Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-11-2023

(05-11-2023, 07:34 PM)gocard14 Wrote:  

(05-11-2023, 05:16 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(05-11-2023, 03:04 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Russian military bloggers are talking about successful Ukrainian breakthroughs in multiple areas of the front, near the flanks of Bakhmut and in the north near Soledar and Kupyansk, with concern that a larger attack is about to come in the south. The Russian MOD issued a statement denying all this, but the feel is similar to Kharkiv and Kherson counterattacks.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1656739969065447457?s=20
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1656774112918790146?s=20

I think this situation is indeed somewhat like Kharkiv/Kupiansk. The Russians just don't have the forces in place to do what they are trying to do. Ukraine has intelligently found a weak link and exploited it. It remains to be seen if the Russians have indeed again left a hollow shell behind them that Ukraine can really exploit, but if they did, Russia is in a lot of trouble. I would bet with high confidence this is NOT Ukraine's intended Schwerpunkt. It is a "bonus", which is always good.

Quote:It strikes me that at this point in the war, Russia's more elite units that have the capability and morale to go on counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces will have been heavily degraded. Hard to say whether these are just successful probing attacks or the actual beginning of Ukraine's full offensive. However if Ukraine does succeed in getting multiple breakthroughs on separate fronts Russia will struggle to plug the gaps.

IMO you are exactly correct. The last thing Russia needs is a requirement to rapidly shuttle forces around to contain breakthroughs. The have shown a marked inability to do anything fast. This will be doubly true if Ukraine can create this problem without using the main striking forces it has accumulated for the "spring offensive". Russia could be massively "wrong footed" here.

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/uk-gives-cruise-missiles-ukraine-073809496.html

Not too much new here but a good summary. IMO the most important point is that this has been the wettest spring in may years and the mud is still bad. Even if Ukraine has already got everything in place, they may need to wait "a bit" before they start the main effort. They really don't want to start making progress (but lose the element of surprise) and then get stuck in the mud. It would be different if they were trying to preempt a Russian offensive, but there is no such thing in the cards. They can pick their time.

I am betting something in Zaporizhia Oblast followed by (if things are going "ok" in the first effort) something 10-14 days later in Kherson Oblast directed at isolating a large segment of the Russian defense and threatening Crimea. If things go badly/slowly in Zaporizhia the Kherson action will become a diversionary effort. Russia is paranoid there (and needs to be), so such a diversion can be effective. If Russia is already committing reserves in Donbas because of setbacks there, even better!

Just armchair generaling here, but it seems like given the relative lack of strategic significance of a Bakhmut advance, the main goal would be to force Russia to commit their reserves to that axis prior to a more aggressive offensive further south. The political importance of Bakhmut at this point could be a tool to force Russia to commit more forces there then is wise.

If they can gain a lot of ground on the flanks and encircle forces within the city, all the better.  I wouldn’t expect a big push within the city itself due to the attrition involved.

I agree with your armchair generaling :-). The Ukrainians also can't profitably use their "new" armor there because there are too many wooded areas and few (if any) good roads they can use to rapidly advance. It is good country for infantry to defend, as Ukraine has shown all along. If Russia collapses as they did around Kupiansk you might see a bigger push over a wider/deeper area, but it will be a push that avoids direct battles and attempts to encircle, as you say.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-12-2023

https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/204051/saudi-arabia-storm-shadow-the-mtcrlyrics????

Interesting post from 2011 regarding the export version of the Storm Shadow. TLDR: it's range is likely much more than ATACMS, >250 miles, on an optimal flight path. On low altitude release and attack profile, it is perhaps shorter than ATACMS. The low altitude profile would be more difficult to intercept of course.

Eyes emoji
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1657051144458326018?s=20[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-12-2023

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russias-kinzhal-never-unstoppable-hypersonic-101700257.html

The hoopla surrounding this, while understandable, is IMO over the top. As the article points out, there is nothing really surprising that a Patriot could destroy a Kinzhal missile. Unfortunately these articles don't explain the parameters of the problem. The Kinzhal is a "fast" missile. It is an air-launched ballistic missile, so it accelerates to a very high speed during the short time it's rocket engine operates. It may reach Mach 10 during this "boost phase" but subsequently slows down continuously due to air resistance. It can be "lofted" to increase range at the expense of speed. It has the ability to maneuver subject to it's aerodynamic limits, which are somewhat strict. The maneuvers are pre-programmed and therefore not in response to an attempted intercept. Obviously, it can exchange altitude for speed (and visa-versa) during the flight. The Kinzhal is derived from the Iskander and has similar "stealth" characteristics, i.e. not very.

The Patriot can intercept a Kinzhal much like it would an Iskander (and a SCUD back "in the day"). The intercepting missile simply has to get in front of the target at the "right time" and let the Kinzhal run/fall into it. If the geometry is such that the intercepting missile can do that, the Kinzhal can be destroyed. Otherwise, not. The Russians are correct that the Patriot isn't going to "win" a tail-chase with a Kinzhal. It isn't fast enough. The Patriot also doesn't know what the target is, so a "feasible" intercept trajectory may not actually work because the Kinzhal can dive on it's target before the Patriot reaches it. That is a difference from the SCUD that was totally ballistic and whose target could be accurately predicted. If the Kinzhal maneuvers during flight but after Patriot launch, it is "often" true the Patriot cannot compensate because there is now no "feasible" intercept course. If the maneuver is "early enough" or "late enough" in the intercept, it may not be effective. This is "just geometry" and there is nothing complicated about it. All that is necessary is to have the target in the "kill basket" at the merge.

The Patriot radar can detect Kinzhal missiles that it has no chance at all of of intercepting, just as was true with the SCUD. In general, the Patriot degenerates into a "point defense" system against ALL ballistic missiles, where it's coverage umbrella is centered around itself and whose diameter is a speed/altitude curve. The maneuver and dive capability of the Kinzhal degrades the kill probability from that of a purely "ballistic" target in a complex way that I am sure has been simulated to death. That number obviously is not zero. That number is also probably classified way above our level :-). It is improbable the Russians were utilizing the ability of the Kinzhal to maneuver because they would have believed it unnecessary. Using it undoubtedly is just "one more thing to go wrong" given Russian QC.

Of course, in any given engagement there is exactly one outcome. The fact one outcome appears to be positive doesn't tell us anything we didn't already know. The Patriot radar can "see" the target (with help from TVM) for sure, and the Patriot interceptors have the ability to "reach" the target for sure, but not in arbitrary geometries. If you are part of the Patriot battery crew, you are quite safe unless somebody screws up.

In terms of outcomes I think it prudent to note that when the Patriot was first used to intercept SCUDs the initial evaluation was a very high kill probability. A subsequent "investigation" yielded a very low kill probability, attributing many of the "kills" to the SCUDs breaking up in flight. These were missiles fired by a US crew with all concurrent data available, and with the benefit of a long analysis time. In Ukraine, we have less concurrent data and possibly don't have the raw data/recordings from the Patriot battery itself. The initial confusion about "what actually happened" leads me to believe there is a good probability there is uncertainty still. We do know that Kinzhals crash on their own, and based on the larger data set of Iskander missiles they often don't reach "full speed". I also find it interesting the announcement used the phrase "downed" as opposed to "shot down" or "intercepted". Makes me believe there still is a bit of fog about what happened.

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/vigilance-accuracy-ukrainian-artillery-kills-091739804.html
Great example of how Ukraine is "winning the battle". The quick, efficient communication and execution is indeed the height of professionalism. Artillery has historically been the major killer of the enemy. Coupling that with the ability to "see the other side of the hill" provided by drones makes artillery much more lethal without requiring massive quantities of ammunition. Being infantry on the move in the open is never a good thing. In the past, moving at night was much safer. Not any more. Moving in an area devoid of direct observation was also safe. Today, with drones, there is no guarantee you are not being observed. The remaining possible weak point is the "decision loop" rendering the observations useless. Ukraine is showing here how to avoid that. Two different units (reporting chains) effecting this again shows how it is done.

This harks back to the WW II German officer who reported the most dangerous man on the European battlefield was an American soldier with a radio.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-12-2023

Ooooh this is interesting in light of the possible Storm Shadow strikes.
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1657067505242734600?s=20[/tweet]

Quote:The ADM-160A carries a Signature Augmentation Subsystem (SAS) which is composed of various active radar enhancers which cover a range of frequencies. The SAS can therefore simulate any aircraft, from the B-52 Stratofortress to the F-117 Nighthawk.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADM-160_MALD

If Ukraine has an appreciable number of these and storm shadows, maybe Kerch bridge is back on the menu.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-12-2023

(05-12-2023, 10:15 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Ooooh this is interesting in light of the possible Storm Shadow strikes.
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1657067505242734600?s=20

Quote:The ADM-160A carries a Signature Augmentation Subsystem (SAS) which is composed of various active radar enhancers which cover a range of frequencies. The SAS can therefore simulate any aircraft, from the B-52 Stratofortress to the F-117 Nighthawk.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADM-160_MALD
If Ukraine has an appreciable number of these and storm shadows, maybe Kerch bridge is back on the menu.

Could be, but it is also possible it is a unit launched from a US intelligence collection drone for "self protection"/cover, i.e. not in Ukrainian service. It could have been used to make the drone appear to be a Russian aircraft. These units are air-launched in US service, so it is unclear how/why Ukraine would have used them in Luhansk. It would be yet another thing that would have to been "grafted on" to a MIG.

OTOH, I do believe Ukraine has something in mind for Kerch bridge. They got to it once, and they have had lots of time to think about how to do it again. It may directly involve Storm Shadows, but it also may not. I do expect that whatever they have in mind will be timed to cause maximum synergy with their upcoming offensive(s).

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-12-2023

I would think it would be unacceptably risky for an American aircraft or drone to release a drone that looks like a cruise missile over Luhansk, especially when other deep missile strikes are happening there. IMHO most likely this was fired from Ukrainian aircraft to help penetration for whatever they used to hit the factory in Luhansk. Likely another kludge for their Migs.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/jabuttee/status/1657079884248670216?s=20[/tweet]

Whatever munition was used in the strike, it made a big big bang.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 05-12-2023

(05-11-2023, 07:34 PM)gocard14 Wrote:  

(05-11-2023, 05:16 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(05-11-2023, 03:04 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Russian military bloggers are talking about successful Ukrainian breakthroughs in multiple areas of the front, near the flanks of Bakhmut and in the north near Soledar and Kupyansk, with concern that a larger attack is about to come in the south. The Russian MOD issued a statement denying all this, but the feel is similar to Kharkiv and Kherson counterattacks.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1656739969065447457?s=20
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1656774112918790146?s=20

I think this situation is indeed somewhat like Kharkiv/Kupiansk. The Russians just don't have the forces in place to do what they are trying to do. Ukraine has intelligently found a weak link and exploited it. It remains to be seen if the Russians have indeed again left a hollow shell behind them that Ukraine can really exploit, but if they did, Russia is in a lot of trouble. I would bet with high confidence this is NOT Ukraine's intended Schwerpunkt. It is a "bonus", which is always good.

Quote:It strikes me that at this point in the war, Russia's more elite units that have the capability and morale to go on counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces will have been heavily degraded. Hard to say whether these are just successful probing attacks or the actual beginning of Ukraine's full offensive. However if Ukraine does succeed in getting multiple breakthroughs on separate fronts Russia will struggle to plug the gaps.

IMO you are exactly correct. The last thing Russia needs is a requirement to rapidly shuttle forces around to contain breakthroughs. The have shown a marked inability to do anything fast. This will be doubly true if Ukraine can create this problem without using the main striking forces it has accumulated for the "spring offensive". Russia could be massively "wrong footed" here.

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/uk-gives-cruise-missiles-ukraine-073809496.html

Not too much new here but a good summary. IMO the most important point is that this has been the wettest spring in may years and the mud is still bad. Even if Ukraine has already got everything in place, they may need to wait "a bit" before they start the main effort. They really don't want to start making progress (but lose the element of surprise) and then get stuck in the mud. It would be different if they were trying to preempt a Russian offensive, but there is no such thing in the cards. They can pick their time.

I am betting something in Zaporizhia Oblast followed by (if things are going "ok" in the first effort) something 10-14 days later in Kherson Oblast directed at isolating a large segment of the Russian defense and threatening Crimea. If things go badly/slowly in Zaporizhia the Kherson action will become a diversionary effort. Russia is paranoid there (and needs to be), so such a diversion can be effective. If Russia is already committing reserves in Donbas because of setbacks there, even better!

Just armchair generaling here, but it seems like given the relative lack of strategic significance of a Bakhmut advance, the main goal would be to force Russia to commit their reserves to that axis prior to a more aggressive offensive further south. The political importance of Bakhmut at this point could be a tool to force Russia to commit more forces there then is wise.

If they can gain a lot of ground on the flanks and encircle forces within the city, all the better.  I wouldn’t expect a big push within the city itself due to the attrition involved.

It seems the dirty Russians have a "Sophie's Choice" situation on their hands now with Bakhmut, doesn't it?

They put all this priority on the territory and made it into a politically significant objective. Ukraine bled them dry there and made the price to keep it significantly high. Now, Ukraine is ready to attack on other fronts that are more strategically valuable. It would make sense for Russia to give up Bakhmut to reinforce other areas, but how can they do this when Bakhmut was made to be the end all be all of the special operation for Russia?

I'm going to guess when Ukraine turns up the heat all the way on Bakhmut, Russian forces will surrender, not only taking them out of Bakhmut but preventing them from being able to be re-deployed elsewhere.

In other words, it looks like Ukraine holding on to Bakhmut was a BRILLIANT decision. Big props to Ukraine decision makers for ignoring those who thought they should give it up.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - MV72018 - 05-12-2023

(05-12-2023, 11:23 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  

(05-11-2023, 07:34 PM)gocard14 Wrote:  

(05-11-2023, 05:16 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(05-11-2023, 03:04 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Russian military bloggers are talking about successful Ukrainian breakthroughs in multiple areas of the front, near the flanks of Bakhmut and in the north near Soledar and Kupyansk, with concern that a larger attack is about to come in the south. The Russian MOD issued a statement denying all this, but the feel is similar to Kharkiv and Kherson counterattacks.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1656739969065447457?s=20
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1656774112918790146?s=20

I think this situation is indeed somewhat like Kharkiv/Kupiansk. The Russians just don't have the forces in place to do what they are trying to do. Ukraine has intelligently found a weak link and exploited it. It remains to be seen if the Russians have indeed again left a hollow shell behind them that Ukraine can really exploit, but if they did, Russia is in a lot of trouble. I would bet with high confidence this is NOT Ukraine's intended Schwerpunkt. It is a "bonus", which is always good.

Quote:It strikes me that at this point in the war, Russia's more elite units that have the capability and morale to go on counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces will have been heavily degraded. Hard to say whether these are just successful probing attacks or the actual beginning of Ukraine's full offensive. However if Ukraine does succeed in getting multiple breakthroughs on separate fronts Russia will struggle to plug the gaps.

IMO you are exactly correct. The last thing Russia needs is a requirement to rapidly shuttle forces around to contain breakthroughs. The have shown a marked inability to do anything fast. This will be doubly true if Ukraine can create this problem without using the main striking forces it has accumulated for the "spring offensive". Russia could be massively "wrong footed" here.

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/uk-gives-cruise-missiles-ukraine-073809496.html

Not too much new here but a good summary. IMO the most important point is that this has been the wettest spring in may years and the mud is still bad. Even if Ukraine has already got everything in place, they may need to wait "a bit" before they start the main effort. They really don't want to start making progress (but lose the element of surprise) and then get stuck in the mud. It would be different if they were trying to preempt a Russian offensive, but there is no such thing in the cards. They can pick their time.

I am betting something in Zaporizhia Oblast followed by (if things are going "ok" in the first effort) something 10-14 days later in Kherson Oblast directed at isolating a large segment of the Russian defense and threatening Crimea. If things go badly/slowly in Zaporizhia the Kherson action will become a diversionary effort. Russia is paranoid there (and needs to be), so such a diversion can be effective. If Russia is already committing reserves in Donbas because of setbacks there, even better!

Just armchair generaling here, but it seems like given the relative lack of strategic significance of a Bakhmut advance, the main goal would be to force Russia to commit their reserves to that axis prior to a more aggressive offensive further south. The political importance of Bakhmut at this point could be a tool to force Russia to commit more forces there then is wise.

If they can gain a lot of ground on the flanks and encircle forces within the city, all the better.  I wouldn’t expect a big push within the city itself due to the attrition involved.

It seems the dirty Russians have a "Sophie's Choice" situation on their hands now with Bakhmut, doesn't it?

They put all this priority on the territory and made it into a politically significant objective. Ukraine bled them dry there and made the price to keep it significantly high. Now, Ukraine is ready to attack on other fronts that are more strategically valuable. It would make sense for Russia to give up Bakhmut to reinforce other areas, but how can they do this when Bakhmut was made to be the end all be all of the special operation for Russia?

I'm going to guess when Ukraine turns up the heat all the way on Bakhmut, Russian forces will surrender, not only taking them out of Bakhmut but preventing them from being able to be re-deployed elsewhere.

In other words, it looks like Ukraine holding on to Bakhmut was a BRILLIANT decision. Big props to Ukraine decision makers for ignoring those who thought they should give it up.

I ardently hope your impressively cogent reasoning proves valid. 

P.S. It is horrible to consider that depending on the result of the '24 presidential election, U.S. support for Ukraine would cease on January 20, 2025.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-12-2023

(05-12-2023, 10:49 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  I would think it would be unacceptably risky for an American aircraft or drone to release a drone that looks like a cruise missile over Luhansk, especially when other deep missile strikes are happening there. IMHO most likely this was fired from Ukrainian aircraft to help penetration for whatever they used to hit the factory in Luhansk. Likely another kludge for their Migs.

Certainly possible it was a launched from a Ukrainian aircraft as a decoy for the attack. OTOH, the ADM-160B was found in Luhansk Oblast, not the city itself, as I understand from the tweet. We don't know when it was deployed, it could have been many days ago. As far as the 160B visually resembling an ALCM, it is 1/2 the length of a Storm Shadow (1/3 that of a Tomahawk) and very much "skinnier", weighing 250 lbs vs 2300 lbs for a Storm Shadow. Wing span is proportionally smaller.

Of course, what it looks like visually probably doesn't matter nearly as much as what it looks like on radar. That is in theory determined by the on board electronics. FWIW it is known that US reconnaissance drones have in the past used these systems to create a false target that appears as a "normal" aircraft to long-range air search radars. This is done to mask the nature of the reconnaissance drone that has a much smaller radar cross section than the one created by the ADM-160B. The ADM-160B can fly slowly enough to stay with the recon drone. Of course it can also fly fast enough to look like a Storm Shadow :-).

IMO we don't know yet what is going on, and as some of the tweets point out, that is probably a "good thing". In any case, many Russian bloggers are already convinced it is a Storm Shadow attack, so even if it was something totally different, it has already created a lot of Fear and Doubt. For that reason, we may never "know".

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(05-12-2023, 11:23 AM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  It seems the dirty Russians have a "Sophie's Choice" situation on their hands now with Bakhmut, doesn't it?

They put all this priority on the territory and made it into a politically significant objective. Ukraine bled them dry there and made the price to keep it significantly high. Now, Ukraine is ready to attack on other fronts that are more strategically valuable. It would make sense for Russia to give up Bakhmut to reinforce other areas, but how can they do this when Bakhmut was made to be the end all be all of the special operation for Russia?

I'm going to guess when Ukraine turns up the heat all the way on Bakhmut, Russian forces will surrender, not only taking them out of Bakhmut but preventing them from being able to be re-deployed elsewhere.

I think we are getting a bit ahead of the story here. Ukraine has had significant success against the flanking "horns" of the attempted Russian envelopment of Bakhmut, so much so that the Russians have evacuated part of Bakhmut. As far as "turning up the heat", Ukraine has a long way to go. Ukraine undoubtedly now wants to envelop the Russians currently in Bakhmut. Note that this is a relatively "shallow" envelopment, not something that would threaten the entire Russian position in the area. Note also that Wagner is in Bakhmut. Those guys aren't going to get themselves surrounded. They may leave the "cannon fodder" there but they will get out, no matter the political black eye it gives their boss. I am sure Ukraine would LOVE to surround those guys, but they have a history of getting out when things look "bad".

That doesn't mean that big things can't happen in the area from a wider envelopment by Ukraine, but so far it isn't being talked about in the blogs. Not to say it won't be.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - fullmetal - 05-12-2023

Prigozhin calls it a rout, Moscow calls it a regrouping.  Russian forces are repositioning themselves north of Bakhmut.

Quote:“The loss of the Berkhivka reservoir – the loss of this territory they gave up – that’s five square kilometres, just today,” Prigozhin said.

“The enemy has completely freed up the Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut road which we had blocked. The enemy is now able to use this road, and secondly, they have taken tactical high round [sic] under which Bakhmut is located,” said Prigozhin, who has repeatedly denounced Russia’s regular military over the past week for failing to supply his forces in Bakhmut.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/12/russian-troops-fall-back-to-regroup-north-of-ukraines-bakhmut

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-12-2023

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/MarquardtA/status/1657114390439645197?s=20[/tweet]

As per Goose's earlier explanation, if Patriot is the target, that would enable a more favorable target geometry for an intercept of this very fast type of missile. Somewhat concerning that the Russians found it but heartening that it could defend itself. Also perhaps heartening that the Russian's didn't use more than one missile to try to take out such a valuable target; they likely don't have many of them.

Regarding Bakhmut, it's useful to look at a map. The Ukrainian gains are pretty small but they are taking some higher ground and in multiple areas on the flanks.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1657117901218893835?s=20[/tweet]

...

Ukraine may have used more than one decoy for the Luhansk strike. Ominous for Russia.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1657141443259932673?s=20[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-12-2023

(05-12-2023, 02:30 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  https://twitter.com/MarquardtA/status/1657114390439645197?s=20

As per Goose's earlier explanation, if Patriot is the target, that would enable a more favorable target geometry for an intercept of this very fast type of missile. Somewhat concerning that the Russians found it but heartening that it could defend itself. Also perhaps heartening that the Russian's didn't use more than one missile to try to take out such a valuable target; they likely don't have many of them.

It is basically inevitable that the Russians would be able to find and geolocate the Patriot batteries operating in Ukraine. Similarly, they can locate all operating NASAMs, S-300 systems and just about everything else operating in Ukraine. It isn't difficult. The only way a battery can avoid this is not use the acquisition radar. If they do that, they can't hit anything. The only thing saving the Ukrainian batteries previously is Russian incompetence against an IADS (they were prepared to fight NATO, not themselves) and the fact Ukraine moves these assets regularly. Against NATO, almost every such site would be on the ATO for the next day. Russia is not trained or resourced to do that (thank goodness).

Russia also probably believed their own press clippings and figured one missile was enough. They probably won't do that next time. It is also good to see that Ukraine did indeed fire a "back up" interceptor. That is doctrine, glad they followed it. This probably also increased the confidence of the Ukrainian crews and of the US in said crews. That said, I am still not sure what actually transpired :-). That is often the nature of these kind of engagements.

What would be REALLY nice to see (and scare the Russians badly) is the Ukrainians fire a missile from a battery that was not targeted (and was in EMCON) but control that missile from the battery that was emitting and targeted. It's supposedly possible. It is a force multiplier because the launch site may not actually even have a radar. Sometimes the geometry is better that way. The missile comes out of nowhere. Probably asking too much :-).

Quote:Regarding Bakhmut, it's useful to look at a map. The Ukrainian gains are pretty small but they are taking some higher ground and in multiple areas on the flanks.



https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1657117901218893835?s=20

Indeed so, and the high ground is pretty important there. You can see a lot without needing drones. All attacks against it will be uphill. Ukraine has also supposedly re-opened a major road to Bakhmut which will greatly improve their supply situation.  This doesn't mean they will or even intend to take back Bakhmut by direct assault. I think they are smart enough to avoid that meat grinder and do their damage on the flanks. Russia couldn't, or at least didn't, take that approach. I am sure the world will be watching.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - rogpodge - 05-12-2023

https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1657044496549306368

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-12-2023

Brutal video of one part of the Bakhmut counter attacks. 
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1657155886677147651?s=20[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-13-2023

Confirmation that Luhansk attack was with Storm Shadows.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1657317762157477888?s=20[/tweet]

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status/1657299084015812608?s=20[/tweet]

And another today in Luhansk. Sort of surprised they are dribbling in the Storm Shadow attacks. But is the prospect of Storm Shadows with radar spoofing MALDs is spooking the Russian Air defense, maybe into shooting down a bunch of their own aircraft?

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1657368124788809728?s=20[/tweet]
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1657360351145361408?s=20[/tweet]

Unclear at this point. Could be Ukraine AD defenses decided to go on the offense close to the border. In any case, another in a string of very bad, no good days for Russia. And still we have yet to see any of the new Ukrainian units assembled for the spring offensive.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-13-2023

(05-13-2023, 06:45 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Confirmation that Luhansk attack was with Storm Shadows.
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1657317762157477888?s=20
https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status/1657299084015812608?s=20

And another today in Luhansk. Sort of surprised they are dribbling in the Storm Shadow attacks. But is the prospect of Storm Shadows with radar spoofing MALDs is spooking the Russian Air defense, maybe into shooting down a bunch of their own aircraft?

Good questions. Why "dribble" in Storm Shadow attacks against these relatively unimportant (apparently) targets? Great they have them, Great they can use them, but why these targets and why now? It would seem better to coordinate these attacks with the upcoming offensive and hit things like ammunition storage. Does seem a bit strange. Lets see what the Ukrainians have to say, if anything. Also interested to hear a US statement about the decoys. Is it one of ours or one of the other NATO allies?

Quote:https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1657368124788809728?s=20
https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1657360351145361408?s=20
Unclear at this point. Could be Ukraine AD defenses decided to go on the offense close to the border. In any case, another in a string of very bad, no good days for Russia. And still we have yet to see any of the new Ukrainian units assembled for the spring offensive.

Indeed curious. It is possible that some of the Russian casualties were due to jitters about incoming missiles, but helicopters?? It has been a problem for both Ukraine and Russia that they can't use their IFF with any confidence because they have the same gear, at least to a large extent. Ukraine did have some "blue on blue" problems early in the war until they went to some real restrictive separation schedules. Russia hasn't had to do that so much, as inside Russia they just assumed they were weapons tight. Maybe now with this attacks they have changed the rules and are shooting their own? Indeed unclear at this point.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-13-2023

Hmmm

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-13-2023

I guess it its possible Ukraine executed these attacks as "live-fire exercises" for their new Storm Shadow capability. They may have picked a relatively "easy" target to work out the kinks and validate that they could indeed execute these types of mission. There may have been some "lessons learned" that allow them to fix the remaining problems, if any. The WW II analog would be sending new pilots/crews on missions into France before sending them against the Germans. In this case, it does give up an element of surprise, but it may have been decided that would be better than "wasting" some warshots on a training run inside Ukraine.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 05-13-2023

Edit-
https://youtu.be/GHBkNJJgMwI
This link on YouTube is maybe better, especially if you enable the translated subtitles, particularly for the celebrations at the end.

Longer video with some new footage from the recent Ukrainian counterattack northwest of Bakhmut showing effective use of combined armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery, with a drone air force providing reconnaissance. Their enemy here is I believe mostly Russian regular army from 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, which was mauled. I don't think Russian forces manning the front in other areas will be much better either.

Similar videos from Zaporizhzhia with Bradleys and Leopards are coming soon I hope!


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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 05-13-2023

(05-13-2023, 02:07 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Longer video with some new footage from the recent Ukrainian counterattack northwest of Bakhmut showing effective use of combined armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery, with a drone air force providing reconnaissance. Their enemy here is I believe mostly Russian regular army from 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, which was mauled. I don't think Russian forces manning the front in other areas will be much better either.

Some will, some won't. Ukraine has shown some skill in finding the ones that won't. Russia is in the unfortunate position of having to use these troops. Supposedly the 72nd Motor Rifle Brigade suffered 500 casualties. If true, it is beyond combat ineffective. This unit is a member of the 3rd Corps, which has always been a Jonah. No way should the Russians put such a unit into the line, but they probably had to.

If Ukraine can advance another 5 km or so along the flanks, they have the opportunity to start pinching down on Wagner. It will be an interesting choice, because if they don't do that and just keep going then they are committing Ukraine to a deeper envelopment and a much bigger "push" that will require lots of flank support. That may not be Ukraine's intention, and if not such an action may not be a "good thing". Of course, if Ukraine doesn't have that much success we will never know, but it will be interesting.

Quote:Similar videos from Zaporizhzhia with Bradleys and Leopards are coming soon I hope!

Videos of Bradleys moving with nothing in front of them would be good too!





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