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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 11-02-2022

Some truly brutal numbers of casualties being reported for the Russians. Almost 1000 KIA in 24 hours with many days in the 600-700 range. Numbers reported by the Ukranians, so take with salt, but they at least seem to aim for the ballpark of accuracy. Mostly in the Donetsk and Lyman areas. 

Sounds like newly conscripted troops are being thrown into a grinder. Appalling.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-02-2022

(11-02-2022, 10:44 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1587754247747149825?s=20&t=_orDuwVinEsAuC4NStr5FA
This is exactly the correct reading of the situation I think. The Russians thought they could make a "big deal" of the Ukrainian USV attack and shut down the grain corridor. The fact everybody just continued on as usual confronted them with the fact they would have to sink a foreign ship to make their point. They then realized the ramifications of that were too bad for them to bear. A big "oops" moment indeed! Lets just hope they always behave this rationally.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 11-02-2022

(11-02-2022, 12:36 PM)Goose Wrote:  
(11-02-2022, 10:44 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1587754247747149825?s=20&t=_orDuwVinEsAuC4NStr5FA
This is exactly the correct reading of the situation I think. The Russians thought they could make a "big deal" of the Ukrainian USV attack and shut down the grain corridor. The fact everybody just continued on as usual confronted them with the fact they would have to sink a foreign ship to make their point. They then realized the ramifications of that were too bad for them to bear. A big "oops" moment indeed! Lets just hope they always behave this rationally.

ALL bullies back down when punched in the face.  It's what they do. Would be a good Geico commercial.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - 81alum - 11-02-2022

(11-02-2022, 11:04 AM)gocard14 Wrote:  Some truly brutal numbers of casualties being reported for the Russians. Almost 1000 KIA in 24 hours with many days in the 600-700 range. Numbers reported by the Ukranians, so take with salt, but they at least seem to aim for the ballpark of accuracy. Mostly in the Donetsk and Lyman areas. 

Sounds like newly conscripted troops are being thrown into a grinder. Appalling.
Those numbers would be appalling.  Verdun killed around 300,000 in about 300 days, by comparison.

However, I am reminded of the body counts from Vietnam--which is merely to emphasize your "salt."  There could be many reasons such numbers get inflated for public consumption, whether deliberately or not.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Mick - 11-03-2022

North Korea launched 23 short range ballistic missiles towards South Korean territory yesterday. Closest one landed 16 miles from SK. It was their most ever in a day, and their 28th test this year. No missiles since 1948 have landed as close to the border as yesterday's. They're reacting to the start of annual military drills between the U. S. and S. K., which started two days ago, and was the allies' largest ever, involving hundreds of aircraft. And the sabers keep rattling...

Vigilant Storm exercise features Korean, U.S., Aussie planes (joins.com)


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-03-2022

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/11/02/four-days-after-a-ukrainian-drone-assault-russias-black-sea-flagship-is-still-afloat/?sh=32c01b1e2956
There are a couple of these reports out now, so probably they have some credibility. How they know which ship is which involves details that are not commonly available, so I can only assume they have "done it right". The most probable evaluation IMHO is that the frigate suffered some relatively minor damage to the outer hull and they intend to replace one or more hull plates. This can be done pretty quickly pier-side unless the damage is well below the waterline. If this were a major naval war she could easily keep operating with that level of damage, but since it isn't fixing the damage makes sense. In other words, a "fender bender".

The USV probably wouldn't inflict significant damage  well below the waterline, but if it did such damage would probably require a stay in the yards. It is possible the Russians just intend to weld plates over the damage and wait until the next major overhaul to actually repair the hull. It is also vaguely possible the damage is even more serious and they are welding plates to the hull so she can transit to Novorossiysk and go into the yards there. There may be no space in Sevastopol. We will know that "soon". However, this is IMHO improbable.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 11-04-2022

This is an interesting/optimistic view on the likelihood of Russia blowing the dam:
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1588609478534270977


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 11-04-2022

(11-04-2022, 12:18 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  This is an interesting/optimistic view on the likelihood of Russia blowing the dam:
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1588609478534270977

Lot of Fog in Kherson. The Russians are evacing. Or not evacuating. Or evacuating their best troops and moving in conscripts to hold positions.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 11-05-2022

[tweet]https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1588635316885258240?s=46&t=lNk09Vi38gmHfR152_P8Sg[/tweet]

What a massive failure by the Russians.

BC


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-05-2022

(11-05-2022, 07:01 AM)BostonCard Wrote:  https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1588635316885258240?s=46&t=lNk09Vi38gmHfR152_P8Sg

What a massive failure by the Russians.

BC
The lack of success in destroying HIMARS is due to several factors, some inherent in the HIMARS itself, some due to the Ukrainian's usage of the HIMARS, and some due to the strangeness of this war. Only a few of these element IMHO are Russian failures. The HIMARS itself is inherently difficult to target because it can drive away after firing literally in a very few minutes. Weapons like artillery and ballistic rockets become useless after that very short window closes.

The HIMARS as used by Ukraine is a very valuable asset and they know it. They also know that any HIMARS that is destroyed won't be replaced anytime "soon". Therefore, Ukraine always does "shoot and scoot" and does not place the HIMARS in locations where it might be targeted through a "random" sighting. They take care of them. The HIMARS has the attribute it outranges 152/155 mm artillery (and obviously anything smaller). The Ukrainians as a rule don't let the HIMARS fall under that footprint. This means the only way Russia is going to hit one is to use an aircraft, a drone, or a SRBM. Even in those cases (unless the Russians are real lucky) the flight time is long enough the target will be gone. A drone or an aircraft could search a bit, because they are faster than the HIMARS truck and they know where it was a few minutes ago. However, operating aircraft/drones over Ukraine well behind Ukrainian lines has been somewhat problematic for Russia, and flying a search pattern isn't very safe.

The Russian counter-battery radars are generally attached to Army artillery units. They aren't designed to target beyond artillery range, and have no organic way to contact and task air force units. There are also a limited number of such units. It would take some luck for them to get a good "fix" on the HIMARS in the first place. Even if they did that, their battery couldn't reach it and there is no way to pass the information on to other assets that perhaps could. Even if there were it probably would take too much time.
 
If the Russians really wanted to go "HIMARS hunting", they could. A Mainstay orbiting in Russian airspace can get a fix on the launch point almost immediately. It could then, at least in theory, command launch via data link Iskander-M missiles from one of several batteries that are left "locked and loaded" to target HIMARS. Several batteries will be needed to ensure the flight time is small enough (hopefully) to hit the HIMARS before it moves. Obviously this ties up a bunch of valuable and rare assets. The Russians have also shown a strange unwillingness to use their airborne C3 capabilities in this war. It would also require organizational skills that they theoretically have but have also not been demonstrated.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 11-05-2022

Sounds a bit like the problem that the US encountered with IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The problem was that by the time the explosive was detonated, the people who planted it were long gone.

The solution was to use satellite data and run it “backwards” in time. Once they got to when the IEDs were placed, they followed the insurgents forwards to where they went after they planted the bombs and then targeted that house.

The Russians should be able to find where Ukrainians are hiding the HIMARS in the same way. Follow the missile backwards to its source, then follow the HIMARS truck forward to wherever it is kept between missiles and hit that location.

I’d link the story, but I forgot what podcast I heard it in.

BC


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-05-2022

(11-05-2022, 10:38 AM)BostonCard Wrote:  Sounds a bit like the problem that the US encountered with IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The problem was that by the time the explosive was detonated, the people who planted it were long gone.

The solution was to use satellite data and run it “backwards” in time. Once they got to when the IEDs were placed, they followed the insurgents forwards to where they went after they planted the bombs and then targeted that house.

The Russians should be able to find where Ukrainians are hiding the HIMARS in the same way. Follow the missile backwards to its source, then follow the HIMARS truck forward to wherever it is kept between missiles and hit that location.

I’d link the story, but I forgot what podcast I heard it in.

BC
It is indeed a similar problem. I don't believe the Russian satellite optics are quite good enough to do that. It can resolve the HIMARS trucks themselves, but it can't see the missiles. Following them back to the source would be difficult for that reason. The weather in Ukraine isn't as cooperative as in the desert either. Cloud cover makes this difficult. Ukraine is also, as I understand it, being careful to not return to previously used locations on any regular pattern, so even if one knows the locations where the HIMARS might be spending the night, doing maintenance, or even reloading between strikes, on any given day/time it probably isn't there :-). You would have to do this process in near real time, which I am sure would not be easy. Even the US does not have full time high resolution imagery available for arbitrary areas in Ukraine 24/7. This constant motion is also oriented to defeat drone and HUMINT reconnaissance which are I think more "real" problems in Ukraine.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 11-05-2022

Yeah, in Afghanistan (or Iraq, I can't remember which) it was a bit easier, because the distances were not as large.  I actually think the US used drones and not satellites, and was able to blanket the skies over key insurgent areas with them.  The optics might not be as good, but I think it should still be possible; based on the location of the missile strike and its direction, it should be possible to have a pretty good idea of where the missiles came from, and even if you can't track the missiles, you can most definitely see the launch flash, which is going to be within a narrow arc outwards of where the missiles struck.  Given the missile's speed, you can narrow down the search for the flash to a pretty narrow area at a pretty defined time; computers should be able to automate it and create a composite image of the relevant cone up to about 100 miles from the strike site.

The trucks are large enough to be able to track even with bad optics.  The US had to track individual insurgents; the Russians only have to track a 7 m long truck.  I won't claim it is easy peasy, but it should be within the capabilities of the Russians, and, given how much damage the HIMARS have caused, it would be something that I would prioritize if I were them.

BC


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 11-06-2022

Yikes, I see it is going well for the newly mobilized troops.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ruslantrad/status/1588987413417771008?s=46&t=wENlelqPZSHgsia6sVM_Cw[/tweet]

Might also apply to Stanford’s newly mobilized running backs.

BC


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 11-06-2022

Or you could just make this thread that has the middle of a donut to do with Stanford sports at least metaphorically tied to them and say...

Stanford's football team was annihilated like a bunch of freshly mobilized Russian troops fighting in Ukraine.  Or maybe it should be Russia's freshly mobilized troops were as prepared to take on Ukraine as Stanford's football team was to take on Washington State.


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 11-06-2022

Ever thought how lucky some of you are to complain about football?


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 11-06-2022

This is a long but very interesting video from the Ukrainrian "Kraken Division" from the September Kharkiv offensive, specifically Kupyansk. Some memorable sequences that have been seen before. You really appreciate the skill with which Ukrainian recon squads are using small commercial drones to correct mortar and artillery fire. Lots of gracious villagers, good tunes. I was pretty riveted. 

https://youtu.be/jVvgnHxJoSY


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 11-06-2022

(11-06-2022, 01:25 PM)M T Wrote:  Ever thought how lucky some of you are to complain about football?

We are lucky to be able to complain about anything.

BC


RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 11-07-2022

On topic of Russian long range targeting of Ukrainian high value assets

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1589576964968689664?s=20&t=ueJnhx9CGBLBc7GFWF8PIQ[/tweet]

The report linked at top of the Twitter thread is excellent, like other RUSI reports which have been some of the most informative sources during the war.

Quote:The VKS had deployed
a fast-jet force of around 350 modern combat aircraft for operations in Ukraine; so the lack
of a publicly visible air campaign came as a major surprise to most analysts.9 The tentative
conclusions reached by this author in March about the lack of VKS capacity to mount complex,
large-scale operations still hold today, but early analysis was wrong about the lack of significant
Russian air activity in the early days of the war.10 This chapter explains how, in fact, the VKS
mounted significant strike and offensive counter-air operations during this period, and the
Ukrainian Air Force engaged in numerous air-to-air clashes to oppose it.11

During the first week of the invasion, Russian electronic warfare using jamming equipment and
E-96M aerial decoys were highly effective in disrupting Ukrainian GBAD.12 S-300 and SA-11 ‘Buk’
radar-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were particularly badly affected in the north of
the country, especially to the north of Kyiv along the Hostomel/Irpin and Chernihiv axes.13 Cruise
and ballistic missile strikes had also damaged or destroyed multiple long-range early warning
radars throughout the country, and destroyed various Ukrainian SAM sites in Kherson and
Zaporizhzhia oblasts in the south. The physical destruction, along with the electronic disruption
and suppression of SAM systems in the north and northeast, left the Mikoyan Mig-29 and Sukhoi
Su-27 fighters of the Ukrainian Air Force with the task of providing air defence over most of the
country for the first few days of the war.14 The Ukrainian air defences progressively recovered
as jammed and damaged radar systems were reset and assets were rapidly repositioned during
the second and third days. After that, the Air Force and air defence infrastructures worked
in tandem. Deconfliction between aircraft and GBAD was coordinated by time until 3 March,
after which deconfliction began to be coordinated by space because of friendly fire incidents.15
In other words, SAM systems and combat aircraft sorties began to be deconflicted by being
allocated separate operational areas.

For Goose re A50 Mainstay

Quote:On the Donbas front and in the south, a similar task was performed by A-50M/U Mainstay
AWACS aircraft which flew an average of two–three sorties per day, providing higher-resolution early warning and vector information on low-flying Ukrainian aircraft in those sectors.39
However, the effectiveness of A-50M as a force multiplier has been limited throughout the
war by two factors. First, Ukrainian forces have found A-50 to be fairly easy to degrade via
electronic attack, and report consistent success in doing so.40 Second, because the Russian
air operation is subordinated to the Ground Forces, surveillance information is not typically
relayed directly between A-50M and fighters on CAP or to long-range GBAD units such as S-400
batteries. Instead, information is normally relayed via the military district command post or a
combined arms army command post, then either directly or via an Il-20M relay aircraft to the
GBAD units and fighter patrols.41 This significantly slows the rate of data transfer and limits the
VKS’s ability to use A-50M/U to directly guide weapon engagements by GBAD assets or fighters.



RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 11-07-2022

Interesting, I had read that Ukraine was now intercepting 80% of Russia's missiles and drones, from the very Economist that Joshi works for (as defense editor).  In fact, he probably authored this piece (Economist articles don't have bylines).


https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/11/06/western-air-defence-systems-help-ukraine-shoot-down-more-missiles



Quote:The country is getting better at knocking them out of the sky. On October 10th, nearly half of the missiles and drones Russia launched against Ukraine dodged the country’s defences; explosions rocked Kyiv for the first time in months. Less than a month later, Ukraine claims to be shooting down over 80% of the drones and missiles heading its way. Of the 55 missiles Russia lobbed at Ukraine on October 31st, the day Juice scrambled, 45 were intercepted, according to Ukraine’s air force.

Maybe the Ukranians know when a Russian missile is going to hit a vacated spot and don't try to down it?

BC