Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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+--- Thread: Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine (/thread-23071.html)

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 12-03-2022

[tweet]https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1599169936961568768?s=46&t=ZsWwHBYgSh4dV0KO4gb3_Q[/tweet]

This seems like a bad development.

BC

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[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1599193148097445889?s=46&t=ZsWwHBYgSh4dV0KO4gb3_Q[/tweet]

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 12-03-2022

(12-03-2022, 04:57 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  [tweet]https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1599169936961568768?s=46&t=ZsWwHBYgSh4dV0KO4gb3_Q[/tweet]

This seems like a bad development.

BC

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[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1599193148097445889?s=46&t=ZsWwHBYgSh4dV0KO4gb3_Q[/tweet]

BC

There’s a big gap between training and supplying Russian troops to giving Russia control of their armed forces. Hopefully internal politics in Belarus will keep that from happening. 

If it does happen one has to wonder what NATOs response would be. Up munitions support? Or note the fact that direct attack on Belarus would not nearly be the escalation that an attack on Russian soil would be. If Belarus invades, NATO strikes on Belarusian military bases may quickly dissuade them.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 12-03-2022

The bridgehead may be less significant than the ISW suggests:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1599165043005792256[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 12-04-2022

(12-03-2022, 07:01 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  The bridgehead may be less significant than the ISW suggests:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1599165043005792256[/tweet]

A nice article on the ability of Ukraine to be innovative and make do with what they have.
https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/europe/ukraine-battle-bakhmut-deaths-drones-intl/index.html

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 12-04-2022

It begs the question if our procurement should be focused on getting hundreds of thousands of disposable surveillance/suicide drones or if a major war for the US would be fundamentally different due to air power, AWACS, and high altitude fixed wing drones.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 12-04-2022

(12-04-2022, 09:21 AM)gocard14 Wrote:  It begs the question if our procurement should be focused on getting hundreds of thousands of disposable surveillance/suicide drones or if a major war for the US would be fundamentally different due to air power, AWACS, and high altitude fixed wing drones.

IMO in a major war the US would fight it differently. Air power is central to all US strategies, both for major and minor wars. We fight under the "aluminum overcast" and until that is possible we basically don't commit troops. In a situation where we don't have the time to obtain air supremacy before using troops, we would have a problem.

In any case, high altitude fixed wing drones are not survivable in modern war without air superiority at least. They can be shot down by missiles that exist today. They are expensive enough it is worth the missile. We don't have a big supply of them to replace losses indefinitely. We also often get ourselves in situations where the ROE preclude us taking advantage of our entire air capability. This is usually a doctrine or policy decision. Given that, it would be prudent to acquire the drone swarms necessary to operate in these conditions. Against an enemy that has that capability, our air power could be at least locally overwhelmed. We also don't (yet) have a real good way of shooting down drones cost-effectively. Running down quadcopters with even F-16s, let alone F-35s, is a fools errand. So yes, we need to acquire such a capability. It will cost a lot. Good luck getting the money.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 12-05-2022

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-needs-exploit-winter-conditions-093500126.html

This article is IMO absolutely correct. Ukraine must keep the pressure on during the winter. Hopefully they will capture significantly more territory, particularly in Kherson Oblast and everywhere possible in the Zaporizhia Oblast. The fighting in Donbas is important too in so far as it fixes Russian forces in place. Breaking the "land bridge" is a very important strategic and political goal.

Even if no major captures of territory ensue, the Ukraine needs to keep the initiative. Reports indicate newly mobilized Russian troops with at least some military training (and therefore value) are arriving in the occupied areas. These units need to be attritted before they become truly combat effective. The Bear is slowly but surely getting it right. He may never actually improve all that much, but he only needs to improve enough to win. While Ukraine too has mobilized lots of troops in their National Guard, these are citizen soldiers who in many cases have no formal training at all. That is one reason Ukraine is pushing NATO to train more troops. They have the bodies, but in many cases they don't yet have the skills.

It is a race to see which military gets there first. NATO needs to up their game and make sure that is Ukraine. It is also unwise for NATO to attempt giving Ukraine "enough" to win. That calculation of "enough" is simply impossible. NATO needs to do all that is possible as fast as possible. Period. Close doesn't work in war. If NATO is not willing to do that, it should expect to lose.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 12-05-2022

NATO obviously is not going to do “all it can,” as that would include nuclear weapons.  This has been a balancing act from Day 1. Some people think the scale should tip towards more weapons, more training, and more funding. Few think NATO should blow Russia off the map.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 12-05-2022

(12-05-2022, 09:31 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  NATO obviously is not going to do “all it can,” as that would include nuclear weapons.  This has been a balancing act from Day 1. Some people think the scale should tip towards more weapons, more training, and more funding. Few think NATO should blow Russia off the map.

Yes, the definition of "can" must include external political constraints. I would say NATO can't use nuclear weapons because the NATO countries that have them simply would not agree to do so.

There are however lots of things that are politically possible inside NATO and militarily possible to execute. Unfortunately, NATO (and it's member states) often decide to do/supply something and then take months to do so. At best, this allows more Ukrainians to die before the action takes effect. At worst, the delay allows Russia to develop and execute countermeasures that defeat the purpose of the activity. There are other actions NATO could take but are holding back on in the (vain IMHO) hope that restraint on the part of NATO will be matched by restraint by Russia. Given the course of the war, if it continues NATO will eventually have to provide Ukraine with tanks and fighter aircraft to replace Ukrainian losses that otherwise cannot be made good. Why delay that inevitability? It gives Russia grounds to believe that NATO will in fact NOT do so, making instead an eventual Russian victory inevitable.

Given the ongoing attacks on Ukrainian power (and thereby railway) structures, NATO will have to find a way to deter Russia from continuing that course. Supplying ATACMS to Ukraine could be used to at least attempt that. If Russia says no to a deal, then do it. Many other similar things are possible.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 12-05-2022

If NATO must to "all it can," and "all it can" is defined to mean "everything that is politically feasible," then NATO will almost always, by definition, be doing "all it can."  The problem you're identifying -- delays in getting the alliance on board -- is inherent in broad collective action.  There almost always will be some members wanting to do more and other members dragging their heels.  

Maybe the alternative is for some portion of the alliance to form a subgroup that is willing to do more, and then do that, quickly.  The question is whether such a plan would alienate the hesitant members to an extent that the plan ends up hurting the war effort.  I could imagine ATACMS coming at the cost of losing a sanctions regime and/or losing Finland/Sweden accession, and those sacrifices might not be worth the tradeoff.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 12-05-2022

Interesting recent developments-

US has disabled ATACMS functionality from the MLRS launchers they have provided, in order to prevent Ukraine from using ATACMS should they find a way to source it outside of the US, or perhaps more likely, manufacture or source some sort of ATACMS knock off.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1599785932311625733[/tweet]

In spite of this, Ukraine is still doing long range strikes inside of Russia, hitting two strategic airbases from which Russian long range bombers have been launching missiles into Ukraine. It has been suggested that Ukraine used Soviet era drone aircraft with a jury rigged warhead.

These bases would be well beyond the range of ATACMS, but seems Russian air defense continues to have problems even with much slower targets.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1599814686005899264[/tweet]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Euan_MacDonald/status/1599667237937623041?s=20&t=1OV9dldQg1C2-67ZIDGbcA[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Hurlburt88 - 12-05-2022

and now, for something completely different:  

https://www.farms.com/news/larger-wheat-harvest-in-ukraine-than-expected-187578.aspx

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 12-05-2022

There must be some country willing to give Ukraine weapons to strike inside Russia.  Perhaps Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania?

So disappointed in the U.S. and other NATO countries who won't give Ukraine long range weapons to hit military targets inside Russia.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 12-05-2022

(12-05-2022, 02:53 PM)OutsiderFan Wrote:  There must be some country willing to give Ukraine weapons to strike inside Russia.  Perhaps Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania?

So disappointed in the U.S. and other NATO countries who won't give Ukraine long range weapons to hit military targets inside Russia.

There is one possibility that Ukraine could use (as they are showing now) that wouldn't involve anybody's "latest and greatest". Many countries (Turkey and Israel for instance) have converted obsolete jet aircraft into drones. Obviously the US does this too, but for the moment assume we want to stay completely out of this one. Ukraine can simply buy these drones, just like the Russian's buy from Iran. These drones are for instance F-4s with no pilot. Load them with bombs, set the destination in Russia and send them on their way. This is equivalent technology to what Ukraine did recently themselves. They just lack the numbers and old Russian drones to make it a real threat to Russia. Many (most probably) won't get through, but the ones that do can do a lot of damage, particularly to Russian strategic bomber bases.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 12-05-2022

(12-05-2022, 02:45 PM)Hurlburt88 Wrote:  and now, for something completely different:  

https://www.farms.com/news/larger-wheat-harvest-in-ukraine-than-expected-187578.aspx

This is awesome news. Thank you for posting.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 12-05-2022

(12-05-2022, 11:30 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  If NATO must to "all it can," and "all it can" is defined to mean "everything that is politically feasible," then NATO will almost always, by definition, be doing "all it can."  The problem you're identifying -- delays in getting the alliance on board -- is inherent in broad collective action.  There almost always will be some members wanting to do more and other members dragging their heels.

True, but the delays in reaching consensus are not the ones I am referring to here. For example, the NASAMS was delayed by 3 or 4 months after the decision was made to give them to Ukraine. I at first thought they were just going to load up the two at Andrews and ship them to Ukraine. Why not? Maybe there were reasons but FWIW I don't see how they could be good ones. Were they broken? If so, that is another problem. When that didn't happen, I assumed we were sending them some of the ones the Norwegians have in storage. Nope. It appears we actually purpose built them. We may have diverted ones that were already being built, but in any case did they put the contractors on double shifts to get them out early? Doubt it. No indication of that. Heck, they took MONTHS negotiating the contract!  If it was our troops and citizens out there getting killed, would we have made such a pathetic effort? Similar situation with the German aid. There were considerable delays. The delay with the IRIS-T SLM was kind of understandable, as this was a first of type, but the other things, particularly the Gepards, was very hard to understand. It seems NATO is treating the situation as "Business as Usual", which IMO it definitely should not be.

Quote:Maybe the alternative is for some portion of the alliance to form a subgroup that is willing to do more, and then do that, quickly.  The question is whether such a plan would alienate the hesitant members to an extent that the plan ends up hurting the war effort.  I could imagine ATACMS coming at the cost of losing a sanctions regime and/or losing Finland/Sweden accession, and those sacrifices might not be worth the tradeoff.

Totally agree there are/may be disagreements among the NATO members and that some of these disagreements are fundamental enough that they can't be rushed or ignored. That said, NATO has had 9 months to look at this war and discuss contingency plans for many scenarios. If that hasn't been happening, 1) NATO is stupid, and 2) it is probable the NATO response to some scenarios will be belated due to the necessary discussions. One of the main questions that has come into vogue (like the last 10 years or so) in the US military is "How does this end?" Presumably NATO has asked themselves that question. Presumably NATO realizes that Ukraine is going to run out of aircraft in the near future. If the answer is "NATO isn't going to do anything to supply aircraft to Ukraine", it is difficult to see how Ukraine can possibly win this war. If, OTOH NATO has a planned response, what is the advantage of delaying it's implementation?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 12-05-2022

(12-05-2022, 10:29 PM)Goose Wrote:  If, OTOH NATO has a planned response, what is the advantage of delaying it's implementation?

One thing to consider is that NATO or the US has already privately committed to Russia to some limits.  You don't do this, and we won't do that.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 12-05-2022

(12-05-2022, 10:37 PM)M T Wrote:  

(12-05-2022, 10:29 PM)Goose Wrote:  If, OTOH NATO has a planned response, what is the advantage of delaying it's implementation?

One thing to consider is that NATO or the US has already privately committed to Russia to some limits.  You don't do this, and we won't do that.

Russian statements seem to allude to this, at least re: ATACMS.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - 81alum - 12-05-2022

With all the discussion (fascinating) about tactics, particular weapon systems, a Ukrainian push here or there, I keep coming back to the endgame.

The war is not going to end with Ukrainian forces marching into Moscow and dictating terms.  Similarly, the odds of Putin's overthrow by pro-Western Russians seems infinitesimal.  Either Putin gets overthrown from the right, or he stays in power in a protracted stalemate.

So with an aggressive Russia in place for the foreseeable future, we are stuck with very unpalatable solutions.  What will Ukraine and its allies give up to obtain peace?  There are clearly prices too high to pay, but isn't it equally obvious that Ukraine can't afford to live with the status quo for another 8 years as they have since the war began in 2014?

I don't have a suggestion.  I just would like our erudite and well informed participants on this board to suggest a plausible end-game strategy.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 12-06-2022

(12-05-2022, 10:55 PM)81alum Wrote:  I don't have a suggestion.  I just would like our erudite and well informed participants on this board to suggest a plausible end-game strategy.

Since the erudite and well informed participants haven't stepped up, I will take a try at it. First, it has to be said that nothing in this war is certain. Things that are just "impossible" have already happened, and will continue to do so. That is one thing that makes war so dangerous, this one in particular. Both Russia and Ukraine have the possibility of their governments collapsing without warning. There are lots of political and social forces that we don't understand in play, and as history shows, stressed societies can behave unpredictably. The Russian military could also collapse because of poor morale and tensions within the leadership. The Ukrainian army could fragment in a political upheaval, but it would keep fighting as long as it physically could.

Assuming these events don't happen, you are correct. It is abundantly clear Ukraine cannot continue this war indefinitely. Their economy is a wreck, and with the assault on the electric grid things will just get worse. Eventually the point will be reached they just can't continue. Their choices are so starkly bad however that they will continue the fight long after everybody else has written them off. So, one possible outcome is that Russia and Ukraine continue to pound each other until Ukraine finally physically can't go on. This is just about everybody's worst case outcome. How long would that take? I figure about 18 to 24 months, max. However, long before that day comes people will start reading the handwriting on the wall, stop supporting Ukraine, and urge a "political" settlement, which is of course actually impossible but looks good on paper. Ukraine knows all this, and is going to do all in their power to avoid this situation. Russia OTOH will not be confronted with the inability to continue. Despite sanctions and the loss of the major gas and oil markets, they can go on with the war. The population may be miserable, hungry, and dispirited, but they can continue as long as their politicians force them to do so.

The Ukraine knows they aren't going to bring Russia to it's knees by invading it. Ukraine also know that Russia could be driven out of all the occupied territory in the Donbas and still keep fighting. What I THINK the Ukraine intends is to take back Crimea and cut Russia's free access to the Sea of Azov. This is a good strategy for three reasons. First, Ukraine found out how much losing free access to the Sea of Azov cost them when Russia took Crimea in 2014. It was both a political and a commercial disaster. Ukraine needs it back to allow ports like Mariupol and Berdyans'k to engage in cabotage and international shipping. They can deny Russia the ability to safely export and import through the strait and the shoe will be on the other foot. This is one of the few costs Ukraine can actually impose on Russia, and it is a significant one.

Second, the military benefit to taking Crimea is large and it is probably easier than taking ground in the Donbas. The threat to Ukraine's southern coast would be removed. The Black Sea fleet would lose the shipyard and all the associated facilities. Ukraine would gain them. The Black Sea fleet and all the coastal defense units would have to retreat to Novorossiysk. The Crimea is supplied only by one bridge and one GLOC along the Sea of Azov. OTOH the Donbas has lots of GLOCs and abuts the Russian border. Ukraine can't cut off Donbas but they can cut off Crimea in a straightforward manner. The know it, and Russia knows it. Russia's actions show they are concerned about that and have committed lots of troops to defend Crimea that right now are doing nothing. For Russia, retaining Crimea is a strategic and political necessity as it also is for Ukraine. Geography favors Ukraine.

Third, and most importantly, the loss of Crimea would be a political disaster for the current Russian leadership, i.e. Putin. Russians could definitely say they are now much worse off on every front than they were before the war. This situation could bring about regime change, and it is about the only thing bad enough to do so IMO. Ukraine knows that Putin will keep fighting if he is still in power. They need to get him out. This would probably do it. The government and army wouldn't implode. They would just get a new leader. The question is, would the new leadership end the war? Lots of reasons to fear they wouldn't. At that point NATO may need to agree to lift sanctions if Russia stops the war, even though we really want to force Russia to take responsibility for their actions. This is IMHO the best possible outcome Ukraine can hope for. They get all their territory back, but Russia is still there. Unfortunately, if the new leadership behaves like the old and continues, Ukraine is still in a tough spot. I don't know what to do then.

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