Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-12-2024

Interesting shakeup in the Kremlin. Longtime Putin crony and Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, in the post since 2012, replaced by Andrei Belousov, an economist and former deputy prime minister. Shoigu apparently being moved to secretary of the security council, where he replaces Nikolai Patrushev, a former FSB director thought to be very close with Putin as well. Patrushev doesn't seem to have a spot in this game of musical chairs thus far.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-proposes-sacking-defence-minister-shoigu-parliament-says-2024-05-12/

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-13-2024

(05-12-2024, 12:22 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Interesting shakeup in the Kremlin. Longtime Putin crony and Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, in the post since 2012, replaced by Andrei Belousov, an economist and former deputy prime minister. Shoigu apparently being moved to secretary of the security council, where he replaces Nikolai Patrushev, a former FSB director thought to be very close with Putin as well. Patrushev doesn't seem to have a spot in this game of musical chairs thus far.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-proposes-sacking-defence-minister-shoigu-parliament-says-2024-05-12/

Shoigu has been a "weak link" for a very long time. On the one hand Putin wanted a stronger and more capable military. On the other hand, it was clear that Shoigu wasn't ever going to make it happen. The real strategic and tactical decisions were being made elsewhere for a very long time. Undoubtedly Putin wanted to replace Shoigu for at least that period.  Shoigu kept his job because he remained unquestionably loyal to Putin and firing your defense minister when you just had an attempted coup and Ukraine is doing well is a very bad look. Russia is doing well right now so it is not a sign of "panic". He got "promoted" at least partially to minimize his exposure to the fallout of ongoing corruption scandal at the Ministry.

The appointment of an economist is interesting, to say the least. That could just be an over-reaction to the current corruption scandal. It also could be an indication Putin is happy with the command structure he has that operates outside of the Ministry. In the latter case the Ministry may just become the logistics and procurement arm of the government and nothing more. There is a lot of tradition and history that Putin may want to bypass.

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-exploiting-ukraines-lack-manpower-151124943.html

Repeating what has been said before, with a few recent consequences added. Russia is using their manpower to "stretch" Ukraine. Russia has more coming as the latest draft "class" is probably getting as useful as it ever will be. Using them now makes sense, and gets the ones that survive combat experience. From October through December of last year Russia drafted 130K people. How many the actually got is another question, but by now they are for sure as trained as they are going to be. As the article states, Ukraine can't suddenly raise and train a lot more troops. Their dithering around the draft legislation was certainly understandable, but it unquestionably delayed raising more troops. Things are not going to get better soon it seems.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-14-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/yevgeny-prigozhin-finally-gets-revenge-151850576.html

More clarification on the "reorganization". If I were Shoigu I would stay away from upper floors and windows. His departure will not in any way change who is "running" the Russian military. Unfortunately it does allow a lot of "baggage" to be dumped on him, thereby validating the assertion that all the problems of the past are "fixed" and the way ahead is clear. This will certainly improve Russian civilian and military morale at least in the short term. Of course, Russians are very used to being lied to, so they will likely de-rate these claims.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-14-2024

Interesting article on Russian use of ATVs

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russias-increasingly-turning-fast-atvs-204815239.html

In summary the Russians are using ATVs to transport troops to the front and perform reconnaissance. They also use them for small scale infantry attacks looking for a "soft spot". The Ukrainians also use ATVs for similar functions. They are clearly vulnerable, but so are individual infantry troops on foot. ATVs are much faster than walking. ATVs provide good lines of sight to the occupants. ATVs are noisy, which for many recon and "probing" attacks is problematic.

Vehicles such as the pickup trucks so ubiquitous in the Middle Eastern insurgent armies have most of the same problems as an ATV, plus some. They provide no protection, but are much more visible than an ATV. Vehicles such as the HUMVEE do provide better protection than an ATV or conventional motor vehicle. They are mine and small arms "resistant", which helps. They are also noisy and are quite large compared to an ATV.  IFVs are better protected, but also much noisier and much more visible. IFVs also provide very restricted lines of sight. Of course, given that Russian IFVs are very uncomfortable and death traps when hit with anything beyond small arms, the troops often ride outside, negating their "better protection". If you want to move 1 to 4 people relatively quickly in an environment that is not "high threat", ATVs make sense. They are not perfect at it however. You can still get killed. Of course, that is true of moving on foot as well, and walking is a lot slower.

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TrumpCard - TrumpCard - 05-16-2024

I’m not sure NATO sending trainers to Ukraine is realistic, but it’s the top story on the NYT online so I take it somewhat seriously:

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/16/us/politics/nato-ukraine.html

Oh, and this article, from solid authors, doesn’t sound great:

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/16/opinion/russia-ukraine-kharkiv.html

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-16-2024

I don't think the US will be sending troops any time soon. Maybe some of the Baltic states would, but they too would be leery of doing so without any other NATO involvement. Estonia said they'd consider sending unilaterally but would prefer other NATO involvement. 

We have trucks and trains these days, I don't think the extra distance to send Ukrainian trainees outside of Ukraine is really a critical problem.

The article is focused on training, but Estonian and also France, when talking about deploying troops, were discussing taking on responsibilities in the rear to allow those Ukrainian troops to deploy to the front.

Myself, I would support sending US and NATO troops for this role. I think Russia would be deterred from attacking those troops purposefully, knowing that it would likely bring more US and NATO involvement if those personnel were injured or killed, and that's pretty much the last thing Russia wants or needs. Their internal political messaging already states that NATO and the US are directly at war with Russia, that American weapons are killing Russian soldiers. So if their rhetoric is already there, may as well live up to it.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-16-2024

(05-16-2024, 12:49 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  I don't think the US will be sending troops any time soon. Maybe some of the Baltic states would, but they too would be leery of doing so without any other NATO involvement. Estonia said they'd consider sending unilaterally but would prefer other NATO involvement. 

We have trucks and trains these days, I don't think the extra distance to send Ukrainian trainees outside of Ukraine is really a critical problem.

Totally agree. Training in already existing facilities in Europe is a much better approach. Ukraine lacks adequate training facilities in their own country, and those that they have are not "safe". Russia can and will target large accumulations of manpower wherever it is in Ukraine. In Europe, they can't. NATO countries already have very good training facilities that are underutilized due to the major reduction is forces since the end of the cold war. Do it "right" and don't try to get by with half-ass training done in a war zone. The travel time isn't significant compared to not training because of "steel rain".

Quote:The article is focused on training, but Estonian and also France, when talking about deploying troops, were discussing taking on responsibilities in the rear to allow those Ukrainian troops to deploy to the front.

Myself, I would support sending US and NATO troops for this role. I think Russia would be deterred from attacking those troops purposefully, knowing that it would likely bring more US and NATO involvement if those personnel were injured or killed, and that's pretty much the last thing Russia wants or needs. Their internal political messaging already states that NATO and the US are directly at war with Russia, that American weapons are killing Russian soldiers. So if their rhetoric is already there, may as well live up to it.

I understand your point. However, both we and Russia have a very long history of misunderstanding each other's political messaging. We also have a very nasty habit of projecting our decision-making process onto our opponents. We say "no reasonable man would do X" and then our opponents surprise us by doing exactly X, for which we are not prepared. I am pretty sure the administration couldn't generate political consensus to do such a thing even if it wanted to (which I am certain it does not). Russia being "deterred" from doing anything is a very risky business. Even if Russia didn't intend it, eventually some of ours will get killed. War happens, missiles miss, etc. Then what do we do? On top of that, it is an election year. Shouldn't matter, but it does.

IMO Ukraine prevailing is EXTREMELY important to the NATO (and the US in particular). We have adopted a very much less than "all in" strategy from the beginning, and then compounded it with political machinations. The Congress (in the last aid bill) added a "requirement" that the administration provide a written "strategy" for Ukrainian victory (or else no more aid). Congress has done many arguably questionable things, but this isn't one of them. This strategy is IMO critically needed. One would think the administration would be "selling" their strategy to the American people already and it would already be "known".  That strategy, if it exists, would govern what we would be willing to do in terms of "boots on the ground", and we would already be doing it. Changing strategy is sometimes necessary, but when doing so it is essential it is done dispassionately and with a "clear eye". Far too often we keep doing the same thing, knowing it isn't working, because it is the only "plan" we have. If we can't articulate what we are doing and how it will produce the desired end state, we are in deep trouble.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 05-17-2024

(05-16-2024, 02:17 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(05-16-2024, 12:49 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  I don't think the US will be sending troops any time soon. Maybe some of the Baltic states would, but they too would be leery of doing so without any other NATO involvement. Estonia said they'd consider sending unilaterally but would prefer other NATO involvement. 

We have trucks and trains these days, I don't think the extra distance to send Ukrainian trainees outside of Ukraine is really a critical problem.

Totally agree. Training in already existing facilities in Europe is a much better approach. Ukraine lacks adequate training facilities in their own country, and those that they have are not "safe". Russia can and will target large accumulations of manpower wherever it is in Ukraine. In Europe, they can't. NATO countries already have very good training facilities that are underutilized due to the major reduction is forces since the end of the cold war. Do it "right" and don't try to get by with half-ass training done in a war zone. The travel time isn't significant compared to not training because of "steel rain".

Quote:The article is focused on training, but Estonian and also France, when talking about deploying troops, were discussing taking on responsibilities in the rear to allow those Ukrainian troops to deploy to the front.

Myself, I would support sending US and NATO troops for this role. I think Russia would be deterred from attacking those troops purposefully, knowing that it would likely bring more US and NATO involvement if those personnel were injured or killed, and that's pretty much the last thing Russia wants or needs. Their internal political messaging already states that NATO and the US are directly at war with Russia, that American weapons are killing Russian soldiers. So if their rhetoric is already there, may as well live up to it.

I understand your point. However, both we and Russia have a very long history of misunderstanding each other's political messaging. We also have a very nasty habit of projecting our decision-making process onto our opponents. We say "no reasonable man would do X" and then our opponents surprise us by doing exactly X, for which we are not prepared. I am pretty sure the administration couldn't generate political consensus to do such a thing even if it wanted to (which I am certain it does not). Russia being "deterred" from doing anything is a very risky business. Even if Russia didn't intend it, eventually some of ours will get killed. War happens, missiles miss, etc. Then what do we do? On top of that, it is an election year. Shouldn't matter, but it does.

IMO Ukraine prevailing is EXTREMELY important to the NATO (and the US in particular). We have adopted a very much less than "all in" strategy from the beginning, and then compounded it with political machinations. The Congress (in the last aid bill) added a "requirement" that the administration provide a written "strategy" for Ukrainian victory (or else no more aid). Congress has done many arguably questionable things, but this isn't one of them. This strategy is IMO critically needed. One would think the administration would be "selling" their strategy to the American people already and it would already be "known".  That strategy, if it exists, would govern what we would be willing to do in terms of "boots on the ground", and we would already be doing it. Changing strategy is sometimes necessary, but when doing so it is essential it is done dispassionately and with a "clear eye". Far too often we keep doing the same thing, knowing it isn't working, because it is the only "plan" we have. If we can't articulate what we are doing and how it will produce the desired end state, we are in deep trouble.

I am going to have a hard time staying out of trouble on this subject.

I agree completely with your comments.  No matter how long we deal with the Russians, both sides never seem to really understand the other's thinking. 

"It is an election year"  No matter whether we are talking about the Middle East, Ukraine, or the Far East.  I think every decision is based simply on what gives the best chance of gathering a few more votes.  Whether it is best for the USA or the World comes in second.

We can no longer make decisions that are in the best interest of our Country first and foremost and our political careers second.  Congress is even more off the rails.

As this mess drags on, I think we are more likely to see European countries get involved out side of NATO. Many of those countries have to live with a Russian neighbor who isn't 7,000 miles away, but just down the street. The fact that we aren't selling a strategy of any kind is worrisome, and I include a strategy for anything anywhere.  We can no longer make decisons or say "or else" to anyone.

We should have been training Ukrainian soldiers outside of Ukraine long ago, and how long it will take to actually do that may be too long.  We can dither around with this like we dithered around with the F16's which remain a mirage in the sun as far as I can see.

More than anything else, we need to spell out some sort of national policy and stick to it, but I doubt that will ever happen.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-18-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-finally-getting-serious-war-121501421.html

IMO this article is a pretty good summary of the "state of play". The "West" made a horrible mistake by allowing Russia to "hang around" for far too long. History shows that is always a mistake with them. They needed to get "blown out" early, and it didn't happen, using sports terminology. That said, they still have problems. Putin's leadership changes may or may not have permanent effects, and Russia going "all in" on a true war economy may be asking to much. Something may "break" in a way that causes political unrest that is hard to control. We don't have much insight into such things, so we can't count on it.

The failure of the West and Ukraine to defeat Russia while they were still "learning" now puts Ukraine and the West in a situation where we can't afford many "mistakes" in strategy or level of effort. As the article points out, Ukraine's morale is now definitely in question, where it was not previously. The "gradualist" approach the US often adopts in conflicts like this is NEVER a good idea. We sometimes get away with it because our opponent is either incompetent, lacks the combat power to "win" even in the best case, or lacks motivation. Russia was incompetent at the start of the war in large measure. They are unquestionably much better now (granted that was a low bar :). The US and NATO has to up their game and also "get serious". If we don't, Ukraine is toast.

Ukraine also has to up their game in terms of manpower utilization in general and bulk up its "masse de manoeuvre". If they can't do this, they will lose the war this year. The Ukrainians moved way too slowly on this issue. It takes time to train troops even when you have the bodies. You also need a continuous flow of replacements to ensure you are not "caught short" due to timing. Ukraine is now caught short, and their survival is far from certain at this point.

If the West and the Ukraine expect the Ukrainian air force to become a factor in this war, the F-16 program needs to be greatly expanded with full US participation including supplying the bulk of the airframes. The West, particularly the US, has to develop a strategy to win and implement it. A force of even 50 older-model F-16s delivered in dribs and drabs probably won't be the "path to victory", and Ukraine isn't even getting that as things stand. It will be lots of effort for a paltry gain unless an adequate mass of pilots and aircraft can be committed as a unit. Even best-case, a coherent plan of attack with both objectives and rationale is necessary, not just "Here is a bunch of planes. See what you can do."

Some "good news" is that Ukraine isn't complaining about lack of artillery ammunition at the moment. We need to ensure it stays that way. However, Ukraine was unable to bring the Russian offensive in the North to a standstill with artillery. Classically this is a main task for artillery. That indicates to me that all is still not well. Russia has improved in using infiltration tactics on a large scale, but their supply lines should still be vulnerable to interdiction.

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lex24 - lex24 - 05-18-2024

(05-17-2024, 01:06 AM)GK3 Wrote:  

(05-16-2024, 02:17 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(05-16-2024, 12:49 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  I don't think the US will be sending troops any time soon. Maybe some of the Baltic states would, but they too would be leery of doing so without any other NATO involvement. Estonia said they'd consider sending unilaterally but would prefer other NATO involvement. 

We have trucks and trains these days, I don't think the extra distance to send Ukrainian trainees outside of Ukraine is really a critical problem.

Totally agree. Training in already existing facilities in Europe is a much better approach. Ukraine lacks adequate training facilities in their own country, and those that they have are not "safe". Russia can and will target large accumulations of manpower wherever it is in Ukraine. In Europe, they can't. NATO countries already have very good training facilities that are underutilized due to the major reduction is forces since the end of the cold war. Do it "right" and don't try to get by with half-ass training done in a war zone. The travel time isn't significant compared to not training because of "steel rain".

Quote:The article is focused on training, but Estonian and also France, when talking about deploying troops, were discussing taking on responsibilities in the rear to allow those Ukrainian troops to deploy to the front.

Myself, I would support sending US and NATO troops for this role. I think Russia would be deterred from attacking those troops purposefully, knowing that it would likely bring more US and NATO involvement if those personnel were injured or killed, and that's pretty much the last thing Russia wants or needs. Their internal political messaging already states that NATO and the US are directly at war with Russia, that American weapons are killing Russian soldiers. So if their rhetoric is already there, may as well live up to it.

I understand your point. However, both we and Russia have a very long history of misunderstanding each other's political messaging. We also have a very nasty habit of projecting our decision-making process onto our opponents. We say "no reasonable man would do X" and then our opponents surprise us by doing exactly X, for which we are not prepared. I am pretty sure the administration couldn't generate political consensus to do such a thing even if it wanted to (which I am certain it does not). Russia being "deterred" from doing anything is a very risky business. Even if Russia didn't intend it, eventually some of ours will get killed. War happens, missiles miss, etc. Then what do we do? On top of that, it is an election year. Shouldn't matter, but it does.

IMO Ukraine prevailing is EXTREMELY important to the NATO (and the US in particular). We have adopted a very much less than "all in" strategy from the beginning, and then compounded it with political machinations. The Congress (in the last aid bill) added a "requirement" that the administration provide a written "strategy" for Ukrainian victory (or else no more aid). Congress has done many arguably questionable things, but this isn't one of them. This strategy is IMO critically needed. One would think the administration would be "selling" their strategy to the American people already and it would already be "known".  That strategy, if it exists, would govern what we would be willing to do in terms of "boots on the ground", and we would already be doing it. Changing strategy is sometimes necessary, but when doing so it is essential it is done dispassionately and with a "clear eye". Far too often we keep doing the same thing, knowing it isn't working, because it is the only "plan" we have. If we can't articulate what we are doing and how it will produce the desired end state, we are in deep trouble.

I am going to have a hard time staying out of trouble on this subject.

I agree completely with your comments.  No matter how long we deal with the Russians, both sides never seem to really understand the other's thinking. 

"It is an election year"  No matter whether we are talking about the Middle East, Ukraine, or the Far East.  I think every decision is based simply on what gives the best chance of gathering a few more votes.  Whether it is best for the USA or the World comes in second.

We can no longer make decisions that are in the best interest of our Country first and foremost and our political careers second.  Congress is even more off the rails.

As this mess drags on, I think we are more likely to see European countries get involved out side of NATO. Many of those countries have to live with a Russian neighbor who isn't 7,000 miles away, but just down the street. The fact that we aren't selling a strategy of any kind is worrisome, and I include a strategy for anything anywhere.  We can no longer make decisons or say "or else" to anyone.

We should have been training Ukrainian soldiers outside of Ukraine long ago, and how long it will take to actually do that may be too long.  We can dither around with this like we dithered around with the F16's which remain a mirage in the sun as far as I can see.

More than anything else, we need to spell out some sort of national policy and stick to it, but I doubt that will ever happen.


Agree here should be a national policy.  Also agree it won’t happen.  It’s not an issue the electorate cares much about.  It should.  But it doesn’t.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 05-18-2024

The BBC reports the maie - female ratio in the Ukraine military is 4 to 1. One way to increase the number of soldiers is to increase the number of women. 

The BBC also reports on the perception (by some, and I believe traditionally) of women as guardians of the home hearth. I do not mean to judge their beliefs or to impose our/my beliefs on them. 

But if you need more soldiers to cycle people in and out of the front lines, maybe including more women will help. 

An upper limit of the potential increase in the soldiers available would be 60% (3 more women for every 4 men + 1woman currently). I am certain many of that number cannot be spared to go into the military.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-18-2024

(05-18-2024, 10:44 AM)M T Wrote:  The BBC reports the maie - female ratio in the Ukraine military is 4 to 1. One way to increase the number of soldiers is to increase the number of women. 

The BBC also reports on the perception (by some, and I believe traditionally) of women as guardians of the home hearth. I do not mean to judge their beliefs or to impose our/my beliefs on them. 

But if you need more soldiers to cycle people in and out of the front lines, maybe including more women will help. 

An upper limit of the potential increase in the soldiers available would be 60% (3 more women for every 4 men + 1woman currently). I am certain many of that number cannot be spared to go into the military.

Actually a 20% female component in the military is "high". The US military has 17.5% female component as of 2022. More importantly, the average age in the US military is 28 years old. Ukraine is supposedly 40+. Ukraine can easily access plenty of people (both male and female) by lowering the draft age to 18. This is contrary to "recent" practice but not to historical practice. The "recent" thinking apparently was that by the time you were 27 you would have fathered your children (at least in part) so if you were killed it wouldn't be "so bad". Maybe not the case, but it was real hard driving the age down to 25, let alone 18. IMO this shows the Ukrainian legislators do not understand the situation.

As I understand it Ukraine does not in general draft women. Trained health care professionals are an exception. FWIW this article says only 7.3% of the Ukrainian military is female. https://war.ukraine.ua/articles/how-many-women-are-defending-ukraine-against-russia-s-invasion/
This article gives percentages for other NATO nations. The number they give for the US is correct FWIW.
There is another article that says it is 20% https://www.dw.com/en/women-in-ukraines-army-fighting-for-the-right-to-fight/video-68464652
The discrepancy may be definitional in nature. Many women serve in organizations that are not considered "military". This paper includes them as military. Additionally, it is certainly true that many occupations in the essential civilian economy are now occupied by women. Rosie the Riveter is alive and well in Ukraine.

While in the US military essentially all MOS are open to females, 11X is overwhelmingly male. There are some females to be sure, but not many. Right now, Ukraine still is a predominantly infantry Army, and they need this MOS more than anything else.

It is very important that Ukraine realize that dropping the draft age from 27 to 25 gives them a "windfall" of an entering draft class that will be three times a "normal" one. Training this overlarge group will be difficult. NATO really needs to help in this process. In a country at war it is very desirable that all draftees that become eligible in any given year be inducted. There shouldn't be any "residual" that gets a bye, because there is no natural way to find them. Due to many factors (corruption being one of them) Ukraine has quite a few people in the 27 and up range that they need to "comb out" and induct. This would also be a windfall. However, next year it will be back to a single year's worth of people. Russia's single year is bigger than Ukraine's by a factor of three. Ukraine can't ignore this and needs to exploit it's windfall to the max. They can get another one by dropping the draft age again, but that is politically very problematic.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-18-2024

Maybe this was mentioned previously but the reason Ukraine's draft age is so atypical is because their demographics were very affected by the collapse of the USSR such that the present young generation is much smaller than older generations.

This means that there are less young people to draft, but also that the more young people die in the war (particularly if before they have children) subsequent generations will be even smaller.

Of course you can only worry about future generations if they have a country to be born into, and political leadership has finally lowered the draft age to 25.

But this demographic problem for Ukraine is also at least partially why they have not tried drafting women, though volunteers are welcome in both combat and non combat roles. Young men dying would be a big future demographic problem, young women even worse.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-18-2024

(05-18-2024, 02:43 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Maybe this was mentioned previously but the reason Ukraine's draft age is so atypical is because their demographics were very affected by the collapse of the USSR such that the present young generation is much smaller than older generations.

This means that there are less young people to draft, but also that the more young people die in the war (particularly if before they have children) subsequent generations will be even smaller.

Of course you can only worry about future generations if they have a country to be born into, and political leadership has finally lowered the draft age to 25.

But this demographic problem for Ukraine is also at least partially why they have not tried drafting women, though volunteers are welcome in both combat and non combat roles. Young men dying would be a big future demographic problem, young women even worse.

You are IMO absolutely right on all points. Ukraine doesn't want to make the population "hole" any bigger than it already is/will be. Killing men who already have had a family is less injurious to the future Ukraine. As you say however, Ukraine has to win or that won't matter nearly as much. Also, as the war goes on the 20 year olds will eventually become 25 year olds. Right now I don't think the Ukrainian birth rate is going up. In fact, quite the opposite. Ending the war sooner may actually save lives, although that is hard to prove to the population's satisfaction. There are also many cultural barriers to drafting women into potentially combat positions. This is true in the US as well, despite the number of women already in our military. These barriers are much more prevalent in Ukraine.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Mick - 05-18-2024

(05-18-2024, 08:32 AM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-finally-getting-serious-war-121501421.html

IMO this article is a pretty good summary of the "state of play". The "West" made a horrible mistake by allowing Russia to "hang around" for far too long. History shows that is always a mistake with them. They needed to get "blown out" early, and it didn't happen, using sports terminology. That said, they still have problems. Putin's leadership changes may or may not have permanent effects, and Russia going "all in" on a true war economy may be asking too much. Something may "break" in a way that causes political unrest that is hard to control. We don't have much insight into such things, so we can't count on it.

I suspect that losing the monumentally corrupt Sergei Shoigu will pay big dividends. He had the job for 12 years, and did the Russian military no favors. One of his deputies, Timur Ivanov, was recently arrested on corruption charges. Replacing Shoigu with the economist Andrei Belousov should, at a minimum, make the military efforts financially efficient and reduce the corruption inherent in the Russian system.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 05-18-2024

The failure to stop the GPS jamming, perhaps by HARM knocking out transmitters doing the jamming, has been perplexing.

I had presumed that GPS jamming was local.  That is, a jammer transmitter might protect some region near it.

I just noticed this article from Wired: "The Dangerous Rise of GPS Attacks"

Quote:One open source intelligence analyst, going by the pseudonym Markus Jonsson, has located jamming in the Baltics, and that which impacted the Finnish airline this week, to Kaliningrad and other Russian locations.

I don't really know how long distance jamming might work.  But, if it can be done, perhaps that explains why the jammers haven't been hit.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-18-2024

(05-18-2024, 04:46 PM)M T Wrote:  The failure to stop the GPS jamming, perhaps by HARM knocking out transmitters doing the jamming, has been perplexing.

I had presumed that GPS jamming was local.  That is, a jammer transmitter might protect some region near it.

You are exactly correct in that presumption. However, the definition of "near" is dependent on the Effective Radiated Power (ERP) of the jammer. The ERP can be directional, where all the jamming power is concentrated in a narrow beam aimed at the vehicle that is to be "jammed". It can also be spread over a defined area by using various forms of directional antennas. However, the easiest way to cover a large area is using a jammer that puts out LOTS of power. Russia is usually quite fond of this "solution". Another way of course is to have many jammers. In Ukraine, Russia seems to be going with quantity, not brute power. Brute power creates a vulnerability. Knock out one jammer and a broad area is unprotected. Lower power jammers are also easier to build. Commercial cell tower components work great in this application and they are easy to buy from many nations that don't care much about sanctions.

Quote:I just noticed this article from Wired: "The Dangerous Rise of GPS Attacks"

Quote:One open source intelligence analyst, going by the pseudonym Markus Jonsson, has located jamming in the Baltics, and that which impacted the Finnish airline this week, to Kaliningrad and other Russian locations.

I don't really know how long distance jamming might work.  But, if it can be done, perhaps that explains why the jammers haven't been hit.

Actually quite the opposite. The larger the ERP the easier it is to detect and geolocate the jammer. It is also easier to "home" on a signal that has a high signal to noise ratio (SNR).

The GPS jamming situation is complicated by the fact the actual received power from GPS satellites is very small. GPS wouldn't work at all if the GPS signal was not coded is such a way that digital signal processing can deliver "processing gain". The various types of jamming gets complicated pretty fast. That said, if a transmitter is delivering enough power to your location that it can jam a desired signal that you would normally detect and use, you can home in on the jammer. That is physics. The fact it isn't being done in Ukraine, especially since the US has known about this vulnerability for over 20 years, is a mystery.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 05-18-2024

Daily GPS jam info is shown at https://gpsjam.org

The site https://spoofing.skai-data-services.com/ shows (some of) current GPS/GLONASS spoofing.  AIUI, it does this by detecting multiple aircraft reporting their positions as the same.

In the last 12 hours, it shows about 500 aircraft with spoofed locations near Israel, about 50 over the Black Sea, but interestingly, 144 near Moscow. The lines show the last reported position of the aircraft before they started reporting the spoofed location.   My supposition is that Russia is spoofing GPS in the area around Moscow as a defensive measure.

I hadn't realized that GPS spoofing causes a plane's Inertia Reference System to be unusable (since its last "real" position was fake).  The Serious Threat Of GPS Spoofing: An Analysis  Presumably, if you know to turn off GPS reception before you get in range of spoofing, the IRS can work.  I presume the same thing is true of a (simplistic) GPS + INS on a missile.

Do we know that it is GPS jamming that is causing the problems for the Ukrainian missiles, or could it be GPS spoofing?
Judging from what I see on the GPS spoofing site, the spoofer near Moscow may have a range of 350km or so.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-18-2024

(05-18-2024, 09:04 PM)M T Wrote:  Daily GPS jam info is shown at https://gpsjam.org

The site https://spoofing.skai-data-services.com/ shows (some of) current GPS/GLONASS spoofing.  AIUI, it does this by detecting multiple aircraft reporting their positions as the same.

In the last 12 hours, it shows about 500 aircraft with spoofed locations near Israel, about 50 over the Black Sea, but interestingly, 144 near Moscow. The lines show the last reported position of the aircraft before they started reporting the spoofed location.   My supposition is that Russia is spoofing GPS in the area around Moscow as a defensive measure.

It makes sense that Russia would do that.

Quote:I hadn't realized that GPS spoofing causes a plane's Inertia Reference System to be unusable (since its last "real" position was fake).  The Serious Threat Of GPS Spoofing: An Analysis  Presumably, if you know to turn off GPS reception before you get in range of spoofing, the IRS can work.  I presume the same thing is true of a (simplistic) GPS + INS on a missile.

The article is misleading. Military grade GPS-INS systems do not unconditionally update the INS position based on the apparent validity of GPS data. The "spoofed" GPS position essentially always contains a discontinuity. This discontinuity is introduced when the spoofing signal "takes over" from the real signal. The spoofed position is so far from the INS position that INS drift cannot be the cause. The nav system software detects that it is being "spoofed" and quits using GPS until it gets back into a position that the GPS fix is believably close to the INS fix. Your cell phone and commercial navigation systems in general do not have this protection. Commercial nav systems could/should have their software modified to take into account possible spoofing. Using more than a 4 satellite constellation (when possible) also makes spoofing more difficult.

Quote:Do we know that it is GPS jamming that is causing the problems for the Ukrainian missiles, or could it be GPS spoofing?

I am sure the US Technical Elint people know. I suspect most of the EU states know too (independent of the US telling them). I don't know, FWIW. On the missiles that have both a GPS and an INS, I suspect the results would be similar. No valid GPS fix would result in falling back to INS, and a "spoofed" GPS fix will be rejected as "impossible" and cause a fallback to INS alone until a "reasonable" GPS fix was maintained for several seconds.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-19-2024

Regarding GPS jamming/spoofing:
https://www.sbg-systems.com/news/introducing-ekinox-micro/?_gl=1*1kicq59*_up*MQ..&gclid=Cj0KCQjwxqayBhDFARIsAANWRnRkTeojxC_krn5aLI8xR4KTz0uqSmODkf45lLDCsoGBg6VWVfa3cicaAmFpEALw_wcB

This unit uses more than three satellites to resist spoofing. It also recognizes "false" GPS data. This ability is typical of all manufactures "military grade" navigation systems. I suspect most "newer" commercial aircraft systems also have this capability. To be clear, the INS generates an autonomous "track" independent of any GPS data. The INS data can be "corrected" by adding in GPS "fixes" made along the track. If the GPS data exhibits an "impossible"  discontinuity or deviates from the INS track by an impossible value, that GPS fix simply will be marked as invalid and not used. The GPS correction factor will remain as the last known valid GPS update. As the platform moves in 3D space the INS absolute position accuracy will degrade. Valid GPS updates cancel the accumulated error and restore the current accuracy of the INS track.

It would in theory be possible to "lead" a specific platform along a false track. If the spoofing agent has an actual radar fix on the intended target platform he could, in theory at least, transmit "believable" GPS signals that would incrementally draw the target along a false track. However, the inherent basic accuracy of the INS severely constrains that track. Once the intended GPS position is "too far" from the INS track, game over for the "spoof". Any other platforms not on the same track would see wildly wrong GPS data and detect the spoof much quicker. The main purpose of "spoofing" is therefore not to "fool" the nav system, but rather to deny the nav system the use of the GPS updates.

FWIW aircraft at relatively high altitudes are easier to spoof using a single  transmitter than lower altitude (e.g. ground level) targets. A transmitter on a 70 ft tower can spoof an aircraft at 30,000 ft at a range of 357 km (193 nm). The same transmitter's range to targets on the ground is 19 km. To targets at 200 ft, like a cruise missile, the range is 44 km.  Thus many transmitters would be needed to shield important targets in depth. Even a glide bomb that operates "for a while" at high altitudes would be pretty hard to jam with a single long range transmitter. The INS will still get it "close" to the target and once it gets below the horizon of the jammer it will get valid GPS again. This will often allow the glide bomb to achieve full accuracy. Multiple jammers with no 70 foot tower, but rather a 10 foot (or so) tower are therefore "better" at protecting most targets. Obviously, both are "nice to have".

GPS satellites orbit at a nominal altitude of 20,200 km. The transmitter power is 44.8 watts with an antenna gain of 12 dBi. Obviously a transmitter that is "only" 357 km away even with an antenna gain of 0 dBi (fully omnidirectional) has a massive advantage. A particularly high power transmitter is not needed. That said, it would be very easy to "lock on" to the spoofing signal and fly right to it.

Resisting GPS jamming is quite possible by using an adaptive array (like your home Wifi does). Unlike your Wifi, the adaptive array would configure itself to reject the "false" GPS signal(s). The depth of the null(s) so generated can be very deep, much deeper than the gain of a synthetic aperture pointing at the satellite would provide. Goodbye spoofer. The spoofer can lie to you about the timing (and thus the range) but it can't hide its actual bearing, which in general is not anywhere near the satellite's actual bearing. Eigenvalues to the rescue. Obviously, the bad news is that one needs several antennas to do this (3 or 4 "works", 8 is much better). Most glide bombs and the like don't presently have that. I suspect they soon will, at significant cost to the taxpayer.

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