn't be worth the effort and 2) do everything possible to accommodate Russia's desires, even if they didn't want to do so.  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization. The Finnish military was also very well aware of the limitations of this strategy. They had lost part of their country despite their best efforts. What "saved" them during the cold war was that the Russian leadership was rational and realized taking Finland simply wasn't worth it. It also helped that Finland served both Russia and the US as a conduit for some trade that was otherwise forbidden. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elektronorgtechnica. One very large factor in Finland's decision to join NATO is that the government and the populace no longer believe that Russia under Putin will behave rationally.

Quote:(4) There is one decisive factor that would distinguish the U.S.'s decision whether to defend Ukraine pre-2022 with the U.S.'s decision whether to defend Ukraine after a potential peace treaty.  Pre-2021, Russia and Ukraine were engaged in active hostilities.  The U.S. would have been intervening in an active conflict in which Russia had recently taken territory and was obviously engaging in ongoing efforts to take more.  If the U.S. put troops in Ukraine and Russia just continued on its course, there would have been a direct conflict between U.S. troops and Russian troops (or Russian proxies at a minimum).  After a treaty, presumably there would be a fortified border like what we see in Korea (though not at the same density of troops due to the length of the Russian/Ukrainian border).  If Russia wanted to take more territory, it would have to initiate a new invasion directly into a "peacekeeping" force.  Russia has demonstrated in the past (e.g. Yalta, Finland) that it won't risk starting WWIII by violating a treaty that establishes a West/East border.

Indeed Russia has behaved relatively rationally during the cold war. Unfortunately they have recently demonstrated that they are perfectly capable of doing something stupid. Russia actually let both Belarus and Ukraine "go in peace" in the dissolution of the Soviet union. That certainly wouldn't happen under Putin and he is in the process of reversing it.

Quote: Russia can do better by focusing any expansion efforts on geographic areas that are more under its sphere of influence (the Caucasus).

Not sure what you mean by "better". None of those countries have much to offer. I doubt Russia wants any of them, except Georgia. Any desire to take others over is minimal. They are Islamic in the main. Russia wants no part of a larger Islamic minority. 
<continued>

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-26-2024

(05-26-2024, 02:48 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  (5) If you're saying that the U.S. or West should have sent troops to defend Ukraine pre-2014, then I agree, but those were very different political times.  Obama was attempting a "re-set" with Russia.  Bush was tied up in two major conflicts for most of his presidency.  Before the Iraq War went south, Ukraine was run by a pro-Russian strongman who would not have accepted Western troops even if we wanted to put them there.  Before that, Yeltsin was trying to move Russia towards a more friendly relationship with the West and we weren't about to undermine him by putting troops directly on his border.  In sum, a 2024 peace treaty would be the most logical time since the Fall of the Soviet Union for the U.S. or the West to put troops in Ukraine.

It might be the most logical time, but the US should never put troops into a country whose defense is not considered in the "vital interest" of the US. Right now, we clearly don't believe that a free Ukrainian state is in our "vital interest", at least not vital enough to actually fight for. I am not arguing here that it is in our vital interest. I am simply stating that right now the US president, the US congress, and the US military do not believe it is. Ukraine knows this and Russia knows this.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 05-26-2024

(05-26-2024, 08:45 AM)gailtate Wrote:  Thoughts on a Sunday morning in May: At the very moment the Free World needs an America to be led by an inspiring, serious and wise statesman or stateswoman, a commander-in-chief steeped in history and instinctively capable of zooming back and forth between details and the big picture of international relations, we are once again stuck with a "choice" between stumbling senility and oblivious narcissism. Any wonder why Hamas, Putin, Xi, the Iranian mullahs, et. al., are rubbing their hands and operating with unmitigated impunity? Their collective future is so bright they gotta wear shades. This is not good, folks.

Amen! No better way to say it like it is.

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(05-26-2024, 04:54 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(05-26-2024, 02:48 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  (5) If you're saying that the U.S. or West should have sent troops to defend Ukraine pre-2014, then I agree, but those were very different political times.  Obama was attempting a "re-set" with Russia.  Bush was tied up in two major conflicts for most of his presidency.  Before the Iraq War went south, Ukraine was run by a pro-Russian strongman who would not have accepted Western troops even if we wanted to put them there.  Before that, Yeltsin was trying to move Russia towards a more friendly relationship with the West and we weren't about to undermine him by putting troops directly on his border.  In sum, a 2024 peace treaty would be the most logical time since the Fall of the Soviet Union for the U.S. or the West to put troops in Ukraine.

It might be the most logical time, but the US should never put troops into a country whose defense is not considered in the "vital interest" of the US. Right now, we clearly don't believe that a free Ukrainian state is in our "vital interest", at least not vital enough to actually fight for. I am not arguing here that it is in our vital interest. I am simply stating that right now the US president, the US congress, and the US military do not believe it is. Ukraine knows this and Russia knows this.

FWL my opinion is worth, I think the problem lies with Congress and the President.  Congress is a mess, no one can agree on anything.  The President has a hard time makiing hard decisions.  The Military is left trying to figure out what they are supposed to do, since almost all the important people above them have NO military expertise or experience.  Our system of having a civilian Commander in Chief is important, but that commander has to be smart emough to staff his advisors with people who understand what he or she doesn't, and then be willing ot listen. Enough said.

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(05-26-2024, 04:54 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(05-26-2024, 02:48 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  (5) If you're saying that the U.S. or West should have sent troops to defend Ukraine pre-2014, then I agree, but those were very different political times.  Obama was attempting a "re-set" with Russia.  Bush was tied up in two major conflicts for most of his presidency.  Before the Iraq War went south, Ukraine was run by a pro-Russian strongman who would not have accepted Western troops even if we wanted to put them there.  Before that, Yeltsin was trying to move Russia towards a more friendly relationship with the West and we weren't about to undermine him by putting troops directly on his border.  In sum, a 2024 peace treaty would be the most logical time since the Fall of the Soviet Union for the U.S. or the West to put troops in Ukraine.

It might be the most logical time, but the US should never put troops into a country whose defense is not considered in the "vital interest" of the US. Right now, we clearly don't believe that a free Ukrainian state is in our "vital interest", at least not vital enough to actually fight for. I am not arguing here that it is in our vital interest. I am simply stating that right now the US president, the US congress, and the US military do not believe it is. Ukraine knows this and Russia knows this.

Amen!

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-29-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-producing-shells-3-times-105404588.html

I am sure we all remember the conjectures about when Russia was going to run out of 152 mm ammunition. While Russia did (and still does) have some "challenges" that has resulted in them using obsolete North Korean ammunition, it is quite clear Russia isn't running out of ammunition in this war, now or ever. Unfortunately the west, particularly the EU, has not increased production to meet the need. The sense of urgency is, once again, distinctly lacking. Despite all their big talk, Rheinmetall hasn't come through with equally big production. They undoubtedly blame the slow pace of contracting by the German government, and they have a point. That said, Rheinmetall is planning to open facilities that will take a year or more to come online. Ukraine very will may not be around to use the shells at that point.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Mick - 05-29-2024

(05-29-2024, 07:14 AM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-producing-shells-3-times-105404588.html

I am sure we all remember the conjectures about when Russia was going to run out of 152 mm ammunition. While Russia did (and still does) have some "challenges" that has resulted in them using obsolete North Korean ammunition, it is quite clear Russia isn't running out of ammunition in this war, now or ever. Unfortunately the west, particularly the EU, has not increased production to meet the need. The sense of urgency is, once again, distinctly lacking. Despite all their big talk, Rheinmetall hasn't come through with equally big production. They undoubtedly blame the slow pace of contracting by the German government, and they have a point. That said, Rheinmetall is planning to open facilities that will take a year or more to come online. Ukraine very will may not be around to use the shells at that point.

Perhaps they're waiting for Ukraine to fall and the Baltics to get attacked. Or Poland...or...

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 05-29-2024

I've read that the U.S. is undertaking efforts to increase artillery production.  Like this recent article:  https://warriormaven.com/land/army-triples-155m-artillery-production-produce-course-correcting-rounds.  I'm not sure if these actions are the type that you all are saying are too little, too late.

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