Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-12-2023

(07-12-2023, 08:58 AM)GK3 Wrote:  My big question is how is all going to end?
Would Putin be willing to call off the hounds short of conquering Ukraine?  

Ukraine's losses have been such I am not sure they would agree to anything short of return to pre 2014 borders.  

Can Russian losses, both human and financial, cause Putin to be ousted and someone new to come in who is willing to end the war?

How long will the West continue to provide money and munitions?

The West seems better able to replace the equipment losses suffered by Ukraine that Russia is of replacing its equipment losses.

I just don't see this mess ending anytime soon.

Lots of people asking these questions, plus some additional ones. For me, the additional big question is:
How long can Ukraine fight with their country in a shambles? Clearly, they have done it longer than many thought they could, but at some point their morale/ability to continue fighting will falter. They need to "win" before that happens.

FWIW, I believe Ukraine has come to the conclusion it must take Crimea back to be a viable country. Without it, Russia will always have a choke-hold on their coastline and the Sea of Azov. Strategically, that is a recipe for failure. Conversely, if Ukraine holds Crimea, it can cut Russia off from the Sea of Azov and has the best naval base in the Black Sea. Fill that with a few modern combatants and they "own" the Black Sea. 6 or so U-212s or newer would do it all by themselves. That gives them pretty big advantages. IMO, that is the point where negotiations will be OK from the Ukrainian point of view. Can they get there? Who knows?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-12-2023

https://www.yahoo.com/news/frontline-ukrainian-soldiers-hope-nato-205333708.html

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-future-nato-precarious-position-155658520.html

Some other peoples thinking on the subject. The first one basically says that Ukraine needs to be in NATO or they will always be fighting Russia. NATO is their "insurance policy". This thought is almost universal (and has been for years) in Ukraine, but it also scares the heck out of NATO military commanders.

The second one covers some of the same ground as my previous posts. Making offers that you don't really intend to/can't honor may result in other people doing stupid things. It doesn't make those things less stupid, but it does cast large doubts about the leadership that makes such offers.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 07-12-2023

(07-12-2023, 09:58 AM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/news/frontline-ukrainian-soldiers-hope-nato-205333708.html

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-future-nato-precarious-position-155658520.html

Some other peoples thinking on the subject. The first one basically says that Ukraine needs to be in NATO or they will always be fighting Russia. NATO is their "insurance policy". This thought is almost universal (and has been for years) in Ukraine, but it also scares the heck out of NATO military commanders.

The second one covers some of the same ground as my previous posts. Making offers that you don't really intend to/can't honor may result in other people doing stupid things. It doesn't make those things less stupid, but it does cast large doubts about the leadership that makes such offers.

Speaking of trying to defend indefensible territory. Russia’s most important naval bases all exist in a similar shadow. Kaliningrad, St. Pete, Murmansk, Sevastopol, and Vladivostok would be overwhelmed by NATO and it’s partner countries in the event of WWIII. Of course, we all assume there will be no such war. The only reason NATO could even consider accepting the Baltics into the alliance was to assume that the purpose of the alliance - to defend against an attack by Russia - would never become operative. Russia lives by the same code, setting up totally indefensible naval bases that serve no purpose other than saber rattling.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Leftcoast - 07-12-2023

When exactly should NATO have extended membership to Ukraine post 2008 discussion?  (Not a guarantee, by the way)

Under the Yanukovych pro-Russia government and vote rigging scandals?  (Yanukovych renounced NATO and pursuit of membership repeatedly). During the brief period after the Euro Maidan revolt and prior to the Crimean seizure?  (Ukrainian polling showed a rejection of NATO membership with opposition to joining hovering around 70%) After the Crimea Seizure with a belligerent Russia and an uncertain leadership in Ukraine?  Most of this happening in the context of see-sawing governments that vacillated between pro-Russia and Pro-Europe positions, an on-going pro-Russia revolt in the Donbas, a faltering economy, and an uncertain commitment to Democracy?

Arguments that only look at the current war and then wave an index finger at "bad NATO" for raising poor Ukraine's hopes ignore the reality on the ground prior to the Russian Invasion.  Ukraine did not show they could meet very important milestones even with the tantalizing promise of NATO membership as an incentive. Personally, I would have been extremely critical of any President that looked at Ukraine and said THAT'S a country I want to give NATO Article 5 protection.

It is reasonable to set hurdles of a stable economy, commitment to Democratic processes, and commitment to a Western outlook as the minimum for NATO membership.  Remember any NATO member has a rock solid promise that we'll send our young men to die on their soil should the need arise. That should only come with great deliberation.

I say this as someone who is 100% pro-Ukraine in the current war and supports the ongoing Biden and NATO policies.

Yanukovych declares Joining NATO off the table during 2010 visit to Russia
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/7774665/Ukraine-drops-Nato-membership-pursuit.html

Wikipedia Entry on Ukraine and Nato - Note polling charts showing a widespread disinterest in NATO membership (and the change in polling after the Crimea seizure)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations#cite_note-77

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-12-2023

(07-12-2023, 04:32 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Speaking of trying to defend indefensible territory. Russia’s most important naval bases all exist in a similar shadow. Kaliningrad, St. Pete, Murmansk, Sevastopol, and Vladivostok would be overwhelmed by NATO and it’s partner countries in the event of WWIII. Of course, we all assume there will be no such war. The only reason NATO could even consider accepting the Baltics into the alliance was to assume that the purpose of the alliance - to defend against an attack by Russia - would never become operative. Russia lives by the same code, setting up totally indefensible naval bases that serve no purpose other than saber rattling.

I can't really agree with you here. Murmansk is a real tough nut. NATO certainly doesn't take for granted that it is "indefensible".  Quite the opposite. Lots and lots of effort continues to go into trying to neutralize Murmansk and it's ongoing surface and submarine threat. In fact, NATO doesn't even believe defending the northern coast of Norway is a given. Those boomers and their escorts in the bastions are not "saber rattling", but rather world ending.

Sevastopol is also pretty "safe", or it was until Ukraine became an open enemy of Russia. The Turks can keep the Russian Navy penned in where it can do no harm outside of the Black Sea, but NATO wasn't going in there to root them out either. The Black Sea is pretty much conceded to Russia, Navy-wise. Right now, the Russian Navy there is a mess, but that doesn't have to be true if this war ends in Russia's favor.

Vlad is not in a great geographic situation, but nobody really wants to fight in the SOJ either. Confined waters. Russia's problem there is it is just too far away from the rest of the country. However, Petropavlovsk is where the "real" problem is. Much like Murmansk, it's submarine threat is very formidable, and also like Murmansk it is not "hemmed in" by NATO territory.

The Baltic Sea is pretty much a "no go" zone for the US Navy. Large ships don't do well there. OTOH, before the end of the Cold War the Danes could close up the entrance totally with mines of various types in literally minutes. Unfortunately, they can't do so today. As in WW II, the Baltic isn't going to be an "important" Naval theater because it is just too dangerous for anybody to operate there. Russia will present some naval problems, but not many. In that, you are correct.

Obviously, all naval bases, both NATO and Russian, are vulnerable from the air. That is what makes the naval situation acutely interesting. Which side can defend their bases from the air will decide how well their Navy does. Russia has put LOTS of effort into defending their naval bases, but Putin has not continued that emphasis. Putin is a bit like Hitler in that regard. He neither values nor understands his navy as much as he should. He has basically eviscerated naval aviation. The irony is that Naval Aviation is launching many of the cruise missiles against Ukraine. The TU-22s are all ex-navy units.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 07-12-2023

All fair points, and Petropavlovsk does seem geographically problematic for us. But I’m assuming that both Russia and NATO could have conflicts short of a nuclear Holocaust, and that conventional military tactics could be relevant to the outcome. Aside from Petropavlovsk, the other naval bases all seem problematic because those other bases are within ATACMS range of NATO territory and most of the bases are “hemmed in.”  Not to mention would have air superiority. The US has natural geographic advantages. It sure is nice that Russia doesn’t have a good place from which to attack San Diego or Norfolk or Honolulu, or most other major American naval bases. But even beyond those advantages, other NATO countries have major naval bases in areas far from Russian military sites. Devonport, Rota, La Spezia, etc.  I don’t see how any of those bases would be vulnerable to Russian attack.  Russia can credibly threaten to end the world, but I don’t think Russia can credibly threaten to invade any NATO country other than the formerly soviet Baltics. Given what we’ve seen in Ukraine, I have my doubts that Russia could take Finland even if NATO didn’t commit troops.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-12-2023

(07-12-2023, 07:42 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  All fair points, and Petropavlovsk does seem geographically problematic for us. But I’m assuming that both Russia and NATO could have conflicts short of a nuclear Holocaust, and that conventional military tactics could be relevant to the outcome. Aside from Petropavlovsk, the other naval bases all seem problematic because those other bases are within ATACMS range of NATO territory and most of the bases are “hemmed in.”  Not to mention would have air superiority. The US has natural geographic advantages. It sure is nice that Russia doesn’t have a good place from which to attack San Diego or Norfolk or Honolulu, or most other major American naval bases. But even beyond those advantages, other NATO countries have major naval bases in areas far from Russian military sites. Devonport, Rota, La Spezia, etc.  I don’t see how any of those bases would be vulnerable to Russian attack.  Russia can credibly threaten to end the world, but I don’t think Russia can credibly threaten to invade any NATO country other than the formerly soviet Baltics. Given what we’ve seen in Ukraine, I have my doubts that Russia could take Finland even if NATO didn’t commit troops.

You are correct that attack from the air (including missiles) can destroy Naval bases, and  that is important. However, there are a couple of things that need to be kept in mind. First, the northern part of Norway, Sweden and Finland are effectively empty and very difficult launch anything from. Russia has a significant Army presence in the far North. NATO really does not.

Second, the other potential European Naval bases (and commercial ports) can be cut off from the continental US by Russian submarines and air power. A land war in Europe that is isolated from easy resupply and reinforcement from the US is a nightmare that has worried the Navy forever. The wide oceans favor the US only if we control them. If we don't, NATO won't last long in Europe.

Right now, Russia looks so inept that none of this matters. However, imagine what happens in Ukraine if none of the help we are sending can get there.  Also no LNG for civilian use in Europe. Different picture. The US sealift capability is questionable even when we have sea control. We still have to use foreign vessels. Without sea control, things go pear-shaped fast.

Fortunately, Russia at present does not have enough conventional sea power to threaten that control. They could make it messy but just don't have the horses. That condition unfortunately is not cast in stone, and the US is in the process of losing critical mass (of ships and especially personnel). Sometime soon, that needs to be addressed.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 07-12-2023

All fair points, and Petropavlovsk does seem geographically problematic for us. But I’m assuming that both Russia and NATO could have conflicts short of a nuclear Holocaust, and that conventional military tactics could be relevant to the outcome. Aside from Petropavlovsk, the other naval bases all seem problematic because those other bases are within ATACMS range of NATO territory and most of the bases are “hemmed in.”  Not to mention would have air superiority. The US has natural geographic advantages. It sure is nice that Russia doesn’t have a good place from which to attack San Diego or Norfolk or Honolulu, or most other major American naval bases. But even beyond those advantages, other NATO countries have major naval bases in areas far from Russian military sites. Devonport, Rota, La Spezia, etc.  I don’t see how any of those bases would be vulnerable to Russian attack.  Russia can credibly threaten to end the world, but I don’t think Russia can credibly threaten to invade any NATO country other than the formerly soviet Baltics. Given what we’ve seen in Ukraine, I have my doubts that Russia could take Finland even if NATO didn’t commit troops.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 07-13-2023

(07-12-2023, 10:04 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  All fair points, and Petropavlovsk does seem geographically problematic for us. But I’m assuming that both Russia and NATO could have conflicts short of a nuclear Holocaust, and that conventional military tactics could be relevant to the outcome. Aside from Petropavlovsk, the other naval bases all seem problematic because those other bases are within ATACMS range of NATO territory and most of the bases are “hemmed in.”  Not to mention would have air superiority. The US has natural geographic advantages. It sure is nice that Russia doesn’t have a good place from which to attack San Diego or Norfolk or Honolulu, or most other major American naval bases. But even beyond those advantages, other NATO countries have major naval bases in areas far from Russian military sites. Devonport, Rota, La Spezia, etc.  I don’t see how any of those bases would be vulnerable to Russian attack.  Russia can credibly threaten to end the world, but I don’t think Russia can credibly threaten to invade any NATO country other than the formerly soviet Baltics. Given what we’ve seen in Ukraine, I have my doubts that Russia could take Finland even if NATO didn’t commit troops.

Another more strategic viewpoint of the Why in all this can be found in Max Boot's article here: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/03/14/russia-population-crisis-putin/

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-13-2023

(07-12-2023, 10:04 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  All fair points, and Petropavlovsk does seem geographically problematic for us. But I’m assuming that both Russia and NATO could have conflicts short of a nuclear Holocaust, and that conventional military tactics could be relevant to the outcome. Aside from Petropavlovsk, the other naval bases all seem problematic because those other bases are within ATACMS range of NATO territory and most of the bases are “hemmed in.”  Not to mention would have air superiority. The US has natural geographic advantages. It sure is nice that Russia doesn’t have a good place from which to attack San Diego or Norfolk or Honolulu, or most other major American naval bases. But even beyond those advantages, other NATO countries have major naval bases in areas far from Russian military sites. Devonport, Rota, La Spezia, etc.  I don’t see how any of those bases would be vulnerable to Russian attack.  Russia can credibly threaten to end the world, but I don’t think Russia can credibly threaten to invade any NATO country other than the formerly soviet Baltics. Given what we’ve seen in Ukraine, I have my doubts that Russia could take Finland even if NATO didn’t commit troops.

On conflating factor that is undoubtedly in all our minds is Russia's exceedingly poor performance in the current conflict. It makes it difficult to envision future events with confidence. Relying on the fact Russia can't do something because they are incompetent could be dangerous, as they are not all incompetent and in the past were much more capable. OTOH one does not want to create a "superpower" out of what could be true but is not true today.

It is necessary to point out that all the seaports in the US are within easy range of sea launched cruise missiles, as are almost all the Russian ones.  However, that fact doesn't imply they will be neutralized. Kiev is still there, and it is in "rock throwing" distance. Kiev also has a significant air defense network. The one around Murmansk makes the one around Kiev pale by comparison. The one around San Diego is nonexistent. The ocean around San Diego is "friendly". The ocean around Murmansk is some of the most hostile in the world. Both sides have to operate in that ocean. In a conventional war, NATO considers Murmansk a "difficult" target. It is important to remember that 1) Norway, Sweden, and Finland do not garrison their far north and have a very limited presence there. Russia OTOH does have significant forces in that area. That means NATO has limited if any offensive capability there. 2) GPS does not work that well at high latitudes. The constellations are almost always at low angles, i.e. close to the horizon. GDOP is significant. It also means that ground-based jammers are more difficult to reject based on elevation. The Russians have plenty of these apparently.

The ability of NATO to fight a conventional war against the USSR always depended on controlling the SLOCs to Europe. The European seaports, both commercial and military, are useful only if the ships can get there. The concern has always been that Russian submarines could cut those SLOCs. Russia has shown itself to be pretty incompetent in Ukraine. Now imagine that most of the military aid from the US could not be delivered to Ukraine because we did not control the SLOCs. That would indeed be a game-changer. The US military sealift capability is known to be inadequate. We rely on commercial shipping, often foreign flagged, to move much of our military and and all of our commercial shipping. Now, imagine that few if any LNG tankers can enter the Baltic sea and all are at risk anywhere in the Pacific and Atlantic. Things in Europe don't look so rosy at that point.

Can Russia do this today? Good question. The answer is probably not, but not because NATO would destroy/overrun Murmansk. Russia probably doesn't have enough operational submarines to do the job. However, counting on that to be true today and tomorrow as well is a bit scary (to me at least). It also doesn't preclude them from trying, and since nothing is certain in war, that is even more scary.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 07-14-2023

Any opportunity arising from the conflict in Ukraine for Moldova or Georgia to obtain a durable settlement with Russia over disputed lands?  Or is creating instability the only value for Russia in propping up these autonomous regions? Same question for Chechnya and Dagestan?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 07-14-2023

(07-14-2023, 12:40 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Any opportunity arising from the conflict in Ukraine for Moldova or Georgia to obtain a durable settlement with Russia over disputed lands?  Or is creating instability the only value for Russia in propping up these autonomous regions?  Same question for Chechnya and Dagestan?

How could anyone trust Russia to abide by any agreement it makes?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-14-2023

(07-14-2023, 12:40 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Any opportunity arising from the conflict in Ukraine for Moldova or Georgia to obtain a durable settlement with Russia over disputed lands?  Or is creating instability the only value for Russia in propping up these autonomous regions?  Same question for Chechnya and Dagestan?

IMO Moldova and Georgia are just hoping Ukraine wins. Then, maybe, they can get a "resolution" in their breakaway provinces by convincing the Russians to leave. A durable settlement depends somewhat on what these states can negotiate within their own country. As long as Russia backs the separatists no solution is possible. If Russia is forced by events in Ukraine to withdraw, a solution is possible but not certain. There are real problems there that transcend Russian involvement.

Chechnya and Dagestan are different cases IMO. Russia isn't going to let go of Chechnya unless the Russian Federation completely collapses. A loss in Ukraine might do that, but I wouldn't count on it. Dagestan is a little further away and Russia needs to go through Chechnya to get there. It is so ethnically diverse it is hard to imagine it can actually put up much of a fight however. If Chechnya becomes independent, Dagestan will too, at least for a while. They only would then have to worry about Georgia, Iran, and Chechnya :-).

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - thatboy - 07-16-2023

Question: I think Biden said recently that the U.S. was running out of ammunition, so we are there sending cluster munitions. Does that concern anyone? It seems kind of ominous, but I didn't see it mentioned here (sorry if I missed it). Is this an issue we should be worried about?

https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/07/politics/joe-biden-cluster-munitions-ukraine/index.html

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-16-2023

(07-16-2023, 03:42 PM)thatboy Wrote:  Question: I think Biden said recently that the U.S. was running out of ammunition, so we are there sending cluster munitions. Does that concern anyone? It seems kind of ominous, but I didn't see it mentioned here (sorry if I missed it). Is this an issue we should be worried about?

https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/07/politics/joe-biden-cluster-munitions-ukraine/index.html

The ammunition being shipped to Ukraine has significantly depleted our stocks. We are not "running out of ammunition" because today we aren't fighting anyone. However, if tomorrow we were, running out of ammunition could be a "concern", although the US today has significantly reduced it's dependence on tube artillery. The Marines in particular have shed essentially all of it. The administration is faced with the decision to either greatly increase production of 155 mm HE rounds (which takes time and money) or just let our more-or-less "normal" production rate refill our stock. Every year, a significant part of our artillery rounds pass there "use by" date and are replaced. In around 8-10 years it normally turns over. The specs say 15 years (I think), but the Army is "conservative". We are just sending that ammo to Ukraine and would replace it "eventually".

The second part of the problem is that Ukraine continually needs resupply, and they are going to need more to conduct an offensive. Thus the demand on our supply is not going away, but rather increasing. This fact will, IMO compell the Army to go on a massive near-term procurement. Sending DPICM to Ukraine will mitigate but not remove this problem.

IMO the "real truth" is that the supply problem is a bit of a "work around" for the fact that Ukraine needs DPICM to attack the Russian trenches. It is the "right" weapon for that task. Lots of people don't want to acknowledge that truth, but truth it is. The supply problem is real. Nobody is telling lies. But that is not the reason. It is an excuse/justification for doing what should have been done a while back. It's not like Ukraine hasn't been asking.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - thatboy - 07-16-2023

Thanks Goose. I was hoping you’d reply and appreciate it. What you said makes a lot of sense and does indeed sound like the actual answer.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - 81alum - 07-16-2023

Once again, I find myself wanting to consult Goose's expert advice on a NYT article:

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/16/world/europe/ukraine-russia-land-mines.html

According to the article, Ukraine was not sufficiently prepared for the variety, quantity, or depth of Russian land mines, and the mines have (almost by themselves) bogged down the "counteroffensive."  Having enormous quantities of land mines is certainly unrelated to the morale or quality of Russian troops, so it would hardly seem to matter that Ukrainian forces have high morale and Russian forces have low morale--in this respect.

US armored vehicles (like the Bradley) save lives but don't really help with a breakthrough.  They get immobilized by anti-tank mines.  Certainly better to be in one than not, since it saves your legs.  But it doesn't exactly create a mobile battlefield.

All in all, it seems pretty pessimistic.  The  Russians can make up with mines  what they lack with everything else.  Or so the article implies.  Thoughts?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 07-17-2023

Drones have become effective tools for identifying mines (which is half the battle), but eliminating them as dangers and roadblocks to advances is another issue. One reason to use cluster munitions is to help clear these mines. They can be targeted to areas with heavy mine concentrations, then drones can check same area again, and if cleared, advance can be made. This is a much better option than sending out mine sweepers ahead of advancing forces.

It also looks like UAF are as much as possible attacking flanks of Russians in order to avoid frontal clashes.  It really would be nice to see UAF have a big operation to drop forces behind Russian lines. There would be a lot fewer mines attacking those lines from behind.

On another note, Russia is claiming it will use cluster munitions if Ukraine does.  But isn't the truth that Russia has already used cluster munitions, not only on UAF, but civilian areas?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-17-2023

(07-17-2023, 05:02 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  Drones have become effective tools for identifying mines (which is half the battle), but eliminating them as dangers and roadblocks to advances is another issue. One reason to use cluster munitions is to help clear these mines. They can be targeted to areas with heavy mine concentrations, then drones can check same area again, and if cleared, advance can be made. This is a much better option than sending out mine sweepers ahead of advancing forces.

OF, it would be good if you could link to some references to this application of DPICM. AFAIK, it isn't something that NATO has used or planned to use. The grenades would most probably detonate any mine it landed directly above, but a DPICM barrage doesn't saturate the ground with grenades. There would be lots of "holes" where the mines are unaffected. Line charges are used in some cases to rapidly clear routes through mined areas, but they explode linearly along their entire length. You have to "stay in the furrow" to be safe.

Drones can certainly spot a poorly laid minefield, or one laid on the surface by artillery. However, Russia has had almost a year to install their minefields. After a good rain, it is pretty difficult to visually spot a minefield placed in open country. You really need mine resistant detection vehicles and/or a mine clearance team to sweep the area. Relying on what you see will get people killed. Of course, if you can see it, you know you must clear/avoid it. FWIW, I would much rather have a mine clearance unit in front of me if I can. Ukraines problems are 1) only about 15% of the promised de-mining equipment has been delivered, and 2) you need to protect your clearance people from artillery and air strikes. Ukraine can do the first pretty well but not the second.

Quote:It also looks like UAF are as much as possible attacking flanks of Russians in order to avoid frontal clashes.  It really would be nice to see UAF have a big operation to drop forces behind Russian lines. There would be a lot fewer mines attacking those lines from behind.

True. It is undoubtedly true that Ukraine is making a methodical advance, not one that attacks without regard to losses. The losses will be high enough as it is. There are also just a lot of Russians that need killing. The sheer size of the task makes it difficult to execute. The good news is that even Russia doesn't have enough troops to be strong everywhere.

The bad news is that Ukraine is back to the old WW I problem. If you methodically advance through the minefields / trenches of your opponent, he has plenty of time to build/reinforce the line of defense you are attacking and the second line behind that. If, OTOH you crash through without regard to casualties, you weaken your forces to the point they can't take the second line of defenses that is already in place and you can't reinforce any faster than you opponent. This produces a stalemate. What Ukraine is trying to accomplish is to apply enough pressure in many places such that Russia runs out of fresh troops to commit. This creates a situation that any breakthrough by Ukraine will mostly hit air, and we saw last year what that can produce.

Russian is clearly being "stretched" and having problems. Ukraine is also attacking the Russian supply lines with significant success. There is some hope all this will work. There would be lots more hope if Russian air could be suppressed so it could not stop a breakthrough all by itself.

Quote:On another note, Russia is claiming it will use cluster munitions if Ukraine does.  But isn't the truth that Russia has already used cluster munitions, not only on UAF, but civilian areas?

That is indeed true, at least as I understand it. They are saying what the are because there is nothing else they can really threaten. The fact they already do it is just a "feature".

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 07-17-2023

(07-16-2023, 08:59 PM)81alum Wrote:  Once again, I find myself wanting to consult Goose's expert advice on a NYT article:

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/16/world/europe/ukraine-russia-land-mines.html

According to the article, Ukraine was not sufficiently prepared for the variety, quantity, or depth of Russian land mines, and the mines have (almost by themselves) bogged down the "counteroffensive."  Having enormous quantities of land mines is certainly unrelated to the morale or quality of Russian troops, so it would hardly seem to matter that Ukrainian forces have high morale and Russian forces have low morale--in this respect.

US armored vehicles (like the Bradley) save lives but don't really help with a breakthrough.  They get immobilized by anti-tank mines.  Certainly better to be in one than not, since it saves your legs.  But it doesn't exactly create a mobile battlefield.

All in all, it seems pretty pessimistic.  The  Russians can make up with mines  what they lack with everything else.  Or so the article implies.  Thoughts?

IMO pretty correct. I doubt Ukraine was surprised at the extent of the Russian minefields. I believe they thought mine clearance would be easier than it has been. Minefields that are not defended and overwatched are easy to clear. Ones that are defended are very difficult to clear and Russia is in most cases defending. Russia has had a year to build these defenses. In most places, Ukraine has not yet reached the MLR.

The good news is that Ukraine's superior morale appears to be driving them forward not with reckless courage but rather dogged determination. Whenever they have come into direct contact, they seem to prevail, sometimes after a very long slugging match. Russia has more troops but these troops seem to be suffering a greater casualty rate than Ukraine, in so far as we are informed. Ukraine is attempting to force Russia to commit all their reserves so they have no maneuver force behind them. Based on the bitching level from some Russian commanders, that may be working. If Ukraine is really starting to win the counter-batter fight (as reported) then the Russian forces will really be fixed in place.

Ukraine is also attempting to disrupt Russian logistics, and there is some evidence it is having an effect. What Ukraine now needs is a breakthrough someplace where they can exploit the Russian interior lines of communication that are not mined and not strongly defended. Ukraine wants to do that before winter.

Russia does have quite a few secondary (or more) lines of defense. Ukraine's intent is that these lines will be lightly manned because everybody is committed "up front". Historically, Russia's record regarding second lines of defense is not very good. However, there are exceptions (Kursk). Hopefully Ukraine has visibility into this. The bad news is that Ukraine really has no other choice if it wants to expel the Russians. It has to fight as many lines as there are. IMO, that is where Ukrainian morale could become a problem. Let's hope those secondary lines are thinly manned or that the troops run. If not, it could be a very long winter.

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