Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-30-2023

https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelenskyy-angry-allies-no-longer-160501495.html

Interesting article about what Zelenskyy is thinking. It is clear that things are getting more difficult politically both inside and outside Ukraine. It is also clear that the strain on Ukrainian society in terms of manpower and willingness to fight is taking it's toll. Russia is undoubtedly counting on this to eventually result in collapse. Hopefully that is going to happen, but it is a distinct possibility. It is foolish for the US to deny this is an issue. We and the EU may need to take action to help Ukrainian morale independent of direct military aid.

There is a presidential election in Ukraine scheduled for 31 March 2024. Will it be held? Should it be held? On the one hand it would send a great message of democratic strength and integrity to the world. On the other hand, Zelenskyy has at times indicated he will not run. Even if he does, there are undoubtedly other candidates that will promise an "easy" solution to the war that actually have no clue. There is a significant risk Ukraine would lose it's best leader. It will be a hard decision whether to have the election or not.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 10-30-2023

(10-30-2023, 01:22 PM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelenskyy-angry-allies-no-longer-160501495.html

Interesting article about what Zelenskyy is thinking. It is clear that things are getting more difficult politically both inside and outside Ukraine. It is also clear that the strain on Ukrainian society in terms of manpower and willingness to fight is taking it's toll. Russia is undoubtedly counting on this to eventually result in collapse. Hopefully that is going to happen, but it is a distinct possibility. It is foolish for the US to deny this is an issue. We and the EU may need to take action to help Ukrainian morale independent of direct military aid.

There is a presidential election in Ukraine scheduled for 31 March 2024. Will it be held? Should it be held? On the one hand it would send a great message of democratic strength and integrity to the world. On the other hand, Zelenskyy has at times indicated he will not run. Even if he does, there are undoubtedly other candidates that will promise an "easy" solution to the war that actually have no clue. There is a significant risk Ukraine would lose it's best leader. It will be a hard decision whether to have the election or not.

Link to VZ saying he won't run?
Link to articles about Ukraine considering whether to skip elections altogether?
Link to polls showing anyone with a good shot at beating VZ?
I am willing to believe these assertions if they have significant backup, but they definitely challenge my assumptions.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-30-2023

(10-30-2023, 02:48 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  

(10-30-2023, 01:22 PM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelenskyy-angry-allies-no-longer-160501495.html

Interesting article about what Zelenskyy is thinking. It is clear that things are getting more difficult politically both inside and outside Ukraine. It is also clear that the strain on Ukrainian society in terms of manpower and willingness to fight is taking it's toll. Russia is undoubtedly counting on this to eventually result in collapse. Hopefully that is going to happen, but it is a distinct possibility. It is foolish for the US to deny this is an issue. We and the EU may need to take action to help Ukrainian morale independent of direct military aid.

There is a presidential election in Ukraine scheduled for 31 March 2024. Will it be held? Should it be held? On the one hand it would send a great message of democratic strength and integrity to the world. On the other hand, Zelenskyy has at times indicated he will not run. Even if he does, there are undoubtedly other candidates that will promise an "easy" solution to the war that actually have no clue. There is a significant risk Ukraine would lose it's best leader. It will be a hard decision whether to have the election or not.

Link to VZ saying he won't run?
Link to articles about Ukraine considering whether to skip elections altogether?
Link to polls showing anyone with a good shot at beating VZ?
I am willing to believe these assertions if they have significant backup, but they definitely challenge my assumptions.

Start with https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/31/7417910/ This article raises questions ("if the elections are held) about the possibility of not having elections and sets forth requirements that have not yet been met in order to hold them. In any case, legislation will be necessary to hold elections and AFAIK this legislation has not been passed. In fact, as near as I can tell, it is more probable than not the election will not be held. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/05/world/europe/ukraine-zelensky-elections-war.html.

Next, look at https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/4220877-ukraines-first-lady-says-she-doesnt-know-if-zelensky-will-run-in-2024/ This article came out AFTER Zelenskyy made the previous statement. It casts some doubt on his intentions. It is obviously not cast in stone that he will run, and his attitude is undoubtedly not being improved by the political situation in the West and in his own country.

https://visegradinsight.eu/several-contenders-lay-in-wait-to-challenge-zelenskyy-for-presidency/ It appears the the "opposition" candidates would prefer to not have an election while the war continues. Running against Zelenskyy (who is the "first choice" of 65% of the voters) isn't inviting, especially if you must now win the war :-). However, depending what happens between now and the end of March it is not impossible that a George McClellan type candidate could rapidly gain traction. I know of nobody out there right now, but I also think nobody understands/can predict  the psychology of the Ukrainian electorate. The public is undoubtedly sick of this war, but they also know the consequences of giving up are seriously unacceptable. The danger is a candidate that has a "secret plan" (a la Nixon) to end the war, allowing them to have their cake and eat it too. Enough people may believe it to get said candidate elected.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 10-30-2023

I come away from those articles thinking: 

(1) The West wants Ukraine to hold the elections.  The West holds the purse strings, so I suspect Ukraine will try pretty hard to find a way to comply (but of course that part is speculation, plus Ukraine might fail even if it were to try).   

(2) If elections are held in March 2024, or close to that time, VZ will almost certainly run (absent a really significant change in circumstances).

I'm not sure any solid information in your links say that VZ would vanquish all challengers in 2024.  Nevertheless, but I tend to buy your statement that VZ would have a strong edge on the competition if the election were held today.  Of course you're right that sentiment in Ukraine could change, but that's speculation.  The sources for the Yahoo article do sound negative/pessimistic, but I'm not sure that such attitudes imply VZ won't get re-elected.  The VZ allies actually sound beaten down by the war and sound like they want out of government.  Since insiders often are the most successful challengers, the fact that insiders in VZ's government aren't inspiring anyone seems to suggest that VZ doesn't have to worry about a disloyal lieutenant.

All the usual caveats here.  I know nothing and I could be very wrong.  Etc.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 10-31-2023

Everyone gets wrapped up in Presidential elections, but the real elections are for houses of legislatures. I don't know the political system in Ukraine, but Zelensky will sail to re-election if there is one and he runs. The question is will his party win its representative elections? 

In any case, I'm seeing Ukraine is really taking a serious foothold on the bank of the Dnipro river, and starting to spread the front line out quite a bit. It appears Ukraine is well aware of Russia's proclivity to attack from flanks. What better way to avoid flank attacks than by not allowing any flanks. 

So rather than concentrating forces in one place to get a breakthrough, and then be left vulnerable from the sides of the re-gained territory, UAF seem more inclined to slowly advance on a much wider front line. The territorial gain in terms of area may be the same as a concentrated breakthrough, but it would be spread over a much wider front line. I don't know what the UAF tactics are in terms of what the size of their fighting groups are and how they are equipped, as they move forward, but I do believe Ukraine is going to start moving a lot more personnel and equipment into Zaporizhia as they gain more ground on that side of the Dnipro.

It would appear Russia can't reinforce Zaporizhia much more. They are trying like hell to save Tokmak and committing and losing an absurd number of resources to Avdivka. They simply aren't going to be able to sustain things on three very active fronts. And they face worn out troops trying to survive the Winter against fresher Ukraine forces with better morale.

You love to see it:
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23451

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-31-2023

(10-31-2023, 06:11 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  Everyone gets wrapped up in Presidential elections, but the real elections are for houses of legislatures. I don't know the political system in Ukraine, but Zelensky will sail to re-election if there is one and he runs. The question is will his party win its representative elections? 

In any case, I'm seeing Ukraine is really taking a serious foothold on the bank of the Dnipro river, and starting to spread the front line out quite a bit. It appears Ukraine is well aware of Russia's proclivity to attack from flanks. What better way to avoid flank attacks than by not allowing any flanks. 

So rather than concentrating forces in one place to get a breakthrough, and then be left vulnerable from the sides of the re-gained territory, UAF seem more inclined to slowly advance on a much wider front line. The territorial gain in terms of area may be the same as a concentrated breakthrough, but it would be spread over a much wider front line. I don't know what the UAF tactics are in terms of what the size of their fighting groups are and how they are equipped, as they move forward, but I do believe Ukraine is going to start moving a lot more personnel and equipment into Zaporizhia as they gain more ground on that side of the Dnipro.

It would appear Russia can't reinforce Zaporizhia much more. They are trying like hell to save Tokmak and committing and losing an absurd number of resources to Avdivka. They simply aren't going to be able to sustain things on three very active fronts. And they face worn out troops trying to survive the Winter against fresher Ukraine forces with better morale.

You love to see it:
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23451

Lets not get carried away. In Kherson Oblast the Russians from day 1 decided not to defend the riverbank. Much of that was attributed to their blowing the dam, but in fact it was also a strategic decision. They wanted to keep their troops outside the artillery footprint of Ukrainian batteries on the other side of the river as much as possible. Ukraine has taken advantage of this to infiltrate commandos into South Kherson, which is indeed a "good thing". They now have established a small group on the left bank of the river. Whether Ukraine intends to keep them there is an open question. It is quite possible Ukraine did this to "force" Russia (due to political considerations, not tactical ones) to actually send troops forward to engage the Ukrainians. These troops will be in the artillery footprint and will suffer heavy casualties.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine have committed "reserves" in South Kherson. It is a relatively "quiet" sector, infantry wise. Neither side likes fighting there because it is all open ground. There is no cover. It is much worse in that regard than even Zaporizhia. However, if Russia doesn't adequately respond and seal off the bridgehead, Ukraine MAY elect to commit more forces to an attack there. Going into winter isn't the ideal time to do that, but if Russia isn't up to the task, take advantage.

This is just another example of the strategic approach both Ukraine and Russia use. Attack everywhere, find a weak spot and reinforce success. Ukraine does have uncommitted reserves, but they have always been loath to go "all in" on anything. It is highly unlikely South Kherson will be heavily reinforced by Ukraine unless Russia simply locally collapses. One thing to consider is that if Ukraine has success in Zaporizhia, Russia would have a much greater supply problem in Crimea. Pulling out of South Kherson may be necessary because they can't supply the troops there. It becomes a large salient that can't be supplied that is also surrounded on two sides by Ukraine and the third side by the sea. It would therefore make sense to pull out, but Russia (Putin) is unlikely to see it that way. Ukraine may very well consider the evacuation of South Kherson as probable and question wasting lives  hurrying it along. That is exactly what they did in the Kherson city area, no reason to expect different now.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 10-31-2023

(10-31-2023, 07:07 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(10-31-2023, 06:11 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  Everyone gets wrapped up in Presidential elections, but the real elections are for houses of legislatures. I don't know the political system in Ukraine, but Zelensky will sail to re-election if there is one and he runs. The question is will his party win its representative elections? 

In any case, I'm seeing Ukraine is really taking a serious foothold on the bank of the Dnipro river, and starting to spread the front line out quite a bit. It appears Ukraine is well aware of Russia's proclivity to attack from flanks. What better way to avoid flank attacks than by not allowing any flanks. 

So rather than concentrating forces in one place to get a breakthrough, and then be left vulnerable from the sides of the re-gained territory, UAF seem more inclined to slowly advance on a much wider front line. The territorial gain in terms of area may be the same as a concentrated breakthrough, but it would be spread over a much wider front line. I don't know what the UAF tactics are in terms of what the size of their fighting groups are and how they are equipped, as they move forward, but I do believe Ukraine is going to start moving a lot more personnel and equipment into Zaporizhia as they gain more ground on that side of the Dnipro.

It would appear Russia can't reinforce Zaporizhia much more. They are trying like hell to save Tokmak and committing and losing an absurd number of resources to Avdivka. They simply aren't going to be able to sustain things on three very active fronts. And they face worn out troops trying to survive the Winter against fresher Ukraine forces with better morale.

You love to see it:
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23451

Lets not get carried away. In Kherson Oblast the Russians from day 1 decided not to defend the riverbank. Much of that was attributed to their blowing the dam, but in fact it was also a strategic decision. They wanted to keep their troops outside the artillery footprint of Ukrainian batteries on the other side of the river as much as possible. Ukraine has taken advantage of this to infiltrate commandos into South Kherson, which is indeed a "good thing". They now have established a small group on the left bank of the river. Whether Ukraine intends to keep them there is an open question. It is quite possible Ukraine did this to "force" Russia (due to political considerations, not tactical ones) to actually send troops forward to engage the Ukrainians. These troops will be in the artillery footprint and will suffer heavy casualties.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine have committed "reserves" in South Kherson. It is a relatively "quiet" sector, infantry wise. Neither side likes fighting there because it is all open ground. There is no cover. It is much worse in that regard than even Zaporizhia. However, if Russia doesn't adequately respond and seal off the bridgehead, Ukraine MAY elect to commit more forces to an attack there. Going into winter isn't the ideal time to do that, but if Russia isn't up to the task, take advantage.

This is just another example of the strategic approach both Ukraine and Russia use. Attack everywhere, find a weak spot and reinforce success. Ukraine does have uncommitted reserves, but they have always been loath to go "all in" on anything. It is highly unlikely South Kherson will be heavily reinforced by Ukraine unless Russia simply locally collapses. One thing to consider is that if Ukraine has success in Zaporizhia, Russia would have a much greater supply problem in Crimea. Pulling out of South Kherson may be necessary because they can't supply the troops there. It becomes a large salient that can't be supplied that is also surrounded on two sides by Ukraine and the third side by the sea. It would therefore make sense to pull out, but Russia (Putin) is unlikely to see it that way. Ukraine may very well consider the evacuation of South Kherson as probable and question wasting lives  hurrying it along. That is exactly what they did in the Kherson city area, no reason to expect different now.

Your points are well taken but sometimes one side or the other has to decide to play the cards they were dealt. Ukraine has been stymied in multiple places by the Russian mine fields and defenses in depth. So if Russian will not commit enough forces in the South to truly stop Ukraine's cross river incursions then I say for Ukraine to commit even more troops and force Russia to make a significant decision. If Ukraine commits enough forces to be at least some threat, then Russia has to pull troops from somewhere and then maybe give Ukraine a better chance elsewhere.
Winter always seems to be the bugaboo. Russia proved in WWII that the Winter was an opportunity when the other side  was not prepared.  The Germans were not prepared for Winter, the Russians were. The Germans attacked in the Bulge in WWII in the Winter.  Thanks to the leadership of the 82nd Airborne and Patton's abilities we extracted victory from disaster. 
Anything Ukraine can do to force the Russians to make some significant troop movements has to be good.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 10-31-2023

Two videos of a Russian line of tanks & IFVs (about 14) getting decimated a week or so ago.
 Side view.   Head-on view.
In the side view, you can see individuals have left their armored vehicle.  In the head-on view, you can see one artillery hit with what I believe are bomblets in their area.  (In the head-on view, there is a short snippet at the end from another drone on the other side of the attack.)

The lead vehicle is a mine-clearing tank.  It leaves a path that the others follow.  That seems so dangerous.  The vehicles can't spread out.  Artillery can be targeted on the path.  When vehicles in front of you and behind you are disabled, all you can do is drive out into the mine field or abandon your vehicle.

Despite this skirmish, the article indicates Russia had made some advances in the area.


In other news, Ukraine indicates Putin has replaced the Colonel General in charge of the Dnipro area.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-31-2023

(10-31-2023, 09:19 AM)GK3 Wrote:  Your points are well taken but sometimes one side or the other has to decide to play the cards they were dealt. Ukraine has been stymied in multiple places by the Russian mine fields and defenses in depth. 

I would argue not "stymied", but rather slowed down. Ukraine is still making progress toward Melitopol'. Russia has supposedly moved several reserve formations out of the city of Melitopol' toward the "front line" in the Tokmat area.
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/25/ukraines-counteroffensive-worries-defense-analysts-ahead-of-winter.html
This is the key strategic area, where Ukraine can really put the hurt to Russia.

Quote:So if Russian will not commit enough forces in the South to truly stop Ukraine's cross river incursions then I say for Ukraine to commit even more troops and force Russia to make a significant decision. If Ukraine commits enough forces to be at least some threat, then Russia has to pull troops from somewhere and then maybe give Ukraine a better chance elsewhere.

Ukraine knows what it is doing. So far it has used a very limited number of troops to cause Russia to react disproportionately. I am sure that if Ukraine sees a clear tactical advantage, they will react accordingly. However, it must be remembered that Ukraine has limited resources. South Kherson is open country where aviation assets can wreak havoc on moving troops. Ukraine doesn't have those assets, but Russia does. Ukraine therefore has to be careful. That is one reason the F-16 are so desired by Ukraine. It allows them to cover the forces against Russian air. Ukraine doesn't have them yet. Ukraine will commit "enough" forces as long as the effect on Russia is disproportionate. If it takes them anywhere near the assets it would take from the Russians, it isn't worth it and won't happen.

Quote:Winter always seems to be the bugaboo. Russia proved in WWII that the Winter was an opportunity when the other side  was not prepared.  The Germans were not prepared for Winter, the Russians were. The Germans attacked in the Bulge in WWII in the Winter.  Thanks to the leadership of the 82nd Airborne and Patton's abilities we extracted victory from disaster.

The weather clearing and allowing the AO to show up had a whole lot to do with it too. Patton's prayer may have been a bigger factor than Patton's tanks :-). Yes, you can fight in the winter, but the state of preparation of both sides is probably similar.

Quote:Anything Ukraine can do to force the Russians to make some significant troop movements has to be good.

Only if what Ukraine has to do to force the Russian movement requires significantly less movement by Ukraine :-). Ukraine doesn't want to dilute any of their offensives. They are going slowly enough. Taking strength away from them will cause them to stop. The problem with attacking everywhere as a strategy is that it only works if you outnumber your enemy. That is why NATO definitely didn't adopt that strategy. The problem in Ukraine is that both sides are somewhat evenly matched in numbers, with Ukraine having somewhat fewer but much better troops. Russia is betting Ukraine can't keep that up. Ukraine is going to be conservative.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - 81alum - 11-02-2023

For quite some time my gut has told me that changes in technology and the nature of the terrain and strategies in this conflict were producing a WWI war of attrition and stalemate.  I know to a certainty that several of you who post in this thread are far more knowledgeable about military history, strategy, tactics, leadership, weapons systems etc. than am I, and so I have always voiced my concerns tentatively and with respect to the expertise that is frequently exhibited by others on this board.

However, when I read this in the NYT this morning I could not help but have my worst fears reinforced.

Quote:With the front line in Ukraine having barely shifted despite months of fierce fighting, Ukraine’s top commander has acknowledged that his forces are locked in a “stalemate” with Russia and that no significant breakthrough was imminent, the most candid assessment so far by a leading Ukrainian official of the military’s stalled counteroffensive.

“Just like in the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” the commander, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, told The Economist in an interview published on Wednesday. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”
It was the first time a top Ukrainian commander said the fighting had reached an impasse, although General Zaluzhny added that breaking the deadlock could require technological advances to achieve air superiority and increase the effectiveness of artillery fire. He added that Russian forces, too, are incapable of advancing.

The general said modern technology and precision weapons on both sides were preventing troops from breaching enemy lines, including the expansive use of drones, and the ability to jam drones. He called for advances in electronic warfare as a way to break the deadlock.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/02/world/europe/ukraine-zaluzhny-war.html

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 11-02-2023

(11-02-2023, 11:06 AM)81alum Wrote:  For quite some time my gut has told me that changes in technology and the nature of the terrain and strategies in this conflict were producing a WWI war of attrition and stalemate.  I know to a certainty that several of you who post in this thread are far more knowledgeable about military history, strategy, tactics, leadership, weapons systems etc. than am I, and so I have always voiced my concerns tentatively and with respect to the expertise that is frequently exhibited by others on this board.

However, when I read this in the NYT this morning I could not help but have my worst fears reinforced.

Quote:With the front line in Ukraine having barely shifted despite months of fierce fighting, Ukraine’s top commander has acknowledged that his forces are locked in a “stalemate” with Russia and that no significant breakthrough was imminent, the most candid assessment so far by a leading Ukrainian official of the military’s stalled counteroffensive.

“Just like in the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” the commander, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, told The Economist in an interview published on Wednesday. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”
It was the first time a top Ukrainian commander said the fighting had reached an impasse, although General Zaluzhny added that breaking the deadlock could require technological advances to achieve air superiority and increase the effectiveness of artillery fire. He added that Russian forces, too, are incapable of advancing.

The general said modern technology and precision weapons on both sides were preventing troops from breaching enemy lines, including the expansive use of drones, and the ability to jam drones. He called for advances in electronic warfare as a way to break the deadlock.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/02/world/europe/ukraine-zaluzhny-war.html

I may be Pollyanna on this stuff, but I wouldn't put it past Ukraine to plant stories that are designed to achieve certain PR objectives to help Ukraine on the battlefield. Right now, Ukraine wants two things: 

- Russia to stop sending "meat waves" of infantry that have to be killed like so many ants invading your house
- The U.S. to provide more weapons to achieve more significant breakthroughs

The "stalemate" comments can impact both.

I was watching the YouTube Ukraine Matters channel host yesterday say he initially didn't think the Dnipro river incursion was going to do much, but that he heard from some sources in UAF that now make him believe a significant push is in fact coming.

IOW, I don't know what to believe. All I know is Russians are now up to 300,000 troops and a staggering amount of vehicles, tanks, and artillery systems lost. The numbers grow every day, and eventually Russia will be worn out. The same can be said for Ukraine, but Ukraine has far more economic might to back it than Russia can conjure. It's pretty obvious China has chosen not to help Russia, so it's gonna be North Korea and maybe Iran?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-02-2023

(11-02-2023, 11:39 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  All I know is Russians are now up to 300,000 troops and a staggering amount of vehicles, tanks, and artillery systems lost. The numbers grow every day, and eventually Russia will be worn out. The same can be said for Ukraine, but Ukraine has far more economic might to back it than Russia can conjure.

Where in the world did you get the idea "Ukraine has far more economic might to back it than Russia can conjure"? Ukraine was, at the start of the war, the poorest country per capita in Europe. In 2021 Ukraine has a GDP of 200 billion USD. In 2021 Russia had a GDP of 1.551 trillion, i.e 7.5 times that of Ukraine. While both Russia and Ukraine have been impacted by the war, without question Ukraine has suffered a bigger hit. Their projected 2023 GDP is 166 billion, while Russia's will be over 2.2 trillion. It isn't close. Ukraine may get considerable economic aid from it's allies, but it will be nothing like the 2+ trillion USD required to even make them equal.

Money aside, Ukraine has a considerably smaller population than Russia. If it comes down to who runs out of bodies first, it will be Ukraine. That is why Ukraine has to fight "smart". They know the demographics, and they are working to win with that in mind.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 11-02-2023

(11-02-2023, 01:37 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(11-02-2023, 11:39 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  All I know is Russians are now up to 300,000 troops and a staggering amount of vehicles, tanks, and artillery systems lost. The numbers grow every day, and eventually Russia will be worn out. The same can be said for Ukraine, but Ukraine has far more economic might to back it than Russia can conjure.

Where in the world did you get the idea "Ukraine has far more economic might to back it than Russia can conjure"? Ukraine was, at the start of the war, the poorest country per capita in Europe. In 2021 Ukraine has a GDP of 200 billion USD. In 2021 Russia had a GDP of 1.551 trillion, i.e 7.5 times that of Ukraine. While both Russia and Ukraine have been impacted by the war, without question Ukraine has suffered a bigger hit. Their projected 2023 GDP is 166 billion, while Russia's will be over 2.2 trillion. It isn't close. Ukraine may get considerable economic aid from it's allies, but it will be nothing like the 2+ trillion USD required to even make them equal.

Money aside, Ukraine has a considerably smaller population than Russia. If it comes down to who runs out of bodies first, it will be Ukraine. That is why Ukraine has to fight "smart". They know the demographics, and they are working to win with that in mind.

Goose, chillax - "to back it" was in reference to all the much more wealthy countries Ukraine can muster to support it than Russia has.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-02-2023

(11-02-2023, 01:47 PM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  

(11-02-2023, 01:37 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(11-02-2023, 11:39 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  All I know is Russians are now up to 300,000 troops and a staggering amount of vehicles, tanks, and artillery systems lost. The numbers grow every day, and eventually Russia will be worn out. The same can be said for Ukraine, but Ukraine has far more economic might to back it than Russia can conjure.

Where in the world did you get the idea "Ukraine has far more economic might to back it than Russia can conjure"? Ukraine was, at the start of the war, the poorest country per capita in Europe. In 2021 Ukraine has a GDP of 200 billion USD. In 2021 Russia had a GDP of 1.551 trillion, i.e 7.5 times that of Ukraine. While both Russia and Ukraine have been impacted by the war, without question Ukraine has suffered a bigger hit. Their projected 2023 GDP is 166 billion, while Russia's will be over 2.2 trillion. It isn't close. Ukraine may get considerable economic aid from it's allies, but it will be nothing like the 2+ trillion USD required to even make them equal.

Money aside, Ukraine has a considerably smaller population than Russia. If it comes down to who runs out of bodies first, it will be Ukraine. That is why Ukraine has to fight "smart". They know the demographics, and they are working to win with that in mind.

Goose, chillax - "to back it" was in reference to all the much more wealthy countries Ukraine can muster to support it than Russia has.

I agree, but that "backing" isn't 2 trillion per year, or anything close to it. Ukraine is really hurting. Their farmers can't plant in may cases, and then when they harvest, they can't export their products. It seemed you were arguing Russia is going to run out of money to fight this war. They aren't, unfortunately. Ukraine very well might, because it was in worse shape before the war started and has been considerably more impacted economically than Russia.

Both sides so far appear to be willing to tolerate economic setbacks and still keep fighting. Originally it was hoped sanctions would impact Russia to the point "they" decided Ukraine wasn't worth it. So far, that shows no sign of happening. The Ukrainian population is suffering considerably from economic conditions. The Russian one is too, but to a much smaller degree. The hope is that the Russian population also has less to gain, and therefore will become dissatisfied much sooner than the Ukrainian population. This is probably not a good bet, but it is possible. Ukraine folding due to economic collapse is, of the two, more probable.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Hurlburt88 - 11-03-2023

I am also in the "stalemate" camp, while holding out some hope for favorable movement and also some fear of Ukraine getting worn out.   This week in addition to the Ukrainian general's comments there was a comment out of moscow that included the "negotiation" word.  Always hard to tell when backchannel discussions hit enough momentum to be meaningful and this could be purely coincidental, but at some point this will end.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-03-2023

(11-02-2023, 11:06 AM)81alum Wrote:  For quite some time my gut has told me that changes in technology and the nature of the terrain and strategies in this conflict were producing a WWI war of attrition and stalemate.  I know to a certainty that several of you who post in this thread are far more knowledgeable about military history, strategy, tactics, leadership, weapons systems etc. than am I, and so I have always voiced my concerns tentatively and with respect to the expertise that is frequently exhibited by others on this board.

However, when I read this in the NYT this morning I could not help but have my worst fears reinforced.

Quote:With the front line in Ukraine having barely shifted despite months of fierce fighting, Ukraine’s top commander has acknowledged that his forces are locked in a “stalemate” with Russia and that no significant breakthrough was imminent, the most candid assessment so far by a leading Ukrainian official of the military’s stalled counteroffensive.

“Just like in the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” the commander, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, told The Economist in an interview published on Wednesday. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”
It was the first time a top Ukrainian commander said the fighting had reached an impasse, although General Zaluzhny added that breaking the deadlock could require technological advances to achieve air superiority and increase the effectiveness of artillery fire. He added that Russian forces, too, are incapable of advancing.

The general said modern technology and precision weapons on both sides were preventing troops from breaching enemy lines, including the expansive use of drones, and the ability to jam drones. He called for advances in electronic warfare as a way to break the deadlock.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/02/world/europe/ukraine-zaluzhny-war.html

This is IMO an important topic. I think I understand the points made by the Ukrainian commander. In many respects he is clearly correct, but overall, history tells another tale, IMO. Discussing the evolution of defensive entrenchments is a subject that has produced many thousands of pages. I can't recap it all here. It would definitely be TL;DR :-).

However, a short version is that during WW I both sides had essentially the same weapons. Attacking across open ground against entrenched troops was suicidal, as the machine gun and aimed rifle fire could engage the attackers fairly far from the entrenchments and inflict devastating casualties. Artillery fire could (and did) greatly degrade the ability of the defense to do this. Obviously the defense could also use artillery to engage the attacking troops in the open. This was even more devastating. Both sides eventually mastered the ability to do this. However, so doing required massive supplies of artillery and even more so artillery shells. Concentrating these forces in a relatively small area to accomplish this took time and was easily observed by the defenders. They would then reinforce their own artillery and bring up reserve troops. The offensive would the occur, and it might even take a few trenches from the defense, at the cost of great casualties. The the reserves would attack and drive out the disorganized troops trying to occupy the newly taken trenches.

The "tank" was developed to allow a "mobile fortification" to approach enemy defended trenches and suppress their rifle and machine gun fire. It wasn't invulnerable but at the beginning the entrenched troops didn't have any weapons that could stop tanks. Artillery could, but generally required a pretty direct hit to do so. Statistically, most tanks would get through. However, during WWI the mechanical limitations of tanks restricted their use considerably, their tactical employment was not well understood, and they were not available in large numbers. The Germans developed "storm detachments" that became expert in infiltrating enemy positions. These detachments were armed with automatic weapons and could deliver a massive number of rounds into a trench they had surprised. However, the size of any such attack was necessarily limited and the "storm" troopers suffered an inordinate number of casualties. It "worked", but was not sustainable. The training took too long and not everyone was "good" at it.

None of these new innovations ended the war. What ended the war was mostly German exhaustion. They economically simply couldn't continue to fight. Even if Germany could have continued, the arrival of the US troops would have resulted in them being so vastly outnumbered that even a "conventional" assault by the Allies would have overwhelmed them, albeit at great cost in casualties to the attackers.

While WW II is often cited as making trench and fortification warfare obsolete,  that is inaccurate. For instance, the Maginot line was never breached. It drove the German need to find a way around it. The attack through the Ardennes  did run into troops entrenched on the riverbank. Where those troops stood and fought, they "won" (e.g. the Senegalese tirailleurs). The problem was other French units were not well-trained and basically ran away when attacked. The big difference in WW II was that if a "breakthrough" could be achieved, even at relatively high cost, the attacking combined arms units could move at much faster than a walking pace. The "blitzkreig" operated at a much faster pace and "leg" infantry (on both sides) were left behind. The combined arms units could cut off and outflank proportionally larger forces, even if these forces were entrenched and relatively invulnerable. These cut off forces were not a threat because they couldn't move fast enough to get in front of the attacking forces, let alone do so and entrench again. France was unable to fortify their entire border area. It was both economically and politically (Belgium was "neutral") impossible.

Obviously in WW II troops still dug entrenchments. However, the mobile nature of the warfare usually meant the entrenchments were not occupied for long. One example of this is the German defense in Normandy. Clearly, the beaches and nearby areas were fortified (long term), and it took a massive invasion force to "crack" this forward defense. Note that Normandy was chosen partly because it was relatively less fortified than the alternatives. Once again, exploiting success in one area allowed the attackers to outflank and surround areas where resistance had been more successful. Later, the terrain provided Germany with "natural" entrenchments in the hedgerows. By WW II, effective direct-fire anti-tank guns existed. These guns were deadly effective but still fairly large. The development of the "bazooka" finally provided the individual infantryman with the ability to engage tanks without requiring dedicated anti-tank forces. However, the thing that really changed the game was air power. In the interest of brevity, see https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/normandy-breakout/

Which brings us back to Ukraine. As the General states, the sides are basically using the same/similar weapons. The usage of precision artillery fires is really not much different in theory from what the artillery did in WW I and WW II. The difference is that fewer guns are need to produce the same kinetic effect because they don't miss as often. The bazooka has been augmented by weapons that allow a single soldier to engage armor from a distance of several km. This is a very significant effect because tanks are no longer able to suppress fire from entrenched infantry with a high level of success. Anti-tank guns could always be a problem, but there were limited numbers of such weapons and they could be relatively easily seen. One man with a Javelin is very hard to see and kill before he kills the tank. 

Drones major contribution is in the ability to actually "see" the entire battle space almost continually. It is almost impossible for the opposition to approach undetected. These drones can also fly further behind the lines and detect enemy concentrations and activities. Both sides have a very good idea of the opponent's potential actions based upon very good visual data collection. You can't hide, and if you are detected, precision fires can reach you and kill you. The kinetic ability of drones is useful in that the "kill chain" consists only of the drone operator. If the drone sees a target, the operator can attack and destroy it. This is a big advantage for "targets of opportunity". However, if the drone sees a concentration of many targets, the drone operator can (at least in theory) call down a very powerful strike on the targets. That is actually a much "bigger deal".

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-03-2023

Ukraine is in an unfortunate strategic situation. Russia has invaded Ukrainian territory, and due to the lack of adequate forces Ukraine had to sit by while Russia built both "major" concrete fortifications and less impressive field fortifications throughout southern Ukraine. Some of these fortifications were protected by vast minefields of an extent comparable to the largest such minefields in WW I and WW II. These fortifications are arrayed in depth, meaning breaking through a "front line" doesn't result in an unimpeded trip to the Sea of Azov. It is however true that the strength of these fortifications varies. Some of them have no minefields, some of them are easily outflanked, and some of them are apparently "optionally manned". Russia has the option of sitting in these fortifications and "playing defense". Ukraine is not a viable state unless it can take back the south. To do that, step 1 is to break the "land bridge". Therefore, Ukraine must attack and breach these fortifications someplace. The most direct route to accomplishing this is to take Melitopl'.  Russia knew this and fortified accordingly.

Ukraine is making progress towards this goal, but it is slow. At first glance, one might say that it might just take another 6 months, but the General appears to believe that adequate progress will be impossible.  It certainly will be costly, given that virtually every attack has to be a "frontal" one. Ukraine suffers from the WW I problem that their attacks cannot penetrate beyond the range of their artillery and that they must remove minefields in the full view of Russian drones. The also need artillery and artillery shells in large quantities, which are probably not available.

An "antidote" to this situation is, as in WW II, air power. No new technological breakthrough required. Air power can function in several ways. One, it can be used to simply "pulverize" any given fortification. Two, it can be used to suppress fire directed against attacking Ukrainians and/or mine clearance teams. Three, it can be used to attack Russian logistics that supplies these fortifications. Logistics are inherently "mobile" and somewhat thin-skinned. Air power can destroy such targets. This would render the Russian fortifications impotent when they run out of bullets, food, and fuel.

Ukraine doesn't have that air power. They are getting maybe 50 F-16s. They will have pilots who can fly the jet but have no combat experience in 5 months or so (according to US sources). Can this group operate over the Russian fortifications in the South? Can this group attack the Russian logistics enough to degrade the Russian's ability to defend? We better hope so, or if that isn't probable, we need another plan.

The USAF possesses 5 generation aircraft. It also possesses AWACS and significant numbers of EW aircraft. They can also borrow Growlers from the Navy.  We also have a much larger highly trained air force. The US would use their 5th gen aircraft to execute the DEAD plan, creating an environment where  our 4th gen aircraft can operate successfully. To do that, attacks may be required into Russia proper. Ukraine will have no 5th gen aircraft. Can they successfully execute a DEAD plan, or even a SEAD plan with 4th gen aircraft? If for some reason the USAF had to accomplish that, they could IMO. It would however be costly in pilots, aircraft, and HARMs. (That is a big reason why we invested in stealth.) It would also be an ongoing effort and it would need airborne EW support. I can see why the General is concerned.

So, is this a "stalemate"? No, because Ukraine is still slowly moving towards Melitopl'. This is "plan A". It may be the General's concern that this can't continue is misplaced. Ukraine has done lots of things we never thought they could. If that momentum ceases, it will be up to the "new" F-16s to do the job. That is "plan B". If that doesn't work, it appears the General is hoping for a "breakthrough" technological solution. One such solution would be the arrival of 5,000 ATACMS unitary warhead missiles in Ukraine. That could really "work over" Russian logistics (and the fortifications themselves for that matter). Since we only have about 400 of them, that could take a while :-). Lets hope "plan A" works.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BigJohn043 - 11-04-2023

(11-03-2023, 02:13 PM)Goose Wrote:  So, is this a "stalemate"? No, because Ukraine is still slowly moving towards Melitopl'. This is "plan A". It may be the General's concern that this can't continue is misplaced. Ukraine has done lots of things we never thought they could. If that momentum ceases, it will be up to the "new" F-16s to do the job. That is "plan B". If that doesn't work, it appears the General is hoping for a "breakthrough" technological solution. One such solution would be the arrival of 5,000 ATACMS unitary warhead missiles in Ukraine. That could really "work over" Russian logistics (and the fortifications themselves for that matter). Since we only have about 400 of them, that could take a while :-). Lets hope "plan A" works.

This is excellent.  Thank you so much for your thoughts.  I am always amazed at the number of people commenting out there that have little to no real knowledge of how war works.

My question is how close to Melitopol do they have to get?  Does Tokmak do it?  I know the real answer is it depends and the closer they get the more they will be able to shut down supply.  But what is the realistic answer to start to put big pressure on supply lines?  They are probably 1/3 of the way to Tokmak.....

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-04-2023

(11-04-2023, 08:20 AM)BigJohn043 Wrote:  My question is how close to Melitopol do they have to get?  Does Tokmak do it?  I know the real answer is it depends and the closer they get the more they will be able to shut down supply.  But what is the realistic answer to start to put big pressure on supply lines?  They are probably 1/3 of the way to Tokmak.....

There are at least two main problems with the offensive in Zaporizhzhia. The first one is the one you cite. How far does Ukraine have to go? IMO Tokmak won't do it. When Ukraine gets that far, it notionally can reach parts of the M14 and the railroad with artillery fire. The distance by from Tokmak to Melitopl' as the crow flies is  52 km (32 miles). The only "artillery" Ukraine has that can reach that far is the HIMARS/M270 systems. They don't need ATACMS at that range, which is good. The problem is that Ukraine has shown it is very difficult to interdict a road/railroad with HIMARS. These weapons generally create mass destruction when fired in quantity.  They aren't "sniper" type weapons. Ukraine also doesn't want to have a HIMARs sitting in a fixed location waiting for a Russian semi to come down the M14. The HIMARS needs to "shoot and scoot".

In theory it would be possible to "take a bit more ground" (like another 25 km) and set up an M777 "park". The "conventional" artillery can deliver a persistence of fires that the HIMARS cannot. The problem is that "park" would be in a fixed location outside any town. Even if you dig it in, it is a fixed target in the open. It wouldn't last long. Even the Russians can bomb that type of a position into oblivion :-). The position at Tokmat would allow periodic disruption of the "land bridge", which is a significant plus. Russia couldn't depend on everything they ship on the railroad/on the M14 reaching it's destination. However, it wouldn't close down the land bridge. Ukraine needs to "shut" that door. IMO Ukraine has to force the Russians to evacuate Melitopl' and occupy it themselves. Nothing less closes the land bridge emphatically. The Ukrainians themselves want to go all the way to Berdiansk. That probably isn't "necessary", as there are no major routes from Berdiansk directly to Crimea/Kherson Oblast.

Reaching Melitopol' isn't as far-fetched as it seems. The defenses Ukraine is fighting against in the south become progressively thinner the further they go. The Ukrainians now need to break the Russian "second line". They aren't doing too much right now. Hopefully they are re-organizing and preparing for the next phase. We know Russia has sent lots of troops that were stationed in Melitopol' (and nearby) toward the front. This is significant in two ways. First, the Russians seem to think they will be needed on the second line, and that they have no other source of troops available. They are being forced to "thin out" their defense in depth. Second, the Russians are also removing administrative troops from Melitopol'. They have also wired the bridges in the city for destruction.  This, coupled with sending troops from Melitopol' indicates IMO Russia does not intend to seriously defend the city. It makes sense. If Ukraine  gets that far, they can cut the railroad and the M14 at the city limits. Supplying Melitopol' at that point would become very difficult for Russia. 

The second major problem for Ukraine in this offensive is the "width" of their penetration. The last thing Ukraine wants is a salient "70 km long and 2 km wide". While they aren't quite that narrow, they are undoubtedly concerned that they are far too narrow. They also have to defend the flanks of their advance, and the further they go, the longer their flanks. It is probable they don't have the troops, and that is what is making them real nervous. The "theory" is that once you "break through", you widen the breach by quickly getting behind the defenses on either side of the breach and cutting them off. Ukraine probably wants to breach the second line before they do that. Ukraine's problem is that there aren't roads that run along the rear of the Russian positions. The terrain is open, and moving cross-country exposes Ukraine to air attack against which they have no really effective defense. What amazes me is that it appears that nobody in Ukraine or NATO seems to have thought this through and realized there was a "hole" in the strategy. Or, maybe they did but figured they had no other choices.

Ukraine may be able to widen the breach by moving at night and "hugging" the Russian defensive rear. A lot of this depends on how the Russians react to having Ukrainians behind them. Supply issues immediately come to mind. If the Russian troops don't "hold tight", it may work. It also may be Russian air is inefficient enough that Ukraine can tolerate it's presence. It would definitely be easier to do that than execute a frontal attack all along the Russian first line of defense. In any case, Ukraine needs a shorter front, not a longer one. Clearing Kherson Oblast will do that, but obviously that is an equally big job as taking Melitopol'. That is why the Ukrainian's pause in front of Kherson city in 2022 was so damaging. 

Undoubtedly Ukraine felt they didn't have the combat power to do otherwise, but the hope was they could keep pushing the Russians south. The fact they couldn't greatly helped to create this "front stretching" problem with the Zaporizhzhia salient. I had originally felt that the south Kherson Oblast should have been Ukraine's next place of offensive operations. Zaporizhzhia Oblast does bring several advantages however. One of them is a physically shorter distance to travel to break the land bridge. The other is the terrain is slightly better for the attackers. The discussions by Ukrainian infantry there is advancing "tree line to tree line". In south Kherson Oblast, there are more areas with no "tree lines" for miles. However, Zaporizhzhia has the disadvantage of Russians on both flanks with relatively good lines of supply. Kherson Oblast has the advantage the Russians are "only" in front of and on the Ukrainian left. However, Ukraine would have to go much farther to break the land bridge, and the break at that point would not be effective against Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

So yes, there are problems. Big ones. However, Russia has it's problems too. Neither side has a "way ahead" that is clear. Ukraine has accomplished a lot with relatively little. We can only hope that continues.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-04-2023

https://www.yahoo.com/news/uk-defence-intelligence-explains-why-112551478.htm

Somewhat in support of my previous points. The situation in the air is puzzling. Ukraine clearly doesn't have the forces to execute a SEAD plan and achieve enough (at least) local air superiority to severely damage Russian defensive positions. Russia actually does, but apparently lacks the will to try. It was never really in their tactical doctrine, but they have had time to adapt. So far, they have not. Ukraine is apparently hoping the F-16s are going to (at a minimum) enable them to keep Russian air off Ukrainian troops. If that happens, Ukraine CAN move across the open areas behind the Russian defenses without too much fear of airborne interference. That will help a lot. Obviously, waiting for a technological solution is too much wishful thinking to be taken seriously.

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