Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 09-15-2023

Reporting that Ukraine destroyed/disabled 2 S400 batteries using drones to damage the radars followed by Neptune's to destroy launchers. If true, or partially true, that is brobdingnagian. Seems like a major effort underway to degrade Crimean air defense. Possibly in anticipation of targeting a certain bridge?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 09-15-2023

I thought this was an interesting use of a phrase [BBC article]

Quote:Rahm Emanuel, the US envoy to Japan, speculated on Mr Li's absence, tweeting that the "unemployment rate" in the Chinese government was very high.

For Russia, one might say that the military generals have a life-long retirement plan.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-15-2023

(09-15-2023, 10:41 AM)gocard14 Wrote:  Reporting that Ukraine destroyed/disabled 2 S400 batteries using drones to damage the radars followed by Neptune's to destroy launchers. If true, or partially true, that is of immense proportions. Seems like a major effort underway to degrade Crimean air defense. Possibly in anticipation of targeting a certain bridge?

There are LOTS of S-400 batteries in Crimea. However, killing them is indeed going to be helpful in attacking the bridge. The problem is that Russia has lots of short-range air defense protecting the bridge, so even if Ukraine removes the medium range and long range defenses, it is still a tough target. Not impervious however.

IMO the targeting of these batteries is primarily oriented towards allowing Ukrainian air to operate in south Kherson and Crimea (eventually) in support of the counter-offensive. Obviously being able to launch Storm Shadow missiles closer to their targets is a "side effect" of this effort. It also means Russian air cannot be sure there will be no Ukrainian air to oppose the Russian attacks on Ukrainian troops. This will become even more important when Ukraine has some F-16s available to keep the Russian air off of their troops. There is a possibility that Ukraine MIGHT actually have a few F-16s operational before the end of the year. They will be so few they will not be tactically significant/effective as such, BUT their mere existence might scare the Russian air enough that it will affect their operations.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - fullmetal - 09-15-2023

Any insight into the value of recapturing those rigs and the jamming platforms?  Anyone know if Chuck Pfarrer is a reasonable source?

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1701670327019864394[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 09-15-2023

I think Chuck Pfarrer is a BS artist. Some things he posts are true but a lot is not. IIRC he has said some prior strikes were ATACMS when clearly they were not, that Ukraine held a bridgehead over the Dnipro that they were expanding when all reputable sources were saying these were just raids and in fact it does not appear there ever was a bridgehead...

I have seen other more reputable sources post about the capture of these rigs however as potentially helpful in degrading Russian AD because they held some radars/sensors that extended Russian detection ranges.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 09-15-2023

Agreed with dabigv13, Chuck tends to make up positive narratives for Ukraine in an attempt to get more attention. He's been proven wrong constantly, and just blocks people that call him out.  Not saying he is right or wrong on this post, just that I wouldn't trust him as a source.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-15-2023

(09-15-2023, 02:39 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  I think Chuck Pfarrer is a BS artist. Some things he posts are true but a lot is not. IIRC he has said some prior strikes were ATACMS when clearly they were not, that Ukraine held a bridgehead over the Dnipro that they were expanding when all reputable sources were saying these were just raids and in fact it does not appear there ever was a bridgehead...

I have seen other more reputable sources post about the capture of these rigs however as potentially helpful in degrading Russian AD because they held some radars/sensors that extended Russian detection ranges.

This whole issue is very "interesting" in that if Russia operated two to three Mainstays continuously in Russian and international airspace around Ukraine, virtually all aircraft and ships (even small ships) that are moving should be easily detected. They may not have targeting grade data, but they should have designated all the contacts. The fact they do not even attempt to do this is perplexing. They have the aircraft. One wonders if possibly they can't keep them operating continuously because they lack spare parts. An aircraft at 30K ft can see LOTS farther than any surface based radar.

Given this situation, we really can't say how important those search radars on the rigs were to Russia. They may have been important, who knows. Given the Russian command and control issues, one wonders to what extent sensor data even helps. With the S-400s and S-300s operating autonomously, it almost seems like "one weapon, one sensor" is the order of the day.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-15-2023

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-commander-says-hed-dead-120352123.html

There has been significant criticism of the NATO supplied training for Ukrainian soldiers. Much of that criticism is justified. IMO the most important factor is this:

Quote:NATO forces also train Ukrainian soldiers to overwhelm their enemies with the type of firepower that it does not possess.

Since the end of WW I, the US has always traded firepower for lives. We deliver overwhelming suppressive fire to allow our troops to advance without  crippling casualties. Ukraine doesn't have that firepower and simply can't do that. As the article points out, NATO hasn't fought a war against a near-peer adversary since WW II.  We haven't fought a war where we didn't have air supremacy essentially ever. Even in WW I, by the time we got to France the German side was at a critical disadvantage in the air. The war in Ukraine just isn't "our type of war".

In addition, it must be said that the duration and repetition of the training provided to the Ukrainians is by NATO standards seriously inadequate. We don't send troops into battle with 30 days training. We also don't field battalions composed entirely of troops with such minimal training. Ukraine, by necessity, does this. It isn't "apples and apples". That said, the current training efforts do need a serious "lessons learned" upgrade and more Ukrainian trainers who have experience "in country". Hard to do in the middle of a war, but it is needed IMO.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 09-16-2023

(09-15-2023, 09:15 PM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-commander-says-hed-dead-120352123.html

There has been significant criticism of the NATO supplied training for Ukrainian soldiers. Much of that criticism is justified. IMO the most important factor is this:

Quote:NATO forces also train Ukrainian soldiers to overwhelm their enemies with the type of firepower that it does not possess.

Since the end of WW I, the US has always traded firepower for lives. We deliver overwhelming suppressive fire to allow our troops to advance without  crippling casualties. Ukraine doesn't have that firepower and simply can't do that. As the article points out, NATO hasn't fought a war against a near-peer adversary since WW II.  We haven't fought a war where we didn't have air supremacy essentially ever. Even in WW I, by the time we got to France the German side was at a critical disadvantage in the air. The war in Ukraine just isn't "our type of war".

In addition, it must be said that the duration and repetition of the training provided to the Ukrainians is by NATO standards seriously inadequate. We don't send troops into battle with 30 days training. We also don't field battalions composed entirely of troops with such minimal training. Ukraine, by necessity, does this. It isn't "apples and apples". That said, the current training efforts do need a serious "lessons learned" upgrade and more Ukrainian trainers who have experience "in country". Hard to do in the middle of a war, but it is needed IMO.

It is always hard in the middle of a war. It was certainly hard during the latter period of the Vietnam War when the 90 day wonders were delivered to theater mostly  unready for what they got.  It became the luck of draw. When the demands of the war exceed the ability to provide properly trained replacements you get what you get and hope.

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(09-15-2023, 09:15 PM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-commander-says-hed-dead-120352123.html

There has been significant criticism of the NATO supplied training for Ukrainian soldiers. Much of that criticism is justified. IMO the most important factor is this:

Quote:NATO forces also train Ukrainian soldiers to overwhelm their enemies with the type of firepower that it does not possess.

Since the end of WW I, the US has always traded firepower for lives. We deliver overwhelming suppressive fire to allow our troops to advance without  crippling casualties. Ukraine doesn't have that firepower and simply can't do that. As the article points out, NATO hasn't fought a war against a near-peer adversary since WW II.  We haven't fought a war where we didn't have air supremacy essentially ever. Even in WW I, by the time we got to France the German side was at a critical disadvantage in the air. The war in Ukraine just isn't "our type of war".

In addition, it must be said that the duration and repetition of the training provided to the Ukrainians is by NATO standards seriously inadequate. We don't send troops into battle with 30 days training. We also don't field battalions composed entirely of troops with such minimal training. Ukraine, by necessity, does this. It isn't "apples and apples". That said, the current training efforts do need a serious "lessons learned" upgrade and more Ukrainian trainers who have experience "in country". Hard to do in the middle of a war, but it is needed IMO.

Goose, I generally agree with all you say, but to say that we have always traded fire power for lives is true in the sense of intent, but actually in Vietnam it failed miserably under Westmoreland. There we could provide all kinds of fire power, but were still asked to take senseless objectives under heavy fire and then simply leave after finally taking the objective. I think we may have gotten a little better at that kind of operation after  9/11.  I have always regarded President Johnsons unwillingness to finally pull the plug on Westmoreland as one of the worst decisions he ever made. General Abrams should have taken command in Vietnam a year earlier than he did.
The Ukraine situation requires a whole different "think" on the issue.  They don't have the time to fully train people, they don't have our ability to provide overwhelming fire support and air cover. So if they want to keep their people alive they have to approach things differently. It seems to me that their success with Drone Warfare is a fall out from their inability to fight what we would call a conventional war. They seem very good at it, and quick to seize new opportunities. They are obviously still taking casualties, but they are inflicting significant loses on the Russians at long range, which hopefully pay dividends down the road.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 09-16-2023

Ukrainian Armed Forces are the most creative I've ever seen. They do more with less than Russia does with more. They are surgically precise with their targeting. I don't know how the pace of Russian losses in troops and equipment are sustainable. Ukraine seems to really know how to hit logistics and enabling infrastructure very well.

When the Abrams, F-16s, and ATACMS are deployed, it's hard to imagine things getting better for Russia. 

Really the only thing Russia can do is throw more bodies at the front lines, but modern weapons combined with Ukraine's ability to destroy supply routes will make them a lot less effective than they might have been in WWII.

The next thing I'm watching for is how the changing weather impacts things. Last year Ukraine pretty much dug in for the winter.  I don't think that is happening this year. I mean there may be some limits to what can be done, but the push must continue to some degree. I've theorized the Abrams and F-16s were being supplied to allow the offensive to continue at a faster pace during winter because they are both all-weather platforms. 

Just get this feeling that Russia is going to collapse all at once at some point after the pressure from Ukraine becomes too great to withstand in too many places. Russia's economy, morale, and supplies aren't sustainable. It's gonna be Afghanistan all over again for them in the end.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Mick - 09-16-2023

(09-16-2023, 01:44 AM)GK3 Wrote:  

(09-15-2023, 09:15 PM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-commander-says-hed-dead-120352123.html

There has been significant criticism of the NATO supplied training for Ukrainian soldiers. Much of that criticism is justified. IMO the most important factor is this:

Quote:NATO forces also train Ukrainian soldiers to overwhelm their enemies with the type of firepower that it does not possess.

Since the end of WW I, the US has always traded firepower for lives. We deliver overwhelming suppressive fire to allow our troops to advance without  crippling casualties. Ukraine doesn't have that firepower and simply can't do that. As the article points out, NATO hasn't fought a war against a near-peer adversary since WW II.  We haven't fought a war where we didn't have air supremacy essentially ever. Even in WW I, by the time we got to France the German side was at a critical disadvantage in the air. The war in Ukraine just isn't "our type of war".

In addition, it must be said that the duration and repetition of the training provided to the Ukrainians is by NATO standards seriously inadequate. We don't send troops into battle with 30 days training. We also don't field battalions composed entirely of troops with such minimal training. Ukraine, by necessity, does this. It isn't "apples and apples". That said, the current training efforts do need a serious "lessons learned" upgrade and more Ukrainian trainers who have experience "in country". Hard to do in the middle of a war, but it is needed IMO.

It is always hard in the middle of a war. It was certainly hard during the latter period of the Vietnam War when the 90 day wonders were delivered to theater mostly  unready for what they got.  It became the luck of draw. When the demands of the war exceed the ability to provide properly trained replacements you get what you get and hope.

This statement reminds me of the Rumsfeld quote: “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” If only there were another option...

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-16-2023

(09-16-2023, 01:44 AM)GK3 Wrote:  

(09-15-2023, 09:15 PM)Goose Wrote:  

Quote:NATO forces also train Ukrainian soldiers to overwhelm their enemies with the type of firepower that it does not possess.

<snip>

It is always hard in the middle of a war. It was certainly hard during the latter period of the Vietnam War when the 90 day wonders were delivered to theater mostly  unready for what they got.  It became the luck of draw. When the demands of the war exceed the ability to provide properly trained replacements you get what you get and hope.

Indeed no matter how much training troops have received, they are NEVER ready for actual combat. At least they were 90 day wonders, not 30 day wonders. They were also generally going to units that were already "in country" and has some combat experience. Ukraine unfortunately has units that have never fought together before their first major battle. Think Kasserine pass. In many cases for Ukraine, they aren't replacements, they are the entire unit, including the leadership. When you are creating an entirely "new" army, as Ukraine must, that is indeed what happens. It isn't the training's shortcomings, it is the situation.

Quote:

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Goose, I generally agree with all you say, but to say that we have always traded fire power for lives is true in the sense of intent, but actually in Vietnam it failed miserably under Westmoreland. There we could provide all kinds of fire power, but were still asked to take senseless objectives under heavy fire and then simply leave after finally taking the objective. I think we may have gotten a little better at that kind of operation after  9/11.  I have always regarded President Johnsons unwillingness to finally pull the plug on Westmoreland as one of the worst decisions he ever made. General Abrams should have taken command in Vietnam a year earlier than he did.

LBJ was getting from Westmoreland exactly what he wanted, a military leader that was willing (even eager) to follow a strategy that had almost no chance of success. We were "messaging" the enemy that he should give up and hoping he would. We had no plan to compel the enemy to give up. As long as the North was able to send troops south, the war wasn't going to end. Lots of people knew that from day 1, but it wasn't a politically acceptable fact. Tactically, our trading firepower for lives "worked" (unless you were unfortunate enough to be one of those lives). Strategically, we were totally bankrupt. Abrams got fewer people killed, but he was still in a strategic "box".

IMO we really haven't gotten better at recognizing situations that military force is only a very partial solution. The so-called "Powell Doctrine" of delivering overwhelming force has "worked" in that it has certainly minimized casualties and has delivered complete tactical victories. It must be remembered that the "enemy" was not anywhere near a "peer" and it was a mismatch. The first Gulf war didn't look like that at the beginning, but it became clear that was the case very quickly. We also had no strategic constraint of possible Russian intervention on the other side.

The remaining problem was that the US had no strategy at all to rebuild the defeated countries to be "stable" and not a threat to world peace (let alone democratic and "just").  We couldn't and we didn't. Not the military's fault. IMO nobody knows how to handle these situations. Sometimes having a certain regime in power in a given country is "totally unacceptable" and we still send our military to remove said regime. They so far have done as ordered. However, the "How does this end?" question is either not addressed at all or is a fantasy. Unfortunately, that has to continue, because the "totally unacceptable" compels action of some kind. What happens afterwords is always hard to know, so the first step will continue to be taken in the often vain hope that we can make things "end" acceptably.

Quote:The Ukraine situation requires a whole different "think" on the issue.  They don't have the time to fully train people, they don't have our ability to provide overwhelming fire support and air cover. So if they want to keep their people alive they have to approach things differently. It seems to me that their success with Drone Warfare is a fall out from their inability to fight what we would call a conventional war. They seem very good at it, and quick to seize new opportunities. They are obviously still taking casualties, but they are inflicting significant loses on the Russians at long range, which hopefully pay dividends down the road.

Ukraine knows what they are doing with knowledge purchased by blood. They are doing lots of things well, but like all countries they still have their "problems". They have certainly been forced by circumstances to make tactical and strategic compromises. Hopefully history will record they made enough "correct" choices to win. In some cases it can be argued they spend too much time on technical developments that aren't "war winners". That said, some of those efforts have had effects all out of proportion to what was originally expected (sea-going drones for example). Hard to know. IMO our military "strategists", such as they are, haven't contributed much to the effort. Ukraine is probably better for it.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-16-2023

(09-16-2023, 05:45 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  Ukrainian Armed Forces are the most creative I've ever seen. They do more with less than Russia does with more. They are surgically precise with their targeting. I don't know how the pace of Russian losses in troops and equipment are sustainable. Ukraine seems to really know how to hit logistics and enabling infrastructure very well.

When the Abrams, F-16s, and ATACMS are deployed, it's hard to imagine things getting better for Russia. 

Really the only thing Russia can do is throw more bodies at the front lines, but modern weapons combined with Ukraine's ability to destroy supply routes will make them a lot less effective than they might have been in WWII.

The next thing I'm watching for is how the changing weather impacts things. Last year Ukraine pretty much dug in for the winter.  I don't think that is happening this year. I mean there may be some limits to what can be done, but the push must continue to some degree. I've theorized the Abrams and F-16s were being supplied to allow the offensive to continue at a faster pace during winter because they are both all-weather platforms.

The US isn't going to supply ATACMS. Remove that from your thinking. It would require the administration to do something the president explicitly said we would not do. That isn't getting "walked back". The number of F-16s that will be operational in Ukraine by February will be minimal if any. The pilots will probably be minimally qualified in IFR conditions. Trust me, the operations tempo of all air units drops precipitously in the European winter. The accident rate among inexperienced pilots will be astronomical if it doesn't. On some days, you can fly. On many, you can't.

The Leopards that Ukraine has are all-weather too. Ukraine doesn't need more tanks to continue the offensive. Be aware however that even the Leopards needs to keep their engines running or it may not start the next morning. The lubricants become ineffective.  Most important however is that the Mark 1 Model 1 infantry trooper is not all weather and cannot operate at temperatures well below freezing for very long without breaking down. That is mostly what Ukraine has and what has brought them their most success. The offensive will continue, but not at nearly the same tempo. That is an unavoidable fact. Fortunately for Ukraine, it is unclear the Russians have provided adequate cold weather gear for their troops. Even if you are in a trench, not in open country, with inadequate gear you will freeze to death.

Of course, it could be a "mild" winter and only occasionally shut down operations. However, the weather is going to have a significant impact.

Quote:Just get this feeling that Russia is going to collapse all at once at some point after the pressure from Ukraine becomes too great to withstand in too many places. Russia's economy, morale, and supplies aren't sustainable. It's gonna be Afghanistan all over again for them in the end.

One thing you can be absolutely sure of is that it will be totally unlike Afghanistan in the end if Russia loses. Afghanistan was never an existential threat to the USSR. They could leave any time and nobody in Russia would really care. Russia wasn't going to lose any territory and wasn't going to be significantly worse off at the end of the war than they were before it. In the Ukraine war, the Russian economy has been seriously compromised, their main energy customers no longer are, and they are cut off from the international banking systems. Inflation is rampant and the Ruble is worth much less that before. Unlike Afghanistan, the EU cares about this one. The main difference is that Russia stands to lose Crimea, and with that control of the Black sea and the Sea of Azov. You can be absolutely certain that such losses will have more effect in Russia than Afghanistan ever did. This is true even if one ignores the vastly greater casualties Russia has suffered in the current war.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 09-16-2023

Ukraine will be like Afghanistan all over again in the sense failure and withdrawal in Ukraine will have to be faced like it was in Afghanistan. 

I offer no opinion on what post war situation will turn out being worse, but it does seem Russia has a lot more stacked against it now than it did after the Afghanistan withdrawal.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-16-2023

(09-16-2023, 10:52 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  Ukraine will be like Afghanistan all over again in the sense failure and withdrawal in Ukraine will have to be faced like it was in Afghanistan. 

I offer no opinion on what post war situation will turn out being worse, but it does seem Russia has a lot more stacked against it now than it did after the Afghanistan withdrawal.

I understand your point, but in reality one of the major factors is that the "failure and withdrawal" from Afghanistan was not "faced". It was a non-event. Only after many years of samizdat reading and the like did a significant number of Russians even know of the failures. Even then, it's political impact was minimal and it didn't have anywhere near enough impact to bring down the regime.

I see no way that withdrawal from Ukraine can be ignored by the Russian government or the Russian people. They will, at a minimum, try to spin it as a "victory" even if it isn't. Given the economic and immigration impacts of the war, I see no way such "spin" can succeed. IMO Putin is "all in" on Ukraine because he knows that if he is forced to withdraw from Crimea, he is toast. If he can keep Crimea and some of his gains in the east, he may survive. The Russian government is stuck in an untenable situation. They have to "win" in order to survive. A significant defeat that can't be spun is a "win" will undoubtedly lead to regime change. Not necessarily a "good" regime change, but the current leaders can't survive an obvious failure (like losing Crimea).

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 09-16-2023

Far too often in the last 60 or so years,  the NCA has made it clear what he wants to hear, so that is what he hears.  It makes no difference if it is true or not.  The nails who stand up and speak of reality soon get hammered down.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-16-2023

(09-16-2023, 01:29 PM)GK3 Wrote:  Far too often in the last 60 or so years,  the NCA has made it clear what he wants to hear, so that is what he hears.  It makes no difference if it is true or not.  The nails who stand up and speak of reality soon get hammered down.

It has been said the President gets the CIA he wants. It may take two years, but it will happen. It doesn't require the President to actually do or say anything along those lines. It is just inherent. While the NCA is a bit bigger than just the President, I think it is the same situation. When there are conflicting opinions, the NCA chooses the one it wants. After a while, there are no conflicting opinions. No hammering needed. The nails give up beating themselves against the wall :-).

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BigJohn043 - 09-16-2023

(09-16-2023, 11:11 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(09-16-2023, 10:52 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  Ukraine will be like Afghanistan all over again in the sense failure and withdrawal in Ukraine will have to be faced like it was in Afghanistan. 

I offer no opinion on what post war situation will turn out being worse, but it does seem Russia has a lot more stacked against it now than it did after the Afghanistan withdrawal.

I understand your point, but in reality one of the major factors is that the "failure and withdrawal" from Afghanistan was not "faced". It was a non-event. Only after many years of samizdat reading and the like did a significant number of Russians even know of the failures. Even then, it's political impact was minimal and it didn't have anywhere near enough impact to bring down the regime.

I see no way that withdrawal from Ukraine can be ignored by the Russian government or the Russian people. They will, at a minimum, try to spin it as a "victory" even if it isn't. Given the economic and immigration impacts of the war, I see no way such "spin" can succeed. IMO Putin is "all in" on Ukraine because he knows that if he is forced to withdraw from Crimea, he is toast. If he can keep Crimea and some of his gains in the east, he may survive. The Russian government is stuck in an untenable situation. They have to "win" in order to survive. A significant defeat that can't be spun is a "win" will undoubtedly lead to regime change. Not necessarily a "good" regime change, but the current leaders can't survive an obvious failure (like losing Crimea).

If Putin could go back to pre-war boundaries he probably would.  But Ukraine won't take that deal.

Do you agree that if Ukraine can close the land bridge to Crimea they will take it?  Close can mean a number of things but if Russia can't supply Crimea over land they likely can't hold it.

And I agree that if they lose Crimea that is a whole different kettle of fish....

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - ADPinWDC - 09-16-2023

(09-16-2023, 09:46 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(09-16-2023, 05:45 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  Ukrainian Armed Forces are the most creative I've ever seen. They do more with less than Russia does with more. They are surgically precise with their targeting. I don't know how the pace of Russian losses in troops and equipment are sustainable. Ukraine seems to really know how to hit logistics and enabling infrastructure very well.

When the Abrams, F-16s, and ATACMS are deployed, it's hard to imagine things getting better for Russia. 

Really the only thing Russia can do is throw more bodies at the front lines, but modern weapons combined with Ukraine's ability to destroy supply routes will make them a lot less effective than they might have been in WWII.

The next thing I'm watching for is how the changing weather impacts things. Last year Ukraine pretty much dug in for the winter.  I don't think that is happening this year. I mean there may be some limits to what can be done, but the push must continue to some degree. I've theorized the Abrams and F-16s were being supplied to allow the offensive to continue at a faster pace during winter because they are both all-weather platforms.

The US isn't going to supply ATACMS. Remove that from your thinking. It would require the administration to do something the president explicitly said we would not do. That isn't getting "walked back". The number of F-16s that will be operational in Ukraine by February will be minimal if any. The pilots will probably be minimally qualified in IFR conditions. Trust me, the operations tempo of all air units drops precipitously in the European winter. The accident rate among inexperienced pilots will be astronomical if it doesn't. On some days, you can fly. On many, you can't.

The Leopards that Ukraine has are all-weather too. Ukraine doesn't need more tanks to continue the offensive. Be aware however that even the Leopards needs to keep their engines running or it may not start the next morning. The lubricants become ineffective.  Most important however is that the Mark 1 Model 1 infantry trooper is not all weather and cannot operate at temperatures well below freezing for very long without breaking down. That is mostly what Ukraine has and what has brought them their most success. The offensive will continue, but not at nearly the same tempo. That is an unavoidable fact. Fortunately for Ukraine, it is unclear the Russians have provided adequate cold weather gear for their troops. Even if you are in a trench, not in open country, with inadequate gear you will freeze to death.

Of course, it could be a "mild" winter and only occasionally shut down operations. However, the weather is going to have a significant impact.

Quote:Just get this feeling that Russia is going to collapse all at once at some point after the pressure from Ukraine becomes too great to withstand in too many places. Russia's economy, morale, and supplies aren't sustainable. It's gonna be Afghanistan all over again for them in the end.

One thing you can be absolutely sure of is that it will be totally unlike Afghanistan in the end if Russia loses. Afghanistan was never an existential threat to the USSR. They could leave any time and nobody in Russia would really care. Russia wasn't going to lose any territory and wasn't going to be significantly worse off at the end of the war than they were before it. In the Ukraine war, the Russian economy has been seriously compromised, their main energy customers no longer are, and they are cut off from the international banking systems. Inflation is rampant and the Ruble is worth much less that before. Unlike Afghanistan, the EU cares about this one. The main difference is that Russia stands to lose Crimea, and with that control of the Black sea and the Sea of Azov. You can be absolutely certain that such losses will have more effect in Russia than Afghanistan ever did. This is true even if one ignores the vastly greater casualties Russia has suffered in the current war.

CORRECT.  Ukraine is not like Afghanistan at all.  Agree. 
Putin uses the map from 1619 -- the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that conquered the territory in the 1500s. 
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Polish-Lithuanian_Commonwealth_(1619).png
-- except the far Eastern region of Ukraine (Luhansk, Donetsk) and Crimea.  

And the election results from 2004, backing Yanukovych, who was ousted in the 2014 Maidan Revolution.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 09-22-2023

Here we go again, like I've said before, I'll believe it when I see it.  I think this is more likely an internal disagreement about approval, and those who want to supply the weapons trying to put more pressure on Biden.  [url=https://x.com/NBCNews/status/1705234960037138647?s=20]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/NBCNews/status/1705234960037138647?s=20[/tweet]

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